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I.  Introduction
This Article is an expanded version of luncheon remarks delivered at a sym-
posium on the Commerce Clause at Georgetown Law School.1 A few things 
became clear after my address on the Indian Commerce Clause and state 
taxation. Many people at the Conference had only a faint memory that 
such a clause even existed. To most state tax practitioners and academics, 
“the Commerce Clause” meant the Interstate Commerce Clause and, per-





























1 The symposium was co-sponsored by Georgetown University Law Center and the ABA 
Section of Taxation’s State and Local Tax Committee in May 2007. 
The length of this Article might suggest that lunch turned into dinner, and dinner into 
breakfast, but my remarks were within the mandate I was given: “have a good opening, have 
a good closing, and keep the two close together.” I knew far less then, which made it easier to 
obey my mandate.
*Alva P. Loiselle Professor of Law, University of Connecticut Law School. B.S., summa cum 
laude, University of Michigan; J.D., magna cum laude, harvard Law School. 
This Article has its origins in Nell Newton’s appointment as Dean of the University of 
Connecticut Law School. Dean Newton (currently Dean of Notre Dame Law School) is an 
eminent authority in the field of Indian law and has inspired generations of teachers and 
scholars. She encouraged me to teach a course on Indian taxation. Fortunately, my colleague 
Bethany Berger, a leading figure in Indian law, agreed to co-teach it. Betsy Conway, Legal 
Counsel for the Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation, subsequently taught the course with me. 
Both have patiently educated me, while sometimes politely disagreeing with my views. In a 
sense, this Article continues a conversation with each.
Professor Berger gave unselfishly of her time in reviewing major parts of this Article. She 
provided a much needed reality check on my understanding of Indian law. I have also ben-
efited from the wisdom and insight of Professor Lofty Becker, Professor Robert Clinton, Betsy 
Conway, Professor Mark Cowan, Professor Richard Collins, Professor Paul Finkelman, Frank 
Katz, Scott Gould, Professor Erik Jensen, Professor Kent Newmyer, Steve Shiffrin, Cathleen 
Shine, and Professor Carol Weisbrod. Professor Matthew Fletcher read the entire manuscript 
and as numerous places in the footnotes show, provided invaluable suggestions. Mai Lin Pomp 
Shine provided her typical understanding of the competing demands on a father.
With no slight to those previously mentioned, Professor Richard S. Kay deserves special rec-
ognition. Professor Kay is a scholar of constitutional interpretation and comparative constitu-
tional law. he would not claim to be either a tax scholar or an Indian law expert. Nonetheless, 
he read all of the manuscript, providing wonderful improvements, and saved me from numer-
ous missteps. In addition, he suggested the title for the Article.
Special recognition is also due Debra herman and Jeff Glickman. Besides being two great 
lawyers, Debra was the Editor-In-Chief of this Journal and Jeff was the Managing Editor. 
Those titles do not capture their enthusiasm, patience, and courtesies extended to me.
Many students participated in various ways in researching and editing the manuscript. 
Jess hamilton, Stephen higgins, Chris houlihan, Brian hughes, Tony Mantia, Erin Martell, 
Keegan McClure, Matt Stein, and Jonathan Zellner have earned my respect and gratitude.
Jeremy Paul, long-time friend and current Dean of the University of Connecticut Law 
School, has provided his typical, unfailing support, both material and otherwise. 
In an Article of this length, it is inevitable that errors remain. They are my responsibility and 
hopefully as they are brought to my attention I will learn from them.
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Commerce Clause.2 
True, a small group of “Indian law”3 insiders has long existed. These special-
ists have traditionally serviced tribes endowed with natural resources. More 
recently, revenue generated across the country from Indian gaming,4 hotels, 
restaurants, manufacturing, industrial parks, gas stations, cement factories, 
timber operations, smokeshops, or sports franchises5 has created legal work 
for firms that traditionally did not practice Indian law. 
This new group of practitioners has quickly learned what the more expe-
rienced firms have long known: the issues raised by the taxation of Indi-
2 U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8 provides that Congress shall have the power to “regulate Commerce 
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” To avoid 
confusion, this Article will refer specifically to the Foreign Commerce Clause, the Interstate 
Commerce Clause, and the Indian Commerce Clause. The “Commerce Clause” will refer to 
all three collectively. 
3 “The term ‘Indian Law’ is a catchall with various meanings, but it refers primarily to that 
body of law dealing with the status of the Indian tribes and their special relationship to the 
federal government, with all the attendant consequences for the tribes and their members, the 
states and their citizens, and the federal government.” William C. Canby, American Indian 
Law 1 (5th ed. 2009). Judge Canby also provides a perceptive discussion of who is an Indian. 
Id. at 9–11.
4 Gaming, of course, drives many of the contemporary issues involving the Indians: land 
claims, recognition of tribes, and involvement in lobbying. Despite the importance of gam-
ing, the states are prohibited from taxing it. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(4) (2010). For a general 
discussion of gaming, see Canby, supra note 3 at 332–72; Stephen L. Pevar, The Rights of 
Indians and Tribes 319–32 (3rd ed. 2002).
5 Richard J. Ansson, Jr. & Lodine Oravetz, Tribal Economic Development: What Challenges 
Lie Ahead for Tribal Nations as They Continue to Strive for Economic Diversity?, 11 Kan. J.L. & 
Pub. Pol’y 441, 445 (2002). Some tribes even have commercial dealings with foreign coun-
tries. The Japanese, for example, opened an automobile testing facility on the Ak-Chine reser-
vation in Arizona. Sharon O’Brien, American Indian Tribal Governments 230 (1989). 
“As tribes take advantage of federal economic development programs and as reservations’ 
reserves of natural resources become increasingly more valuable, there is more on Indian reser-
vations to tax.” Russel Lawrence Barsh, Issues in Federal, State, and Tribal Taxation of Reservation 
Wealth: A Survey and Economic Critique, 54 Wash. L. Rev. 531, 533 (1979) [hereinafter Barsh, 
Reservation Wealth]. Traditionally, “[t]he road to economic and social development for Indian 
Nations in the United States [was] impeded by an intractable host of tangible and intangible 
barriers. Territorial remoteness, an inadequate public infrastructure base, capital access bar-
riers, land ownership patterns, and an underskilled labor and managerial sector combine[d] 
with paternalistic attitudes of federal policymakers to stifle Indian Country development and 
investment.” Robert A. Williams, Jr., Small Steps on the Long Road to Self-Sufficiency for Indian 
Nations: The Indian Tribal Governmental Tax Status Act of 1982, 22 harv. J. on Legis. 335, 
335–36 (1985).
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ans, the tribes,6 and those doing business with them are sui generis—and 
complicated, even by tax standards. To be sure, state tax lawyers are used to 
multijurisdictional issues. Taxes are levied by sewer, water, school, and transit 
districts; cities; counties; states; and the national government—tribal taxes 
would seem to add merely one more level. 
Although comforting, this view would be misleading. Indian taxation drags 
lawyers into areas outside their normal comfort zone. Practitioners need to 
master treaties between the federal government and the tribes;7 state enabling 
6 There are currently 564 tribes recognized by the federal government. Frequently Asked 
Questions, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Department of the Interior (last updated Sept. 
14, 2010), http://www.bia.gov/FAQs/index.htm. Some tribes are recognized by their states 
but not by the federal government. For a discussion of what constitutes an Indian tribe, see 
Canby, supra note 3, at 3–9. 
“Between 1954 and 1962, Congress terminated federal recognition of more than one 
hundred tribes and bands. While all but one of these were recognized again in later years, 
several were forced to forfeit their ancestral lands.” L. Scott Gould, The Consent Paradigm: 
Tribal Sovereignty at the Millennium, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 809, 812 (1996) [hereinafter Gould, 
Consent].
7 Nearly 400 18th and 19th century treaties exist. A list of treaties appears in 2 Indian 
Affairs: Laws and Treaties (Charles J. Kappler ed. 1905), available at http://digital.library.
okstate.edu/kappler/Vol2/TOC.htm. Luckily, the number dealing with taxation is much 
smaller. Research on a tax issue may nonetheless involve treaties that predate the Constitution 
and laws adopted by the first Congress. See Cohen’s handbook of Federal Indian Law 1 
(Nell Jessup Newton ed. 2005) [hereinafter Cohen’s handbook]. For a general discussion, 
see Canby, supra note 3, at 115–37.
In the early days, the government needed to pacify the stronger and more numerous 
Indians. The Indians were militarily important and the early treaties reflected this reality. After 
the Revolutionary War, and especially after the War of 1812, the United States no longer wor-
ried about the Indians allying with the British. Cohen’s handbook, supra, at 74. William 
henry harrison, while Governor of the Indiana Territory, defeated the Northwest tribes at the 
Battle of the Thames where the Indians had allied themselves with the British in the War of 
1812. After the War of 1812, “the last vestiges of tribal resistance to United States hegemony 
east of the Mississippi were suppressed in conjunction with the defeat of Great Britain, eastern 
tribalism’s former historical ally against United States’ imperialism.” Robert A. Williams, Jr., 
Documents of Barbarism: The Contemporary Legacy of European Racism and Colonialism in the 
Narrative Traditions of Federal Indian Law, 31 Ariz. L. Rev. 237, 257 (1989) [hereinafter 
Williams, Barbarism].
Prior to 1815, Indians negotiated treaties from a position of some power, for the 
tribes had the option of allying with either the United States or the British. The 
young American nation was most concerned with bare survival for many years; it 
needed the support of the Indians, or at least their assurances against hostility. Thus 
the tribes were a power to be reckoned with. As the Supreme Court expressed it:  
“[T]he early journals of Congress exhibit the most anxious desire to conciliate the 
Indian nations . . . The most strenuous exertions were made to procure those sup-
plies on which Indian friendships were supposed to depend; and everything which 
might excite hostility was avoided”. . . When the War of 1812 ended and the British 
withdrew from the Continent, the tribes lost much of their bargaining leverage. The 
negotiations became increasingly one-sided. After 1815, United States Indian policy 
became necessarily responsive to the westward expansion, and treaties were used to 
remove the Indian tribes from the path of the ever-advancing white civilization. From 
the Indians’ point of view, it was a hobson’s choice. Theoretically, they could keep 
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their land and be overrun by white settlers. Or, they could sell their land, their ances-
tral heritage, and remove to a new site. 
Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: “As 
Long as Water Flows, or Grass Grows Upon the Earth”—How Long a Time is That?, 63 Cal. L. 
Rev. 601, 608–09 (1975); see discussion infra notes 229−99.
In 1871, Congress prohibited the practice of entering into treaties with Indian Tribes. 25 
U.S.C. § 71 (2010). The prohibition was accomplished by a rider to an appropriation bill. 
Michael Minnis, Judicially-Suggested Harassment of Indian Tribes: The Potawatomis Revisit Moe 
and Colville, 16 Am. Indian L. Rev. 289, 297 (1991). This statute had no effect on existing 
treaties. “No obligation of any treaty lawfully made and ratified with any such Indian nation or 
tribe prior to March 3, 1871, shall be hereby invalidated or impaired.” 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2010). 
The prohibition on the treaty power is constitutionally suspect because the Constitution vests 
in the President, not Congress, the power to make treaties. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; 
William C. Canby, Jr., American Indian Law in a Nutshell 121 (5th ed. 2009). 
One leading treatise describes the prohibition on treaty-making as reflecting the jealousies 
of the house of Representatives, which has no role to play with treaties, unlike the Senate, 
which must ratify all treaties. See Cohen’s handbook, supra, at 74. “The house wanted a 
larger piece of the action than that of simply appropriating funds for treaty arrangements made 
by others.” Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 12 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 3, 52 
(1987) [hereinafter Ball, Constitution]. Another commentator described the house as being 
angry about being excluded from making Indian policy. Minnis, supra, at 297. After 1871, 
Congress continued to negotiate agreements with the Indians—the difference being that such 
agreements were now adopted as statutes and not treaties. Robert N. Clinton, There is No 
Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 Ariz. St. L. J. 113, 168 (2002) [hereinafter Clinton, 
Supremacy].
Reservations were confirmed by bilateral agreements enacted after 1871, when the 
United States renounced formal treaty making with tribes; these agreements were 
negotiated in the field between federal and tribal representatives and then approved 
through the normal legislative process involving both houses rather than through the 
procedure for treaties, which involved only the Senate’s advice and consent.
Charles F. Wilkinson, American Indians, Time, and the Law 8 (1987) [hereinafter 
Wilkinson]. The reality was that, after 1871, the federal government continued to deal with 
the Indians, not through treaties, but through agreements, statutes, and executive orders. 
Cohen’s handbook, supra, at 75. Between 1855 and 1919, when Congress ended the prac-
tice, reservations were created through executive orders. Id. at 76.
In Cherokee Tobacco v. Georgia, the Court upheld a federal statute taxing tobacco produced 
anywhere in the United States, notwithstanding that a treaty exempted sales of tobacco on 
tribal land from federal taxes. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616 (1871). The Court held that treaties 
could be implicitly abrogated by subsequent federal law, the so-called “last in time” doctrine. 
Id. at 621. The “last expression of the sovereign will must control.” Chae Chan Ping v. United 
States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889). Violation of the treaty was a non-
justiciable, political question. Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. 616, 621; see Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 
187 U.S. 553 (1903); United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 (1986) (“We have required 
that Congress’s intention to abrogate Indian treaty rights be clear and plain.”). Even if that 
intention is clear, Professor Milner Ball argues that “Congress cannot by legislation choose to 
transfigure a treaty relationship with another nation and elect to govern that nation by stat-
ute.” Ball, Constitution, supra, at 53. Wilkinson and Volkman describe the abrogation policy 
as follows: “Congressional power to abrogate is based on the notion that a treaty represents 
the political policy of the nation at the time it was made. If there is a change of circumstances 
and the national interest accordingly ‘demands’ a modification of its terms, then Congress may 
abrogate a treaty in whole or in part.” Wilkinson & Volkman, supra, at 604. Things are even 
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acts; numerous Indian-specific statutes and executive orders that often reflect 
polar swings in Congressional policy;8 special Indian canons of construction;9 
the unique patchwork pattern of land ownership on reservations;10 and con-
cepts like “Indian sovereignty”11 that serve as a ubiquitous, amorphous, and 
more dire without a treaty. In Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, the Warren Court held that 
the government could take the aboriginal lands of Indians in Alaska without just compensa-
tion. 348 U.S. 272 (1955). For an insightful discussion, see Nell Jessup Newton, At the Whim 
of the Sovereign: Aboriginal Title Reconsidered, 31 hast. L. J. 1215, 1241–44 (1980). 
8 “Federal Indian policy is completely reversed periodically.” Ball, Constitution, supra note 
7, at 16.
9 See Cohen’s handbook, supra note 7, at 119–24; Erik M. Jensen, Taxation and Doing 
Business in Indian Country, 60 Me. L. Rev. 1, 28 (2007); see infra notes 130, 251, 257, 532, 
541, 619, 936, 1057.
10 
Over the course of two hundred years the United States has used various proce-
dural devices to recognize tribes and, thus, to establish reservations. Although 
some 389 treaties were negotiated, treaty making is not as dominant as it is often 
thought to be. Of the 52 million acres of trust land now held by tribes and individual 
Indians, only about 20 million were originally recognized by treaty. The majority of 
Indian land was set aside in reservation status by procedures that amount to treaty  
substitutes . . . Indian reservations have also been established by unilateral congres-
sional statutes and by the Interior Department acting pursuant to delegated authority 
from Congress. The largest amount of trust land, 23 million acres, was established 
by yet another means, the promulgation of executive orders between 1855 and 1919. 
In turn, more than 90 percent of that executive order land was later confirmed by 
statute. In several cases, individual reservations contain some or all of these various 
kinds of land. 
Wilkinson, supra note 7, at 8. For a discussion of allotment, which also affects the pattern of 
land ownership, see infra notes 235, 364, 376−77, 592, 620, 675, 1277, 1359.
11 In his classic and iconic treatise on Indian law, Felix S. Cohen described the issue of sov-
ereignty in 1941 as follows: 
The whole course of judicial decision on the nature of Indian tribal powers is marked 
by adherence to three fundamental principles: (1) An Indian tribe possesses, in the 
first instance, all the powers of any sovereign state. (2) Conquest renders the tribe 
subject to the legislative power of the United States and, in substance, terminates the 
external powers of sovereignty of the tribe, e.g., its power to enter into treaties with 
foreign nations, but does not by itself affect the internal sovereignty of the tribe, i.e., 
its powers of local self-government. (3) These powers are subject to qualification by 
treaties and by express legislation of Congress, but, save as thus expressly qualified, 
full powers of internal sovereignty are vested in the Indian tribes and in their duly 
constituted organs of government. 
Felix S. Cohen, handbook of Federal Indian Law 123 (1st ed. 1941). Professor Milner 
Ball describes Cohen as having an “undoubted salutary effect upon the Supreme Court. But 
Cohen also engaged in harmful fiction that has been equally influential. . . . Cohen’s conquest 
myth—it is historical as well as juridical myth—supplies a basis for exercise of power over 
Indians that the Court had not imagined until then. Cohen of course offers no clue about the 
date or means of such an event.” Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 43–44. “The 1982 revi-
sion of Cohen republishes the statement of the conquest myth, with embellishment . . . tribes 
have been incorporated as well as conquered.” Id. at 44. Ball characterizes the 1982 edition as 
“neglect[ing] minimum standards of scholarship.” Id. at 45. 
The first edition of Cohen’s seminal work was published in 1941 by the federal government. 
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Cohen was then Assistant Solicitor in the Department of the Interior. The audience was gov-
ernment administrators and it became widely cited by the Court and others in the field. 
Kevin K. Washburn, Felix Cohen, Anti-Semitism and American Indian Law, 33 Am. Indian 
L. Rev. 583 (2008–09) (book review), tells the fascinating story behind the treatise. The trea-
tise has its roots in 1939, when Cohen was detailed to the Department of Justice to run the 
Indian Law Survey, a job that he initially resisted. The Survey was apparently intended to 
be a litigation manual. Id. at 600. After acquiescing, Cohen received a one-year posting as 
Special Attorney. Id. at 599. Cohen was fired that same year, along with members of his staff 
that had Jewish surnames, in what seems to be part of an anti-Semitic purge. Id. at 599–600. 
After being fired, Cohen returned to his regular position as Associate Solicitor for Indian 
Affairs at the United States Department of the Interior. Id. at 583–84. The Survey became 
the handbook of Federal Indian Law and completed under the imprint of the Department of 
Interior. Id. at 584.
In 1958, the Bureau of Indian Affairs published a new edition, which deviated in key parts 
from the first edition. In 1972, the University of New Mexico Press reprinted the 1941 version 
of Cohen because of the unhappiness with the 1958 edition. The foreword to the reprinted 
version explains that 
[i]n the early fifties, both the executive and the legislative branches of the Federal 
Government determined to follow a new policy concerning Indians: a policy of ter-
minating all tribes and ending Federal services to Indians. [The 1941 edition] which 
had been originally published under the auspices of the Department of the Interior, 
then proved embarrassing . . . The response of the Department of the Interior 
was simple: rewrite Cohen’s book and discredit the original under the guise of a  
revision . . . Many of the carefully considered arguments that were made by Cohen 
were omitted . . . From a well-reasoned, balanced discussion of the countless unde-
cided questions . . . the [1958 edition] deteriorated into a volume with a new and 
constant theme: the Federal Government’s power over Indian Affairs is plenary.
Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 77 (citing Robert L. Bennett & Frederick M. hart, Foreword 
to Felix S. Cohen, handbook of Federal Indian Law v (University of New Mexico Press 
1971)). For a discussion of the role of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Department of the 
Interior, see Canby, supra note 3, at 52–61. Professor Williams, never one to mince words, 
refers to the “legendary incompetence of the Bureau.” Robert A Williams, Jr., Learning Not to 
Live With Eurocentric Myopia: A Reply to Professor Laurence’s Learning to Live With the Plenary 
Power of Congress Over the Indian Nations, 30 Ariz. L. Rev. 439, 450 n.51 (1988).
The first edition is sometimes cited as having a 1942 date (as the citations by others 
throughout this article suggest). The first edition was actually published in 1940, intended to 
be temporary, and had a limited circulation within the Department of the Interior. The first 
publicly available printing was in 1941 with a small circulation. A larger run was made in 
1942. Foreword to Felix S. Cohen, handbook of Federal Indian Law (1942), supra note 
7, at 1.
The 1958 edition has been “repudiated by some scholars.” L. Scott Gould, Tough Love for 
Tribes: Rethinking Sovereignty after Atkinson and hicks, 37 New Eng. L. Rev. 669, 671 n.14 
(2003) [hereinafter Gould, Tough Love]. “Termination was the policy that [the 1958 edition] 
sought to advance with its revision of history and law.” Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 78. 
See also Matthew L. M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court’s Indian Problem, 59 hastings L. J. 579, 
592 n.85 (2008) [hereinafter Fletcher, Indian Problem], who refers to the 1958 edition as 
“disgraced” and “disgraceful.”
Washburn, supra, at 584, notes that “[s]ome scholars refuse to count the 1958 revision by 
the Department of the Interior, which was ideologically motivated and, many believed, bas-
tardized Cohen’s 1942 work,” citing Clinton, supra note 7, at 232.
A board of editors put out a revised edition in 1982 and in 2005. Cohen, who died in 
1953, only authored the 1941 edition and would likely disagree with parts of the subsequent 
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malleable backdrop in many cases.12 Bread-and-butter issues for state tax law-
yers—like apportionment and discrimination—take on new meanings. The 
Indian tax cases tolerate results that would violate the Interstate Commerce 
Clause.13 The formative Supreme Court cases on Indian taxation often reflect 
the composition of the bench and sympathies (or lack thereof ) of individual 
editions. Unfortunately, the Court and others treat the editions as if they were all authored 
by Cohen, despite significant differences among them. See Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 
13. The 1982 edition has been criticized for “mak[ing] no . . . attempt to survey the history 
of judicial conceptions of the legal position of tribes in relation to the American federalist sys-
tem.” William Walters, Review Essay: Preemption, Tribal Sovereignty, and Worcester v. Georgia, 
62 Or. L. Rev. 127, 128 n.9 (1983).
Louis F. Claiborne, who as a long-time deputy Solicitor General participated in many 
Supreme Court cases involving the Indians, offers a less romantic view of sovereignty than that 
found in the Cohen treatises. 
Until very recently, there were serious obstacles to headlining the term “Indian sover-
eignty.” First, to speak of “sovereign Tribes” within States was undiplomatic, to put it 
mildly. Second, “sovereign” seemed an ill-fitting word to describe wholly dependent 
collections of Indians, sometimes of unrelated Tribes, merely subsisting on govern-
ment “hand-outs” on arbitrarily assigned reservations, often with no governmental 
structure of their own. Third, to claim tribal sovereignty appeared to be inconsis-
tent with the State jurisdiction within Reservations had to be conceded (e.g., the 
McBratney rule and the taxability of non-Indian land), not to mention the “plenary” 
power of Congress. And, finally, in McClanahan, if not earlier, the Court had rele-
gated the Indian sovereignty doctrine to the role of a mere “backdrop.” I may add that 
talk of “sovereignty” tends to create unreal expectations in the Indian community. All 
these problems still exist. But the significant rebirth of tribal institutions makes the 
claim of sovereignty more persuasive. 
Louis F. Claiborne, The Trend of Supreme Court Decisions in Indian Cases, 22 Am. Indian L. 
Rev. 585, 595 (1998). 
12 “[T]he doctrine of American Indian tribal sovereignty is a legal and conceptual conun-
drum.” Sarah Krakoff, A Narrative of Sovereignty: Illuminating the Paradox of the Domestic 
Dependent Nation, 83 Or. L. Rev. 1109, 1110 (2004). 
The British government recognized the sovereignty of Indian tribes. Worcester v. Georgia, 
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 556 (1832). The first white settlers had no choice but to recognize Indian 
sovereignty because they needed the help and support of the more numerous and powerful 
tribes. As circumstances changed, the Indians became dispensable. Short-term alliances out of 
political expediency, only to be broken later, are hardly unusual. Compare the Stalin-hitler 
Non-Aggression Pact, which Germany discarded when the alliance with the Soviet Empire was 
no longer needed. According to Professor Deloria, “America has yet to keep one Indian treaty 
or agreement despite the fact that the United States government signed over four hundred such 
treaties and agreements with Indian tribes.” Vine Deloria, Jr., Custer Died for Your Sins: 
An Indian Manifesto 28 (1969).
13 See, e.g., Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 
134 (1980), discussed infra notes 740−915 and accompanying text; Cotton Petroleum v. New 
Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989), discussed infra notes 1131−1270 and accompanying text.
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justices for the Indians.14 Add to this the difficulty of obtaining up-to-date 
information on tribal tax codes, and the result is a labyrinth of unpredict-
ability.15 
While the topic of my conference presentation and hence the subject of 
this Article is the Indian Commerce Clause and state taxation16—and not a 
14 See David h. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the 
Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 1573 (1996) [hereinafter Getches, Conquering] 
(“[Tribes] now . . . are left to the vicissitudes of Court majorities that depend on the percep-
tions of culturally alien Justices in individual cases.”); Matthew L. M. Fletcher, The Supreme 
Court and Federal Indian Policy, 85 Neb. L. Rev. 121, 124–25 (2006) [hereinafter Fletcher, 
Supreme Court] (“[T]he federal courts have had fewer and fewer authorities to rely on to decide 
disputes, opening the door for the Supreme Court to exercise additional latitude in deciding 
Indian cases according to its own preferences.”); Robert N. Clinton, Book Review, 47 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 846, 848 (1980) (reviewing Russel Lawrence Barsh & James Youngblood 
henderson, The Road: Indian Tribes and Political Liberty (1980)) (“[T]he Supreme 
Court’s approach to the question of the Indian tribes’ role in American legal theory has vac-
illated between theories of subjugation of the tribes to the states, and protection of tribal 
autonomy from state encroachments.”). 
15 Jensen, supra note 9, at 24 (“Because much American Indian law doctrine does not mesh, 
one can ‘prove’ almost any proposition by finding the right case or statute to cite and ignoring 
contrary authority.”); Scott A. Taylor, An Introduction and Overview of Taxation and Indian 
Gaming, 29 Ariz. St. L. J. 251, 251 (1994) (“It is often very difficult to predict the tax 
consequences that will attach to a particular transaction that takes place in Indian Country. 
This lack of certainty is grist for the lawyer’s mill because it increases the likelihood of litiga-
tion involving large sums of money.”); Robert G. Natelson, The Original Understanding of 
the Indian Commerce Clause, 85 Denv. U. L. Rev. 201, 204 n.5 (2007) (“That Indian law is 
chaotic seems to be one of the few points of agreement among commentators on the subject.”); 
Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture of Indian 
Tribal Authority over Nonmembers, 109 Yale L. J. 1, 4–5 (1999) [hereinafter Frickey, Common 
Law] (“Given the lack of guidance in positive law, the complexity of the issues, and the tangled 
normative questions surrounding the colonial displacement of indigenous peoples to construct 
a constitutional democracy, it is also not surprising that the resulting decisional law is as inco-
herent as it is complicated.”); Russel Lawrence Barsh, Omen: Three Affiliated Tribes v. Moe and 
the Future of Tribal Self-Government, 5 Am. Indian L. Rev. 1, 56–57 (1977) [hereinafter Barsh, 
Omen] (“[J]udges and lawyers share an education that excludes mature consideration of tribal 
government. Few law textbooks in general use accord Indian law serious treatment. Ignorance 
is a powerful helpmate of confusion. In an appeal in which the advocates and judges have 
only briefly investigated an unfamiliar topic, we can expect what is in fact in evidence in the 
Supreme Court record: abused precedents, citations to inconsistent chains of precedent, essen-
tial cases and statutes overlooked, significant social and economic facts disregarded.”); Philip 
P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 Minn. L. Rev. 31, 33 (1996) [hereinafter 
Frickey, Domesticating] (“[F]ederal Indian law is a snarl of doctrinal complications . . .”).
16 As expounded below, the Indian Commerce Clause can be read as granting Congress the 
exclusive power to regulate commerce with the tribes (subject to state police powers). In sharp 
contrast, the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Clauses were not intended to grant Congress 
the exclusive powers of regulating these areas but left room for state intervention that went well 
beyond just police powers (although at one point the Court viewed the Interstate Commerce 
Clause as granting exclusive powers to Congress). See infra notes 190, 447. Under the Interstate 
and Foreign Commerce Clauses, the challenge for the courts has been to sort out acceptable 
state statutes from those that impose unreasonable or discriminatory burdens on commerce. 
Courts will strike down state statutes under the dormant or negative Interstate or Foreign 
Commerce Clause. Those Clauses, like the Indian Commerce Clause, represent a positive 
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treatise on all aspects of state taxation17 (and nothing on federal taxation)18—I 
would disserve the reader by not straying a bit afield. To cut to the chase, the 
Court has emasculated and denigrated the Indian Commerce Clause, pre-
venting implementation of the Founders’ vision. Readers would have every 
right to feel that slogging their way through this lengthy Article was not 
worth the effort if that were the only message at the end of the journey. And 
so, with the encouragement of the conference organizers and journal edi-
tors, I have interpreted my charge broadly to sketch the contours of other 
Indian tax doctrines so that the reader will have a feel for the signposts and 
boundaries. I have focused on a selection of prominent U.S. Supreme Court 
cases, mostly involving state taxation; many more could have been discussed. 
My goal is not to be exhaustive (or exhausting), but rather suggestive and 
illustrative.19
Unlike an article on, say, the Interstate Commerce Clause, I have not 
or explicit delegation by the Constitution to Congress. There is no explicit language in the 
Constitution that prohibits the states from burdening commerce in unacceptable ways. 
Nonetheless, under the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Clauses, the positive delegation to 
Congress has come to mean that the Court can strike down unacceptable state actions. In other 
words, the positive delegation implies negative constraints on certain state actions, hence the 
term “negative” Commerce Clause. The “Dormant” in “Dormant Commerce Clause” refers to 
Congress not having exercised its power to prohibit a state statute. 
Justice Scalia, who is skeptical about the existence of a negative or Dormant Interstate 
Commerce Clause, views 
[t]he least plausible theoretical justification of all [for the doctrine] is the idea that in 
enforcing the negative Commerce Clause the Court is not applying a constitutional 
command at all, but is merely interpreting the will of Congress, whose silence in cer-
tain fields of interstate commerce (but not in others) is to be taken as a prohibition 
of regulation. There is no conceivable reason why congressional inaction under the 
[Interstate] Commerce Clause should be deemed to have the same pre-emptive effect 
elsewhere accorded only to congressional action.
Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 262 (1987) (Scalia, J. dis-
senting). “It is astonishing that we should be expanding our beachhead in this impoverished 
territory, rather than being satisfied with what we have already acquired by a sort of intellectual 
adverse possession.” Id. at 265. For a rebuttal, see Dan. T. Coenen, Constitutional Law: The 
Commerce Clause 214 n.19 (2004); Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law 403–05 (2nd ed. 
2002). For an argument that the term “dormant” is a misnomer, see Julian N. Eule, Laying the 
Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 Yale L. J. 425, 425 n.1 (1982). Although Justice Scalia 
expressed his view in the context of the Interstate Commerce Clause, presumably he would 
extend it to the Indian Commerce Clause.
17 For a concise summary of state taxation of Indians and those doing business with them 
(especially given the page constraints imposed on the contributing authors), see Cohen’s 
handbook, supra note 7, § 8; see also Canby, supra note 3, at 286–331; Pevar, supra note 4, 
at 188–207.
18 For a readable and sophisticated treatment of the federal issues, see Mark J. Cowan, 
Leaving Money on the Table(s): An Examination of Federal Income Tax Policy towards Indian 
Tribes, 6 Fla. Tax Rev. 345 (2004).
19 I have left one area in particular, state taxation of tribally-owned land or land owned 
by members of the tribe, to Professor Jensen, who makes sense of this complicated subject. 
Jensen, supra note 9, at 13–16, 83–84. See also Robert L. Pirtle, et al., Taxation and 
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assumed a shared tax culture and history that would otherwise allow me to 
mention a chestnut like Complete Auto20 and move on, secure that everyone 
was intimately familiar with that watershed case. Accordingly, I have pre-
sented the seminal Indian tax cases in detail. I have also indulged myself 
in the occasional tangent when I thought there was something of particular 
interest to state tax academics and practitioners. Most writing on Indian taxa-
tion has been dominated by Indian law scholars and academics more schooled 
in federal than state tax. Yet, as I hope to demonstrate, state tax lawyers and 
academics have a unique and useful perspective for analyzing many of the 
precedent-setting Supreme Court cases.
Finally, I have let the justices speak in their own voices more than is typi-
cal in the academic literature. My own experience, especially in the field of 
Indian taxation but also more generally, is that too often an author’s para-
phrasing and description of a case fails to capture the nuances, texture, lay-
ers, and subtleties that characterize an opinion. Too many authors force the 
reader to print out a case and read it alongside their articles.21 
Given the theme of this Article, Section II opens with a detailed and lengthy 
history of Colonial America, the Crown, and their dealings with the Indians. 
Section II ends with the adoption of the Articles of Confederation, with a 
special focus on Article IX—the precursor to the Indian Commerce Clause. 
Section III surveys the Constitutional Convention and the birth of the Indian 
Commerce Clause and contrasts that Clause with the Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce Clauses. It highlights two competing schools of interpretation of 
the Indian Commerce Clause.22 These Sections make a credible case that the 
Indian Commerce Clause was not meant to be interpreted in pari materia with 
the Interstate Commerce Clause and the Foreign Commerce Clause. Com-
pared with these other Clauses, the Indian Commerce Clause was drafted and 
formulated at a different time during the Constitutional Convention, had 
its unique roots in the Articles of Confederation, and was apparently tagged 
onto the already drafted Interstate and Foreign Commerce Clauses, more for 
stylistic convenience than for substantive reasons.
Section IV presents the early U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence, covering 
1831-1899. Both tax and non-tax cases are analyzed. Section V covers the 
modern cases, starting in 1959. Together Sections IV and V showcase the 
seminal cases involving state taxation of Indians and those doing business 
Indian Affairs 57–65 (1999). I also leave a discussion of estate and inheritance taxes to id. 
at 65–69.
20 Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
21 There are other mundane stylistic decisions. Unless otherwise noted footnotes within quo-
tations are mine. Citations within quotations are also eliminated unless particularly relevant 
to this Article.
22 This Part relies heavily on the research of Robert N. Clinton, The Dormant Indian 
Commerce Clause, 27 Conn. L. Rev. 1056 (1995) [hereinafter Clinton, Dormant], and Robert 
G. Natelson, supra note 15. Their work is a paragon of research and rich in citations to the 
leading materials. No one can write on the history of the Indian Commerce Clause without 
paying them homage. 
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with them and, to a lesser extent, those involving tribal taxation. 
Section VI provides a conclusion and attempts to answer why the promise 
of the Indian Commerce Clause has gone unfulfilled. The section also pro-
vides some guidance in negotiating the “labyrinth of unpredictability.”
II.  The Early Days
A.  Colonial America and the Crown
The story of the Indian Commerce Clause starts well before the Constitu-
tional Convention and even long before the Articles of Confederation. The 
story reflects a consistent and ongoing theme: to what extent should the 
Crown and its colonies, and, later, the Continental Congress, the Constitu-
tional Congress, the states, and today’s national government, control Indian 
affairs? Early on, this theme was drenched in blood and fraud,23 and reflected 
a power struggle for Indian loyalty, land,24 and trade.25 
23 Scott A. Taylor, A Judicial Framework for Applying Supreme Court Jurisprudence to the 
State Income Taxation of Indian Traders, 2007 Mich. St. L. Rev. 841, 849 (2007) [hereinafter 
Taylor, Framework] (“Early experience showed that the violence between colonists and the 
various tribes often arose out of fraudulent trade practices by the Europeans.”).
24 Writing about the 1985 term of the U.S. Supreme Court, Professor Milner S. Ball stated 
“[d]irectly or indirectly, land was implicated in all the term’s cases. Tribal identity and religion 
are tied to the land, and land is, more than anything else, the immediate reason for conflict 
between Indians and non-Indians,” a comment that could be extended to most other periods 
in the history of the country. Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 14. “[C]laims of competing 
states [for land] based on their crown charters unleashed distrust and political alliances with 
land speculators’ greed that undermined the national union: ‘This virus of sectional rivalry 
would have been hazardous even in a stable, vigorous government; it was almost fatal to the 
new union.’” Gloria Valencia-Weber, The Supreme Court’s Indian Law Decisions: Deviations from 
Constitutional Principles and the Crafting of Judicial Smallpox Blankets, 5 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 
405, 411 (2003) (quoting Thomas Perkins Abernethy, Western Lands and the American 
Revolution 366 (1939)). “Once tribes felt their own subsistence needs threatened by English 
agrarian expansion or encroachment, Indian-English contact was transformed into Indian-
English confrontation over tribal land claims.” Williams, Barbarism, supra note 7, at 249. 
25 King James granted the Virginia Company, whose stock was held by English merchants 
and investors, the right to establish colonies in North America. The charter granted by King 
James provided that “in propagating of Christian Religion to such People, as yet live in 
Darkness and miserable Ignorance of the true Knowledge and worship of God, and may in 
time bring the Infidels and Savages, living in those Parts, to human Civility, and to a settled 
and quiet Government . . . .” Documents of American history 8 (henry S. Commager ed., 
10th ed. 1988). “With sincere convictions, although without much actual success in the end, 
the English colonizers placed conversion of the Indians a major justification for their under-
taking.” Francis Paul Prucha, The Great Father: The United States Government and 
the American Indians 9 (1984) [hereinafter Prucha, The Great Father]. In the early 17th 
century, a group of investors organized a company to establish the Jamestown colony. David 
h. Getches, Charles F. Wilkinson, & Robert A. Williams, Jr., Cases and Materials 
on Federal Indian Law 53 (5th ed. 2005) [hereinafter Getches, Cases and Materials]. 
From Jamestown, English settlers established several other colonies. By 1625, there were nine-
teen settlements throughout the region of Virginia. herbert Eugene Bolton & Thomas 
Maitland Marshall, The Colonization of North America 1492–1783, at 123 (1920). 
The “Indians almost universally chose to greet the British with friendship and assistance.” 
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During the very early days of the country, the British “generally adhered 
to the view that, as separate peoples, the Indians were politically and legally 
autonomous within their territory.”26 But in New England and Virginia “the 
colonists claimed the right to appropriate uncultivated land of the Indians 
as vacant waste.”27 Thus, the tension that was to mark early dealings with 
the Indians soon emerged. The British needed the militarily powerful Indi-
ans as allies in its martial struggles with other foreign powers, especially the 
French.28 The British settlers, however, needed land and were not above tak-
ing it through deceit, corruption, and violence, as well as through generous 
interpretations of legal doctrine governing title to Indian land.29 By contrast, 
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Indian Tribes: A Continuing Quest, reprinted in 
Native Americans and Public Policy 14 (Fremont J. Lyden and Lyman h. Legters eds. 
1992). The early British colonies were never far from disaster, and the Indians provided them 
with lifesaving aid on a number of occasions, only to have their “overt friendliness . . . viewed 
by the colonists with inexplicable suspicion.” Id. One contemporary recounting of a Virginia 
Colony, on the edge of starvation, captures the ambivalence with which such aid was accepted 
from the Indians: 
All accounts agree that for some reason the Indians did daily relieve them for some 
weeks with corn and flesh. The supplies brought from England had been nearly 
exhausted; the colonists had been too sick to attend to their gardens properly, and 
this act of the Indians was regarded as a divine providence at the time . . . What was 
the real motive for the kindly acts of the Indians may not be certainly known, but it 
probably boded the little colony a future harm.
Id. at 15.
26 Clinton, supra note 14, at 851. Several million Indians lived in communities throughout 
North and South America when Christopher Columbus arrived on the island now known as 
San Salvador. Paul Stuart, Nations Within A Nation 51 (1987). The Indians of North 
America were divided into distinct tribes with different ways of life. By 1700, Europeans were 
aware of more than fifty distinct tribes, about half living west of the Mississippi and about half 
living east. Edward h. Spicer, A Short history of the Indians of the United States 
14–15 (1969).
Professor O’Brian notes that at the time of European discovery, there were more than 600 
tribes consisting of approximately five million people. Sharon O’Brian, American Indian Tribal 
Governments 14 (1989).
27 Id. 
28 France and Britain fought over control of the lucrative fur and pelt trade. For a fuller 
discussion, see Taylor, Framework, supra note 23, at 849.
29 The Indians did not have the same concept of private land ownership as did the European 
invaders. Property that the Indians claimed often had no clearly demarcated boundaries. More 
generally, the biggest obstacle to successful Indian-white treaties was a cultural one. Indian 
cultures did not embrace concepts of private property or exclusive ownership in the European 
sense, and the colonists could not overcome their ethnocentrism to recognize this. All treaties 
were written on the assumption that the Indians originally owned the land, a concept foreign 
to all tribes. The great majority of treaties were thus fundamentally flawed from their incep-
tion. Alan Axelrod, Chronicle of the Indian Wars: From Colonial Times to Wounded 
Knee 34–35 (1993). To the Indians, “land was ‘given,’ not ‘taken;’ it was the mother to be 
respected, not the wanton daughter to be debauched; it existed prior to each man’s brief mortal 
stay on earth, and would remain after it. It could be used, but not abused. It has to be enjoyed, 
but not alienated. In the spiritual assumptions of most Indian groups land served the role of 
source and sustainer of life; ‘she’ played the role of mother to her ‘children.’” To the Europeans, 
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the French were more interested in the fur trade and less interested in acquir-
ing land for agriculture.30 
Predictably, war and conflict marked this early period. Many of the well-
known 17th century Indian wars, such as the Pequot War (1637) and King 
Philip’s War (1675–76), were attributable to “greed on the part of colonial 
officials in the implementation, or rather, misapplication, of a body of legal 
doctrine.”31 The colonists, however, used these Indian uprisings as an excuse 
to retaliate and seize Indian land.32
Initially, the British left the management of the Indians to the colo-
nists—an inherent conflict of interest because the colonists “had the most 
to gain financially by striking unfair or even fraudulent business arrange-
ments with surrounding Indian tribes and by engaging in fraud and duress 
in land cessions.”33 Unsurprisingly, this benign neglect by the British proved 
unworkable, and the Crown was forced to intervene. In response to pleas by 
the Indians, the British issued admonitions and directives, but control from 
a distance was difficult.34 The colonies typically ignored these Royal declara-
tions and scoldings, claiming that the British did not have jurisdiction to 
intervene—a charge that, in various forms, would become a major theme in 
the early power struggle over controlling the Indians. 
land was a commodity to be owned, bought, and sold. Neither fully understood the concept of 
the other. Prucha, The Great Father, supra note 25, at 15. Even worse, European views on 
land ownership supported the belief that their society was morally, culturally, and religiously 
superior to that of the Indians. Ralph W. Johnson, Fragile Gains: Two Centuries of Canadian 
and United States Policy Toward Indians, 66 Wash. L. Rev. 643, 647 (1991).
Puritan leaders in Massachusetts viewed the Indians as owning only land they “actively and 
regularly cultivated.” Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1065. Whether sincerely held or not, 
this view of ownership happily coincided with the self-interests of the colonists. 
Dean Washburn reports that Felix Cohen appreciated the Indians’ “collective forms of own-
ership, viewing their structures as obstacles to concentrations of wealth and economic power.” 
Kevin K. Washburn, Felix Cohen, Anti-Semitism and American Indian Law, 33 Am. Indian L. 
Rev. 583, 587 (2008–09) (book review).
30 Cohen’s handbook, supra note 7, at 18. By contrast, the Spanish sought gold and agri-
cultural products. Lyle N. McAlister, Spain and Portugal in the New World 78–80 
(1984). Queen Isabella encouraged her colonies to become as profitable as possible, id. at 
78–79, by subjugating Indian labor. Prucha, The Great Father, supra note 25, at 12. The 
Spanish crown also committed itself to converting the Indians to Catholicism. Id. The Spanish 
“carried on large-scale missionary efforts to Christianize the Indians, and the Church was 
as significant as the state in the development of Spanish America. The predominantly male 
Spanish colonists, moreover, took Indian women as wives and concubines, incorporating the 
Indians biologically as well as socially into Spanish society.” Id. Nothing similar occurred with 
the British.
31 Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1066. For a general discussion of the Indian wars 
during the colonial period, see Wilcomb E. Washburn, The Indian in America, 126–45 
(1975).
32 Cohen’s handbook, supra note 7, at 18.
33 Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1064.
34 Id. at 1067.
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As the French in the North and West,35 and the Spanish in the South36 
35 The French were mainly interested in the fur trade, William T. hagan, American 
Indians 13 (1993), and the French traders cultivated relationships with the Indians in order 
to draw upon their special hunting skills. There were few women among the early French set-
tlers. Mason Wade, French Indian Policies, in 4 handbook of North American Indians: 
history of Indian-White Relations 24 (Wilcomb E. Washburn ed. 1988). Accordingly, 
the hunters intermarried with the Indians, which helped the French achieve closer bonds of 
friendship than did the English or Spanish. 
36 When Spain learned of Columbus’s discovery, the Crown immediately sent diplomatic 
envoys to ask Pope Alexander VI to confer ownership of the New World to Spain. Columbus 
and His Discoveries, 2 Narrative and Critical history of America 13–14 (Justin Windsor 
ed. 1967). The Pope, a Spaniard by birth, has been described as a “corrupt ecclesiastical politi-
cian of the infamous Borgia family who owed not only papal office but also much of his fam-
ily’s great wealth to the favors of the Castillian Crown.” Getches, Cases and Materials supra 
note 25, at 46. Pope Alexander obligingly issued the Bull Inter Caetera Divinae, granting the 
New World to Spain. The proclamation conferred on Spain the sole right to “colonize, civilize, 
and Christianize” the New World’s indigenous people. Because of the risk of excommunication 
from the Catholic Church, no other Christian European monarch would interfere openly with 
Spain’s newly conferred rights. 
Spain’s first official policy toward the Indians was the Requerimiento, which the Crown 
required conquistadors to read aloud to the Indians, unfortunately in Spanish, before com-
mencing any hostilities towards the Indians. The Requerimiento informed the Indians that 
“God had given charge of ‘the whole human race’ to the Pope in Rome, who had donated all 
their lands to the King and Queen of Spain.” The Declaration threatened the Indians’ complete 
destruction if they did not acknowledge the Pope and Spanish monarchs as supreme and allow 
the preaching of Christianity. Getches, Cases and Materials, supra note 25, at 47.
In 1532, in a series of university lectures, Dominican priest and scholar Francisco de Victoria 
attacked the policy of the Requerimiento. Felix S. Cohen, The Spanish Origin of Indian Rights 
in the United States, 31 Georgetown L. J. 1, 11 (1942). Victoria was head professor of theol-
ogy at Salamanca University. Lyle N. McAlister, Spain and Portugal in the New World 
472 (1984). his lectures became a primary source for the basic principles of post-16th century 
Spanish colonial law, as well as for modern international and U.S. law on the treatment of 
indigenous people. Getches, Cases and Materials, supra note 25, at 48.
he argued that “the aborigines in question were true owners, before the Spaniards came 
among them, both from the public and the private point of view.” Francisco de Victoria, 
De Indis Et De Jure Belli Reflectiones, § 1-336, at 128 (1917) (Ernest Nys, ed., Photo 
reprint 1995). According to Victoria, the Spanish had no right of discovery to the land because 
it was already inhabited by persons who possessed natural legal rights as free and rational 
people, and not even the Pope had the power to partition the property of the Indians. Spanish 
claims on the basis of “discovery” or papal grant were illegitimate. The Spanish could obtain 
land through just war or voluntary consent. As long as the Indians respected the Spaniards’ 
rights to travel and to carry on trade, no justifiable cause for war existed. The Spanish did, 
however, have a right under natural law to exploit the Indian’s land without harming them. 
If the Spanish were not granted this right, they could avail themselves of the “rights of war.” 
Victoria suggested that Spain become the Indians’ guardian. The guardianship concept would 
reappear in American Indian jurisprudence. See infra notes 214−15 and accompanying text; 
notes 352, 434. Cohen credited Victoria for providing a “humane and rational basis for an 
American law of Indian affairs.” Felix S. Cohen, The Spanish Origin of Indian Rights in the 
United States, supra, at 11. 
France “disputed the right of the Pope to partition the world . . . claiming that a monop-
oly on trade in any area could be maintained only by permanent occupation in the region.” 
William John Eccles, France in America 3 (1990). In 1533, France convinced “Pope 
Clement VII that the Bull Inter Caetera of Alexander VI, which granted the New World to 
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increasingly threatened the colonies in the early 1700s, the Crown tried to 
exercise more control, especially as the colonies fought among themselves 
for hegemony over the Indians.37 British merchants, protesting certain colo-
nial laws that adversely impacted their interests, also pressured the Crown to 
intervene.38 In response, the Crown became more involved in land disputes 
between the Indians and the colonies.39 
King George III established a boundary between Indian and non-Indian 
lands. Like most royal attempts to deal with the Indians, however, the bound-
ary was short-lived and ineffective, and Virginia, Connecticut, and Massa-
chusetts subjugated many eastern tribes.40 Regardless of whether the Crown 
may have had paternalistic intentions or, less benignly, simply needed the 
Indians as allies against the French, it was outmaneuvered by the colonies. 
The colonies sought “to regulate sales of guns and liquor to the Indians” and 
to control the fur trade—a significant part of the colonial economy.41 Ever 
Spain, governed only the then known lands, and not those subsequently discovered by the sub-
jects of other crowns.” Id. The other European powers were now encouraged to send explorers 
and settlers to the New World.
37 In 1703, a Mohegan Indian filed suit with the Queen in Council arguing that colonial 
land grants by Connecticut officials violated the Tribe’s aboriginal title. The case dragged on for 
more than 70 years and the Mohegans ultimately lost title to most of the land they claimed. 
See Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1068. Professor Clinton thinks this case triggered 
increased oversight and control of Indian affairs by the British. Id. Professor Natelson disagrees 
with reading the case as “evidence the framers intended federal jurisdiction over Indian affairs 
to be exclusive.” Natelson, supra note 15, at 262–65. The reality is that this case is just one 
piece of a mosaic.
38 Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1072.
39 Professor Clinton views 1723 as a turning point. Previously, the 
role of the British government . . . involved financially supporting the trade and dip-
lomatic initiatives, gifts, and military defense preparations undertaken by the colonial 
authorities . . . After 1723, however, the great cost of Indian gifts and other aspects of 
the Indian trade and increased security concerns caused the Board of Trade to assume 
a more active role . . . .
Id. at 1069. The Indians often viewed the gifts as “tribute” or “protection money” in exchange 
for their neutrality or aid. The Europeans, however, often viewed their gifts as symbolic of 
Indian dependence. Where the gifts consisted of guns, they were a practical method of arm-
ing Indian auxiliaries. Wilcomb E. Washburn, Red Man’s Land White Man’s Law 48 
(1995) [hereinafter Washburn, Red Man’s Land]. In addition to munitions, gifts included 
food, toys, jewelry, clothing, wampum, and liquor. Walter R. Borneman, The French and 
Indian War 27 (1995). “[P]resents were the most aggressive marketing inducements of the 
age, designed to win and keep commercial and political relationships . . . Both France and 
England expended large sums to provide these gifts but . . . English presents were more abun-
dant and of higher quality . . .” Id. This difference in views about the nature of the gifts nicely 
captures the conflicting mindsets of the Europeans and the Indians.
40 Clinton, supra note 14, at 851.
41 Timothy Joseph Preso, A Return to Uncertainty in Indian Affairs: The Framers, The Supreme 
Court, and the Indian Commerce Clause, 19 Am. Indian L. Rev. 443, 445 (1994). The colonies 
attempted to assert control through the use of licensing systems. Id. See also infra note 71.
01-Pomp.indd   916 12/23/2010   11:03:24 AM
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2443846
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 63, No. 4
 INDIAN COMMERCE CLAUSE AND STATE TAXATION 917
land-hungry,42 the colonists illegally encroached upon the tribes. 
These actions generated ill will toward both the British and the colonies 
as the Indians failed to distinguish between “paternalistic” laws passed by 
the British and their failed implementation by the colonies. One result was 
that the powerful Six Nation Confederacy of the Iroquois (“Confederacy”) 
did not generally support the British during King George’s War (1744–48) 
between England and France.43 That war demonstrated the need for a united 
front in dealing with the tribes, especially because of the ongoing threat of 
Indian uprisings.
Reacting to the power of the Confederacy and motivated by the need to 
retain the loyalty of the Indians in the struggle with France for control over 
North America,44 seven of the thirteen colonies sent representatives, includ-
ing Benjamin Franklin, to Albany, New York, to deal with tribal relations.45 
At the resulting Albany Congress of 1754, Franklin proposed centralizing 
power over the Indians in a Union of the Colonies, which would have had to 
be adopted by an Act of Parliament. This proposed union was an early recog-
nition of the need for a centralized power to deal with the Indians and is often 
cited as one of the first proposals for a confederated colonial government.46 
Franklin’s plan called for organizing the colonies under a President General 
and Grand Council.47 Significantly, the first substantive power he proposed 
provided:
That the President General with the advice of the Grand Council, hold or 
direct all Indian Treaties in which the General Interest or Welfare of the 
Colonys [sic] may be concerned; and make Peace or declare War with the 
42 One of the primary crops of the early English settlements was tobacco, which exhausted 
the soil and required new land. herbert Eugene Bolton & Thomas Maitland Marshall, 
The Colonization of North America 1492–1783 at 121 (1920). The English found it eas-
ier to take over Indian fields, which had already been cleared, than to do the work themselves. 
Axelrod, supra note 29, at 10. This encroachment was often resisted with force. Prucha, The 
Great Father, supra note 25, at 13. As one Indian Chief politely put it, because “you are heare 
[sic] strangers, and come into our Countrey [sic], you should rather conform yourselves to 
the Customes [sic] of our Countrey [sic], than impose yours upon us . . . .” Paula Mitchell 
Marks, In a Barren Land: American Indian Dispossession and Survival 10 (1998). 
Marks claims that when fighting broke out, the Indians witnessed a new kind of warfare that 
involved the killing of noncombatants and destruction of food and property. Id. 
43 Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1075. In Europe, King George’s War was known as 
the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–48) and principally involved England and Austria 
against France and Prussia. The British attacked the French in Canada, captured Louisbourg 
in Nova Scotia, but gave it back in the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle.
44 Id. at 1076. Indian hostility was so great “that in 1754 a Mohawk leader threatened to 
sever the traditional ties between the Six Nations of the Iroquois and the colony of New York.” 
Preso, supra note 41, at 445.
45 Preso, supra note 41, at 445.
46 A Congressional resolution described Ben Franklin and George Washington as greatly 
admiring the concepts of the Six Nations of the Iroquois Confederacy and that the confedera-
tion of the 13 Colonies was influenced by the political system developed by the Confederacy. 
h. R. Con. Res. 331, 100th Cong. 2nd Sess. (1988). See also infra note 94.
47 Preso, supra note 41, at 445.
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Indian Nations. That they make such Laws as they judge necessary for the 
regulating all Indian Trade. That they make all purchases from Indians for 
the crown, of lands . . . not within the bounds of particular Colonies, or 
that shall not be within their bounds when some of them are reduced to 
more convenient dimensions . . . .48
The Albany Congress wanted the Crown to appoint Indian agents who 
would live with the Indians to oversee trade so that it served the greater good 
rather than private interests; void illegal land purchases and require purchases 
of land to be made by the colonies; and address Indian complaints of fraud.49 
Despite the enormous intellectual effort and promise of the Albany Plan, the 
colonies and the King ignored it. Nonetheless, the message was clear: Indian 
relations needed to be centralized.50
That message was not lost on the Crown. In 1755, the Crown appointed 
Indian superintendents to control political relations with the Indians.51 They 
were subordinated to the commander-in-chief of British forces in America. 
The superintendents marked a significant undercutting of the powers of the 
colonies.52
In 1761, England prohibited the colonies from issuing further grants of 
Indian lands and instructed the colonial governors to order all settlers on such 
lands to leave.53 The Crown took increasing control of Indian land cessions, 
which, prior to the war, had been marked by fraud and coercion and had 
alienated many Indians. The Crown appointed two superintendents to nego-
tiate treaties and regulate trade with the Indians.54 When the British obtained 
formerly French-controlled territory as part of the spoils of war, the Indians 
48 Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1078–79 (citing 6 Documents Relative to the 
Colonial history of the State of New York 890 (E.B. O’Callaghan ed. 1955) [hereinafter 
Documents]); see also Robert Newbold, The Albany Congress and Plan of Union of 
1754, at 186 (1955).
49 Obviously, not all colonial officials were out to defraud the Indians. One official who was 
notable for his integrity in dealing with the Delaware Indians was William Penn. Alan Taylor, 
American Colonies 268–69 (Eric Foner ed. 2001) [hereinafter Taylor, Colonies].
50 Professor Natelson acknowledges that the Albany Plan provided for central governance 
over the Indians. Natelson, supra note 15, at 226. he notes, however, that the 
Albany Plan would have granted to the central authority control over those Indian 
treaties “in which the general interest of the Colonies may be concerned,” leav-
ing, presumably, Indian affairs with only local impact in the hands of individual  
colonies . . . . Colonial police power apparently would have remained largely intact, 
but subject to being overridden by central trade regulation. 
Id. (citation omitted). Issues of taxation would not fall within the police power, at least as that 
term has been interpreted under the Interstate Commerce Clause.
51 Preso, supra note 41, at 446. Apparently, the Crown was responding to a proposal of the 
English Board of Trade that all Indian affairs should be centralized. Documents, supra note 
48, at 903–06.
52 Wilcomb E. Washburn, Indians and the American Revolution, http://www.americanrevolu-
tion.org/ind1.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2010) [hereinafter Washburn, American Revolution].
53 Cohen’s handbook, supra note 7, at 19.
54 Id.
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responded with the uprising known as Pontiac’s War or Rebellion (1763-66). 
That incident convinced the Crown of the need to accelerate its control over 
the Indians.55 
Accordingly, King George III issued the Royal Proclamation of 1763. The 
Proclamation was intended in part to win the loyalty of the Indians, who 
generally favored the French in the French and Indian Wars (1754–63),56 and 
to promote the fur and pelt trade.57 The Proclamation recognized that great 
fraud and abuse had been committed in purchasing lands from the Indians.58 
In response, the Proclamation reserved all the lands beyond the Appalachians 
for the Indians and “forbade British citizens or colonies from purchasing 
lands from the Indians except . . . in the name of the Crown.”59 
The Proclamation attempted to stop colonial encroachment by establishing 
a temporary boundary between the colonies and the tribes, and prohibited 
any colonial governor from granting land within that boundary that had been 
reserved to the Indians, though there was an exception for the Governors 
in Canada and East and West Florida.60 The lands beyond the Appalachian 
mountain chain were off limits to the colonies, as they were reserved to the 
Indians under the cognizance of the Crown.61 
55 Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1089.
56 Taylor, Colonies, supra note 49, 428–37. The French and Indian Wars were the last in a 
longstanding conflict between the British and the French. This conflict started in Europe. For 
example, the War of the League of Augsburg (1688–97), known as King William’s War in the 
English colonies, pitted an anti-French alliance that included England, Sweden, Spain, Austria, 
holland, and a few German States, against Louis XIV. In terms of European dynasties, it rep-
resented the hapsburgs against the Bourbons. This, and related conflicts, made Canada a prize 
the British desperately sought. Queen Anne’s War (1702–1713) involved essentially the same 
protagonists in a fight over who would succeed to the Spanish throne when Charles II died 
without issue. Spain was a nominal ally of France so that once again Canada was in play but 
ultimately remained in French hands. Under the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713, which ended new 
hostilities between the Bourbons and the hapsburgs, France yielded portions of Nova Scotia, 
Newfoundland, and the southern shores of hudson Bar to England. Despite these concessions, 
France continued to embrace the North American continent, founding New Orleans in 1718. 
Spain had a presence in Florida, leading the British to found Savannah, Georgia in 1733 as a 
buffer between the Carolinas and Florida. This strategy proved successful when Georgia later 
became a royal province over the opposition of Spain.
57 Taylor, Framework, supra note 23, at 849. “The trade was so important that France, Britain, 
and America fought major wars aimed at gaining control over this trade.” Id. at 852.
58 Cohen’s handbook, supra note 7, at 19. “Abuses included fraud in the sales of goods, 
exorbitant prices for goods, use of liquor to acquire goods and land at unfairly low prices, 
extortion, trading in stolen goods, gun-running, and physical invasion of Indian territory.” 
Natelson, supra note 15, at 220.
59 Cohen’s handbook, supra note 7, at 19; see Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Preconstitutional 
Federal Power, 82 Tul. L. Rev. 509, 550 (2007) [hereinafter Fletcher, Preconstitutional].
60 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 548 (1832). All applications for Indian land 
cessions and patents had to be forwarded to England. Francis Paul Prucha, American 
Indian Policy in the Formative Years: The Trade and Intercourse acts, 1790–1834, 18 
(1962) [hereinafter Prucha, Policy]. Prior to the 1763 Proclamation, there was no recognized 
territory dedicated solely to the Indians. Id. at 13.
61 Washburn, American Revolution, supra note 52.
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“Although the anger of the colonies was tempered by the knowledge that 
the freeze was a temporary measure and not necessarily permanent, it marked 
another example of the tightening noose placed by the home government 
over colonial freedom of action.”62 Anyone illegally possessing Indian land 
would be removed.63 Only the Crown could purchase Indian land within 
a colony. British subjects could freely trade with the Indians only if they 
obtained a license from their colonial governor and posted security, which 
would be forfeited if they refused to follow relevant regulations.64 In addition, 
between 1765 and 1769, a permanent boundary was established running from 
Canada (specifically Lake Ontario) to Florida,65 “confirming in the minds of 
Indians (and of many colonists) the belief that the Indian country was closed 
to speculation and settlement by the increasingly aggressive colonists.”66 The 
Crown thus imperialized the control of land in the colonies.
Because the Proclamation provided a “more carefully coordinated and 
more tightly administered colonial administration,”67 it was resisted by the 
colonists and by individuals who regarded speculation in Indian lands as their 
right.68 Nevertheless, England saw such restrictions as necessary to avoid wars 
precipitated by the colonists’ land claims.69
A more ambitious plan for implementing the Proclamation of 1763 was 
issued by the Board of Trade one year later. The Board proposed establish-
ing a British Department of Indian Affairs under the direction of the Crown 
“so as to set aside all local interfering of particular Provinces, which has been 
one great cause of the distracted state of Indian affairs in general,”70 and put 
“the regulation of Indian Affairs, both commercial and political throughout 
all North America, upon one general system, under the direction of officers 
appointed by the Crown.”71 
62 Id.
63 Adam Short & Arthur Doughty, Documents Relating to the Constitutional 
history of Canada 1759–1791, at 167–68 (1907).
64 Taylor, Framework, supra note 23, at 849. Professor Clinton described the Proclamation 
of 1763 as the “culmination of British crown experience in seeking an effective model for the 
management of Euro-American/Indian relations.” Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1092. 
he identified the key elements: centralization of the management of land cessions, diplomatic 
relations and trade in London and the diminution or elimination of local colonial authority; 
long-term guarantees to the Indians of their lands; and protection of Indian autonomy and 
sovereignty. Id. A proclamation issued by Massachusetts Governor Gage in 1772 provided that 
persons illegally on Indian land should leave immediately. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 548. 
65 Prucha, Policy, supra note 60, at 19; see also Short & Doughty, supra note 63, at 
119–23.
66 Washburn, American Revolution, supra note 52.
67 Washburn, Red Man’s Land, supra note 39, at 49. 
68 Robert A. Williams, Jr., The American Indian in Western Legal Thought: The 
Discourses of Conquest 227–30 (1990).
69 Washburn, Red Man’s Land, supra note 39, at 49–50.
70 Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1093 (quoting 6 Documents Relative to the 
Colonial history of the State of New York, supra note 48, at 634–41). 
71 Id. Beginning in 1764, the Board of Trade began more aggressive regulation of trade 
between colonies and the Indians. Trade was taken out of the hands of the colonists, all colonial 
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This plan, however, was abandoned in 1768. After putting down Pontiac’s 
War (1763-66) and eliminating the French threat, the British apparently 
felt less pressure to spend money and resources managing the Indians. Con-
sequently, control of Indian trade reverted to the colonies, which did very 
little. With the expulsion of the French, who previously maintained colonies 
stretching from the mouth of the St. Lawrence River to the mouth of the 
Mississippi, the Indians who lived in that region could no longer play off the 
two European powers.72 The colonies could afford to ignore the Indians and 
trade abuses and land encroachments again became rampant and generated 
the same unrest that had occurred prior to the French and Indian War: 
Experience with commercial regulation at the colonial level (and, later, 
the state level) was fundamentally unsatisfactory. . . . During the Colonial 
Era, the British superintendents of Indian affairs complained bitterly about 
abuses in Indian trade and about what they saw as the unwillingness of 
colonial officials to correct the problems. Native leaders also frequently 
complained, urging British officials to further limit trading posts to fixed 
locations, to tighten trader licensing, and to invalidate land titles received 
without government authorization.73
On the eve of the Revolution, separate, independent colonial management 
of Indian affairs had failed again. Immediately prior to 1776, events were 
moving toward complete reassertion of imperial control over the manage-
ment of Indian matters. The Revolution, however, intervened and left to 
the newly-independent colonies the problem of restructuring a functional 
institutional machinery for regulating Indian affairs.74
Professor Clinton summarizes the colonial period as follows:
The colonial experience afforded considerable evidence of the impor-
tance of centralized coordination of Indian trade, land and diplomatic  
policies. . . . There was always an underlying tension between the need for 
laws regulating Indian affairs were repealed, and control was given to British superintendents 
of each district. Under this new regulation all traders were required to obtain licenses from the 
governor of their respective colonies and to post bonds for the observance of the regulations. 
Trade was governed by prices established from time to time by appointed officials, in concert 
with the traders and Indians. This plan lasted four years. Prucha, The Great Father, supra 
note 25, at 26. This early use of licenses and price controls may have influenced the design of 
the Indian Trader statutes, See infra notes 427, 432, 434. In 1768, “the Board of Trade formally 
divided authority so that London retained control over treaty talks and over issues of land titles 
outside any colony, while local colonial assemblies handled other governmental functions, 
including the regulation of commerce with the Indians. Such was the division of authority 
when the Revolution began.” Natelson, supra note 15, at 219.
72 Washburn, American Revolution, supra note 52. “The history of the tortuous diplomacy 
between the Iroquois Confederation and their Dutch and English neighbors on the one hand 
and the French in Canada on the other is matched in the south by the contest between England 
and France for the loyalty and support of Cherokees, Choctaws, Chickasaws and Creeks.” 
Washburn, Red Man’s Land, supra note 39, at 47–48. 
73 Natelson, supra note 15, at 222–23.
74 Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1097.
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effective, coordinated, and well-run Indian policy and the profits colonists 
knew could be made in Indian trade and land cessions. . . . The newly-
independent states thereafter replayed the same mistakes earlier made by 
the British as they tried, during the confederation period, to separately 
implement an Indian policy with ineffectual, limited coordination by the 
national government. Again, the conflict between local desires for economic 
profit and land and the necessity for coordination and centralization in 
Indian regulation frustrated the efforts of the new nation to implement a 
successful Indian policy after the Revolution.75
Professor Natelson agrees in part: 
[E]ven purely local interactions [with the Indians] might have wider con-
sequences—negative externalities. Negative externalities suggested a need 
for central control. For example, during the British imperial period, the 
regional effects of colonial failure to properly regulate trade argued for cen-
tral trade regulation by the British government. [But, on] the other hand, 
the cost of central control sometimes exceeded the cost of negative external-
ities. For example, remote British colonial administration was encumbered 
by all sorts of practical problems, which argued for regulating trade at the 
colonial level. Consequently, the most appropriate level of government to 
handle a particular problem did not always appear obvious.76
B.  The Revolutionary War and the Confederation 
1.  The Revolutionary War
The Declaration of Independence contained one unflattering reference to the 
Indians: “[King George III] had excited domestic insurrections amongst us, 
and has endeavoured to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, merciless 
Indian Savages, whose known rule of warfare, is an undistinguished destruc-
tion of all ages, sexes and conditions.”77 Nonetheless, the Revolutionary War 
again made the “merciless savages” sought-after allies. But if the colonies 
could not win over the Indians as allies, then it was critical at least to neutral-
ize them. 
On July 12, 1775, the Continental Congress declared its jurisdiction over 
Indian tribes and pledged itself to secure and to preserve the peace and friend-
ship of the Indian nations.78 A report from a committee on Indian affairs, 
recognizing that there was a distinct possibility that the British would attempt 
to enlist the aid of the Indians against the rebellion, recommended that mea-
75 Id. at 1098.
76 Natelson, supra note 15, at 218–19.
77 The Declaration of Independence para. 29 (U.S. 1776). Apparently, this reference 
was in response to the Indian murder of a Miss Jane McCrea. The Indians were under the com-
mand of British General Burgoyne. Washburn, American Revolution, supra note 52.
78 2 Journals of the Continental Congress 1774–1789, at 174–75 (1905). For a gen-
eral discussion of the Indians during the American Revolution and its aftermath, see Wilcomb 
E. Washburn, The Indian in America 146–69 (1975).
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sures be taken to foster friendship with the various tribes.79 
In the early days of the war, neither the British nor the colonists enlisted 
Indian support; both sides urged the Indians to remain neutral because the 
“disputes were a family quarrel in which the Indians were not concerned.”80 
Nonetheless, in the winter of 1774–75, George Washington recruited some 
Indians.81 In the fall of 1775, the British General Gage used Washington’s 
actions to bring the Indians into the war on the side of England.82 
The British had an advantage in winning over the Indians. Because of long-
standing hostility between the Indians and the land-hungry, expansionist 
colonists, the Indians viewed the British as the lesser of two evils.83 Realizing 
this, the Continental Congress countered with a plan directed at “securing 
and preserving the friendship of the Indian nations”84 by establishing three 
agencies (or departments) for the northern, southern, and middle tribes to 
“treat with the Indians . . . to preserve peace and friendship.”85 
These agencies replicated the British organization for handling Indian 
affairs. The importance of these agencies is demonstrated by the appointment 
of Benjamin Franklin, Patrick henry, and James Wilson as commissioners of 
79 Prucha, Policy, supra note 60, at 27.
80 Washburn, American Revolution, supra note 52.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 See Valencia-Weber, supra note 24, at 424 (“In the revolutionary and confederacy period, 
the British, French, and Spanish each pursued advantages in political, economic, and military 
alliances. Each exploited a strategically stated willingness to respect the tribes as political pow-
ers who had full title to their lands, in contrast to expansive states’ claims to title in Indian 
lands.”).
The Continental Congress worried that the British would enter into a treaty with 
the Western tribes, especially the Six Nations of haudenosaunee and the Indians 
of the Great Lakes and Ohio River Valley region, and those tribes would take up 
arms against the Americans. Given the relative military weakness of the Americans 
in the early years of the Revolutionary War and the fear of Indian-style guerrilla 
warfare, the Continental Congress treated the situation with grave concern. The 
Continental Congress had another reason to fear the Indian tribes—they had a much 
better relationship with the British than the Americans, who the Indian tribes viewed 
as a vicious and hungry competitor to their lands. The British Indian agents lob-
bied Indian tribes all along the Western frontier to fight against the Americans. The 
Continental Congress had little choice but to deal with the Indian tribes, seeking 
either alliances or tribal neutrality, as the piecemeal efforts of the individual colonies 
failed. 
Fletcher, Preconstitutional, supra note 59, at 545–46.
84 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 549 (1832).
85 Cohen’s handbook, supra note 7, at 20 (quoting 2 Journals of the Continental 
Congress 175, 183 (1775)); see also Worcester, 31 U.S. at 573–74 (M’Lean, J., concurring)
(“The Indian country was divided into three departments, and the superintendence of each 
was committed to commissioners, who were authorised to hold treaties with the Indians, make 
disbursements of money for their use, and to discharge various duties, designed to preserve 
peace and cultivate a friendly feeling with them towards the colonies. No person was permitted 
to trade with them without a license from one or more of the commissioners of the respective 
departments.”).
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the middle department.86 In presenting a unified front to the Indians, the colo-
nists’ goal was to “prevent their taking any part in the present commotions.”87 
It was critical that the colonists, who lived along the frontiers of the Tribes, at 
least neutralize the Indians. For example, the British presence in Canada pres-
sured the young country to ratify its first treaty, with the Delawares,88 which 
contained “all of the hallmarks of international diplomacy.”89
Not until the summer of 1776 did either side attempt to involve the Iro-
quois, the most powerful of the northeast tribes. The Iroquois initially resisted. 
Uncertainty, however, about how the Indians might be affected by the war 
caused bitter divisions within the Iroquois tribe itself.90 By 1776, four of the 
six Iroquois nations joined the British (the Oneida91 and the Tuscarora would 
join later).92 A delegation from the north composed of Shawnees, Delawares, 
and Mohawks convinced the Cherokees to join the British.93 In the far south, 
the Indians also stood with the British in a losing effort against the Spanish.
86 2 Journals of the Continental Congress 175, 183 (1905).
87 Worcester, 31 U.S. at 549. 
88 Id. The treaty promised the free passage for the American troops through the Delaware 
Nation and that the Delaware Nation would be the head of a state formed by the tribes 
“friendly to the interest of the United States.” Id. at 550. The offer of statehood was withdrawn 
once the Revolutionary War ended and the Delawares were no longer a critical ally. John R. 
Wunder, “Retained by the People”: A history of American Indians and the Bill of 
Rights 19 (1994); see also Clinton, Supremacy, supra note 7, at 125–26. A 1785 treaty with 
the Cherokee Nation promised it “shall have the right to send a deputy of their choice . . . to 
Congress.” Treaty with the Cherokee, U.S.-Cherokee Nation, art. 12, Nov. 28, 1785, 7 Stat. 
18 [hereinafter Treaty of hopewell]. “Early on, there were persistent assumptions that Indian 
tribes would compose states or send representatives to Congress. In recent times there have 
been proposals for a ‘treaty federalism’ to include tribes in the governmental structure.” Ball, 
Constitution, supra note 7, at 69. Professor Clinton cites two treaties with the Indians as prom-
ising “Indian statehood, or at least a delegate to Congress,” and notes that “[t]hroughout the 
nineteenth century consideration was given to forming an Indian, rather than a multiracial, 
state in the former Indian territory, now eastern Oklahoma.” Clinton, Dormant, supra note 
22, at 1241 n.470.
89 Clinton, Supremacy, supra note 7, at 119–20. Before written treaties there were oral under-
standings marked by formal diplomatic ceremonies lasting several days, accompanied by the 
exchange of presents, and promises of friendship. Francis Paul Prucha, American Indian 
Treaties 26 (1994) [hereinafter Prucha, Treaties].
90 Washburn, American Revolution, supra note 52.
91 The Oneida were “one of the six nations of the Iroquois, the most powerful Indian Tribe 
in the Northeast at the time of the American Revolution.” City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian 
Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 203 (2005) (citing County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 
U.S. 226, 230 (1985)).
92 Washburn, American Revolution, supra note 52.
93 The Delaware Tribe vacillated between support for the Americans and support for the 
British. The Tribe was undecided about which was the lesser evil. Some Delaware leaders 
viewed the conflict as a way to gain powerful American support in order to “shake off Iroquois 
domination,” whereas others abhorred a treaty. Celia Barnes, Native American Power in 
the United States, 1783–1795, at 41 (2003). In 1778, a group of the Tribe, led by White 
Eye, “signed a treaty of neutrality with the Americans that gave them right of passage across 
Delaware land and included provision for a separate Delaware state” at the end of the war. Id. 
Not all Delawares supported the treaty and White Eye was murdered while he was working 
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2.  Articles of Confederation
The so-called “Indian problem” dominated the new country. Benjamin Frank-
lin, the author of the Albany Plan of 1754, which had attempted to centralize 
control over the Indians, completed a first draft of the Articles of Confedera-
tion for the Continental Congress in 1776.94 The 1776 draft delegated to the 
national government the sole and exclusive right of regulating trade and man-
aging all affairs with the Indians.95 The draft provided that no colony could 
engage in an offensive war with the Indians without Congressional consent, 
nor could any colony purchase or encroach upon Indian lands. The draft also 
called for a perpetual alliance with the formidable Confederacy. In addition, 
the draft gave the Continental Congress the exclusive right to purchase land 
from the Indians. 
Professor Clinton describes this first draft as seeking to “nationalize the con-
trol of Indian affairs, including the regulation of trade and land cessions.”96 
The second draft, by John Dickinson—who, like Franklin, also favored 
national control—expressed the same theme: The United States assembled 
shall have the sole and exclusive Right and Power of “[r]egulating the Trade, 
and managing all Affairs with the Indians.”97
for the Americans. During this period, the Americans disappointed many Delawares because 
the “frontiersmen continued to deny them supplies and the Continental Congress repeatedly 
broke its word.” 4 handbook of North American Indians 147 (1988). The Tribe later 
shifted its allegiance to the British. Id. 
94 Some historians claim that Franklin and other Founders were influenced in their think-
ing by the governmental structure of the Iroquois Confederacy. See, e.g., Brian Cook, Iroquois 
Confederacy and the Influence Thesis (Dec. 11, 2000), http://www.campton.sau48.k12.nh.us/
iroqconf.htm. See also h. Con. Res. 331, 100 Cong. 2nd Sess. (1988) (“[T]he original framers 
of the Constitution, including, most notably, George Washington and Benjamin Franklin, are 
known to have greatly admired the concepts of the Six Nations of the Iroquois Confederacy.”); 
supra note 46.
95 Mark Savage, Native Americans and the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 16 Am. 
Indian L. Rev. 57, 99 (1991). 
Language to the effect that the national government had the right to regulate trade with the 
Indians and manage all of their affairs would subsequently appear in Article IX of the Articles 
of Confederation and in treaties. See infra notes 107−09 and accompanying text. This lan-
guage has never been interpreted to mean that a tribe “was divested of self-government.” Ball, 
Constitution, supra note 7, at 48. 
Professor Fletcher notes that Indian advocates may object to a suggestion that Indian tribes 
can be divested of inherent authority without tribal consent. They object to Cohen’s 1941 
edition, see supra note 9, which stated that the tribes could be divested of inherent tribal sov-
ereignty by Congress. To such advocates, this formulation smacks of a colonialist formulation. 
Fletcher, Supreme Court, supra note 14, at 182. Cohen’s formulation was approved of in United 
States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978), and in later editions of the handbook. Unsurprisingly, 
advocates would prefer a rule that Indian tribes can be divested of authority only with their 
consent. Id. 
96 Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1099.
97 Preso, supra note 41, at 447 (emphasis added). For a more detailed history of this pro-
posal, see Savage, supra note 95, at 81 n.97.
Professor Natelson describes Dickinson’s Indian affairs provision as in “some ways more 
nationalistic than the Franklin draft and in some ways less.” Natelson, supra note 15, at 227. 
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The debate over whether the Continental Congress should have the exclu-
sive power over the Indians reflected diverse views. South Carolina, for exam-
ple, argued that trade with the Indians was too lucrative to be ceded to the 
new Congress.98 In contrast, other states favored national control because the 
cost of fighting the Indians would outweigh the gains from trade.99 Some 
argued that only the Continental Congress should have the power over the 
Indians to stop conflicts among the colonies and between the colonies and the 
tribes.100 Virginia sought to retain control over the “tributary tribes” within its 
territory;101 Jefferson argued that some Indians were “living in a colony and 
thus subject to [Virginia’s] laws.”102 Pennsylvania disagreed: “[w]e have no 
right over the Indians, whether within or without the real or pretended limits 
of any Colony.”103 
The more cynical feared that federal politicians wanted the exclusive power 
in order to exploit the Indians and to make their own fortunes in land specu-
lation. Others opposed the centralization of power on more philosophical 
grounds, as a matter of states’ rights. Debates over Franklin’s draft mirrored 
the longstanding issue of whether the new national government should have 
the exclusive power over Indians or whether control should be shared with 
the states. At the least, it was understood that the states would not have the 
exclusive power.
Unlike Franklin’s proposal, Dickinson granted Congress the exclusive power to acquire land 
from the Indians only outside state boundaries. Id.
98 
South Carolina governed Indian commerce in several different ways. Some regula-
tions were directed at the identity of those carrying on that commerce. A trader had 
to be licensed. he had to be of good moral character and post a bond. A potential 
applicant’s name was posted publicly before applying, so anyone with objections 
would have an opportunity to raise them. Traders were restricted as to whom they 
could employ as their agents. The names of potential agents had to be disclosed. 
Traders who violated these rules by, for instance, trading without a license, were sub-
ject to substantial penalties . . . In addition, South Carolina law specified where trade 
could be carried on. A trader’s license stated where he was authorized to trade, and he 
could not work elsewhere. It was illegal to bring natives into white settlements with-
out prior permission. It was illegal for whites to travel into Indian country without 
prior permission . . . . Apart from its thoroughness, the South Carolina scheme was 
not unusual. Most of the provisions listed above appeared in the laws of other juris-
dictions. They also appeared in treaties. In other words, this was the sort of scheme 
the founding generations envisioned when it granted a federal power to ‘‘Regulate 
Commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes.’’
Natelson, supra note 15, at 220–22. See also supra notes 41, 71.
99 Preso, supra note 41, at 447; Savage, supra note 95, at 81.
100 Savage, supra note 95, at 81–82.
101 6 Journals of the Constitutional Congress 1776, at 1077 (1906).
102 Savage, supra note 95, at 99–100.
103 6 Journals of the Continental Congress 1776, at 1078 (1776); see also Savage, supra 
note 95, at 100.
01-Pomp.indd   926 12/23/2010   11:03:25 AM
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2443846
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 63, No. 4
 INDIAN COMMERCE CLAUSE AND STATE TAXATION 927
3.  Article IX of the Articles of Confederation
A majority of representatives at the Continental Congress realized that peace 
with the Indians required negotiations by a centralized body speaking on 
behalf of all the colonists.104 After various iterations,105 Article IX of the Arti-
cles of Confederation, approved by the Continental Congress on November 
15, 1777,106 set forth compromise language: 
The United States, in Congress assembled, shall also have the sole and exclu-
sive107 rights and power of . . . regulating the trade and managing all affairs 
with the Indians,108 not members of any of the States, provided that the 
legislative right of any State within its own limits be not infringed or vio-
lated.109
From the outset, Article IX was plagued by two gaping ambiguities. There 
was no understanding as to which Indians were considered as “members” of a 
104 But see Natelson, supra note 15, at 225 (“When Americans began to consider a com-
mon government other than the Crown, they had to weigh the same issues of how to divide 
central and local control over Indian affairs. These were not easy questions. The Indian tribes 
were (then as now) sui generis—neither wholly foreign nor wholly part of the body politic, so 
foreign and domestic affairs precedents offered no obvious rule for dividing jurisdiction. There 
certainly was not, as some writers have claimed, any emerging consensus in favor of central 
over local control.”).
105 The full story is set forth in Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1099–1103.
106 Most of the debate over Article IX has not been preserved. “We do know that jurisdiction 
over Native affairs remained a controversial point.” Natelson, supra note 15, at 228.
107 Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. IX (emphasis added).
108 In 1785 and 1786, the “treaties negotiated at hopewell with the Cherokees, Choctaw, 
and Chickasaw provided that the United States in Congress assembled, shall have the sole and 
exclusive right of regulating trade with the Tribes. The treaties guaranteed the Tribes continued 
occupancy of land in North and South Carolina and Georgia.” Brief of Respondent-Appellee 
Indian Tribes, Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 
134 (1979) (No. 78-630), 1979 WL 200129, at *73 (internal quotations omitted) [hereinafter 
Brief of Appellee Indian Tribes]; see also Treaty with the Cherokee, U.S.-Indian, art. IV, Nov. 
28, 1785, 7 Stat. 18; Treaty with the Choctaw, U.S.-Indian, art. III, Jan. 3, 1786, 7 Stat. 21; 
Treaty with the Chickasaw, U.S.-Indian, art. III, Jan. 10, 1786, 7 Stat. 24.
109 The Treaty of hopewell (1785) with the Cherokee Nation contains virtually identical 
language, granting Congress the right of “regulating the trade with the Indians, and managing 
all their affairs.” Treaty of hopewell, supra note 88. This treaty language is cited in Worcester v. 
Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 554 (1832). In Worcester, Chief Justice Marshall interpreted the 
phrase “managing all their affairs” to exclude any effect on the internal affairs of the Tribe. Id. 
Marshall “read it to mean that Congress has power to regulate trade with Indians, no more. It 
did not mean that the tribe was divested of self-government. Tribal political existence was not 
thus to be annihilated.” Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 48.
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state110 or what constituted the “legislative right” of a state.111 The result was 
that the constraints on the power of the Continental Congress were vague and 
unclear.112 These flaws would prove to be fatal and led Madison to describe 
Article IX as “incomprehensible”113 and “obscure and contradictory.”114 For 
the time being, however, Article IX allowed the Continental Congress to tem-
porarily postpone the ultimate showdown on the appropriate distribution of 
powers over the Indians. 
The Articles of Confederation were approved on November 15, 1777 with 
final ratification in March 1781.115 The ambiguities in Article IX played out 
as expected, with conflicts between the states and the Continental Congress 
over their respective powers and rights. The two ambiguities in Article IX 
110 According to Madison,
Indian[s] not members of a State, must be meant those . . . who do not live within 
the body of the Society, or whose Persons or property form no object of its laws. In 
the case of Indians of this description the only restraint of Congress is imposed by the 
Legislative authority of the State. If this proviso be taken in its full latitude, it must 
destroy the authority of Congress altogether, since no act of Congs. within the limits 
of a State can be conceived which will not in some way or another encroach on the 
authority [of the] States.
James Madison, 8 The Papers of James Madison 156 (William T. hutchinson et al. eds. 
1973) (emphasis added). 
Professor Clinton argues that “members” refers to Indian voting citizens, such as “the 
Indians in the Massachusetts praying Indian towns,” Clinton, Supremacy, supra note 7, at 128, 
or tributary tribes, such as existed in Virginia under feudal tutelage of that State, Clinton, 
Dormant, supra note 22, at 1140–41. When the Articles were drafted in 1777, the boundaries 
of the United States contained only the land claimed by the states so that all Indians within 
the United States were within the geographical limits of a state. Id. at 1141. Professor Natelson 
states that “[a]s contemporaneous dictionaries make clear, the requirement that an Indian be a 
‘member’ of a state meant that he had to be integrated into the body-politic as a citizen—or at 
least a taxpayer—of the state.” Natelson, supra note 15, at 229.
111 For Professor Clinton’s views, see Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1103–04. Article 
II of the Articles of Confederation provided that “[e]ach state retains its sovereignty and 
every power, jurisdiction, and right which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated 
to the United States.” Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. II. According to Professor 
Natelson, the combination of Articles II and IX was “a clear victory for the advocates of state 
power. States would retain authority over ‘Member-Indians,’ those who had been completely 
subject to state laws.” Natelson, supra note 15, at 230.
112 Professor Fletcher surmises that the Article “consisted of the squeezing together a combi-
nation of the nationalists’ proposed language and the antifederalists’ proposed language—with-
out serious consideration of the impact it would have on the meaning of the final provision.” 
Fletcher, Preconstitutional, supra note 59, at 548.
113 “And how the trade with Indians, though not members of a State, yet residing within its 
legislative jurisdiction, can be regulated by an external authority, without so far intruding on 
the internal rights of legislation, is absolutely incomprehensible. This is not the only case in 
which the Articles of Confederation have inconsiderately endeavored to accomplish impossi-
bilities; to reconcile a partial sovereignty in the Union, with complete sovereignty in the States; 
to subvert a mathematical axiom, by taking away a part, and letting the whole remain.” The 
Federalist No. 42, at 236 (James Madison) (E.h. Scott ed., Scott, Foresman & Co. 1898).
114 Id.
115 19 Journal of the Continental Congress 1781, at 213–14 (1912).
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were interpreted by some states as legitimizing their dealings with, and regu-
lation of, the tribes. Georgia, North Carolina, and New York, for example, 
continued to exercise jurisdiction over the Indians, and other states and their 
residents continued to assert claims over Indian land. 
In addition, some states entered into treaties with the Indians, thwarting 
national attempts to do so. “The colonists chose treaty making to obtain 
what they needed from the Native Americans who had superiority over 
the Euro-Americans in population, military strength, possession of land, 
critical resources, and knowledge for surviving in the environment alien to 
newcomers.”116 “Less well known is the fact that colonies (and later states) 
regularly exercised, or attempted to exercise, police power over those Native 
Americans, tribal and non-tribal, who lived within their borders.”117 
New York claimed the exclusive right to enter into a treaty with the Con-
federacy at the same time that the Continental Congress was attempting to 
negotiate its own treaty.118 North Carolina and Georgia were constantly at 
loggerheads with the Continental Congress. Georgia tried to negotiate its 
own treaty with the Indians.119 The hope for a unified country neutralizing 
the tribes in the Revolutionary War rapidly faded as many Indians fought 
alongside the British.120
C. Post-Revolutionary War
The Treaty of Paris of 1783, which ended the Revolutionary War, contained 
no reference to the Indians.121 Great Britain ceded whatever title it had to the 
territory between the Atlantic Ocean and the Mississippi, including the lands 
116 Valencia-Weber, supra note 24, at 421. 
117 Natelson, supra note 15, at 223. “This power was in accordance with English case author-
ity . . . .” Id.
118 New York, for example, acquired vast amounts of land, both before and after the adop-
tion of the Constitution through treaties it independently negotiated. Gerald Gunther, 
Governmental Power and New York Indian Lands—A Reassessment of a Persistent Problem of 
Federal-State Relations, 8 Buffalo L. Rev. 1, 4–6 (1959).
119 1 American State Papers: Indian Affairs 16–17 (1832).
120 The Cherokees were among those who fought with the British. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 
U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 551 (1832). For an extensive discussion of the conduct of the Indians during 
the Revolutionary War, see Prucha, The Great Father, supra note 25, at 36–50 and Walter 
Mohr, Federal Indian Relations, 1774–1788, at 37–91 (1933). See also Savage, supra note 
95, at 100.
121 “Despite their important role and visible presence, [the Indians] had receded into the 
shadows of European diplomacy. Recognition of their existence and status was easier to ignore 
or deny in Europe than in America.” Washburn, American Revolution, supra note 52. Because 
the Treaty of Paris did not include any provision for the Indian tribes, they therefore remained 
technically at war with the colonists. Prucha, The Great Father, supra note 25, at 42–43. 
Thus “[i]t seemed only natural and proper to the founders of the nation that Indian affairs be 
placed under the War Department.” Id. at 42. Walter Mohr, however, claims that although the 
“Indians are not mentioned in the treaty of 1783, yet they were a very influential factor in the 
negotiations.” Mohr, supra note 120, at 93.
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of numerous tribes.122 In gaining this land, the new country realized it had 
to make peace with many hostile tribes that had fought with the British in 
order to avoid another prolonged—and unsustainable—conflict, especially 
as Americans became increasingly expansionist.123 In their negotiations, the 
Americans tried to convince the Indians that they were a conquered people 
who had lost all their rights as a result of allying themselves with the defeated 
British in the Revolutionary War.124 But “[n]either the Iroquois, nor the Indi-
ans of the Old Northwest, nor those of the South, tamely accepted colonial 
assertions of sovereignty by right of conquest.”125 
Some states made their own overtures to the Indians, but most realized that 
the Continental Congress was the appropriate body to pursue peace. “[I]t is 
just and necessary that lines of property should be ascertained and established 
between the United States and [the Indians], which will be convenient to 
the respective tribes, and commensurate to the public wants.”126 In 1784, 
the Continental Congress appointed Commissioners to negotiate boundary 
lines and conclude peace with the tribes.127 The United States entered into a 
series of treaties by which “the ‘hatchet’ was ‘forever buried.’”128 One of these 
122 Treaty of Paris, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. 1-2, Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80. The Spanish representa-
tive at the Paris negotiations argued that the lands west of the Appalachians belonged to the 
“free and independent nations of Indians,” to which the British had no claim. Washburn, 
American Revolution, supra note 52.
123 Arrell M. Gibson, Constitutional Experiences of the Five Civilized Tribes, 2 Am. Indian L. 
Rev. 17, 20 (1974); Savage, supra note 95, at 100. 
124 Savage, supra note 95, at 100; Washburn, American Revolution, supra note 52.
125 Washburn, American Revolution, supra note 52. “The United States was militarily weak 
after 1783 and, although it at first treated the tribes as conquered nations, it quickly reversed 
itself, developing the policy of compensating tribes for any land it took and arranging for trea-
ties between tribes and the federal government to effect any transfers of property. The tribes 
were upset at the United States’ highhanded policy after the war, which threatened the security 
of the United States.” Joseph William Singer, Canons of Conquest: the Supreme Court’s Attack on 
Tribal Sovereignty, 37 New Eng. L. Rev. 641, 657 (2003).
126 Report of the Committee to Whom Were Referred Sundry Papers on Indian Affairs in the 
Northern and Middle Departments, 25 Journal of the Constitutional Congress 682 
(1922).
127 Cohen’s handbook, supra note 7, at 22.
128 Id. (citing Treaty at hopewell). The Continental Congress had two clauses dealing with 
treaties. One dealt with treaties with the Indians; the other with foreign countries. Articles 
of Confederation of 1781, art. IX, para. 1, 4. The U.S. Constitution gives the President the 
power to make treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 
2. The Constitution is silent on the nature of the treaty partner.
Treaties are the acts of sovereigns, and autonomy (self-government free from outside 
control) is central to the definition of sovereignty. The good faith and good will of the 
participants, and the belief of each that the other has the power to fulfill its obliga-
tions, are essential to the success of a treaty. Without such power, any agreement is 
meaningless.
I The Cambridge history of the Native Peoples of the Americas 462, 486 (Bruce G. 
Trigger & Wilcomb E. Washburn eds., 1996).
These treaties varied quite significantly from each other, but the early ones tended to cover 
land cessions, boundary matters, exchange of prisoners, mutual assistance, extradition, the 
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treaties was with the Confederacy. In a conciliatory effort, the Continental 
Congress determined the boundaries of Indian and non-Indian lands and 
voided all purchases of Indian lands outside the boundaries of the states. 
But states like Georgia challenged these actions and continued to negotiate 
treaties with the Indians to purchase their lands,129 sometimes under suspect 
circumstances.130 
right to pass through Indian country, and relations with other sovereigns. See Early American 
Indian Documents: Treaties and Law, 1607–1789 (Alan T. Vaughan ed.); Cohen’s 
handbook, supra note 7, at 26–33. Some early treaties provided for tribal representation in 
Congress, see supra note 88, but such provisions were never implemented. Cohen’s handbook, 
supra, at 28. The overriding treaty objective of the United States was to obtain Indian lands. 
Id. at 29. The early treaties referred to the tribes as sovereigns, possessing the right to govern 
their internal affairs. The later treaties imposed federal controls over matters involving Indian 
intercourse with non-Indians, and moved away from exclusive tribal authority. Id. at 32.
129 In 1786, Georgia signed the Treaty of Shoulderbone with the Creek Indians, in defiance 
of the federal government’s exclusive power to deal with the Tribes. Preso, supra note 41, at 
450. 
130 As a general matter, treaties were sometimes entered into through bribery, fraudulent, or 
questionable means or signed by persons who did not represent the whole tribe. Jay Kinney, A 
Continent Lost—A Civilization Won 37, 44–45, 52, 71, 93–94 (1937). Tribal organiza-
tions were loose, sometimes to the point of anarchy, which meant that even though a chief 
might agree to a treaty, others did not view it as binding. Axelrod, supra note 29, at 34. This 
loose tribal government structure often led to splintered factions of “war” and “peace.” Id. 
Friendly Indians were commonly selected as chiefs by federal officials and given 
power and prestige over tribes that had their own methods for selecting leaders. Some 
treaties purported to bind Indian tribes not present at negotiations by the signatures 
of unauthorized head men who were unaware that their signatures would bind those 
tribes. There are numerous accounts of threats, coercion, bribery, and outright fraud 
by the negotiators for the United States.
Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 7, at 610. See also supra note 93. A further problem 
was the language barrier. “The Indian treaties were written only in English, making it a cer-
tainty that semantic and interpretational problems would arise. When several Indian tribes 
were involved, the government negotiators would sometimes use a language they believed to 
be common to all tribes but which in fact carried different meaning to each.” Id. The U.S. 
Supreme Court acknowledged these problems in Jones v. Meehan. 175 U.S. 1, 11 (1899); see 
also Choctaw Nation v. Okla., 397 U.S. 620, 630–31 (1970) (“The Indian Nations did not 
seek out the United States and agree upon an exchange of lands in an arm’s-length transac-
tion. Rather treaties were imposed upon them and they had no choice but to consent.”). These 
problems help explain the Indian canons of construction for interpreting treaties. See infra 
notes 251, 257, 532, 541, 619, 1057, 1302. Wilkinson and Volkman identify three canons for 
interpreting treaties: ambiguous expressions must be resolved in favor of the Indians; treaties 
must be interpreted as the Indians themselves would have understood them; treaties must be 
liberally construed in favor of the Indians. Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 7, at 617. The 
explanation for these canons would seem to be limited to treaties; however, the courts have 
extended the general approach to interpreting statutes.
Many treaties were entered into in bad faith, but not all of the violations can be blamed on 
white perfidy. Many times the white treaty makers “fully expected that their side would abide 
by the terms of the agreement[s],” but unfortunately neither the colonial nor (later) the federal 
governments always had the means to force the compliance of those they governed. Axelrod, 
supra note 29, at 34 (1993). 
01-Pomp.indd   931 12/23/2010   11:03:26 AM
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2443846
932 SECTION OF TAXATION
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 63, No. 4
Disputes between some of the southern states and certain Indian tribes 
continued after the war and underscored the need for a strong national gov-
ernment that could impose order. Like the British before, the Continental 
Congress was reduced to issuing proclamations that outlawed encroachments 
on Indian land and that prohibited hostilities against the tribes, but these 
were promptly ignored. Some states continued to enter into treaties, while 
other states attacked the Indians. Georgia, for example, declared that any 
Creek Indian found within the State would be put to death and subsequently 
went to war with the Tribe in 1787; North Carolina was on the verge of war 
with the Cherokees.131 Other states, like Virginia, aggressively intervened in 
Indian affairs.132 Relations with the Indians were seriously deteriorating.133 By 
the mid-1780s, “the resulting encroachment into Indian territory had lead 
[sic] the young nation to the brink of Indian warfare on several fronts.”134
III.  Birth of the Indian Commerce Clause
As the brief summary in the previous Section suggests, relations with the 
Indians were chaotic and deteriorating when the Constitutional Convention 
met for the first time on May 25, 1787. Besides the hostilities occurring in 
the Ohio River Valley, the States of Virginia, Georgia, North Carolina, and 
New York were negotiating on their own with the Confederacy.135 
131 In 1785, North Carolina requested Congress to disavow the Treaty of hopewell, which 
defined the lands of the Cherokee Nation. Preso, supra note 41, at 450. Secretary of War henry 
Knox sided with the Indians. In general, Knox “insisted that the dignity, morality, and stability 
of the new nation demanded respect for treaty obligations and tribal property rights.” Cohen’s 
handbook, supra note 7, at 33.
[T]he framers regarded Indian tribes as sovereign nations, albeit nations that would 
soon either move West, assimilate, or become extinct . . . . In formulating federal pol-
icy toward Indian tribes in the early years of the Constitution, President Washington 
and Secretary of War Knox followed the policy promulgated by the British Crown—
though not always followed by individual colonies—of dealing with Indian tribes as 
sovereign nations. Their principal reason was practical: earlier attempts by individual 
colonies and some states under the Articles of Confederation to assert power over 
Indian tribes, especially power to seize tribal lands, had caused conflicts. According 
to one historian, ‘‘[t]he country, precariously perched among the sovereign nations of 
the world, could not stand the expense and strain of a long drawn-out Indian war.’’
Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope and Limitations, 132 Pa. L. 
Rev. 195, 200 (1984) [hereinafter Newton, Federal Power]; see also Sarah h. Cleveland, Powers 
Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary 
Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 80-81 (2002).
132 Fletcher, Preconstitutional, supra note 59, at 552.
133 30 Journal of the Continental Congress 1786, at 372–74 (1934); 32 Journal of 
the Continental Congress 365–69 (1936); 34 Journal of The Continental Congress 
1786, at 365–69 (1936); 34 Journal of the Continental Congress 1787, at 182–83 
(1937). 
134 Cohen’s handbook, supra note 7, at 24.
135 Even after the Constitution had been ratified, New York appointed treaty commissioners. 
Natelson, supra note 15, at 223.
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The problems caused by state intrusions into the area of Indian affairs 
became of paramount concern to the drafters of the Constitution. James 
Madison referred to these problems in his introduction to the debates in 
the Constitutional Convention when he included “treaties and war with 
the Indians” in his enumeration of the violations of federal authority under 
the Articles.136 
Following adoption of the Constitution, “Secretary of War henry Knox, 
Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, and President George Washington for-
mulated a [new] policy of honor and goodwill toward the Indians.”137 This 
policy was reflected in 1787 in the Northwest Ordinance:
The utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the Indians, their 
lands and property shall never be taken from them without their consent; 
and in their property, right and liberty, they shall never be invaded or dis-
turbed, unless in just and lawful wars authorised by Congress; but laws 
founded in justice and humanity shall from time to time be made for pre-
venting wrongs being done to them, and for preserving peace and friend-
ship with them.138
The Ordinance turned out to be more aspirational than real, as many states 
ignored it, and bitter and violent confrontations occurred on the frontier.139 
Knox also reported to Congress that a national solution to the problem of 
dealing with the Indians was necessary to avoid war.140 he acknowledged that 
the various state claims over the Indians under the Articles of Confederation 
impeded a national solution.141 A committee of the Continental Congress 
reported in that same year that the complete and undivided federal control of 
Indian affairs was necessary. The Committee’s Report warned of possible war 
between the Creeks and Georgia and that the Indians might be seeking trade 
with Florida, then under Spanish domination.142 The Report blamed much of 
the friction on a misunderstanding of Article IX.143
136 Lester Marston & David A. Fink, The Indian Commerce Clause: The Reports of its Death 
have been Greatly Exaggerated, 16 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 205, 209 (1986). Professor 
Natelson describes Madison as favoring a “very broad congressional power over Indian affairs 
at the federal convention [but] when arguing for ratification he referred to the new congressio-
nal power in a way that equated it to trade regulation only.” Natelson, supra note 15, at 247.
137 Washburn, American Revolution, supra note 52.
138 32 Journals of the Continental Congress 1787, at 340–41 (2005).
139 Washburn, American Revolution, supra note 52.
140 32 Journals of the Continental Congress 1787, at 365–69 (2005). Professor 
Natelson describes Knox as favoring Georgia and North Carolina ceding disputed territory to 
the United States where it would be placed under congressional jurisdiction. Natelson, supra 
note 15, at 234.
141 32 Journal of the Continental Congress 1787, at 366–68 (2005); Natelson, supra 
note 15, at 233.
142 33 Journals of the Continental Congress 1787, at 455–463 (2005).
143 Brief of the Appellee Indian Tribes, supra note 108, at *75.
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A.  The Constitutional Convention
The defects in Article IX, which undercut the Continental Congress’s central-
ized control over Indian affairs, figured prominently in debates at the Consti-
tutional Convention. The Continental Congress had exercised considerable 
power over Indian affairs, provoking strong protests from states like New 
York, North Carolina, and Georgia, which had large numbers of Indians 
within their borders and wanted to control trade and land cessions. These 
states regulated Indian affairs inconsistently with each other and at odds with 
the Congress, with many of the regulations continuing pre-existing colonial 
policies. 
Because of opposition by some states, the Continental Congress was unable 
to assert exclusive power over the tribes. The states, however, seemed to accept 
the proposition that exclusive national authority was needed over the por-
tions of the western frontier ceded to the national government. Even New 
York, North Carolina, and Georgia recognized that the federal government 
had the exclusive authority over peace and war with the Indians, even with 
tribes living within those states. But this consensus broke down over lucrative 
commercial issues such as land and trade.
According to Professor Clinton, 
when the Constitutional Convention met in 1787 a majority view already 
had emerged on two important constitutional principles: (1) the need to 
complete centralization of control of Indian affairs in the national govern-
ment and (2) the autonomous legal status of the tribes. The ambiguities in 
[Article IX] had previously permitted room for state dissension from these 
principles and the most affected states had vigorously dissented.144 
Professor Natelson, however, offers a contrary view. 
[T]he state-congressional jurisdictional conflict during the Confederation 
period was very much a back-and-forth affair. There was no clear trend in 
the direction of either local or central control.145 As far as the delegates to 
the federal convention were concerned, there was no obvious precedent for 
them to follow.146 The delegates, like others before them, would have to 
grapple with the twin jurisdictional issues of (1) which levels of government 
144 Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1147.
145 Professor Clinton comments:
[T]he evidence strongly suggests that most members of the Continental Congress 
conceived the Indian tribes that had not completely lost their tribal autonomy during 
the colonial period as separate political groups which were not subject in any way to 
direct state regulation and were only subject to national authority in their relations 
with the states and their citizens. In matters of self-government and police regulations 
which did not affect the states or their citizens, the tribes were therefore viewed as 
independent and not subject to white authority. . . .
Id. at 1146.
146 Natelson, supra note 15, at 235.
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regulated which substantive areas and (2) which level of government should 
treat with which categories of Indians.147
Perhaps reflecting this lack of an “obvious precedent,” the Virginia Plan 
submitted to the Convention in May 1787 was silent on the Indian issue. 
The New Jersey148 and John Dickinson plans included commerce powers 
but no specific mention of Indian affairs.149 Another draft, presented by 
Charles Pinckney of South Carolina, would have granted Congress “exclusive 
power . . . of regulating the Trade of the several States as well with foreign 
Nations” and “exclusive Power . . . of regulating Indian Affairs.”150 The Report 
by the Committee of Detail followed the New Jersey and Dickinson plans. The 
draft provided for Congress to “regulate commerce with foreign nations, and 
among the several States.”151 There was no specific Indian affairs clause.152 
147 Id.
148 The New Jersey plan also incorporated earlier proposals setting forth a formula for deter-
mining representation in Congress. That formula excluded “Indians not paying taxes.” The for-
mula was based on the rule for apportioning the money the states were expected to contribute 
to the Continental Congress. 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 161, 
236 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1986). The ultimate formula included in art. I, sec. 2, cl. 3 of 
the Constitution for determining the number of members a state would have in the house of 
Representatives, as well as for determining the levying of direct taxes, referred to “Indians not 
taxed.” The contrast with slaves, who were counted as three-fifths of a person, suggests that the 
Indians were not viewed as part of the new country, a view consistent with that of Chief Justice 
Marshall in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), and Worcester v. Georgia, 
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). Professor Clinton notes that the exclusion of “Indians not taxed” 
provoked no debate, evidence that the Indians were not part of the “state polities” and not 
members of any state. Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1149. The broad interpretation of 
Article IX’s reference to “members of the state,” which some states used to justify their control 
of Indian affairs, would seem to be inconsistent with the exclusion of “Indians not taxed” 
from the formula, at least if “Indians not members of any of the states,” included “Indians not 
taxed.” For a detailed history of this provision, see Savage, supra note 95, at 64–72.
Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment repeats the phase “Indians not taxed.” Professor 
Clinton suggests this “clearly reflects the common contemporary legal understanding that 
interim events, including the massive removal of Indian tribal members and the altered federal-
state balance generated by the Civil War, had done nothing to change the political relationship 
of Indian tribes and their people to the federal union as late as 1868 when the Fourteenth 
Amendment was ratified.” Clinton, Supremacy, supra note 7, at 125. “Not taxed” is ambiguous. 
Does it refer to federal taxes, state taxes, or both? Which taxes are referred to? Income? Sales? 
Property? Does “not taxed” mean that the taxing jurisdiction cannot tax an Indian? What if it 
can tax an Indian but voluntary chooses not to do so? The Attorney General has refused to rule 
on these issues. Exclusion of ‘Indians Not Taxed’ When Apportioning Representatives, 39 Op. 
Att’y Gen. 518, 519–20 (1940).
Professor Natelson criticizes those who assume “that all Indians not taxed were necessarily 
outside state or federal political jurisdiction. The error lies in overlooking the fact that during 
the Founding Era, representation was not nearly as congruent with political jurisdiction as it is 
today.” Natelson, supra note 15, at 260.
149 Id. at 236.
150 Id. 
151 Id.
152 Professor Natelson speculates that the failure to address the Indians “may have been an 
oversight, although this seems unlikely. . . . Perhaps the committee thought Indian affairs 
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In August 1787, a committee of the Continental Congress recommended 
“the complete and undivided national control over” the Indians.153 The report 
recited the usual litany of problems between the states and the Indians, with 
Georgia and North Carolina singled out for their encroachments on the lands 
of the Creeks and Cherokees. The committee cited the possibility of war by 
the Creeks against Georgia; reported that the Tribes threatened to trade with 
Florida, which was under Spanish control and, thus, viewed as an enemy; 
and stated that Congress should be “promoting peace and free trade between 
them and the Indians.”154 The report blamed the ambiguities in Article IX as 
the source of these problems.155 The committee recognized legitimate griev-
ances by the tribes and concluded: 
The powers necessary [for dealing with the Indians] appear to the commit-
tee to be indivisible, and that the parties to the confederation must have 
intended to give them entire [sic] to the Union, or to have given them entire 
[sic] to the State; these powers before the Revolution were possessed by the 
King, and exercised by him nor did they interfere with the legislative right 
of the colony within its limits; this distinction which was then and may be 
now taken, may perhaps serve to explain the proviso . . . The laws of the 
State can have no effect upon a tribe of Indians or their lands within the 
limits of the State so long as that tribe is independent, and not a member 
of the State, yet the laws of the State may be executed upon debtors, crimi-
nals and other proper objects of those laws in all parts of it, and there the 
Union may make stipulations with any such tribe, secure it the enjoyment 
of all or parts of its lands without infringing upon the legislative rights in 
question.156 
The committee identified two solutions. The states could make liberal 
grants of territory to the federal government for use by the Indians, or, in the 
alternative, the states could 
accede to Congress’s managing exclusively, all affairs with the Cherokees, 
Creeks, and other independent tribes within the limits of the said States, so 
that Congress in either case may have the acknowledged power of regulat-
ing trade, and making treaties with those tribes, and of preventing on their 
lands, the intrusions of the white people.157
were best handled at the state level unless the federal government saw a need to act through 
diplomatic channels—i.e., through the treaty power.” Id. If the latter is correct, then Congress 
apparently changed its mind with the enactment of the Indian Commerce Clause.
153 Brief of Appellee Indian Tribes, supra note 108, at *74 (quoting 33 Journals of the 
Continental Congress, at 454).
154 Id. at *75 (quoting 33 Journals of the Continental Congress, at 456).
155 33 Journals of the Continental Congress, at 457–58.
156 Id. at 458–59; see also E. Parmalee Prentice & John G. Eagan, The Commerce Clause 
of the Federal Constitution 349 (1898).
157 33 Journals of the Continental Congress, at 460. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 
(6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832). 
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On August 18, 1787, fifteen days after the committee reported, Madison 
suggested that Congress be given the power “[t]o regulate affairs with the 
Indians, as well within as without the limits of the United States,”158 which 
apparently is the earliest version of what would become the Indian Commerce 
Clause. There was no reference to this power being exclusive. Four days later, 
the Committee of Detail suggested adding to the already drafted Interstate 
Commerce and Foreign Commerce Clause the language “and with Indians, 
within the Limits of any State, not subject to the laws thereof.”159 Again, there 
was no mention of whether this power was to be exclusive.
One month after the committee report, the final language of the Indian 
Commerce Clause—Congress shall have power “to regulate commerce . . . 
with the Indian Tribes”—was added to the Interstate and Foreign Commerce 
Clause provisions. There was little fanfare or debate.160 “With the adoption 
of the Constitution, Indian relations became the exclusive province of federal 
law.”161 Apparently no one made anything of the fact that the language of 
158 James Madison, 1 Journal of the Federal Convention Kept by James Madison 
549 (E.h. Scott ed. 1894). 
159 Jonathan Elliot, Debates on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 207 
(1845); Savage, supra note 95, at 73.
160 Savage, supra note 95, at 75. Clinton attributes the lack of debate to the fact that all 
Congress did was ratify the dominant view that “the national government had the sole and 
exclusive right to regulate affairs with all sovereign Indian tribes.” Clinton, Dormant, supra 
note 22, at 1158. “All the framers did at the Convention was ratify this dominant view, an 
action that required and consumed little debate.” Id.
The debates over the ratification of the Constitution, both in the state conventions 
and in the popular press, also failed to focus extensively on the Indian Commerce 
Clause. These discussions, however, were not entirely unenlightening. Rather, they 
reinforced the view that the Constitutional Convention, in adopting the Indian 
Commerce Clause, sought to constitutionally protect from state encroachment the 
exclusive power of the national government over Indian affairs and to constitutionally 
protect the legal status of the Indian tribes as separate and sovereign peoples.
Id. Prucha states that the lack of debate at the Convention about the Indians “indicates, per-
haps, the universal agreement that Indian affairs should be left in the hands of the federal 
government.” Prucha, The Great Father, supra note 25, at 50.
161 City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 544 U.S. 197, 205 n.2 (2005) (citing 
Cnty. of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 470 U.S. 226, 234 (1985) (citing Oneida 
Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Oneida Cnty., 414 U.S. 661, 670 (1974))). But see Savage, supra note 
95, at 75–76.
Professor Natelson rejects the views of certain commentators that there was “any emerging 
consensus in favor of central over local control.” Natelson, supra note 15, at 225. he especially 
rejects the views of Professor Clinton and Father Prucha. Id. at 225 n.168. With his character-
istic graciousness, Natelson describes each author as “honest enough to admit the evidence to 
the contrary, so each has to struggle mightily to preserve the claim of an emerging consensus 
in favor of central over local control.” Id. Professor Natelson describes the Indian Commerce 
Clause as a 
power both narrower and broader than that enjoyed by the Confederation Congress. 
It was narrower in that it did not purport to be exclusive, and it covered only com-
mercial transactions with Indian tribes rather than all affairs with all Indians. It was 
broader in that this commercial regulation was not subject to state obstruction, even 
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Article IX referring to Congress having the sole and exclusive rights of regulat-
ing trade was not repeated in the Indian Commerce Clause.162
Four points are noteworthy, although they speak more to the scope of the 
Indian Commerce Clause and less to whether it was meant to be an exclu-
sive grant to the federal government. First, both the Committee of Detail’s 
substitution language and the ultimate phrasing of the Clause were narrower 
than Madison’s original proposal. The substitution language replaced “affairs 
with the Indians” with the apparently narrower category of “commerce with 
Indians.”163 The reference to “commerce” carried over into the final phrasing 
when it infringed the state’s police power over persons within state boundaries. The 
Tenth Amendment clarified that the states retained whatever was not granted. Among 
the authority retained was police power over all persons within state boundaries, sub-
ject to being overridden by constitutional federal laws and treaties.
Id. at 243. Professor Natelson notes that “there appears to be no suggestion in the ratification 
record that anyone thought any part of the Commerce Clause to be exclusive of concurrent 
state jurisdiction.” Id. at 250.
162 Professor Natelson claims that the “convention records show clearly that in the delegates’ 
view the states would enjoy concurrent, although subordinate, jurisdiction with Congress over 
Indian commerce.” Natelson, supra note 15, at 238–39. he does not cite any comments made 
in the context of Indian commerce. Instead, he argues by inference from statements made in 
other contexts. Id. at 238–41. 
163 Professor Natelson has undertaken his own research and reviewed the extant literature on 
the meaning of “commerce.”
Some have argued that the Founders intended commerce to encompass not only 
trade but also all gainful economic activity, or even any and all intercourse whatever. 
Although such an expansive meaning seems out-of-place in a listing of enumerated 
powers—and, indeed, counter-intuitive generally—several recent studies have taken 
it seriously enough to examine how the word was employed in the lay and legal con-
texts before and during the Founding Era. Those studies have found that, in the legal 
and constitutional context, ‘commerce’ meant mercantile trade, and that the phrase 
‘to regulate Commerce’ meant to administer the lex mercatoria (law merchant) gov-
erning purchase and sale of goods, navigation, marine insurance, commercial paper, 
money, and banking. Thus, ‘commerce’ did not include manufacturing, agriculture, 
hunting, fishing, other land use, property ownership, religion, education, or domestic 
family life.
Id. at 214–15. Based on his research, Professor Natelson concluded that “commerce” meant 
“trade” and that “regulation” meant the “legal structures by which lawmakers governed the 
conduct of the merchants engaged in the Indian trade, the nature of the goods they sold, 
the prices charged, and similar matters.” Id. at 215–16. Professor Natelson recognizes that a 
section of the Indian Intercourse Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 137-38 (1790), addressed crimes com-
mitted in Indian country, which could not be described as a commercial regulation or Indian 
intercourse. Id. at 252–53. Some have argued that this shows Congress intended an expansive 
reading of commerce. Professor Natelson rejects this argument by citing Prucha, The Great 
Father, supra note 25, for the proposition that the Indian intercourse laws were adopted 
under the Treaty Power and not the Indian Commerce Clause. Id. at 254. Further, the Court 
in United States v. Kagama, rejected the Indian Commerce Clause as the source of Congress’s 
power in enacting the Major Crimes Act. 118 U.S. 375, 378–79 (1886), discussed infra notes 
333−52 and accompanying text.
Professor Barnett concluded that “commerce” was a synonym for trade. Randy E. Barnett, 
The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 101, 114–25 (2001). But 
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of the Clause. The reference to “affairs with the Indians” was language that 
had been used in Article IX of the Articles of Confederation and in numerous 
treaties with the Indians.164 Presumably, affairs with the Indians subsumed 
commerce.165
Second, the Interstate Commerce Clause refers to “commerce among the 
states,” and the Foreign Commerce Clause refers to “commerce with foreign 
nations.”166 Madison and the Committee of Detail referred to commerce 
“with the Indians,” not “among the Indians” (and not commerce of the Indi-
ans), suggesting that the Indians were viewed more as foreign nations than 
as states. Also, the use of “among the states” suggests the Founders were giv-
ing the national government the power to regulate commerce, for example, 
see Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause: Applying First 
Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve State Control over Social Issues, 
85 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 14–21, 35–42 (1999), who argue for a broader meaning.
Professor Prakash argues that the meaning of “commerce” is the same in each of the three 
Commerce Clauses. Saikrishna Prakash, Our Three Commerce Clauses and the Presumption of 
Intrasentence Uniformity, 55 Ark. L. Rev. 1149 (1999). For a response, see Adrian Vermeule, 
Three Commerce Clauses? No Problem, 55 Ark. L. Rev. 1175 (2003).
Professor Natelson’s research indicates that the term “affairs” was used to describe “inter-
action with the Indians of all kinds,” a “much broader category than trade or commerce.” 
Natelson, supra note 15, at 217.
‘[A]ffair’ could include a commercial transaction, but it also could include a war, a 
treaty, or a family picnic. Thus, the committee’s change would deny Congress com-
petence over diplomacy, boundary adjustment, and other forms of intercourse, all 
of which would be handled by treaty instead. A fortiori, the new language denied 
Congress any form of police power over the tribes. Instead, Congress would receive 
only a portion of a single Indian affairs power that, in the days before Independence, 
the British had set aside for the colonial assemblies.
Id. at 238. There seems to be little controversy among commentators that the Indian Commerce 
Clause was not meant to grant Congress power over a tribe’s internal affairs. Id. at 241.
164 See, e.g., Treaty with the Cherokee, art. IX, U.S.-Cherokee, Nov. 28, 1785, 7 Stat. 18; 
Treaty with the Choctaw art. VIII, U.S.-Choctaw, Jan. 3, 1786, 7 Stat. 21; Treaty with the 
Chickasaw art. VIII, U.S.-Chickasaw, Jan. 10, 1786, 7 Stat. 24. 
165 Surprisingly, this narrowing of Madison’s original proposal has apparently had no effect 
on how the U.S. Supreme Court interprets Congress’s plenary powers under the Indian 
Commerce Clause. See Savage, supra note 95, at 116. Congress can “legislate for the Indian 
tribes in all matters, including their form of government,” United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 
313, 319 (1978); terminate the federal recognition of a tribe, Menominee Tribe of Indians v. 
United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968); and abrogate treaties with the tribes, United States v. Dion, 
476 U.S. 734, 738 (1986). For a discussion of Justice Thurgood Marshall’s opinion in Dion, see 
Tassie hanna and Robert Laurence, Justice Thurgood Marshall and the Problem of Indian Treaty 
Abrogation, 40 Ark. L. Rev. 797, 829-838 (1987).
Wheeler said that the tribes’ “incorporation within the territory of the United States, and 
their acceptance of its protection, necessarily divested them of some aspects of the sovereignty 
which they had previously exercised.” 435 U.S. at 323. For a penetrating critique of this so-
called incorporation doctrine, see Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 34–42.
166 Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress had no control of interstate commerce. 
Although the Articles reserved certain aspects of foreign commerce to Congress, there was 
nothing equivalent to the Foreign Commerce Clause. Brief of Appellee Indian Tribes, supra 
note 108, at *79; see also Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. IX, para. 1.
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between Massachusetts and New York; the Founders did not claim to regulate 
commerce between one tribe and another, any more than they claimed to 
regulate commerce between England and France. Nor were they attempting 
to regulate the internal affairs of the Tribes, an important distinction that 
casts doubt on whether the Clause is the source of Congress’s plenary power 
over the Indians.167
Third, the substitution language “within the limits of any state, not subject 
to the laws thereof,” would, of course, have re-introduced the ambiguities 
that had infected Article IX. That the language was dropped from the final 
phrasing of the Clause was not surprising. Madison declared that Congres-
sional regulation of “commerce with the Indian tribes is very properly unfet-
tered from two limitations in the Articles of Confederation, which render the 
provision obscure and contradictory.”168
Fourth, and perhaps most puzzling, was that the phrase “and with the 
Indian Tribes” was substituted for “and with the Indians,” which was used by 
both Madison and the committee of detail.169 There is apparently nothing in 
writing explaining this change. One reasonable inference is that this change 
made the Indian Commerce Clause conform with the Foreign Commerce 
Clause, viewing the tribes, rather than the members of those tribes, as similar 
to nations.170 The Court has not attached any significance to this change.171
167 Professor Frickey emphasizes that the “text of the Constitution lacks much of a hint of 
any plenary power,” and nothing in the Constitution makes that plenary power legitimate. 
Philip P. Frickey, Adjudication and its Discontents: Coherence and Conciliation in Federal Indian 
Law, 110 harv. L. Rev., 1754, 1760 (1997). Professor Clinton complains that “[i]t is a long, 
twisted path indeed from the framers’ decision to give Congress the exclusive power to regu-
late commerce and other relations with the Indian tribes to the modern assertion of plenary 
powers over them.” Robert N. Clinton, Reviewing Russel Lawrence Barsh and James Youngblood 
Henderson, The Road: Indian Tribes and Political Liberty, 47 U. Chi. L. Rev. 846, 859 (1980) 
(emphasis in original). Savage notes that the Founders viewed the Indians as nations and dealt 
with them diplomatically. Savage, supra note 95, at 76.
The Lara majority, see infra notes 181, 184, 276, 563, suggested that the government’s 
plenary power arises from “preconstitutional powers necessarily inherent in any Federal 
Government.” 541 U.S. 193, 201 (2004).
168 The Federalist No. 42, supra note 113, at 236; see also Savage, supra note 95, at 115.
169 Professor Natelson refers to the Indian Commerce Clause as governing “the trade carried 
on between citizens and tribal Natives and those persons involved in that trade.” Natelson, 
supra note 15, at 241 (emphasis added). he does not comment on the substitution of Indian 
Tribes for Indians.
170 Cherokee Nation describes the tribes as “dependent, domestic nations,” not identical to 
foreign nations. See infra notes 218–22, and accompanying text. Although Professor Fletcher 
does not specifically address this question, his powerful article, The Original Understanding 
of the Political Status of Indian Tribes, 82 St. John’s L. Rev. 153, 165–172 (2008), provides 
invaluable insights.
171 See United States v. holliday, 70 U.S. 407, 418 (1865) (“[I]f commerce, or traffic, or 
intercourse, is carried on with an Indian tribe, or with a member of such tribe, it is subject to 
be regulated by Congress . . . .”) (emphasis added). According to one commentator, the word 
“Tribe” in the Commerce Clause means a self-governing body and not Indians qua Indians, 
William Draper Lewis, The Federal Power Over Commerce and Its Effect on State 
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B.  Interstate and Foreign Commerce Clauses
The Indian Commerce Clause seems to have received more debate than 
the Interstate or Foreign Commerce Clauses. The Interstate Commerce 
Clause was not the focus of much controversy either during the constitu-
tional debates or in the ratifying conventions. “[N]early universal agreement 
[existed] that the federal government should be given the power of regulating 
commerce.”172 “The records disclose no constructive criticisms by the states 
of the commerce clause as proposed to them.”173 Madison wrote that “few 
oppose [the proposed Commerce Clause] and from which no apprehensions 
are entertained.”174 
The lack of opposition to the Interstate Commerce Clause is easy to appre-
ciate. After the Revolutionary War, the states regulated and taxed interstate 
commerce in a manner that gave them a competitive advantage over other 
states, and they zealously guarded their powers.175 Unlike the Indian Com-
merce Clause, the Articles of Confederation reserved to the states–but did not 
grant to the national government–the power to regulate foreign and inter-
state commerce. The Articles provided that “no treaty of commerce shall be 
made whereby the legislative power of the respective States shall be restrained 
from imposing such imposts and duties on foreigners, as their own people 
are subjected to, or from prohibiting the exportation or importation of any 
species of goods or commodities whatsoever.”176 This distribution of power 
proved unworkable because it allowed the states to continue their internecine 
feuding through trade wars and trade barriers, including tariffs and duties. 
The states were also unable to deal cohesively with foreign trade relations. 
Trade with Great Britain, as well as with other countries, diminished with a 
resulting shortage of foreign currency. Political leaders feared that economic 
warfare would dissolve the union.177 
The structure of the Articles with respect to interstate and foreign com-
merce stands in sharp contrast to the distribution of power over the Indians. 
Subject to the two glaring ambiguities discussed above, Article IX granted the 
exclusive power of regulating the trade and managing all affairs with the Indi-
ans to the Congress. In drafting the Constitution, the starting point for the 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce Clauses was opposite to that of the Indian 
Commerce Clause, although there was a recognition that federal control over 
Action 21 (1892), but this interpretation seems inconsistent with Holliday, which had been 
decided before Lewis’ book was published.
172 Albert S. Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention and in Contemporary 
Comment, 25 Minn. L. Rev. 432, 443–44 (1941).
173 Felix Frankfurter, The Commerce Clause under Marshall, Taney and Waite 12 
(1937). 
174 James Madison, Federalist No. 45, at 259 (E.h. Scott ed., Scott, Foresman & Co. 
1898).
175 Craig Ducat, Constitutional Interpretation 340 (6th ed. 1996).
176 Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. IX, para. 1.
177 Richard D. Pomp, State and Local Taxation 1-1 (6th ed. 2009).
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commerce was required, just like the recognition that federal control over the 
Indians was required.178 
The Interstate and Foreign Commerce Clauses had been approved before 
the Convention took up the Indian Commerce Clause, and “[b]y this time, 
the larger part of the discussion in the federal convention relative to com-
mercial regulations was over, and in that which did take place later there is no 
language relating even remotely to the Indian trade.”179 
C.  Two Schools of Interpretation
Notwithstanding the similarities in phrasing and grammatical construction 
of the Interstate, Foreign, and Indian Commerce Clauses, the last has its own 
unique history. The Indian Commerce Clause was separately dealt with by 
the Founders, emerged at a different time at the Constitutional Convention, 
and consequently was not intended to be interpreted in pari materia with the 
other two provisions.180 
At a minimum, all three clauses have come to be interpreted as establish-
ing the plenary power of Congress.181 Two opposite interpretations have been 
178 Charles Pinckney’s draft constitution would have provided that Congress had the exclu-
sive power to regulate interstate commerce. See Abel, supra note 172, at 434. 
179 Abel, supra note 172, at 468.
180 The Interstate and Foreign Commerce Clauses are not interpreted in pari materia. The 
Court has acknowledged that the Foreign Commerce Clause requires a “more extensive con-
stitutional inquiry” than the Interstate Commerce Clause. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los 
Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 446 (1979). The Interstate Commerce Clause was intended to “avoid 
the tendencies toward economic Balkanization that plagued relations among the Colonies and 
later among the States under the Articles of Confederation.” hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 
322, 325 (1979). The Indian Commerce Clause is “directed at economic, not political rela-
tions between the states.” Brief of Appellee Indian Tribes, supra note 108, at *83.
The author of a seminal article on the Commerce Clause concluded that transactions with 
the Indians were “so distinct and specialized a subject as to afford no basis for argument as to 
the meaning of the rest of the clause.” Abel, supra note 172, at 468. “Indian trade was a special 
subject with a definite content, which had been within the jurisdiction of Congress under the 
Articles of Confederation” and “thus derived from a totally different branch of the Randolph 
outline than did the control over foreign and interstate commerce.” Id. at 467. See also Robert 
L. Stern, That Commerce Which Concerns More States than One, 47 harv. L. Rev. 1335, 1342 
n.27 (“The exigencies of the time may have called for a more complete system of regulating 
affairs with the Indians than of controlling commerce among the states.”).
Professor Prakash thinks the term “regulate” should be interpreted the same in each of the 
three commerce clauses, Saikrishna Prakash, Against Tribal Fungibility, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 
1069, 1088 (2004) [hereinafter Prakash, Against], but that ignores the unique history of the 
Indian Commerce Clause.
181 The term “plenary” or “plenary power” has several different meanings. One meaning is 
“exclusive,” which some argue was the Founder’s intent with respect to the Indian Commerce 
Clause. Another is “unlimited,” but not exclusive, which seems the meaning with respect to 
the Interstate Commerce Clause. Still other meanings are possible. See David E. Engdahl, 
State and Federal Power over Federal Property, 18 Ariz. L. Rev. 283, 363–66 (1976); see also 
Lone Wolf v. hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903). Just because the United States has exclusive 
power over the Indians vis-a-vis the states, does not mean it has that power over the tribes. 
Nonetheless, with one exception, Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996), the U.S. 
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Supreme Court has never struck down a federal statute directed at the Indians. Justice Thomas 
seems willing to reexamine the plenary power doctrine, as well as the concept of tribal sover-
eignty. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 214–16 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring); see also 
Robert Laurence, Learning to Live with the Plenary Power of Congress over the Indian Nations: 
An Essay in Reaction to Professor Williams’s Algebra, 30 Ariz. L. Rev. 413 (1988). 
Professor Natelson describes 
[c]ourts and commentators [as having] offered a variety of justifications for the ple-
nary congressional power theory, all defective in various ways. One such justification 
is the doctrine of inherent sovereign authority: that federal control over Indian affairs 
is inherent in the nature of federal sovereignty. The idea is that the British Crown 
transmitted extra-constitutional sovereign authority to the Continental Congress, 
which then passed it to the Confederation Congress, which in turn conveyed it to 
the federal government.
Natelson, supra note 15, at 204. Professor Natelson criticizes this proposition on the grounds 
that it clashes with the Constitution’s theory of enumerated powers. Id., at 206. Professor 
Natelson also describes the proposition as historically wrong.
As a matter of historical record, the British Crown did not transfer its foreign affairs 
powers to the Continental Congress, but to the states. The Confederation Congress 
did not receive its authority from the Continental Congress, but from the states. The 
federal government did not receive its powers from the Confederation Congress, but 
from the people.
Id., at 205–06. I would add that the British treated the tribes as sovereigns, which is why they 
entered into treaties with them.
Professor Frickey argues that the
real problem with the supposed plenary power is not that it exists in the federal 
government versus the states, but that the adjective ‘plenary’ makes it seem unlim-
ited. In other words, the constitutional problem is not so much one of whether the 
power should be attributed to Congress, whether through Article I or other legitimate 
means, but instead one of what limits, if any, the Constitution or other sources of law 
might place upon it. 
Frickey, Domesticating, supra note 15, at 66–67. he concludes that plenary should mean “com-
plete” and not “absolute.” Id. 
Professor Milner Ball captures the tension between the sovereignty of the Indians and the 
power of Congress as follows: 
If an Indian nation is a nation, then its governmental powers cannot simply evanesce 
and reappear in the hands of another nation’s government. Justice Stevens said the 
tribes once exercised virtually unlimited power over their members. [Nat’l Farmers 
Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 851 (1985).] The story of 
Native Americans and American law requires that we know at what point and by 
what means a plenary power afterward passed from Indian nations to the United 
States.
Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 21.
One commentator argues that no plenary power exists in the national government and 
that many federal statutes are ultra vires and unconstitutional, “even though Congress enacted 
them, the President signed them, and the Supreme Court upheld them.” Savage, supra note 
95, at 82.
For the most detailed treatment of whether and to what extent Congress has plenary power, 
see Newton, Federal Power, supra note 131; see also David Engdahl, State and Federal Power over 
Federal Property, 18 Ariz. L. Rev. 283, 363–66 (1976); Natelson, supra note 15, at 205–06.
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offered, however, about whether the Indian Commerce Clause was meant to 
be exclusive rather than being shared with the states. 
The “exclusive” view182 emphasizes the dissatisfaction with the ambiguities 
in Article IX, the need for the new country to act in a unified manner with 
the Indians, the experience of certain states in undercutting the Continental 
Congress, and contemporaneous statements by the Founders.183 This view is 
consistent with non-contemporaneous characterizations by the Court, which 
describe Congress’s power under the Clause as plenary and exclusive.184 As one 
For a systematic and thorough critique of the various theories granting Congress plenary 
power, see Prakash, Against, supra note 180.
182 Professor Clinton is the intellectual leader of the school holding that the Indian Commerce 
Clause vests exclusive powers in Congress vis a vis the states. See, e.g., Robert N. Clinton, The 
Dormant Indian Commerce Clause, 27 Conn. L. Rev. 1056 (1995). Under this exclusive view, 
state taxes could not be applied to commerce with the tribes.
183 See Frickey, Domesticating, supra note 15, at 68 n.157 (citing James Madison, The 
Federalist No. 42, at 268–69 (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961) and Letter from President George 
Washington to the Cornplanter, half Town, and Great Tree, Chiefs and Counselors of the 
Seneca Nation of Indians (Dec. 29, 1790), in 312 Writings of George Washington 179, 
180 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed. 1939)). Of course, this does not reflect current law. See Frickey, 
Domesticating, supra note 15, at 69 n.162.
184 See, e.g., Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 764 (1985) (“The 
Constitution vests the Federal Government with exclusive authority over relations with Indian 
tribes.”) (emphasis added); Lara, 541 U.S. at 200 (“the Constitution grants Congress broad 
general powers to legislate in respect to Indian tribes, powers that we have consistently described 
as ‘plenary and exclusive.’”) (emphasis added). Lara suggested that Congress may have precon-
stitutional power to deal with Indian affairs that is broader than the Indian Commerce Clause. 
For a very perceptive analysis of Lara, see Fletcher, Preconstitutional, supra note 59; Bethany 
Berger, U.S. v. Lara as a Story of Native Agency, 40 Tulsa L. Rev. 5 (2004).
The Supreme Court held in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida that
the Indian Commerce Clause accomplishes a greater transfer of power from the States 
to the Federal Government than does the Interstate Commerce Clause. This is clear 
enough from the fact that the States still exercise some authority over interstate trade 
but have been divested of virtually all authority over Indian commerce and Indian 
tribes.
517 U.S. 44, 62 (1996). The results in the tax cases discussed infra are inconsistent with these 
broad statements by the Court.
In Seminole, the Court invalidated a federal statute dealing with Indian affairs on Eleventh 
Amendment grounds. Seminole is the first time the Court has struck down a federal statute 
dealing with Indian affairs on constitutional grounds. Chief Justice Rehnquist identified the 
question in Seminole as “whether Congress has acted ‘pursuant to a valid exercise of power,’” 
517 U.S. at 55. Seminole could have been an opportunity for the Court to explore the Indian 
Commerce Clause, which was a source of Congress’s right to have enacted the statute. The 
majority opinion, however, went off in a different direction. For a penetrating critique of 
Seminole, see Fletcher, Indian Problem, supra note 11, at 611–13.
Professor Jensen describes Seminole as 
concluding that the federal government was obligated to act if it had reason to know 
tribal government was misappropriating funds intended for members. If the interests 
of a tribe and its members diverge in a particular case, however (which is certainly 
conceivable), the federal government’s obligations are not so clear.
Jensen, supra note 9, at 21 n.113.
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commentator concluded, “it seems inescapable that the Framers intended the 
Indian Commerce Clause to remove all doubt about the location of authority 
over Indian commerce: The states were excluded.”185 
The nonexclusive school186 emphasizes that unlike Article IX of the Articles 
of Confederation, which stated that Congress shall have the “sole and exclu-
sive rights and powers . . . regulating the trade and managing all affairs with 
the Indians,”187 the Indian Commerce Clause (as well as Madison’s earlier 
version and that of the Committee of Detail) does not explicitly confer exclu-
sivity.188 This school emphasizes that when the Constitution wanted to grant 
the federal government exclusive powers it did so by either explicitly using the 
Two commentators describe the Indian Commerce Clause as “even more firmly grounded 
on an historical basis than is national control of interstate or foreign commerce.” Marston 
& Fink, supra note 136, at 206. They describe the purpose of the Clause at “nationaliz[ing] 
political and economic relations with the Indian tribes and preempt[ing] state authority over 
those relations.” Id. 
185 Preso, supra note 41, at 453. Professor Natelson disputes this view, arguing that the “states 
would retain concurrent, although subordinate, authority in the realms of Indian” commerce, 
as well as with respect to interstate and foreign commerce. Natelson, supra note 15, at 241. 
A former Deputy Solicitor General of the United States who argued many Indian law cases 
believed that the 
Clause, of its own force, arguably precludes State interference with white-Indian 
intercourse, until and unless Congress otherwise provides. . . .[R]egulation of the 
intercourse with the Indian Tribes is, by the Constitution, committed to the United 
States exclusively. The State can intervene only by leave of federal authority, and it 
bears the burden of showing such permission.
Claiborne, supra note 11, at 598. The views he expressed in his 1997–98 article preceded 
Supreme Court opinions suggesting the contrary.
186 Professor Natelson provides the most scholarly view that the Indian Commerce Clause 
was not meant to be exclusive. Natelson, supra note 15, at 212. Professor Natelson character-
izes most of the academic commentary on the “original force of the Indian Commerce Clause” 
as “confessedly agenda-driven” and “plagued by errors of historical method.” Id. at 212–13. If 
the power to regulate commerce with the tribes is meant to be shared in some manner with the 
states, then a court has to decide whether a state regulation or tax is an acceptable exercise of 
that power. The inquiry invites a comparison with the approach the courts have used under the 
dormant Interstate Commerce Clause. State taxes on interstate commerce are evaluated under 
what is known as the four-part Complete Auto test, see supra note 20, infra notes 192, 367, 
447, 690, 775, 789, 1006, 1084, 1126, 1213, 1281. If a dormant Indian Commerce Clause 
challenge to a state tax were to be evaluated under that same Complete Auto test, a state is more 
likely to prevail than if the Indian Commerce Clause were interpreted as granting exclusive 
power to Congress. 
187 Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. IX, para. 1 (emphasis added).
188 Professor Clinton does not discuss the failure to incorporate the “exclusivity” language 
and many commentators ignore it as well. One exception is Professor Fletcher. Fletcher, 
Preconstitutional, supra note 59, at 549–50. Professor Fletcher argues that the Founding Fathers 
recognized at least two different classes of Indian tribes: those located within the boundaries of 
the United States and those without. They believed (or wished) that the former would eventu-
ally assimilate or disappear into the states in which they were located (or move west or become 
extinct). Id. at 559. No special constitutional provision would be necessary to deal with this 
group because they would not continue to exist. Id. at 560. The “provisions in the Constitution 
dealing with the internal Indian tribes are insufficient.” Id. at 562.
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word “exclusive” or prohibiting the states from legislating in that area. Advo-
cates of this school also emphasize the custom and practice that existed prior 
to the Constitution, proceedings at the convention, as well as statements by 
the Founders.189 
Under the “exclusive” interpretation, any state law that regulated commerce 
with the tribes would be prohibited by the Indian Commerce Clause.190 The 
primary issue for a court would be whether commerce was involved. Under 
the non-exclusive interpretation, some, but not all, regulations would be pro-
hibited.191 A court would have to draw a line between acceptable and unac-
ceptable state regulations, similar to what occurs under the dormant Interstate 
Commerce and Foreign Commerce Clauses.192 Resolving these contrary 
interpretations is unnecessary for this Article because the Supreme Court has 
been indifferent to the Indian Commerce Clause, no matter what version has 
been put forth. The Court’s indifference has not been a function of whether 
the Clause should be interpreted to adopt an exclusive test or not.
IV.  Early U.S. Supreme Court Jurisprudence 
A.  Cherokee Nation v. Georgia
The adoption of the Indian Commerce Clause did nothing to alter Georgia’s 
longstanding hostility and aggressiveness toward the Cherokee Nation.193 The 
discovery of gold on Cherokee and Creek lands fueled Georgia’s bloodlust 
189 See, e.g., Natelson, supra note 15.
190 Although the Indian Commerce Clause was not intended to be interpreted in pari mate-
ria with the Interstate Commerce Clause, the “exclusive” interpretation has a parallel with an 
earlier view of the Interstate Commerce Clause that the states could not “regulate those phases 
of the national commerce, which, because of the need of national uniformity, demand that 
their regulation, if any, be prescribed by a single authority.” S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 
761, 767 (1945). That was not the original view of the Interstate Commerce Clause. 
During the first few decades of operation under the Constitution, the validity of 
state commercial regulations, if not pre-empted by Congress, was taken for granted. 
When advocates of exclusive federal power began to raise their arguments during 
the ante-bellum period, they were forced to accommodate this understanding by 
classifying state commercial laws as ‘police power’ measures rather than commercial 
regulations.
Natelson, supra note 15, at 211 n.68. Perhaps the best known early attempt at establishing the 
exclusive power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce was Justice Johnson’s concurring 
opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824). Professor Natelson argues that “most of the 
convention delegates would have disagreed with Justice Johnson, for they voted specifically to 
leave substantial commercial powers, including the power to impose trade embargoes, with the 
states.” Natelson, supra note 15, at 256.
191 See Natelson, supra note 15, at 256.
192 In the case of state taxation, the Court has developed a four-part test under the Interstate 
Commerce Clause, see Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 274, discussed supra note 186 and 
citations therein, and a six-part test under the Foreign Commerce Clause, see Japan Line Ltd. 
v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. at 434 (1979), discussed supra note 180, infra notes 463, 
1066, 1213.
193 See, e.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). Milner Ball described Peck as 
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and ultimately doomed the Indians.194
Georgia expropriated the land of the Cherokees and distributed it to vari-
ous counties,195 and annulled all of the Tribe’s laws and ordinances in an 
attempt to destroy the Indians as a political society.196 In Cherokee Nation v. 
one of the cases that angered Georgians, [in which] the Court struck down their 
reformist legislature’s attempt to undo its predecessor’s corrupt sale of the state’s west-
ern territories in the Yazoo land fraud. Although tribes were not directly involved, 
the status of tribal title was indirectly and secondarily brought into play because the 
territory included Indian country.
Milner S. Ball, John Marshall and Indian Nations in the Beginning and Now, 33 J. Marshall 
L. Rev. 1183, 1184 (2000) [hereinafter Ball, John Marshall]. See also Jill Norgren, The 
Cherokee Cases: Two Landmark Federal Decisions in the Fight for Sovereignty 
87–92 (2004).
194 The Georgia Governor ordered a survey of the land containing gold and “called out the 
state militia to protect [the] surveyors.” Ronald A. Berutti, The Cherokee Cases: The Fight to 
Save The Supreme Court and the Cherokee Indians, 17 Am. Indian L. Rev. 291, 296 (1992). he 
threatened civil war if the federal government interfered. Id. 
The need for land on which to grow cotton also jeopardized the Indians. 
When the cotton plantation system began its dynamic drive West across the gulf 
plains after the War of 1812, a movement stimulated by the invention of the cotton 
gin and the seemingly endless demand for cotton to feed the new mills in England 
and the Northeast, the lands held by the Indians seemed an enormous obstacle.
Prucha, The Great Father, supra note 25, at 195. The growing of tobacco had the same 
effect. See infra note 235.
The discovery of gold and high-quality farmland in the western United States in the 
mid-19th century brought hordes of miners and settlers to Indian-occupied lands. 
This time the government’s solution was to create reservations for the Indians, again 
to separate them from the white invaders, often finding it necessary to coerce, cajole, 
or force the tribes onto reservations. The fact that these reservation lands were typi-
cally barren and unproductive did not matter because, the government rationalized, 
the Indians would occupy them only temporarily pending their assimilation into the 
larger society.
Ralph W. Johnson & Berrie Martinis, Chief Justice Rehnquist and the Indian Cases, 16 Pub. 
Land L. Rev. 1, 3 (1995). In 1875 gold was discovered in South Dakota’s Black hills, resulting 
in the invasion by the United States Army in contravention of treaty agreements, ultimately 
leading to the Sioux’s attacking Custer under the leadership of Chiefs Crazy horse and Sitting 
Bull. Edward Lazarus, Black hills White Justice: The Sioux Nation Versus the United 
States, 1775 to the Present 72–88 (1991).
195 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 542 (1832). Apparently, “Cherokee land was 
sold at public lottery.” Berutti, supra note 194, at 297.
196 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 15 (1831). The Cherokees had proclaimed 
themselves to be an independent state outside the jurisdiction of the United States. Berutti, 
supra note 194, at 297. The Georgia laws “declared the Cherokee lands to be ‘Cherokee County’ 
within the State of Georgia, and designated this as ‘surplus’ land to be opened to Georgia 
citizens for settlement by lottery. Indians were denied the right to appear in court under this 
legislation, and non-Indians living within this Cherokee area were required to obtain a permit 
from officials of the State of Georgia . . . [T]ribal lands were overrun by Georgians who stole 
horses and cattle, ejected Indians from their homes, and seized their property. . . At Georgia’s 
request, President Jackson removed federal troops from Indian land and turned all law enforce-
ment, including tribal criminal law, over to the state.” Rennard Strickland, The Tribal Struggle 
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Georgia,197 the Tribe sought from the U.S. Supreme Court an injunction to 
restrain the State.198 John Marshall was Chief Justice, and this case would be 
one of his three seminal and foundational decisions on Indian law: the so-
called Marshall trilogy (although “trinity” might be an equally appropriate 
term).199 
for Indian Sovereignty: The Story of the Cherokee Cases, in Race Law Stories 37, 41–44 (Rachel 
F. Moran & Devon W. Carbado eds. 2008).
For a discussion of how Georgia’s laws worked in practice, see Rennard Strickland & William 
M. Strickland, A Tale of Two Marshalls: Reflections on Indian Law and Policy, The Cherokee 
Cases, and the Cruel Irony of Supreme Court Victories, 47 Okla. L. Rev. 111, 121–22 (1994). 
In the 1820’s several states passed statutes (known colloquially as ‘Indian laws’) bring-
ing Indians within their borders under the jurisdiction of state courts. Indians were 
required to pay taxes, serve in the militia, and work on state highways. They could be 
sued in state courts for trespass or debt. Their tribal laws were declared to be super-
seded by state law, and punishments were prescribed for those attempting to enforce 
tribal laws. Those statutes were predicated on the assumption that the legal status of 
Indians approximated that of persons owing legal obligations to the state in which 
they resided rather than that of members of independent nations.
G. Edward White, The Marshall Court and Cultural Change 1815–1835, at 711 
(1988).
197 30 U.S. (6 Pet.) 1 (1831). 
198 Id. at 1. In an earlier case, a Georgia court convicted a Cherokee of murder committed on 
Cherokee land. The U.S. Supreme Court granted a writ of error to review the conviction but 
Georgia refused to honor the writ and hanged the Cherokee in defiance. Cohen’s handbook, 
supra note 7, at 49; Rennard Strickland, The Tribal Struggle for Indian Sovereignty: The Story 
of the Cherokee Cases, in Race Law Stories 37, 44 (Rachel F. Moran & Devon W. Carbado 
eds. 2008).
199 The other two cases were Johnson & Graham’s Lessee v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 
543 (1823) [hereinafter Johnson v. M’Intosh], which preceded Cherokee Nation, and Worcester, 
which shortly followed Cherokee Nation. Professor Wilkinson apparently coined the phrase 
“Marshall Trinity” in Wilkinson, supra note 7, at 24.
Johnson v. M’Intosh involved a dispute between two non-Indians over title to non-Indian 
land that each claimed. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 571–72. The land was a vast tract in Illinois 
between the Illinois and Wabash rivers. Id. Chief Justice Marshall held that the person whose 
title flowed from the United States, which purchased the land from a tribe, had better title than 
the party whose title flowed from a sale from a tribe to a non-Indian. Id. at 592. No Indian or 
tribe was a party to the case. Johnson v. M’Intosh has been described as the first judicial expres-
sion of a federal power and a federal responsibility over Indian land and Indian affairs. Vine 
Deloria Jr. & Clifford Lytle, American Indians, American Justice 27 (1983). 
For one of the best and thorough discussions of Johnson v. M’Intosh, see Lindsay G. 
Robertson, Conquest by Law: how the Discovery of America Dispossessed Indigenous 
Peoples of Their Lands (2005). See also Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Iron Cold of the Marshall 
Trilogy, 82 N. D. L. Rev. 627, 631–39 (2006); Norgren, supra note 193, at 92–95; Philip 
P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in 
Federal Indian Law, 107 harv. L. Rev. 381, 385–90 (1993) [hereinafter Frickey, Marshalling]. 
White, supra note 196, at 710 (“natural rights of human beings to dispose of property that 
they held by virtue of possession did not apply to Indians in America.”). 
A 16th century champion of Indian autonomy, Dominican priest and scholar Francisco 
de Victoria contended that there was no legitimate title to Indian lands by right of discovery, 
only by conquest or voluntary consent. Francisco de Victoria, De Indis et De Jure Belli 
Relectiones § 2, propositions 8-16 & § 3, proposition 1 (Ernest Nys ed., John Pawley Bate 
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Georgia disputed the Court’s jurisdiction and refused to appear.200 
The Cherokees’ legal right to their lands was not doubted. According to 
Professor Kent Newmyer, Chief Justice Marshall’s prominent biographer: 
The legal right of the Cherokees to their land seemed fully secured by a 
series of treaties with the federal government, the most important of which 
were the Treaty of hopewell (1785) and the Treaty of holston (1791).201 
These treaties, in addition to several federal statutes, had encouraged the 
Indians to give up their native traditions in favor of American “civiliza-
tion.” Under the leadership of a mixed blood elite, Georgia’s Cherokees did 
just that.202 With the encouragement of the Adams administration, they 
trans., Williams S. hein & Co. 1995) (1557). See also supra note 36. Realizing that the Indians 
would not understand the European Law of Nations, Victoria suggested that a civilized nation, 
Spain, become the Indians’ guardian. Id. § 3, proposition 18.
Dean Getches describes the Marshall trilogy as exhibiting “a self-conscious concern with 
the moral justification for a theory that allowed Europeans to extinguish Indian land title 
and to curb, by their very presence, pre-existing powers of tribal self-government.” Getches, 
Conquering, supra note 14, at 1579. Some “scholars question the authenticity of Marshall’s 
professed agony over the morality of the doctrine and its contradictions with natural law.” Id. 
at 1580 n.24. Nowhere does Marshall justify the legality or morality of the subjugation of the 
Indians. he would not “enter into the controversy, whether agriculturalists, merchants, and 
manufacturers, have a right, on abstract principles, to expel hunters from the territory they 
possess, or to contract their limits.” Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 588. Marshall repeated 
similar sentiments in Worcester, 31 U.S. at 543, treating the issue as nonjusticiable.
200 Georgia Governor Lumpkin was outraged at the impudence of summoning his State 
before the Court. he described the Cherokee Nation as a “few savages residing within the ter-
ritory of Georgia.” Claiborne, supra note 11, at 588. Georgia’s opposition to the Court dated 
back to Chisholm v. Georgia, in which a citizen successfully sued the State for amounts owed for 
goods supplied to Georgia during the Revolutionary War. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). Georgia 
did not appear before the Supreme Court on the grounds that as a sovereign it could not be 
sued without its consent. Instead, Georgia lobbied Congress for a change in the law to limit 
the Court’s jurisdiction. Norgren, supra note 193, at 100.
Georgia ignored the decision in Chisholm, which was overturned by the Eleventh 
Amendment. R. Kent Newmyer, Chief Justice John Marshall’s Last Campaign: Georgia, Jackson, 
and The Cherokee Cases, 23 J. Sup. Ct. hist. 76, 78 (1999). Even though Georgia did not 
appear in Cherokee Nation, Marshall nonetheless “assumed the truth of the underlying facts 
and legal conclusions alleged by the Cherokee.” Frickey, Marshalling, supra note 199, at 391.
201 Georgia had protested the Treaty of hopewell on the grounds that the “pretended treaty, 
and all other proceedings that have yet transpired, are a manifest and direct attempt to violate 
the retained sovereignty and legislative right of this State, and repugnant to the principles and 
harmony of the Federal Union.” Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1115. North Carolina 
similarly refused to recognize the Treaty because its interests were not represented. President 
Washington did not enforce the Treaty against North Carolina, which had not yet ratified the 
Constitution. By the time it did so, there were too many settlers within Cherokee territory to 
make enforcement feasible. The result was that a new treaty, the 1791 Treaty of holston, had to 
be negotiated. When Tennessee complained about this new treaty, President Adams negotiated 
the Treaty of Tellico. Berutti, supra note 194, at 295.
202 The Cherokees had a “‘ruling elite’ that consisted of the wealthier, English-speaking, 
mixed blood members of the Nation, and who were opposed in many of their goals by other 
members, although not on the goals of cultural diversity and separatism. . . . Those members 
of the Cherokees that favored maintenance of ancient tribal customs and practices were con-
demned by the elite Cherokees as ‘aboriginal.’” White, supra note 196, at 716.
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developed domestic agriculture, a written language, and a constitution.203 
Ironically, it was this very progress of Americanization, along with peren-
nial land greed and the discovery of gold on Indian land, which prompted 
Georgia to move against the Cherokees.204
1.  Article III of the Constitution
The Cherokees faced what would be an insurmountable barrier to the 
Court’s jurisdiction. Under Article III of the Constitution, the Court 
has jurisdiction over controversies between a state and foreign states.205 
Consequently, the issue was whether the “Cherokee nation [was] a for-
eign state in the sense in which that term is used in the constitution[.]”206 
203 The Cherokees, Creeks, Chickasaws, Choctaws, and Seminoles, “collectively known as 
the ‘Five Civilized Tribes,’” responded to aggression by the settlers with a strategy of “passive 
defense.” Berutti, supra note 194, at 294. They strengthened their internal institutions, invited 
missionaries onto their territories, centralized their governments, supported literacy programs, 
created a written alphabet for the Cherokee language, published the first Indian newspaper, 
developed a legal system, and entered into treaties with the United States. Id.
204 Newmyer, supra note 200, at 81. The reference to “progress of Americanization” is unclear 
because land greed and gold would seem to have been enough on their own to have doomed 
the Cherokees. Id.
205 The U.S. Constitution provides that “[t]he judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in 
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, . . . to Controversies . . . between a State, or 
the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.” U.S. Const. art III, §2, cl. 1. 
206 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831). William Wirt, who repre-
sented the Cherokees along with John Sargent, sought an informal opinion from Chief Justice 
Marshall on the jurisdictional issue before filing the case. Chief Justice Marshall “thought it 
his duty to refrain from indicating any opinion” on the issue. White, supra note 196, at 721. 
Strickland says that Wirt asked Judge Carr to probe Marshall’s views. Rennard Strickland, The 
Tribal Struggle for Indian Sovereignty: The Story of the Cherokee Cases, in Race Law Stories 
37, 46 (Rachel F. Moran & Devon W. Carbado eds., 2008). Putting aside his representation 
of the Cherokees, Wirt personally believed—as did Marshall, Story, and Madison—that the 
Indians were savages and incompatible with civilized society. “If ‘civilizing’ [the] Indians could 
not solve their plight, dispossession and removal” were required. White, supra, at 722. Each felt 
that the Indians’ possession of land yielded no natural rights of ownership. Id. 
“Wirt was one of the most distinguished and well-known attorneys of the age . . . When 
first approached, he was reluctant to take the case, but he was ultimately persuaded to represent 
the Cherokee Nation by the injustices being suffered by the tribe and the influence of his old 
friend Daniel Webster. The Cherokee people held Wirt in such esteem that for generations 
young men were given his name.” Strickland, supra, at 43.
Wirt also argued Worcester v. Georgia, discussed infra notes 229−99.
The first major step in federal policy regarding the Indians was the removal of many 
Eastern tribes to lands west of the Mississippi River to make room for non-Indian 
settlement. Indians resisting removal were told that if they remained in the East they 
could not expect the federal government to protect them. They were told they would 
have to submit to state jurisdiction and state law because the Constitution made 
no provision for separate sovereigns to exist within a state. To encourage voluntary 
removal, the Indians were told that west of the Mississippi they would be forever free 
from state and federal interference.
Johnson & Martinis, supra note 194, at 2–3. See also Angie Debo, A history of the Indians 
of the United States 117–49 (1970).
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Chief Justice Marshall,207 writing for himself and Justice M’Lean,208 attempted 
207 
As Newmyer notes, The Cherokee Cases arose out of an old Georgia antipathy to the 
Court and arrived in a highly-charged political atmosphere when the Chief Justice 
was beset with troubles of all kinds: his wife’s death, his own old age and illness, 
the threat of states’ rights ideology, the rise of Jacksonian democracy, and in-house 
divisiveness among the Justices marked by their abrupt abandonment of a shared 
boardinghouse life in Washington.
Ball, John Marshall, supra note 193, at 1183. Marshall was “no particular friend either to state 
sovereignty or to the Jackson administration.” White, supra note 196, at 730. The case came 
to the Court “in the midst of Marshall’s personal and political woes . . . Andrew Jackson was 
elected President in 1828, and in his first message to Congress, he made it clear that he sup-
ported removal of the Cherokee. Congress responded with the Removal Act of 1830.” Ball, 
John Marshall, supra note 193, at 1184. 
As soon as the results of the 1828 election were known, Georgia extended its laws 
over the Indians within the state. . . . Jackson [later] told Congress, ‘years since I 
stated my belief to them that if the states chose to extend their laws over them it 
would not be in the power of the federal government to prevent it.’
Michael Paul Rogin, Fathers and Children: Andrew Jackson and the Subjugation of 
the American Indian 212–13 (Transaction Publishers, 1991).
208 M’Lean had recently been appointed by President Jackson and was a presidential aspi-
rant. Norgren, supra note 193, at 100. Professor Norgren does not comment on whether the 
appointment was meant to remove a political rival of Jackson’s. She describes M’Lean’s earlier 
opinions as being “often guided by political aspirations.” Id. at 105. 
Only six Justices heard the case. Justice Johnson concurred in a separate opinion, refer-
ring to the Indians as a “people so low in the grade of organized society” as not to be taken 
seriously, Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 21 (Johnson, J., concurring), as “nothing more 
than wandering hordes, held together only by ties of blood and habit, and having neither 
laws or government, beyond what is required in a savage state,” id. at 27–28, as a “petty kraal 
of Indians,” id. at 25, which existed in a state of “feudal dependence,” id. at 24. he used the 
term “master and conqueror,” id. at 27, to describe the Tribes’ relationship with the United 
States. Johnson thus rejected any concept of territorial sovereignty. Gould, Consent, supra note 
6, at 820. President Jefferson had appointed Justice Johnson to break Marshall’s hold on the 
Court. Johnson sought to justify his opinion with “tortured and ethnocentric legal distinctions 
concerning the meaning of a state, a foreign state, and a member of the family of nations.” 
Norgren, supra note 193, at 107. 
Justice Baldwin concurred in an opinion describing the Treaty of hopewell as “an indenture 
of servitude.” Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 39. Both Justices Baldwin and Johnson 
concluded that the Cherokees had no sovereignty at all. 
Baldwin joined the Court two months before oral arguments in Cherokee Nation. “While 
mental illness and an inconsistent jurisprudence limited Baldwin’s intellectual contributions in 
the course of his judicial career, his opinion in Cherokee Nation was not at odds with several 
of the themes in his later work, namely, concern for state power and the unwarranted extension 
of Supreme Court power.” Norgren, supra note 193, at 106.
Justice Thompson dissented, joined by Justice Story. Professor Newmyer states that Chief 
Justice Marshall encouraged Justices Thompson and Story to dissent, Newmyer, supra note 
200, at 86, presumably to balance Justices Johnson and Baldwin. Justice Thompson wrote a 
long opinion challenging the majority on both the jurisdictional and substantive issues. The 
dissent argued that the Cherokees did not surrender their status as a foreign nation by being 
dependent on the United States for military defense. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 
53 (Thompson J., dissenting). The Indians reserved their right to self-government and did not 
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lose their sovereignty. Id. at 53. 
Justice Thompson was appointed by President Monroe in 1823. “Although not always sup-
portive of the strong national powers promoted by Justice Story, Thompson had been born in 
New York State and educated at Princeton. he brought a northerner’s perspective to the ques-
tion of Indian sovereignty.” Norgren, supra note 193, at 106. 
Justice Duvall was not present due to the mental illness of his son. When the original deci-
sion was handed down no dissents were announced. Because only Justice M’Lean joined Chief 
Justice Marshall, the opinion was a plurality opinion and, as Professor Frickey characterizes 
it, “something of a middle ground, and it is relied upon today despite its lack of complete 
precedential value.” Frickey, Common Law, supra note 15, at 10 n.38. Strickland describes the 
opinion as a “two, two, two split, with Marshall and McLean deciding that the Court did not 
have original jurisdiction but that the Cherokees were entities with specific rights. . . . Baldwin 
and Johnson decided that the Cherokee were not a state and had very few, if any, rights. Story 
and Thompson, on the other hand, decided that the Cherokees were entitled to original juris-
diction as a foreign state with independent legal and political rights. In another, broader sense, 
the court split might also be seen as a four to two decision, affirming Indian rights but denying 
the tribe the right to present its case before the Court.” Rennard Strickland, The Tribal Struggle 
for Indian Sovereignty: The Story of the Cherokee Cases, in Race Law Stories 37, 48 (Rachel F. 
Moran & Devon W. Carbado eds. 2008).
Justice Story was a “Massachusetts lawyer and scholar,” who “emphasized the values of 
republicanism, nationalism, and the liberalism of John Locke in his jurisprudence. his vote 
against Georgia in Cherokee Nation reflected his New England roots, an unyielding commit-
ment to the powers of the national government over those of the states, and an abiding faith in 
private property rights.” Norgren, supra note 193, at 108.
Chief Justice Marshall wanted the plight of the Cherokees to be made public. he was anx-
ious to keep the issue of Georgia’s dispossession of the Cherokees in the public domain and 
help defeat President Jackson in the 1832 presidential election. 
Marshall was already losing control of the Court as Jackson’s appointees split with 
him on fundamental issues of constitutionalism and the relationship between the fed-
eral government and the states. he hoped a Republican president would appoint his 
protégé, Justice Story, as Chief Justice to replace him, so that he could retire knowing 
his federalist legacy was safe.
Robert T. Anderson, Bethany Berger, Philip P. Frickey & Sarah Krakoff, American 
Indian Law 62 (2nd ed. 2010).
Curiously, given the great importance of the case and the increasing practice of filing 
concurring and dissenting opinions, initially neither Justice Thompson nor Justice 
Story submitted a written opinion to be published as part of the official court record. 
When the spring session of the court closed a few days after the announcement of 
the Cherokee Nation decision, Chief Justice Marshall decided that the unbalanced 
nature of the public record would not do. Seeking to alter this and perhaps regretting 
his own vote, the chief justice took the unusual step of suggesting that Thompson and 
Story draft an opinion outlining their arguments in support of Cherokee claims.
Norgren, supra note 193, at 108–09. 
The Court’s Reporter, Richard Peters, collaborated with Chief Justice Marshall and Justices 
Story and Thompson in publishing a pamphlet, The Case of the Cherokee Nation Against the State 
of Georgia, which included all of the opinions, James Kent’s paper supporting the Cherokees 
on the jurisdictional issues, and the relevant treaties and statutes. White, supra note 196, at 
730. Justice Story thought that the pamphlet would “do a great deal of good,” “unite the moral 
sense . . . of our people,” and “sink to the very bottom of their sense of Justice.” Id. 
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to resolve the unique political status of a tribe.209 Marshall observed that 
“[t]he condition of the Indians in relation to the United States is perhaps 
unlike that of any other two people in existence. In the general, nations not 
owing a common allegiance are foreign to each other.”210 Nonetheless,
[t]he Indian territory is admitted to compose a part of the United  
States. . . . They acknowledge themselves in their treaties to be under the 
protection of the United States; they admit that the United States shall have 
the sole and exclusive right of regulating the trade with them, and manag-
ing all their affairs as they think proper . . . .211 [I]t may well be doubted 
whether those tribes which reside within the acknowledged boundaries of 
the United States can, with strict accuracy, be denominated foreign nations. 
They may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent 
nations.212 They occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent of 
their will, which must take effect in point of possession when their right of 
possession ceases. Meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage.213 Their rela-
tion to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.214 They 
look to our government for protection; rely upon its kindness and its power; 
appeal to it for relief to their wants; and address the president as their great 
father.215 
209 One commentator claims that the opinion was written in two days, Walters, supra note 
11, at 127 n.4; another claims the Court issued its opinion in four days after the oral argu-
ment, White, supra note 196, at 724. According to one commentator, the politics of the time 
made it impossible for Chief Justice Marshall to rule in favor of the Cherokees. Berutti, supra 
note 194, at 298–99. In addition, the Cherokees’ “choice of chief counsel, former Attorney 
General William Wirt,” a political enemy of President Jackson, was “suicidal to their case.” 
Id. at 300. See also supra note 206. For a general discussion of the case, see Norgren, supra 
note 193, at 98–111, who describes Marshall as “extricat[ing] the court from the rough seas 
of politics with procedural sleight of hand,” the way he had done “decades before in Marbury 
v. Madison.” Id. at 100.
210 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 16. While not all that common, there are sovereigns 
that are geographically located entirely within other sovereigns. Examples of these “enclaves” 
include San Marino, Vatican City, and Lesotho. It is also common that countries enter into 
mutual defense pacts. 
211 Id. at 17. 
212 Professor Clinton argues that the term “dependent” was not “a statement of political infe-
riority or a statement of federal supremacy, but, rather . . . an implied criticism of the political 
branches of the United States government which had failed to enforce the treaty obligations of 
protection when requested to do so by the Cherokee Nation.” Clinton, Supremacy, supra note 
7, at 141. In contrast, the Cohen treatise states “[t]hey are denominated . . . dependent because 
they are subject to federal power.” Cohen’s handbook, supra note 7, at 1. The tenor of the 
opinion supports Cohen. See also Johnson & Martinis, supra note 194, at 14 (“In international 
law, the use of the dependency criterion makes sense: a domestic dependent nation could not 
have its own foreign relations powers without potentially compromising the foreign affairs of 
the nation upon which it is dependent.”). See also supra note 210.
213 “Likening tribes to wards in ‘a state of pupilage’ was not intended as a compliment, but 
with that status comes certain expectations about the behavior of the American national gov-
ernment.” Jensen, supra note 9, at 22.
214 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17. 
215 Id. Professor Jensen describes the use of the ward-guardian metaphor as “condescend-
ing.” Jensen, supra note 9, at 21. As Professor Jensen perceptively notes, concepts like ward-
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Accordingly, the Court determined, “the framers of our constitution had 
not the Indian tribes in view, when they opened the courts of the union to 
controversies between a state . . . and foreign states.”216 
Additionally, Chief Justice Marshall made much of the construction of the 
Commerce Clause. “In this clause they are as clearly contradistinguished by 
a name appropriate to themselves, from foreign nations, as from the several 
guardian, state of pupilage, references to the President as the great father, and the trust doctrine 
in general, “could call into question the tribes’ status as sovereigns. The trust obligation need 
not be interpreted in that way: one sovereign nation may have obligations to act in the best 
interests of a weaker sovereign nation without diminishing the weaker nation’s sovereignty. The 
tension nonetheless exists.” Jensen, supra note 9, at 22. For a devastating critique of the trust 
doctrine, see Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 61–66. For a general discussion, see Stephen L. 
Pevar, The Rights of Indians and Tribes 32–45 (3rd ed. 2002).
The “ward-guardian” language did not stop the government from entering into treaties with 
its “wards.” Felix Cohen warned that talk of a guardian and ward relationship would legitimize 
“congressional legislation that would have been unconstitutional if applied to non-Indians.” 
Cohen, supra note 11, at 170. The “ward-guardian” language has been described as the “first 
judicial formulation of the trust relationship between the United States and the American 
Indians.” Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 7, at 613. Professor Natelson views the guard-
ianship analogy as implying “a restricted, fiduciary power. The Founders themselves used the 
fiduciary analogy to emphasize the limited nature of federal authority.” Natelson, supra note 
15, at 206. That language, however, came to serve as the rationale for expansive federal legisla-
tion. See supra notes 214−15 and accompanying text; infra notes 352, 434. A resolution by the 
house of Representatives states that “from the first treaty entered into with an Indian Nation, 
the treaty with the Delaware Indians of September 17, 1778, the Congress has assumed a trust 
responsibility and obligation to Indian tribes and their members.” h. Con. Res. 331, 100th 
Cong. 2nd Sess. (1988).
216 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 18. Chief Justice Marshall made no attempt to exam-
ine any of the debate over Article III, but he did assert that
[a]t the time the constitution was framed, the idea of appealing to an American court 
of justice for an assertion of right or a redress of wrong, had perhaps never entered 
the mind of an Indian or of his tribe. Their appeal was to the tomahawk, or to the 
government. This was well understood by the statesmen who framed the constitution 
of the United States, and who might furnish some reason for omitting to enumerate 
them among the parties who might sue in the courts of the union.
Id. Professor Norgren claims this statement “was nothing more than a falsification of history. 
Since the middle of the seventeenth century Native Americans had been frequent litigants in 
colonial courts.” Norgren, supra note 193, at 101. Professor Williams agrees. “Marshall’s argu-
ment by inference in Cherokee Nation conveniently ignored numerous well-publicized instances 
where tribal Indians asserted claims in white colonial courts. As in [Johnson v. M’Intosh] the 
Chief Justice felt compelled to legitimate the denial of fundamental rights to Indian tribes on 
the basis of their Eurocentrically-perceived deficient and uncivilized character. Like all great 
theorists and systematizers of the European legal tradition, Marshall performed a bold and 
reconciling act of critical amnesia.” Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: 
The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man’s Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 
Wis. L. Rev. 219, 257–58 [hereinafter Williams, Algebra]. 
Professor Norgren claims that Marshall “‘was willing to sacrifice the rights of the Cherokee 
people’ for political motives, and that his characterization of tribes as ‘domestic dependent 
nations’ instead of declaring them foreign nations was a ‘transparent ploy.’” She deplores the 
result as based on “tortured and ethnocentric legal distinctions.” Norgren, supra note 193, 
at 92–95.
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states composing the union.”217 The Clause “does not comprehend Indian 
tribes in the general term ‘foreign nations;’ not we presume because a tribe 
may not be a nation, but because it is not foreign to the United States.”218 
Consequently, Chief Justice Marshall concluded the Tribe was not a foreign 
nation within the meaning of Article III so that the Court lacked jurisdic-
tion.219 
2.  The Oxymoronic Domestic Dependent Nation
The oxymoronic category of “domestic dependent nation”220 was Marshall’s 
solution to characterizing “distinct political societies with the power of self 
government and the right to make treaties that have the force of supreme 
law but who, in those same treaties, were recognized as ‘dependent’ on the 
217 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 18.
218 Id. at 19. 
219 Professor Frickey describes the structure of the opinion, “discussing the merits first and 
jurisdiction last and finding the absence of jurisdiction a convenient way to avoid a direct con-
frontation between the Court and a powerful institutional opponent,” as similar to Marbury 
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Frickey, Marshalling, supra note 199, at 391 n.45. 
Wilkinson and Volkman concur, comparing Cherokee Nation to Marbury v. Madison, “where 
Chief Justice Marshall also held that the Court did not have jurisdiction, but established the 
basic constitutional law principle of judicial review. . . . The jurisdictional ruling in Cherokee 
Nation permitted Chief Justice Marshall to set forth important legal principles, while, at the 
same time, rendering no affirmative order; because there was no order to enforce there was no 
order to disobey.” Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 7, at 613 n.60.
220 The term encapsulates the tension that marks Indian law more generally. See Jensen, supra 
note 9, at 21–27. Justice Thomas recently recognized this tension. “[T]he tribes either are or 
are not separate sovereigns, and our federal Indian law cases untenably hold both positions 
simultaneously.” United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 215 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring).
Professor Natelson argues that the use of the term “nation” by members of the founding 
generation
has induced some to conclude that the Founders “regarded Indian tribes as sovereign 
nations, with the ability to make war, treaties, and laws for their own people.” From 
this it has been inferred that American governments had no political jurisdiction over 
tribes within their borders. Yet . . . colonial and state governments did exercise police 
powers over Indians within their borders, including tribal Indians. . . . Referring 
to tribes as “nations” was consistent with exercising political jurisdiction over them 
because at the time the word “nation” did not necessarily evoke the association with 
political sovereignty it evokes today. The more common meaning of “nation” fol-
lowed its Latin root, natio, in referring merely to a people or ethnic group or the 
inhabitants of a general territory. . . . To be sure, the contemporaneous definition of 
“nation” did not exclude the possibility that some tribes were thought of as sovereign. 
A member of the founding generation might well think of some tribes as sovereign 
entities. But one cannot generalize from the use of the word “nation” to a conclusion 
that the Founders thought all tribes were sovereign.
Natelson, supra note 15, at 259. Presumably, however, the use of the same term within the 
Foreign Commerce Clause was meant to suggest political sovereignty.
Professor Norgren explains that “domestic” means that the Indian territories were located 
within the exterior boundaries of the United States; dependent means that limitations were 
placed on them with respect to war and foreign negotiations; and national means they were 
distinctly separate peoples outside the American polity. Norgren, supra note 193, at 103.
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United States and whose trade with the United States could be regulated by 
Congress.”221 Professor Krakoff captures the essence of the term by describing 
Marshall as struggling to “mediate the realpolitik of the times; Indian nations 
had been absorbed within the American legal framework against their will, 
and there was little the Court could do but recognize their status as ‘depen-
dent’ sovereigns, but sovereigns nonetheless.”222
Chief Justice Marshall had a more ambitious agenda, however, than merely 
interpreting Article III. Marshall’s opinion could have reached the same con-
clusion—that the Cherokees were not a foreign nation—without any discus-
sion of sovereignty or of the Cherokees’ status as a nation. For jurisdiction to 
exist under Article III, the Tribe had to be both “foreign” and a “nation.” It 
was not “foreign” regardless of its status as a “nation.” The opinion could have 
been limited to that issue. That Marshall’s decision spoke in general terms 
about the Indians, rather than specifically about the Cherokees, and discussed 
the Indians’ sovereignty as nations, indicates an agenda well beyond that of 
resolving the issue before the Court.223
In his opinion, Marshall expressed great sympathy for the Cherokees:224 
221 Newmyer, supra note 200, at 85.
222 Sarah Krakoff, City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York: A Regretful Postscript 
to The Taxation Chapter in Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 41 Tulsa L. Rev. 5, 19 
(2005). Professor Norgren characterizes Marshall as “protecting the future of the Supreme 
Court by side-stepping further confrontation between the judiciary and Georgia and the 
Jackson administration.” Norgren, supra note 193, at 102.
223 Professor Norgren characterizes much of the opinion as dictum and a corrupt reading of 
history. Norgren, supra note 193, at 101.
224 According to Professor Newmyer,
[Marshall’s] personal views of Native Americans were conflicted. As with slavery, he 
was torn between a humane concern for their rights as human beings, and a realistic 
recognition of the cultural obstacles to the realization of those rights. Judging from 
Virginia history, which is what Marshall did, the obstacles were formidable. Except 
for a brief interlude when there was mutual respect between the colonists and Native 
Americans, the story in Virginia was largely one of deception and aggression on the 
part of a relentlessly advancing Anglo-civilization marked by bloody frontier warfare 
in which whites and reds alike shared in the barbarities. Marshall came of age in 
this hostile environment . . . Marshall grew up thinking of Indians as “savage” . . . . 
When allied with Great Britain, France, and Spain, as they were at various times in 
Marshall’s life, he saw them as enemies of the new nation. At the same time (espe-
cially when it became clear that ultimate victory would go to the better armed and 
more numerous Americans), he saw Indians as victims in need of protection . . . .
R. Kent Newmyer, Chief Justice John Marshall’s Last Campaign: Georgia, Jackson, and the 
Cherokee Cases, 23 J. of Supreme Ct. hist., at 79 (1999). Marshall’s opinions in Cherokee 
Nation and Worcester reflect this latter sentiment. Professor Frickey documents other evidence 
of Chief Justice Marshall’s sympathies for the Indians, as well as those of Justice Story. Frickey, 
Marshalling, supra note 199, at 405 n.107. Compare supra note 206. After the opinion in 
Worcester, Justice Story wrote to George Ticknor: “The Court has done its duty. Let the nation 
now do theirs.” Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics and Morality, 21 
Stan. L. Rev. 500, 527 (1969).
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If the courts were permitted to indulge their sympathies, a case better cal-
culated to excite them can scarcely be imagined. A people once numerous, 
powerful, and truly independent, found by our ancestors in the quiet and 
uncontrolled possession of an ample domain, gradually sinking beneath our 
superior policy, our arts and our arms, have yielded their land by successive 
treaties, each of which contains a solemn guarantee of the residue, until they 
retain no more of their formerly extensive territory than is deemed neces-
sary to their comfortable subsistence.225
Moreover, Marshall acknowledged that the Cherokees were a distinct polit-
ical society with an “unquestioned right to lands they occupy, until that right 
shall be extinguished by a voluntary cession” to the Federal Government.226 
here Marshall was addressing the merits of the controversy; and, indeed, 
he appeared to settle it decisively. having spoken on the merits of the case, 
he went on to proclaim that he was not speaking on the merits of the case. 
he could not do so, he said, because the Court had no authority to hear 
the case under the original jurisdiction, since the Cherokees were neither a  
state . . . nor a foreign state.227 
Marshall concluded
[i]f it be true that the Cherokee nation have rights, this is not the tribunal 
in which those rights are to be asserted. If it be true that wrongs have been 
inflicted, and that still greater are to be apprehended, this is not the tribunal 
which can redress the past or prevent the future.228 
225 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 15. “To admit personal prejudice in favor of one of 
the litigants in the case was unusual to say the least. To say that the Cherokees claimed under 
‘successive treaties, each of which contains a solemn guarantee’ was even more remarkable.” 
Newmyer, supra note 200, at 84. 
Chief Justice Marshall resisted the political and moral pleas of the Cherokees because 
he believed that the Constitution would not allow the Court to accept jurisdic-
tion. The best he would do for the Cherokee Nation . . . was to suggest through his  
opinion . . . that the Cherokee claims had merit and that the Court might rule dif-
ferently in a future case.
Burke, supra note 224, at 530–31.
226 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.
227 Newmyer, supra note 200, at 84 (emphasis in original). Professor Newmyer views the “ad 
hoc nature of the whole opinion [as suggesting] that the Chief Justice was slipping, that age 
and sickness had taken their toll. That impression was strengthened by the fact that he was 
unable to unite the Court behind him.” Id. at 85. Similar comments would apply to Worcester, 
decided just one year later.
228 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 20. 
In this statement one can barely recognize the voice of the assertive jurist long reviled 
by states’ rights partisans, the famed John Marshall, whose court had previously not 
shied from upholding the national powers of the United States in the cases Martin 
v. Hunter’s Lessee, McCulloch v. Maryland, and Dartmouth College v. Woodward. 
Perhaps Marshall pulled back in Cherokee Nation because Indian rights were at issue 
rather than his beloved contract clause or the national bank. Perhaps the climate of 
Jacksonian politics overwhelmed the usually feisty chief justice. Perhaps Marshall 
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B.  Worcester v. Georgia
The third case in Chief Justice Marshall’s famous trilogy was Worcester v. Geor-
gia.229 Georgia required those entering Cherokee land to obtain a State license 
and swear a loyalty oath to Georgia.230 In Worcester, two federally licensed 
missionaries—Worcester and Butler—were U.S. citizens who, acting under 
the federal Trade and Intercourse Acts, were on Cherokee land without a 
Georgia license.231 Worcester and Butler were imprisoned for violating Geor-
gia law. Other missionaries were also convicted but accepted a pardon from 
felt that Indian removal would occur quickly and that the Court would be foolish 
to invite further confrontation with members of Congress intent on limiting federal 
judicial authority. . . . The final two paragraphs of the opinion in particular offer clear 
evidence of Marshall’s mental exhaustion and abandonment of the Indian cause.
Norgren, supra note 193, at 104–05.
“The Chief Justice’s prophecy has proved correct. The Court has typically failed to protect 
tribal rights, and greater wrongs have been inflicted. But his prophecy was insufficient. his pre-
science could scarcely have revealed to him that the wrongs would continue into the twenty-
first century and that the Court would not only not redress or prevent them but would become 
their principle [sic] contemporary source.” Ball, John Marshall, supra note 193, at 1195.
229 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). Professor Frickey characterizes Worcester as “one of the most 
important components of federal Indian law.” Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of 
Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority over Nonmembers, 109 Yale L.J. 
1, 10 (1999). Professor Gould describes the trilogy as delineating
the nature and extent of the doctrine of inherent sovereignty. Tribes are domestic 
dependent nations whose right to occupy their lands is subject to the “ultimate 
domain” of the federal government; they may not form treaties with foreign nations, 
but may govern their affairs without interference from the states, except when limited 
by treaties or by the acts of Congress. Implicit in the Marshall trilogy is that sover-
eignty exists over territory. 
Gould, Consent, supra note 6, at 817. 
Professor Wilkinson states that “of all the United States Supreme Court cases handed down 
between 1789 and the end of the Civil War . . . only three of those cases were cited more often 
by modern courts during the 1970s than Worcester v. Georgia.” Charles Wilkinson, Perspectives 
on Water and Energy in the American West and in Indian Country, 26 S.D. L. Rev. 393, 402 
(1981). Professor Wilkinson must be disappointed by the Court’s opinions after he wrote those 
comments. See Fletcher, infra note 244.
230 A leading casebook suggests that Georgia prohibited non-Indians from going into Indian 
country without a license and swearing loyalty to the State in order to eliminate non-Indian 
influences on the Cherokees. Anderson, Berger, Frickey & Krakoff, supra note 208, at 62. 
More generally, the Georgia laws have been attributed to “lust for gold, the need for large tracts 
of land to grow cotton, or the need to cut through Cherokee territory for a route from the 
Atlantic to the Tennessee River. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Iron Cold of the Marshall Trilogy, 
82 N. D. L. Rev. 627, 643 n.84 (2006).
231 “Worcester was a white missionary, the nephew of the founder of the powerful American 
Board of Commissioners for the Foreign Missions, and the eighth generation in an unbroken 
line of Congregational ministers [who] abandoned the pleasant life of a Vermont minister to 
teach the gospel and civilization to the Cherokees.” Burke, supra note 224, at 519. “In Samuel 
Worcester, the Cherokees could have found neither a better plaintiff nor a more loyal spokes-
person. he was as articulate as he was determined, and the press took to his cause, which came 
to symbolize the power of a giant state oppressing an individual standing on moral principle 
in defense of the wronged.” Rennard Strickland, The Tribal Struggle for Indian Sovereignty: 
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the Georgia Governor; Worcester and Butler refused and were sentenced to 
four years of hard labor.232 They appealed their convictions in order to chal-
lenge the constitutionality of the State’s law.233 Unlike Cherokee Nation, no 
issue of jurisdiction was presented because the plaintiffs were U.S. citizens. As 
in Cherokee Nation, Georgia refused to participate in the case.234 
Part of the background of the case involved an 1802 compact between the 
United States and Georgia (the Georgia Compact) that had obligated the 
federal government to extinguish Indian title within Georgia in exchange for 
that State’s ceding a large area of land to the United States (parts of which 
would become Alabama and Mississippi).235 In 1816, Andrew Jackson, as 
The Story of the Cherokee Cases, in Race Law Stories 37, 50 (Rachel F. Moran & Devon W. 
Carbado eds. 2008).
232 Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 521, 597. The Georgia trial court initially released Worcester 
because as a missionary he could dispense federal funds and thus be considered a federal agent. 
William F. Swindler, Politics as Law: The Cherokee Cases, 3 Am. Indian L. Rev. 7, 15 (1975). 
he was also the postmaster of New Echota, the Cherokee capital. Id. To make sure Georgia 
could apply its laws to Worcester, President Jackson made it clear Worcester was not a federal 
agent and also fired him as postmaster. Id.
233 Clifford M. Lytle, The Supreme Court, Tribal Sovereignty, and Continuing Problems of State 
Encroachment into Indian Country, 8 Am. Indian L. Rev. 65, 70 (1980). Worcester and Butler 
argued that the Superior Court of Gwinnett County, the trial court that released them, was 
“the highest court in [the state] in which a decision could be had in [such a] suit.” Worcester, 31 
U.S. (6 Pet.) at 532. “[T]he clerk of the county court responded to their writ of error, although 
the judge never signed it.” White, supra note 196, at 731. hence, a record was created in 
the case and although Georgia never appeared before the U.S. Supreme Court, the case was 
docketed for the 1832 Term. Id. For background on the events leading up to Worcester, see the 
sources cited in Walters, supra note 11, at 129 n.17.
234 Once again, the Cherokees hired Sargent and Wirt, see discussion supra notes 206, 209. 
Wirt may not have been the best choice of counsel because he was running against President 
Jackson in the 1832 presidential election. Swindler, supra note 232, at 9. “Surely Jackson was 
not going to execute in Wirt’s favor any Supreme Court mandate which could prove harmful 
to Jackson’s administration.” Berutti, supra note 194, at 304. Wirt’s “concluding argument 
was so moving that Chief Justice Marshall shed tears, something he had not done since the 
Dartmouth College case. Rennard Strickland, The Tribal Struggle for Indian Sovereignty: The 
Story of the Cherokee Cases, in Race Law Stories 37, 51 (Rachel F. Moran & Devon W. 
Carbado eds. 2008).
235 Cohen’s handbook, supra note 7, at 46 & n.274. The Compact “assumed that only 
the federal government could acquire land held by Indians, but it did not apply to Indian 
reserves and allotments, which in practice were ‘sold’ by Indians to whites as rapidly as white 
settlers demanded them.” White, supra note 196, at 715. One commentator describes the 
1802 Compact as taking a “large step toward making Removal a national policy.” Berutti, supra 
note 194, at 293. The origins of the policy of removing the Indians west of the Mississippi 
reflect the pressures of an increased population after the Revolutionary War. Also, cotton, 
one of the young country’s major crops, exhausted the soil so that new farmland was always 
needed, supra note 194. The cultivation of tobacco was also land-intensive, supra note 42. 
No doubt contempt for the Indians also played a role. Leading politicians of that era thought 
nothing of writing that “‘civilized and uncivilized people cannot live in the same territory or 
even in the same neighborhood.’” Berutti, supra, at 293. (citing Roy h. Pearce, Savagism 
& Civilization: A Study of the Indian and the American Mind 68 (Johns hopkins 
University Press 1965)). A familiar theme was that the Indians were non-Christian savages. 
Id. at 298. One of the earliest versions of this theme was expressed by the infamous preacher 
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Commissioner for the United States, negotiated a treaty that provided for 
the Tribe’s voluntary removal from their land within Georgia in exchange for 
land in the West and compensation. Because removal was voluntary and few 
Cherokees were willing to move, the treaty failed to satisfy Georgia.236 
The case came before the Court at a time when the Federal Government 
and the states were hoping to move the eastern tribes to areas west of the Mis-
sissippi, to free up their lands for settlement.237 At the time,
[t]he nation [had] long avoided facing Indian relations as a legal, political, 
or moral problem. The ambivalent Indian policy of the federal government, 
the irresistible push of white settlers, and the official ‘willingness’ of the 
tribes to sell their lands long hid the conflict between the theory and prac-
John Cotton, who fashioned a Biblical argument justifying the dispossession of the Indians. 
John Cotton, God’s Promise to his Plantation 4–5 (Reiner Smolinski ed. 2007) (1630), 
available at http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/etas/22/. 
The Louisiana Purchase in 1803 was partially motivated by the need to move the Indians 
westward. Berutti, supra, at 293. After the Louisiana Purchase in 1803, federal policymak-
ers “began to debate the tactics of inducing Indians east of the Mississippi to exchange their 
remaining ancestral lands for a permanent territory in the West.” Getches, Cases and 
Materials, supra note 25, at 94. Removal would “allow the white man to claim the land so 
that the black man could work it for him.” Berutti, supra note 194, at 293. Father Prucha attri-
butes to President Jefferson the idea of moving the Indians from the East to the newly acquired 
lands. See Williams, Barbarism, supra note 7, at 256.
236 Cohen’s handbook, supra note 7, at 46; Prucha, Treaties, supra note 89, at 42, 
64, 88; see Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 583 (M’Lean, J., concurring). The Cherokees were 
influenced by federal Indian agents and missionaries—sometimes one and the same—who 
impressed upon them the benefits of farming. By 1827, the Cherokees adopted a constitution, 
had essentially abandoned hunting, refused to emigrate or sell their lands, and declared them-
selves to be an independent nation. See discussion supra note 203. President Jackson refused 
to help them in their struggle with Georgia, taking the position that they could not establish 
an independent nation within that State, and the United States would not interfere with the 
internal laws of a state. Jackson’s position was that the Indians had either to emigrate or to 
comply with the Georgia statute, which was a version of the “Indian laws.” White, supra note 
196, at 715. Professor Milner Ball suggests that Christian missionaries were hired as federal 
agents. Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 4. Presumably, this was done to convert the Indians 
to Christianity.
237 See supra note 235. Worcester was no ordinary case.
The Court approached the case . . . as though caught in the clutches of fate and 
irresistible events. . . . The Governor, legislators, and judges of Georgia had publicly 
dared the Supreme Court to interfere; and the President . . . who had encouraged—or 
at lest winked at—this outrage, now seemed prepared to stand by and watch the State 
defy the Constitution, laws, and treaties.
Burke, supra note 224, at 500. Writing in 1826, James Madison stated that “[n]ext to the case 
of the black race within our bosom, that of the red on our borders is the problem most baffling 
to the policy of the country.” Letter from James Madison to Thomas L. McKenney (Feb. 10, 
1826), in Annie heloise Abel, 1 The History of Events Resulting in Indian Consolidation West 
of the Mississippi, Annual Report of the American historical Association for 1906, 
at 255 (1908). The contrast between the term “within our bosom” for the black race with 
“on our borders” for the Indians is telling. It helps explain the difference in the constitutional 
distinction between Indians and slaves for purposes of Congressional representation. See supra 
note 148.
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tice of our Indian relations . . . Written treaties that spoke of Indian nations, 
Indian boundaries, and Indian political rights remained on file, while time 
and the lack of records concealed the bribery, threats, and force that so often 
preceded their signing.238
In 1829, President Jackson announced that he was recommending legisla-
tion to set aside federal lands west of the Mississippi for emigrating Indians. 
Those Indians who chose not to emigrate could retain allotted land, but would 
be subject to state laws. The Cherokees responded by petitioning Congress 
to vindicate their rights. “Southern congressmen overwhelmingly supported 
[Jackson’s removal bill and] Northern representatives generally opposed it.”239 
henry Clay and Daniel Webster, adversaries of Jackson, kept the issue before 
the public. When the bill was passed in 1830,240 opponents of the Jackson 
administration, including Webster, recommended that the Cherokees liti-
gate.241
1.  Extra- and Pre-Constitutional Discussion of Sovereignty (Dicta)
In Worcester, Chief Justice Marshall wrote the opinion he wished he could 
have written in Cherokee Nation242 and read it to a hushed audience in a barely 
audible voice.243 Professor Newmyer describes Cherokee Nation as a “bridge 
238 Burke, supra note 224, at 501.
239 White, supra note 196, at 715–16.
240 For a critical review of the Removal policy, see generally helen Jackson, A Century of 
Dishonor (Univ. of Okla. Press 1995). A Georgia Congressman no doubt captured the mood 
of the southern states when he argued in defense of the 1830 Removal Act:
The practice of buying Indian lands is nothing more than the substitute of human-
ity and benevolence, and has been resorted to in preference to the sword, as the best 
means for agricultural and civilized communities entering into the enjoyment of their 
natural and just right to the benefits of the earth, evidently designed by Him who 
formed it for purposes more useful than Indian hunting grounds.
Williams, Barbarism, supra note 7, at 244 (emphasis in original). The removal of the Indians to 
the west had been debated “as the final solution to the ‘Indian problem’ since Jefferson’s 1803 
Louisiana Purchase.” Id. See supra note 235. “Even so-called ‘friends of the Indians’ argued that 
tribalism’s incompatibility with the values and norms of white civilization left removal as the 
only means to save the Indian from destruction.” Id. at 245.
241 After denying the Cherokee standing in Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 1, Chief 
Justice Marshall privately informed Wirt that he was sympathetic to the Indians’ cause, and 
believed that Georgia lacked jurisdiction over them. Chief Justice Marshall encouraged Wirt to 
bring a case that the Court could hear. 1 The Cambridge history of the Native Peoples of 
the Americas, supra note 128, at 525–26. Wirt, who argued Cherokee Nation, was co-counsel 
for the plaintiffs with Sergeant. Justice Story described Wirt’s oral argument as “uncommonly 
eloquent, forcible, and finished.” White, supra note 196, at 731. See also supra notes 206, 
209.
242 Worcester gave the Cherokee “one last chance for survival, Marshall one last opportunity 
to answer his states’ rights critics, and the American people a chance to depose ‘King Andrew.’” 
Newmyer, supra note 200, at 86.
243 Newmyer, supra note 200, at 87. Justices Duvall (who was absent in Cherokee Nation), 
Story, and Thompson joined Chief Justice Marshall. Justice M’Lean concurred, seeking to 
“distinguish himself from the apparent limits the opinion of the Court placed on a state’s 
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to Worcester . . . . The link . . . was Marshall’s ‘domestic dependent nation’ 
concept.”244 
After dispensing with a series of procedural issues establishing the jurisdic-
tion of the Court,245 Chief Justice Marshall embarked on a lengthy review of 
the history of the British, the colonies, and the United States with the Indians 
power to regulate the affairs of Indians within its borders.” White, supra note 196, at 732. In 
dicta, Justice M’Lean stated that he would allow a state to exercise power if the Indians had 
become assimilated or if they became incapable of self-government because of a reduction in 
their numbers. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 594.
If a tribe of Indians shall become so degraded or reduced in numbers, as to lose 
the power of self-government, the protection of the local law, of necessity, must be 
extended over them . . . The exercise of the power of self-government by the Indians, 
within a state, is undoubtedly contemplated to be temporary.
Id. at 593. he also stated that “[a]t no time has the sovereignty of the country been recognized 
as existing in the Indians, but they have always been admitted to possess many of the attributes 
of sovereignty. All the rights which belong to self government have been recognized as vested 
in them.” Id. at 580. In an opinion Justice M’Lean subsequently wrote as a circuit judge, he 
upheld Ohio’s assertion of jurisdiction over the Wyandott Reservation by applying state law 
and not the federal Nonintercourse Act to a non-Indian who stole a horse from an assimilated 
Indian. United States v. Cisna, 25 F. Cas. 422 (C.C.D. Ohio 1835) (No. 14,795). One of the 
determinative factors was that the reservation was surrounded by a “dense” white population 
that had “daily intercourse” with the Indians. Id. at 424.
Justice Baldwin dissented in Worcester on the grounds that the writ of error was defective. 
See supra note 233. On the merits, however, he would have sided with Georgia for the reasons 
he expressed in Cherokee Nation. See supra note 208. In Cherokee Nation, Justice Baldwin 
described the United States’ relationship with the Indians as one in which the United States 
had “the right of soil, sovereignty and jurisdiction.” 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 40. “he therefore 
thought the territory clause was relevant to Indian law. Baldwin believed Indian country was 
United States territory. he never said exactly how it became so, except by his interpretation of 
treaties.” Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 48.
“Justice Baldwin’s dissent essentially tracked his concurrence in Cherokee Nation. Justice 
Johnson was absent because of ill health.” White, supra note 196, at 732. Strickland states that 
Johnson would have otherwise dissented. Rennard Strickland, The Tribal Struggle for Indian 
Sovereignty: The Story of the Cherokee Cases, in Race Law Stories 37, 52 (Rachel F. Moran & 
Devon W. Carbado eds. 2008).
244 Newmyer, supra note 200, at 86. Worcester, however, does not use the phrase “domes-
tic dependent nation.” See 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). Indeed, a Lexis search for the term 
“domestic dependent nation” turns up only eight references in U.S. Supreme Court opinions. 
Professor Fletcher thinks that Marshall replaced the term “domestic dependent nations” with 
“distinct, independent political communities.” Fletcher, Indian Problem, supra note 11, at 595. 
That term appears five times in Supreme Court opinions, including Worcester. More generally, 
in the “last few decades, the Court almost never cites Worcester for any proposition other than 
the undisputed tenet that tribes retain some sovereignty. The Court has long ago departed from 
the platonic notion that state law has no force in Indian Country.” Id.
The U.S. Supreme Court has described Worcester as one of Chief Justice Marshall’s “most 
courageous and eloquent opinions.” Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219 (1959). One of the 
reasons the opinion was courageous was that it “reaffirmed the sovereign and autonomous 
status of the Cherokee Nation as a domestic dependent nation at the very time the federal gov-
ernment and the states were seeking to remove eastern tribes to land west of the Mississippi.” 
Clinton, supra note 14, at 848. The opinion was a thumb in Jackson’s eye.
245 Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 536–51.
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generally, and the Cherokees in particular, to determine whether Georgia was 
acting extra-territorially by asserting jurisdiction over the Tribe.246 “America, 
separated from Europe by a wide ocean, was inhabited by a distinct people, 
divided into separate nations, independent of each other and of the rest of 
the world, having institutions of their own, and governing themselves by 
their own laws.”247 Marshall emphasized that the British treated the Indians 
with respect, as self-governing communities able to enter into treaties. “[O]ur 
history furnishes no example . . . of any attempt on the part of the crown to 
interfere with the internal affairs of the Indians.”248 At the time of the Revolu-
tionary War, Britain considered the Indians “as nations capable of maintain-
ing the relations of peace and war; of governing themselves,”249 and during 
and after the war the United States adopted the same attitude.250 
Marshall laid the groundwork for what would become an important Indian 
canon of construction251 by describing the Cherokee chiefs who signed the 
1785 Treaty of hopewell252 as “not very critical judges of the language, from 
the fact that every one makes his mark; no chief was capable of signing his 
name. It is probable the treaty was interpreted to them.”253 “The language 
used in treaties with the Indians should never be construed to their prejudice. 
If words be made use of which are susceptible of a more extended meaning 
than their plain import, as connected with the tenor of the treaty, they should 
be considered as used only in the latter sense.”254
Accordingly, Marshall interpreted the Treaty liberally in favor of the Indi-
ans.255 “Chief Justice Marshall appeared to view the Indian treaty narrowly 
246 Id. at 536–41, 542–51. 
247 Id. at 542–43. 
248 Id. at 547. 
249 Id. at 548.
250 Id. at 548, 552. Dean Getches notes that Marshall “went out of his way to describe tribal 
sovereignty in ringing, unmistakable terms: ‘national character,’ ‘right of self-government,’ 
‘nations capable of maintaining the relations of peace and war,’ ‘distinct, independent political 
communities,’ ‘Indian nations,’ ‘political existence,’ and ‘pre-existing power of the nation to 
govern itself.’” Getches, Conquering, supra note 14, at 1577. As I argue in the text, despite the 
importance of these references generally, I view them as dicta.
251 The Indian canons of construction are intended to encourage interpretations of stat-
utes and treaties that favor Indian rights. See Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical 
Reasoning, and the Dynamic Nature of Federal Indian Law, 78 Calif. L. Rev. 1137, 1141 (1990) 
[hereinafter Frickey, Congressional Intent]. Professor Jensen thinks the court is less enthusiastic 
about the Indian canons outside of the treaty context. Jensen, supra note 9, at 93–94. For an 
explanation of why the canons might be limited to just treaties, see supra note 130 and the 
references therein. See generally Cohen’s handbook, supra note 7, at 119–28.
252 Other treaties were mentioned in passing. In addition to the Treaty of hopewell, Chief 
Justice Marshall analyzed a treaty with the Delawares, Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 549–50, 
and the Treaty of holston, id. at 555–56.
253 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 551. See also supra note 130.
254 Id. at 582.
255 See Frickey, Marshalling, supra note 199, at 401.
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as a contract of adhesion256—an agreement in which the negotiation process 
had not been one of arm’s-length bargaining between equal adversaries and 
in which the more powerful party bore full responsibility for all contractual 
drafting.”257 Marshall thus concluded that the Cherokees did not surrender 
their sovereignty but remained a nation, albeit one receiving the protection 
of a more powerful country.258 “This relation was that of a nation claiming 
and receiving the protection of one more powerful: not that of individuals 
abandoning their national character, and submitting as subjects to the laws 
of a master.”259
Marshall went on to interpret a second treaty with the Cherokees, the 1791 
Treaty of holston, concluding that “[t]his treaty, thus explicitly recogniz-
ing the national character of the Cherokees, and their right of self govern-
ment; thus guarantying their lands; assuming the duty of protection, and of 
course pledging the faith of the United States for that protection; has been 
frequently renewed, and is now in full force.”260 Under that treaty, the Chero-
256 Professor Frickey raises some serious problems with “embracing this contract-of-adhe-
sion theory.” Id. at 406. But see Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 7, at 617–18. Indians 
apparently viewed the treaties as more than contracts—as enduring commitments to brotherly 
care. Valencia-Weber, supra note 24, at 423 (citing Robert A. Williams, Jr., Linking Arms 
Together: American Indian Treaty Visions of Law and Peace, 1600–1800, at 98–123 
(1997) [hereinafter Williams, Linking Arms]). Treaty provisions on “[l]and transactions 
were to bind, not separate, the parties, and thus form multi-cultural unity.” Id. at 423 (citing 
Williams, Linking Arms, supra, at 115–23).
257 Frickey, Marshalling, supra note 199, at 401. This justification for a generous construc-
tion of treaties in favor of the Indians would not apply to the interpretation of federal or state 
statutes. Professor Jensen, however, suggests that the canons can be viewed as one way for the 
national government to satisfy its obligation to act as a guardian to the tribal wards. Jensen, 
supra note 9, at 29. Dean Getches defends applying the canons to the interpretation of federal 
statutes on the grounds such laws “were not founded on a relationship of mutuality. Rather, 
they have arisen in a context of enormous federal power over Indians.” Getches, Conquering, 
supra note 14, at 1584. Many other groups, however, could probably make a similar argument. 
In Choctaw Nation v. United States, the Court said it would interpret a treaty as “unlettered 
people” understood it, and “as justice and reason demand in all cases where power is exerted by 
the strong over those to whom they owe care and protection.” 119 U.S. 1, 28 (1886); see also 
Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 196 (1999) (“[W]e inter-
pret Indian treaties to give effect to the terms as the Indians themselves would have understood 
them.”); County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 247 (1985) (“[C]anons are 
rooted in the unique trust relationship between the United States and the Indians.”); Carpenter 
v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930) (“Doubtful expressions are to be resolved in favor of the 
weak and defenseless people who are the wards of the nation, dependent upon its protection 
and good faith.”).
258 Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 555. 
259 Id. Marshall had an extended discussion of Article IX of the Treaty of hopewell, which 
provided that “the sole and exclusive right of regulating the trade with the Indians, and manag-
ing all their affairs, as they think proper.” Id. at 553 (emphasis in original). he rejected inter-
preting the phrase “managing all their affairs” as indicating that the Cherokees surrendered 
their self-government. Id. at 553–54. 
260 Id. at 556. “Marshall understood the treaty transaction to be a ceding of rights by the 
tribe, not a granting of rights by the United States, with the key question being what the 
Indians thought they were giving up.” Frickey, Common Law, supra note 15, at 10 n.43. In 
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kees declared that they were under the protection of the United States. “This 
relation was that of a nation claiming and receiving the protection of one 
more powerful: not that of individuals abandoning their national character, 
and submitting as subjects to the laws of a master.”261
Marshall then turned to various Congressional Acts to regulate trade with 
the Indians, describing them as considering “the several Indian nations as dis-
tinct political communities, having territorial boundaries, within which their 
authority is exclusive, and having a right to all the lands within those boundar-
ies, which is not only acknowledged, but guarantied by the United States.”262 
he characterized the treaties and laws as “contemplat[ing] the Indian terri-
tory as completely separated from that of the states; and provid[ing] that all 
intercourse with them shall be carried on exclusively by the government of 
the union.”263 
The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent 
political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undis-
puted possessors of the soil, from time immemorial, with the single excep-
tion of that imposed by irresistible power . . . . The very term “nation,” 
so generally applied to them, means “a people distinct from others.” The 
constitution, by declaring treaties already made, as well as those to be made, 
to be the supreme law of the land, has adopted and sanctioned the previous 
treaties with the Indian nations . . . .264 
The Cherokee Nation “is a distinct community occupying its own territory, 
with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have 
no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter.”265
Noteworthy was the absence throughout the opinion of the term “domes-
tic dependent nation.”266 That term might have been necessary in order to 
finesse the issue of jurisdiction in Cherokee Nation, but in Worcester, Marshall 
could let his true views control. The tribes might not be “foreign” nations but 
Marshall had no doubts whatsoever that they were nations. Georgia could no 
more legislate for the Indians than it could for South Carolina or Canada.
As powerful and eloquent as Chief Justice Marshall was in establishing the 
sovereignty of the Cherokee and treating them as a nation,267 this discussion, 
general, “treaties were viewed as solemn agreements between cooperative sovereigns under 
which the tribe, not the federal government, granted rights, which as in derogation of their 
own sovereignty should be narrowly construed.” Id. at 12.
261 Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 555.
262 Id. at 557.
263 Id.
264 Id. at 559.
265 Id. at 561. William Walters cites this language as support for the proposition that “inher-
ent tribal sovereignty bars the intrusion of state law into tribal territory.” Walters, supra note 
11, at 134.
266 See supra note 170 and the references therein. 
267 Two other cases in the 1880s further the view that the tribes were sovereigns located 
within the United States. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896) (tribal police powers 
were not federal power created by and springing from the Constitution but preexisted the 
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which dominates the opinion both in eloquence and in length,268 was argu-
ably dicta.269 The Cherokee nation might be a distinct community occupying 
Constitution and are not subject to the Fifth or Fourteen Amendments); Ex parte Crow Dog, 
109 U.S. 556 (1883) (federal court lacked jurisdiction to try an Indian for the murder of 
another member of his tribe on the reservation). The Court refused to construe ambiguous 
language in a treaty as indicating tribal consent to federal criminal jurisdiction. Shortly after 
the decision, Crow Dog was overturned in 1885 by the Federal Major Crimes Act, codified at 
18 U.S.C. § 1153, granting the Federal Government jurisdiction over seven serious crimes 
when committed in Indian country by an Indian against either non-Indians or Indians. The 
constitutionality of the Act was upheld in United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886), dis-
cussed, infra notes 333–53, and accompanying text. Talton was overruled in part by the Indian 
Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303, which applied to the tribes various provi-
sions of the Bill of Rights, such as the prohibition against unreasonable search and seizures, 
protection against double jeopardy, a right against self-incrimination, due process protections, 
equal protection, and a right to a jury trial in criminal cases. Professor Wilkinson describes 
the Worcester-Crow Dog-Talton cases as “calling for largely autonomous tribal governments 
subject to an overriding federal authority but essentially free of state control.” Wilkinson, 
supra note 7, at 24. In United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978), the Court held because 
the Indians were sovereigns, a person could be tried in both tribal and federal courts without 
violating double jeopardy. For a general discussion of criminal jurisdiction in Indian country, 
see Canby, supra note 3, at 169–204; Stephen L. Pevar, The Rights of Indians and Tribes 
142–66 (3rd ed. 2002).
Professor Gould issues a cautionary warning: 
Crow Dog continues to be lauded as one of the most important decisions upholding 
tribal rights of self-determination. Yet by stressing cultural differences between tribal 
Indians and non-Indians, the decision invited other Courts to hold that tribal powers 
extend to tribal members only. The decision also prompted Congress to legislate in 
matters that previously had been left to tribal self-governance.
Gould, Consent, supra note 6, at 827. 
Professor Natelson warns that just because “members of the founding generation often 
spoke of the tribes as ‘nations,’” Natelson, supra note 15, at 259, does not mean that the 
states had no “political jurisdiction over tribes within their borders.” Id. “[C]olonial and state 
governments did exercise police powers over Indians within their borders, including tribal 
Indians.” Id. (emphasis in original). But Professor Natelson issues a caveat. “To be sure, the 
contemporaneous definition of ‘nation’ did not exclude the possibility that some tribes were 
thought of as sovereign. A member of the founding generation might well think of some tribes 
as sovereign entities. But one cannot generalize from the use of the word ‘nation’ to a conclu-
sion that the Founders thought all tribes were sovereign.” Id. (emphasis in original). See also 
supra note 220.
268 Out of a twenty-eight page opinion, (31 U.S. 536-563), Marshall devoted over seventy 
percent to a history of the Indians, over twenty percent to procedural and jurisdictional issues, 
and less than fifteen percent to constitutional issues (as opposed to pre- and extra-constitu-
tional issues). Professor White describes this allocation as making “Marshall’s familiar point 
that attention to history and to the principles embodied in that history not only clarified con-
stitutional analysis, it went a long way toward disposing of the issues to be analyzed.” White, 
supra note 196, at 733.
269 Many commentators would disagree with this conclusion. Professor Frickey states that 
Marshall “had to rebuff arguments that the tribe had lost its sovereignty, either through the 
legally operative effects of discovery and conquest or by ceding it in a treaty, and had therefore 
become legally indistinct from other residents of Georgia.” Frickey, Marshalling, supra note 199, 
at 394 (citing Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 542–48). The pages in the opinion that Professor 
Frickey cites, 542–48, however, do not support what he assumed to be Georgia’s argument. 
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its own territory in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, so that the 
judgment of that State’s courts is a “nullity,” but could the Supreme Court 
reverse it?270 If the Cherokees’ only complaint about Georgia law was its “extra-
Georgia did not appear in the Supreme Court and thus did not file any brief. It is possible 
that Chief Justice Marshall’s discussion of sovereignty was responding to Justice Johnson, who 
argued in Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 20–31, that the Cherokees had no sovereignty. 
Johnson was ill and did not take part in Worcester. White, supra note 196, at 732. 
See also Walters, supra note 11, at 136 (“[T]he Georgia law was void because it infringed 
upon the inherent sovereignty of the Cherokee nation.”). Walters implicitly agrees that the 
discussion of sovereignty would be dicta if the Indian Commerce Clause were the ground for 
the opinion. he rejects this ground because he cannot accept that Marshall would have spent 
so much time on dicta. Walters claims that federal law had incorporated the concept of tribal 
sovereignty and that “when Georgia infringed upon the rights of the Cherokees to govern 
themselves, the state also violated the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States.” 
Id. at 140. Walters does not explain, however, how federal law incorporated the concept of 
tribal sovereignty. his views are also inconsistent with Justice Marshall stating that the sov-
ereignty argument would not have provided a constitutionally-recognized claim that could 
be redressed. As Marshall stated, if the Cherokees’ only complaint about Georgia law was its 
“extra-territorial operation, the objection, though complete, so far as respected mere right, 
would give this court no power over the subject.” 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561.
Walters also overlooks that “[t]raveling far beyond the question presented in a case was 
typical of Marshall, was contemporaneously criticized, and, as a method of adjudication, is 
excused today largely because scholars have on the whole sympathized with Marshall’s per-
ceived ends.” Lindsay G. Robertson, Conquest by Law: how the Discovery of America 
Dispossessed Indigenous Peoples of Their Lands xi (2005). 
Just because the sovereignty discussion was dicta does not mean Marshall was wrong in 
addressing it or that it was unimportant or irrelevant to the development of Indian law. 
Marshall was addressing a larger audience with a larger issue and making a political argument 
rather than a legal one. I think it would have been better to have spent more time developing 
the holding of the case, especially the Indian Commerce Clause argument. But many tribal 
rights and powers flow from the pre- and extra-constitutional sovereignty argument into which 
Marshall breathed life. “Perhaps the most basic principle of all Indian law . . . is the principle 
that those powers which are lawfully vested in an Indian tribe are not, in general, delegated 
powers granted by express acts of Congress . . . .” Felix S. Cohen, Federal Indian Law 122 
(1942), repeated in Cohen’s handbook, supra note 7, at 122. 
According to Professor Gould, this statement “usually attributed to Cohen, first appeared 
in an opinion of Solicitor Nathan R. Margold, Powers of Indian Tribes, 1 Op. Solic. Gen. 
445, 447 (1934).” Gould, Consent, supra note 6, at 816 n.33. “Fundamental to the doctrine of 
inherent sovereignty is the principle that tribal powers arise outside the Constitution. Unless 
ceded by treaty or limited by the Congress, these powers secure for tribes the essential rights 
of separate sovereigns.” Gould, Consent, supra note 6, at 816. But the “doctrine of inherent 
sovereignty has been unequal to the task of protecting tribal power because it has no textual 
support within the Constitution.” Gould, Tough Love, supra note 11, at 675. I share this view 
and think supporters of the Indians would have been better off had Marshall emphasized the 
constitutional aspects of Worcester in addition to the pre- and extra-constitutional sovereignty 
discussion.
Professor Frickey, however, describes Worcester and Talton, see supra note 267, infra note 
336, as the “conceptual high-water mark of tribal sovereignty in federal Indian law” that remain 
“formidable precedents antagonistic to modern judicial efforts to undercut tribal authority.” 
Frickey, Common Law, supra note 15, at 11. “Formidable” overstates their precedential value, 
at least in the cases discussed in this Article.
270 Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561.
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territorial operation, the objection, though complete, so far as respected mere 
right, would give this court no power over the subject.”271 In a sense, Marshall 
just admitted that what he previously wrote was dicta.272
2.  The Judiciary Act of 1789
Marshall did not elaborate on why the Court would have “no power over the 
subject,” but presumably he was referring to the controversial Section 25 of 
the Judiciary Act of 1789, which provided Supreme Court review of “a final 
judgment or decree in any suit, in the highest court of law or equity of a State 
in which a decision in the suit could be had . . . where is drawn in question 
the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under any State, on the 
ground of their being repugnant273 to the constitution, treaties or laws of the 
United States, and the decision is in favour of such their validity.” 
Apparently, Marshall felt that he had to base his decision on narrower 
grounds than the grandiose and sweeping pre- and extra-constitutional con-
cept of Indian sovereignty, especially in a case involving penal laws.274 It wasn’t 
enough that the laws of Georgia violated the sovereignty of the Cherokees—
which they did—and that such laws would no more apply to the Tribe than 
to Canada, he had to show that “the acts of Georgia are repugnant to the 
constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States.”275 This he did with an 
economy of language totally inconsistent with the eloquence of his earlier 
discussion of sovereignty:276
271 Id. Although “[t]he Cherokees constituted a distinct, sovereign nation that retained its 
‘natural rights’ to self-government, despite the fact that it lay within the geographical boundar-
ies of the United States and the State of Georgia . . . [N]o federal issue is raised; in other words, 
the substantive conclusion does not provide the Court with jurisdictional authority.” Walters, 
supra note 11, at 140. This statement seems inconsistent with Walters’ views discussed supra 
note 269.
272 Not all commentators agree. For example, Professor Dewi I. Ball states “[t]he ruling in 
Worcester held that the states had no jurisdiction in the reservations and only Congress had 
the power to remove attributes of tribal sovereignty. The tribe had authority over the reserva-
tion and all people in the reservation.” Dewi I. Ball, Williams v. Lee (1959)—50 Years Later: 
A Re-Assessment of One of the Most Important Cases in the Modern Era of Federal Indian Law, 
n.45 (unpublished paper, on file with the author). That view, however, while perhaps sufficient 
to make the Georgia judgment a nullity, would give the Court “no power over the subject.” 
Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561.
273 Dean Getches states that “repugnant” was a term that in the early days meant “preemp-
tion.” Getches, Conquering, supra note 14, at 1591 n.73.
274 See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 567–69 (M’Lean, J., concurring). 
275 Id. at 561.
276 See supra note 268. Walters thinks that Marshall based his decision on the ground that 
“native tribes enjoy a federally recognized right to govern themselves, a right, moreover, which 
was absolutely incompatible with the assertion of state authority over federally recognized 
tribal territory.” Walters, supra note 11, at 141. Walters understands that this interpretation 
raises two questions. 
Does tribal sovereignty bar[] the intrusion of federal as well as state jurisdiction 
into Indian country? To turn this question around, does federal power to legislate 
within tribal territory derive solely from particular treaty relationships with particular  
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[T]he acts of Georgia are repugnant to the constitution, laws, and treaties 
of the United States. 
They interfere forcibly with the relations established between the United 
States and the Cherokee nation, the regulation of which, according to the 
settled principles of our constitution, are committed exclusively to the gov-
ernment of the union . . . They are in direct hostility with treaties . . . .277
These brief, compact statements suggest three independent grounds for 
holding that Georgia’s laws were unconstitutional that would satisfy the Judi-
ciary Act: they violated treaties with the Cherokees, they violated the Indian 
Commerce Clause, and they violated federal statutes. None of these reasons 
depended on the sovereignty of the Indians.
3.  The Holding: Violation of the Indian Commerce Clause
Georgia “interfere[d] forcibly with relations established between the United 
States and the Cherokee nation, the regulation of which, according to the 
settled principles of our constitution, are committed exclusively to the govern-
ment of the union.”278 “The whole intercourse between the United States 
and [the Cherokee Nation], is, by our constitution and laws, vested in the 
tribes . . . ? And what is the tribal right of self-government guaranteed by federal com-
mon law or whether it rises to constitutional status. Otherwise asked, does Congress 
itself, in Marshall’s views, have the power to alter the terms of the federal recognition 
of the Cherokees’ sovereignty? Could Congress overrule Worcester v. Georgia?
Id. at 141 n.66. 
If the opinion is not grounded on specific provisions in the Constitution or on federal 
statutes, but rather on the pre- and extra-constitutional sovereignty of the Indians, then the 
Court would be applying federal common law. Speaking generally about Indian law and not 
specifically about Worcester, Professor Pommersheim describes the Court as engaging in federal 
common law because where Congress has been silent and one would “normally presuppose an 
unimpaired tribal sovereignty—the Court now recognizes a judicial plenary power to parse the 
limits of tribal court authority based on federal common law.” Frank Pommersheim, Tribal 
Courts and the Federal Judiciary: Opportunities and Challenges for a Constitutional Democracy, 
58 Mont. L. Rev. 313, 328 (1997). Federal common law might be enough to justify charac-
terizing the Georgia court’s judgment as a nullity, 31 U.S. at 561, but not enough to satisfy the 
requirements of the Judiciary Act of 1789. 
If Marshall had not been concerned about the Judiciary Act of 1789, the opinion could have 
stopped at the point where he described the Georgia law as a “nullity.” The opinion could then 
have been defended on the structure of the Constitution and the original understanding of the 
Founders. That approach could describe the Court’s opinion in Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 
(1999). See also United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 201 (2004) (“Moreover, ‘at least during the 
first century of American’s national existence . . . Indian affairs were more an aspect of military 
and foreign policy than a subject of domestic or municipal law.’ [citing Cohen’s handbook 
208 (1982 edition)]. Insofar as that is so, Congress’s legislative authority would rest in part, not 
upon ‘affirmative grants of the Constitution,’ but upon the Constitution’s adoption of precon-
stitutional powers necessarily inherent in any Federal Government, namely, powers that this 
Court has described as ‘necessary concomitants of nationality.’ United States v. Curtiss-Wright 
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315–22.”).
277 Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561.
278 Id. (emphasis added).
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government of the United States.”279 Presumably, this exclusive commitment 
referred to the Indian Commerce Clause,280 although at this point in the 
opinion Marshall did not refer explicitly to that Clause.281
Earlier in the opinion, however, Marshall had explained that:
279 Id. 
280 Professor Clinton describes Marshall in Worcester as “correctly reflect[ing] the decision 
of the framers of the Constitution to vest sole and exclusive power of managing the bilateral 
relations with the Indians . . . .” Robert N. Clinton, Reviewing Russel Lawrence Barsh and James 
Youngblood Henderson, The Road: Indian Tribes and Political Liberty, 47 U. Chi. L. Rev. 846, 
858 (1980). Professor Natelson acknowledges that Worcester “might have had some probative 
value of the original understanding if Marshall (a leading ratifier himself ) had discussed what 
that understanding was. But he did not. The decision tells us nothing about what the rati-
fiers understood forty-three years earlier.” Natelson, supra note 15, at 260–61. It is not clear, 
however, why Marshall, a “leading ratifier,” should not be viewed in Worcester as expressing the 
“original understanding.”
William Walters asks whether 
Marshall based his ultimate conclusion upon the ground of exclusive federal author-
ity. Marshall maintained that the federal government enjoyed exclusive authority 
to deal with Indian tribes. he did not, however, strike down the Georgia law that 
supported Worcester’s convictions by reasoning from the premise that the state had 
attempted to exercise a power reserved to the federal government. Although this path 
to Worcester’s result lay open for Marshall, he passed it by in favor of one that tra-
versed a different ground, that is, that the Georgia law was void because it infringed 
upon the inherent sovereignty of the Cherokee nation.
Walters, supra note 11, at 135–36. Walters’s argument is consistent with the amount of time 
Marshall spent discussing the sovereignty issue, supra note 268, but is inconsistent with 
Marshall’s express desire to source the decision on the Constitution to avoid any challenge 
under the Judiciary Act. That desire was understandable given such a politically explosive hold-
ing in the case and one that involved a state’s criminal laws. The opinion reads as if Marshall 
was exhausted by the time he turned his attention to the constitutional issues, consistent with 
Professor Newmyer’s description of Marshall’s health as “slipping, [and] that age and sickness 
had taken their toll.” Newmyer, supra note 227, at 85.
281 Professor Natelson says that Marshall had 
no need to investigate the constitutional question: the Court’s holding was mandated 
by two treaties governing the case, treaties Marshall recited at length . . . Only at one 
point did he seem to indicate that the exclusive power of Congress arose from the 
Constitution alone; and unsupported by citation or argument.
Natelson, supra note 15, at 260–61 (citing Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561 (the Georgia 
statutes “interfere forcibly with the relations established between the United States and the 
Cherokee nation, the regulation of which, according to the settled principles of our con-
stitution, are committed exclusively to the government of the union”)). Professor Natelson 
acknowledges that Justice M’Lean’s concurring opinion “is clearer.” Id. at 261 n.425. To be 
sure, Marshall could have written a tighter opinion, with more citations, but for the reasons 
suggested in the text, I do not view the statements Professor Natelson referred to as dictum. 
Marston and Fink state that read “in the broadest possible sense, Worcester stands for an 
automatic and absolute exclusion of state law in Indian country, based on Congress’s plenary 
control over Indian ‘commerce.’” Lester J. Marston & David A. Fink, The Indian Commerce 
Clause: The Reports of its Death Have Been Greatly Exaggerated, 16 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 
205, 210 (1986). Presumably, they are referring to the Indian Commerce Clause. They do not 
address why “commerce” existed. See infra note 284.
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The ambiguous phrases [of Article IX of the Articles of Confederation] were 
so construed by the states of North Carolina and Georgia as to annul the 
power itself. . . . The correct exposition of this article is rendered unneces-
sary by the adoption of our existing constitution. That instrument confers 
on congress the powers of war and peace; of making treaties, and of regu-
lating commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and 
with the Indian tribes. These powers comprehend all that is required for the 
regulation of our intercourse with the Indians.282 They are not limited by any 
restrictions on their free actions. The shackles imposed on this power, in 
the confederation, are discarded. . . . [T]he whole power of regulating the 
intercourse with [the Indians] was vested in the United States.283
In his concurring opinion, Justice M’Lean endorsed the Indian Commerce 
Clause as the source of exclusive power over the Indians: “By the constitution, 
the regulation of commerce among the Indian tribes is given to congress. This 
power must be considered as exclusively vested in congress . . . .”284
282 Walters relies on this language to support his view that Marshall “never hinted of any 
federal police power applicable to Indian territories, except that specifically provided for in 
Indian treaties.” Walters, supra note 11, at 138.
283 Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559–60 (emphasis added). “Marshall’s Worcester reading of 
Congress’s power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes is the same as his Gibbons read-
ing of Congress’s power to regulate commerce among the states and with foreign nations. The 
power belongs wholly to Congress. In relation to its object, the power is unlimited. however, 
it cannot be extended beyond the specified relationship. It has no force with respect to affairs 
internal to the foreign nations, state, or tribe. This reading of the Indian commerce clause 
is consistent with Marshall’s general view of the relation of the federal government to the 
separate, distinct Indian nations.” Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 48. In Gibbons, Marshall 
asserted without explanation that commerce with foreign nations means “every species of com-
mercial intercourse,” 22 U.S. 1, 193, and that if “this be the admitted meaning of the word, in 
its application to foreign nations, it must carry the same meaning throughout the sentence.” 22 
U.S. 1, 194. See supra note 163. For Professor Natelson’s views on the meaning of “commerce” 
at the time of the Constitution, see supra note 163.
More important than whether the meaning of commerce is the same for all three clauses 
is whether the power to regulate commerce should be viewed the same. The unique history 
surrounding the drafting of the Indian Commerce Clause suggests that whether Congress’s 
power under that Clause should be viewed as exclusive or shared with the states is independent 
of how that power is interpreted under the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Clauses. The 
Court has held that the Foreign Commerce Clause is not interpreted in pari materia with 
the Interstate Commerce Clause. See supra note 180. The Indian Commerce Clause is not 
intended to be interpreted in pari materia with either the Foreign Commerce Clause or the 
Interstate Commerce Clause.
According to Professor Frickey, Marshall’s quotation of the Commerce Clause “defined the 
sovereign status of tribes.” Frickey, Marshalling, supra note 199, at 394. I do not see the link 
between the Indian Commerce Clause and the sovereignty issue for the reasons I argue in the 
text.
284 Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 580 (emphasis added). But M’Lean also issued a cautionary 
warning that tracked his concurrence in Cherokee Nation.
If a tribe of Indians shall become so degraded or reduced in numbers as to lose 
the power of self-government, the protection of the local law, of necessity, must be 
extended over them. The point as which this exercise of power by a State would be 
proper, need not now be considered: if indeed it be a judicial question.
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The Indian Commerce Clause speaks only to regulating commerce with 
the Indian tribes; there was no doubt that the Cherokees were a tribe.285 Mar-
shall understood that the Clause delegated to Congress the exclusive power to 
regulate commerce with Indian tribes. hence, Georgia had no power to seize 
Cherokee lands, annul their laws, or control access to their territory. Marshall 
had no doubts that the Indian Commerce Clause provided an automatic and 
absolute exclusion of Georgia law in Indian country286 (a proposition slowly 
whittled away by subsequent cases). The degree and nature of the Tribe’s sov-
ereignty was simply not relevant under the Indian Commerce Clause.287 
4.  The Holding: Violation of the Treaties288
As part of his sovereignty discussion, Marshall analyzed numerous provisions 
of the treaties between the Cherokees and the national government. Georgia’s 
actions violated many of these provisions. Georgia’s laws violated provisions 
that “mark[ed] out the boundary that separates the Cherokee country from 
Id. at 593 (M’Lean, J., concurring). Commenting on Justice M’Lean’s warning, Dean Getches 
noted the “Court, however, declined to decide it was a judicial function to readjust the sover-
eign status of tribes.” Getches, Conquering, supra note 14, at 1586.
Neither Marshall nor M’Lean explained why “commerce” existed within the meaning of 
the Clause in the case of missionaries who might not have been engaged in commerce, at 
least if that term is narrowly interpreted. But there is nothing in the case elaborating on what 
they did. The Georgia law affected the ability of all persons, including those clearly engaged 
in commerce (given any reasonable interpretation of the term), to enter the Cherokee Nation 
without a license. In Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886), see discussion infra notes 333−352 and 
accompanying text, decided 54 years later, the United States argued that commerce meant 
“intercourse,” a term that presumably would have covered the missionaries. Professor Natelson 
rejects this meaning of commerce. See supra note 163.
285 See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
286 For a general discussion of the term “Indian Country,” see Cohen’s handbook, supra 
note 7, at 182–99; Jensen, supra note 9, at 9–13.
287 Walters claims that Marshall did not decide the case on the basis of the Indian Commerce 
Clause but on the ground that the Georgia law “was void because it infringed upon the inher-
ent sovereignty of the Cherokee nation.” Walters, supra note 11, at 136. But Marshall clearly 
worried that relying on that pre- and extra-constitutional ground would not satisfy the require-
ments of the Judiciary Act of 1789 so that Walters’s reading, shared by other commentators, 
cannot be correct.
The Court has held that nothing should turn on whether the commerce is with a tribe or an 
individual Indian. See supra note 171. If the latter is covered by the Clause, then a fortiori the 
degree and nature of a tribe’s sovereignty is irrelevant.
If the interpretation in the text is rejected, the question then becomes why Marshall did not 
rely on the Indian Commerce Clause.
288 Walters argues that because the Constitution declares treaties to be the supreme law 
of the land, and the treaties embody a conception of tribal sovereignty, that conception has 
been incorporated into the Constitution. “When the people of the United States adopted 
the Constitution with its provision that prior treaties are the law of the land, the principle of 
tribal sovereignty received recognition in the supreme law of the land.” Walters, supra note 11, 
at 142 n.17. But neither tribes nor treaties are fungible. So even accepting Walters’s formula-
tion arguendo, what “conception” of sovereignty should be viewed as being embodied by the 
Constitution? And nothing in the Constitution requires that treaties be entered into only with 
“sovereigns,” nor is there any definition of what constitutes a “sovereign.”
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Georgia;289 guarant[ied] to them all the land within their boundary; solemnly 
pledge[d] the faith of the United States to restrain their citizens from trespass-
ing on it; and recognize[d] the pre-existing power of the nation to govern 
itself.”290 
Again, these violations were independent of the sovereignty issue. As long 
as the treaties were valid, and that issue was not before the Court,291 Georgia’s 
laws had to be struck down. A determination of whether the treaty was vio-
lated was independent of the sovereignty issue.292
5.  The Holding: Violation of Federal Statutes
Finally, although not a major part of his opinion, Chief Justice Marshall held 
that the Georgia statute violated laws of the United States.293 Presumably, 
these laws referred to the Congressional acts to regulate trade and intercourse 
with the Indians, which he mentioned at various places earlier in the opin-
ion.294 Once again, the issue of sovereignty was irrelevant; these laws would 
289 An amicus brief by the State of Washington on behalf of Montana in Moe v. Confederated 
Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976), see discussion infra notes 654−739 and accom-
panying text, described the treaties with the Cherokees as denying Georgia any jurisdiction 
over the Tribe. 
In a very real and express sense, the Cherokee lands were not a part of the State of 
Georgia . . . . The purpose of the Georgia Act declared unconstitutional was to add 
Cherokee territory to the boundaries of the State of Georgia . . . . it is not so much 
that the principles of [Worcester] have been changed by subsequent cases. Rather, 
what has been changed are the rights guaranteed to the Indians by federal legisla-
tion of which treaties are only a part. It is equally interesting to note that even in 
these early cases the court was not unaware of the problems that might result when 
the Indian reservation communities became intermingled with lands and communi-
ties over which the Indians had no jurisdiction. In fact, the treaties which set apart 
lands for the Indians at a place distant to the white man’s settlements were in specific 
response to these problems.
Brief of the State of Washington as Amicus Curiae for Montana, 1975 WL 173494 at *8–9.
290 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561–62.
291 Even today, when the sovereignty doctrine has been greatly eroded, the treaties with 
the Indians remain valid. The issue today is over how a treaty should be interpreted, see e.g., 
Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 7, which presupposes the validity of the treaties.
292 In his concurring opinion, Justice M’Lean rejected the proposition that for a treaty to be 
valid each party had to possess the same attributes of sovereignty. The only requisite according 
to M’Lean was that each of the contracting parties must possess the right of self-government 
and the power to perform the provisions of the treaty. See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 581 
(M’Lean, J., concurring).
For a discussion of with whom the Senate can enter into treaties, see Laurence h. Tribe, 
American Constitutional Law 646 (3rd ed. 2000).
293 Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561.
294 Id. at 556, 562, 576. The 1802 Act was the first permanent trade and intercourse statute. 
It was preceded by four temporary acts. The Cherokees had argued that Georgia violated an 
1802 “act to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes.” Id. at 540. In his concur-
ring opinion, Justice M’Lean was more specific: “[Georgia’s laws] are repugnant to the . . . law 
of 1802.” Id. at 578 (M’Lean, J., concurring). 
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preempt the Georgia statutes regardless of the sovereignty of the Indians.295 
Tribal sovereignty was no doubt the “heart of Marshall’s decision,”296 but by 
itself that would not suffice to give the Court jurisdiction as Marshall explic-
itly stated.
The Court reversed and annulled the verdict and conviction of Worces-
ter and Butler. After winning the case, Worcester and Butler were caught 
up in politics and procedural infirmities and were not immediately released. 
When it became obvious the Cherokees did not have the support of President 
Jackson,297 and had been deserted by many of their earlier allies, Worces-
ter and Butler ultimately accepted a pardon from the Georgia Governor in 
1833.298
295 Presumably, Professor Gould would reject my analysis of the holding of Worcester. “Bold 
as it was, Justice Marshall’s view that Georgia had no authority to impose its laws within the 
territory of the Cherokees was what now would be regarded as federal common law, intersti-
tial rather than constitutional.” Gould, Tough Love, supra note 11, at 675–76. “[B]ecause the 
doctrine of inherent sovereignty lacks constitutional underpinnings, it has consistently failed 
the tribes whenever it has been advanced as a basis for asserting power over nonmembers.” Id. 
at 676. Gould, however, does not cite Kerr-McGee, Colville, or Merrion, which upheld as an 
inherent aspect of sovereignty tribal taxes imposed on activity occurring on tribal land, which 
would seem to contradict his statement, although Atkinson Trading, see infra notes 331, 592, 
759, 762, 880, 1075, cuts back on this power. I do agree with Professor Gould, however, that 
a decision based on sovereignty would constitute federal common law, but that is exactly why 
I think Marshall did not rest the decision on those grounds. his fear was that federal common 
law would not have satisfied the Judiciary Act of 1789. Consequently, Marshall grounded the 
decision more firmly (if only half-heartedly) on the Constitution and relied on the Indian 
Commerce Clause, treaties, and statutes. 
Sovereignty might not be the holding in Worcester but I disagree with McSloy, who suggests 
that it would be malpractice to cite the inherent sovereignty doctrine as grounds for bringing 
suit. Steven Paul McSloy, The “Miner’s Canary”: A Bird’s Eye View of American Indian Law and 
its Future, 37 New Eng. L. Rev. 733, 738 (2003), cited in Gould, Tough Love, supra note 11, 
at 677 n.45.
296 Walters, supra note 11, at 140.
297 “Indian policy under Jackson was distinguished by a refusal on the part of the federal gov-
ernment to regard the Indian tribes as sovereign nations, by deference to states who attempted 
to compel Indians to conform to their laws, and by constant pressure on the Indians to emi-
grate.” White, supra note 196, at 711.
298 Burke, supra note 224, at 530; Strickland & Strickland, supra note 196, at 115–16. There 
is some confusion among commentators over what happened after the decision. The Court did 
not issue an enforcement order to Georgia and may have even lacked a procedural mechanism 
for doing so, although one commentator states that the Court purposely did not follow its 
normal procedure of preparing a mandate requiring federal marshals to effectuate the deci-
sion. Berutti, supra note 194, at 305. Professor Norgren writes that the Supreme Court issued 
a mandate to the Georgia Superior Court to release Butler and Worcester and the Supreme 
Court’s term ended before a writ of execution could be issued. Nothing could be done until 
the next term of the Court in the fall. There was a question of whether Georgia had to issue 
a written refusal to execute the Court’s mandate before the Court could act. Norgren, supra 
note 193, at 122–23. 
Even if there were a procedural mechanism for issuing an order, many Georgia officials 
announced that they disagreed that the State had no jurisdiction over the Cherokees. “The 
Court rose before the return of the messenger who bore the requisite documentation of 
Georgia’s refusal of obedience. The Court had been concerned about what it regarded as defi-
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ciencies in the Judiciary Act of 1789. The Act foreclosed possible avenues of enforcement 
available to the Court.” Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 58. Those deficiencies were cured by 
changes made in 1833. Burke, supra note 224, at 531. 
A potential crisis was avoided when Georgia Governor Lumpkin pardoned the missionar-
ies in order not to embarrass President Jackson, see Cohen’s handbook, supra note 7, at 50; 
Swindler, supra note 232, at 17, although other commentators fail to mention this. “Due to 
a glitch in federal statute law governing the appeals process, the Court’s formal reversal order 
to the [relevant Georgia court] was never issued. Technically, Georgia did not have to defy the 
Court, and Jackson did not have to take a public stand on the matter.” Newmyer, supra note 
200, at 90. Strickland & Strickland, supra note 196, at 114 (citing Burke, supra note 224, at 
526), claim that the Court “could not have issued a writ of habeas corpus until its 1833 term; 
and since ‘the Georgia court never puts its refusal in writing, it is arguable that the Supreme 
Court could not have awarded execution’ even in its next term.” 
White tells a more involved story. had Worcester and Butler asked the Justices to certify 
Georgia’s refusal to release them, President Jackson would have had the constitutional obliga-
tion to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” U.S. Const. art. II, § 3. Georgia might 
have then declared the federal statutes and treaties null and void and other southern states 
might have rallied to its case. Secession and civil war were a possibility. But if Worcester and 
Butler were to ask the Georgia governor for a pardon, which it was understood he would have 
granted, they would be acknowledging that Georgia could regulate Indian affairs within their 
borders. That acknowledgment would have been as dangerous to the Union, the Cherokees 
argued, as would the enforcement of the Court’s mandate by Jackson. (The famous statement 
attributed to President Jackson in response to Worcester, “John Marshall has made his deci-
sion, now let him enforce it,” turns out to be apocryphal, Newmyer, supra note 200, at 90, 
but certainly consistent with Jackson’s views, which is why it has had such currency.) After 
first resolving to press their appeal, Butler and Worcester changed their minds, accepted a 
pardon, and were released from prison. White, supra note 196, at 738. See also 4 Albert J. 
Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall 539–52 (1980); 1 Charles Warren, The Supreme 
Court in United States history, ch. 19 (1926); h. von holst, The Constitutional 
and Political history of the United States 448–58 (1889).
When Andrew Jackson beat henry Clay in the 1832 presidential election, the federal gov-
ernment continued the policy of dispossessing the Indians under the 1830 removal legisla-
tion. The Cherokees made the political judgment in the face of physical threats, beatings, and 
coercion, that they would be better off moving west rather than resisting Georgia’s continued 
incursions without having the support of the federal government. Strickland & Strickland, 
supra note 196, at 117–25. 
The Creeks, Choctaws, and the Cherokees were all forced into signing such treaties, 
in which the federal government provided them with lands west of the Mississippi. 
While the treaties gave “civilized” Indians the option of remaining on allotted land, 
federal policy contributed to the speedy resale of allotments to white settlers and 
speculators. Even though most Indians preferred not to emigrate, the federal govern-
ment assumed that they would, and failed to scrutinize “sales” in which the Indians 
were severely disadvantaged.
White, supra note 196, at 736–37.
A minority faction of the Cherokees signed in 1835 the Treaty of New Echota (denounced 
by the majority as “the false treaty”), surrendered their land in Georgia for five million dollars 
and land in Indian Territory, which would later become Oklahoma, and embarked on the 
infamous “trail of tears.” Strickland & Strickland, supra note 196, at 123. “[S]ixteen thousand 
Cherokees were driven at gunpoint from their homeland in Georgia . . . and more than four 
thousand . . . died enroute.” Id. at 111. Even worse, when they arrived at the Promised Land, 
other tribes were already in possession. “From the Cherokee’s point of view, Marshall’s opin-
ion for the Court, like the treaties they were now constitutionally entitled to negotiate, was 
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Worcester was a seminal case, widely cited more for its dicta about the pre- 
and extra-constitutional sovereignty of the Indians than for the importance 
of the Indian Commerce Clause.299 The focus on sovereignty was understand-
able. Marshall was probably responding to the common and demeaning per-
ception that the conflict between Georgia and the Cherokees was “a contest 
between the savage and the civilized, between expansion and stagnation, 
between progress and decay. . . . The idea of the Indian as a savage and as 
an obstacle to civilization was almost totally pervasive during this period.”300 
President Jackson understood and exploited these sentiments, which even 
Marshall’s eloquence could not offset. On a more legal and less political level, 
Marshall was likely responding to the Johnson and Baldwin concurrences in 
Cherokee Nation that denied the sovereignty of the Indians.301 In any event, as 
the discussion below illustrates, the Indians would have been better off if the 
Court’s emphasis on the Indian Commerce Clause were better appreciated.
With the advent of the Civil War, Indian policy no longer held full sway. 
worth no more than the paper it was written on.” Newmyer, supra note 200, at 90. President 
Jackson justified his inaction in defense of the Cherokees as saving them from being murdered. 
Other states also ignored the teachings of Worcester. See, e.g., State v. Foreman, 16 Tenn. 256 
(1835). See also Anderson, Berger, Frickey, & Krakoff, supra note 208, at 74–77; Grant 
Foreman, Indian Removal: The Emigration of the Five Civilized Tribes (1932); Amy 
h. Sturgis, The Trail of Tears and Indian Removal (2007); The Cherokee Removal: A 
Brief history with Documents (Theda Perdue and Michael Green eds. 2005); Cherokee 
Removal: Before and After (William L. Anderson ed. 1991). Strickland captures the 
dilemma of the Cherokees. “If the tribe signed the removal treaty, they would surrender their 
homelands and the graves of their beloved ancestors; if the tribe refused to sign, they would 
be driven at bayonet point away from their homelands and the graves of their beloved ances-
tors. The choice was no choice.” Rennard Strickland, The Tribal Struggle for Indian Sovereignty: 
The Story of the Cherokee Cases, in Race Law Stories 37, 55 (Rachel F. Moran & Devon W. 
Carbado eds. 2008).
The initial reaction to Worcester was quite different. “News of [the decision] was greeted with 
euphoria among the Cherokees in Georgia and their friends in Washington.” Strickland & 
Strickland, supra note 196, at 112. “Reverend Lyman Beecher, father of henry Ward Beecher, 
is reported to have jumped in the air, clapped his hands, and shouted ‘God be praised.’” Id. 
In a letter to his wife, Justice Story proclaimed: “Thanks be to God, the Court can wash 
their hands clean of the inequity of oppressing the Indians and disregarding their rights.” 
Russel Lawrence Barsh & James Young Blood henderson, The Road: Indian Tribes 
and Political Liberty 60 (1980).
In 1992, then-Governor Zell Miller of Georgia pardoned Worcester and Butler. See Tom 
Watson, 160 Years Later, Georgia Apologizes for Cherokee, Pardon Helps Heal, USA Today, Nov. 
25, 1992, at A2. Of course, Worcester and Butler had previously accepted a pardon, see supra, 
so the need for a second one is unclear.
299 Beveridge comments that Marshall’s discussion of the sovereignty of the Indians “is the 
most extended and exhaustive historical analysis Marshall ever made in any judicial utterance, 
except that on the law of treason during the trial of Aaron Burr.” Beveridge, supra note 298, 
at 549.
300 Strickland & Strickland, supra note 196, at 118.
301 Baldwin dissented in Worcester, relying on his opinion in Cherokee Nation. See supra note 
208. Baldwin’s views are “historically as well as juridically unsubstantiated; they have much 
in common with the position on plenary power taken by today’s Court in National Farmers 
Union.” Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 49.
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Both sides in the War seized Indian lands that were strategically located. The 
West was marked by increased hostility toward the Indians, reinforced by the 
passage of the homestead Act of 1862. In that same year, Congress autho-
rized the President to abrogate all treaties with tribes that were fighting with 
the South.302
Massacres of the Indians and other abuses and atrocities led Congress, 
shortly before the end of the Civil War, to authorize an inquiry into the treat-
ment of tribes by military and civil authorities. The country was exhausted 
from the War and wanted to put the Indian problem behind it. Consequently, 
numerous treaties were signed during and shortly after the Civil War that fig-
ure in some cases below.303 In 1871, Congress outlawed future treaties with 
the tribes.304
The first cases challenging state taxing power over Indians arose during this 
post Civil War period. Dean Nell Newton, an icon in the field of Indian law, 
summarizes this time period as follows:
In the years preceding the Civil War, especially during the 1830’s to the 
1850’s, Congress had sought to remove the Eastern Indian tribes West 
of the Mississippi, but as settlers began opening up the West, continued 
removal305 began to be viewed as impossible. After the Civil War and the 
pacification of the last tribes of the plains, a movement began to assimilate 
Indians into American culture, by force if necessary. A policy of treating 
Indian tribes as separate nations with power over their own people on their 
own land was seen as antithetical to this new policy. . . . Indian law became 
more a matter of domestic law, with Indians regarded as subjects to be gov-
erned, rather than foreign nationals.306 
302 Cohen’s handbook, supra note 7, at 69. For a general discussion of the Indians and the 
Civil War, see Annie heloise Abel, The Indians in the Civil War, 15 The American historical 
Review 281 (1910); Laurence M. hauptman, Between Two Fires: American Indians in 
the Civil War (1955); Arrell Morgan Gibson, Native Americans and the Civil War, 9 American 
Indian Quarterly 385 (1985); Annie heloise Able, The American Indian in the Civil 
War 1862-1865 (1992); David A. Nichols, Lincoln and the Indians: Civil War Policy 
and Politics (1978); Edmund Danziger, Indians and Bureaucrats: Administering the 
Reservation Policy During the Civil War (1996).
303 See, e.g., Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973) (1883 treaty); McClanahan 
v. State Tax Comm’n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164 (1973) (1868 treaty); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 
217 (1959) (1868 treaty).
304 25 U.S.C. § 71. See supra note 6.
305 
The idea of removing the Eastern Indians to the trans-Mississippi territories had been 
considered by presidents as a solution to the so-called ‘Indian problem’ since the 
formation of the Republic. however, not until the 1830s did Andrew Jackson, a 
fervent believer in state sovereignty, set federal Indian policy steadfastly on a course 
of removing tribes to federal territory west of any states. 
Wilkinson, supra note 7, at 17.
306 Newton, Federal Power, supra note 131, at 205–06. The Government’s policy of remov-
ing Indians and relocating them to reservations was criticized by the Indian reform movement 
starting in the 1870s. See Americanizing the American Indians 1–10 (Francis Paul Prucha 
ed. 1973). The Lake Mohonk Conferences of Friends of the Indian were annual conferences 
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C.  The Kansas Indians and The New York Indians
Despite this new policy that Dean Newton describes, the Court’s early cases 
striking down a state tax were consistent with Worcester’s pre- and extra-
constitutional sovereignty discussion. The two earliest prominent tax cases 
decided right after the end of the Civil War were The Kansas Indians,307 and 
The New York Indians,308 companion cases decided in 1867. The former con-
solidated three cases,309 and prohibited Kansas from taxing land belonging to 
a tribe, and land held in severalty by individual Indians under patents issued 
to them pursuant to certain treaties. The property tax was a major source of 
state revenue at this time,310 underscoring the significance of these cases.
1.  The Teaching of Worcester
The Court left no doubt about how it viewed the sovereignty of the Indians. 
Consistent with the teachings of Worcester, the Kansas Indians were described 
as a “people distinct from others, capable of making treaties, separated from 
the jurisdiction of Kansas.”311 As “long as the United States recognizes [the 
Tribe’s] national character they are under the protection of the treaties and 
the laws of Congress, and their property is withdrawn from the operation of 
state laws.”312 “There can be no divided authority” between federal and state 
governments over Indian affairs.313 State law does not apply until there is “a 
voluntary abandonment of their tribal organization.”314 The Tribes “enjoy the 
privilege of total immunity from [s]tate taxation.”315 
By accepting statehood, Kansas ceded control over the Indians to the fed-
eral government.316 As long as the Tribe is “preserved intact, and recognized 
of Indian sympathizers, which typically did not include Indians. Ironically, these sympathizers 
tended not to value Indian civilization. Id. at 1. Their agenda emphasized allotment, educa-
tion, and granting Indians citizenship. Id. at 6–7.
307 Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. 737 (1867).
308 New York Indians, 72 U.S. 761 (1867).
309 Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. at 751–57 (Shawnee), 757–59 (Weas), 759–61 (Miamis).
310 See Richard Ely, Taxation in American States and Cities 172 (1888).
311 Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. at 755.
312 Id. at 757. 
313 Id. at 755. This might be an oblique reference to the Indian Commerce Clause, although 
that provision was not cited in the opinion.
314 Id. at 757.
315 Id. at 756. According to Professor Milner Ball, the “modern revision of that statement 
takes its origin from the Williams v. Lee statement that, ‘absent governing Acts of Congress, the 
question has always been whether state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to 
make their own laws and be ruled by them.’” Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 101; Williams 
v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), discussed infra notes 376–424 and accompanying text. I am not 
sure why Professor Ball thinks Williams v. Lee is the “modern revision” of that statement. The 
statement that the Tribes enjoy the privilege of total immunity from state taxation, and the 
caveat that state law applies until there is a “voluntary abandonment of their tribal organiza-
tion” is far more protective of tribal interests than the holding in Williams v. Lee that a state 
can legislate up to the point where it infringes on the right of reservation Indians to make their 
own laws and be ruled by them (absent prohibition by Congress).
316 Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. at 756.
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by the . . . government as existing, then they are a ‘people distinct from oth-
ers,’ . . . separated from the jurisdiction of [the State], and to be governed 
exclusively by the government of the Union.”317 While the Indian Commerce 
Clause was not explicitly cited, presumably it was the source of Congress’s 
exclusive authority.318
2.  The Application of a Treaty
In the companion case of New York Indians,319 the Court also held in favor 
of the Indians, essentially on the basis of a treaty. The state property tax was 
characterized as “an unwarrantable interference, inconsistent with the original 
title of the Indians, and offensive to their tribal relations.”320 “Until the Indi-
ans have sold their lands, and removed from them in pursuance of the treaty 
stipulations,321 they are to be regarded as still in their ancient possessions, 
and are in under their original rights, and entitled to the undisturbed enjoy-
ment of them.”322 Neither case involved a discussion of the Indian Commerce 
Clause, perhaps because it was problematic whether “commerce” existed.
D.  Utah & Northern Railway v. Fisher
Another post-Civil War tax case of significance is Utah & Northern Railway 
v. Fisher323 (decided five months before Kagama, discussed infra). In a brief 
1885 opinion, the Court upheld a property tax levied by the Territory of 
Idaho on an easement owned by the railroad that ran through a reservation. 
The Indians sold land to the United States for $6,000 with the understand-
ing that such land would be used by the railroad as a right of way and road-
bed, and for depots, stations, and other structures.324 After taking title to the 
land, the United States granted a right of way to the railroad for the same 
317 Id. at 755 (emphasis added). 
318 The Indian Commerce Clause would also seem to be the source for the Court’s statement 
that “there can be no divided authority between federal and state governments over Indian 
affairs.” Id. at 755. Preso is more definitive. “The Court also reaffirmed the Indian Commerce 
Clause as an independent bar to state authority . . .” Preso, supra note 41, at 456–57 n.87. 
Professor Clinton also agrees. “While the Indian Commerce Clause was not explicitly cited, 
[the] result is quite consistent with the dormant Indian Commerce Clause.” Clinton, Dormant, 
supra note 22, at 1175. In general, Professor Clinton will treat a case whose holding is consis-
tent with the dormant Indian Commerce Clause as if that case actually involved that Clause. I 
am less willing to characterize those cases in that manner. 
319 New York Indians, 72 U.S. 761 (1867).
320 Id. at 771.
321 That exact situation would occur in Utah & Northern Railway v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28 
(1885), infra notes 323−32 and accompanying text.
322 New York Indians, 72 U.S. at 770.
323 116 U.S. 28 (1885). The defendant, the tax assessor and tax-collector of the county, made 
no appearance. The tax was levied under the laws of the Territory for territorial and county 
purposes. Id. at 28–29.
324 Id. at 32.
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$6,000.325 
The railroad argued that because the land was located on the reservation, it 
was geographically outside the Territory of Idaho and thus outside the Terri-
tory’s taxing jurisdiction. The railroad wanted to cloak itself with the property 
tax exemption the Indians had for their own land under The Kansas Indians 
and The New York Indians. Under this view, the case could have been framed 
as whether the Territory could tax privately-owned property located within 
an Indian reservation.326 
1.  The Railroad’s Property Was “Withdrawn” from the Reservation
Part of the opinion takes this tack. The “land upon which the railroad and 
other property of the [railroad] are situated was, so far as necessary for the 
construction and working of the road, and the construction and use of build-
ings connected therewith, withdrawn from the reservation.” 
“The road and property thereupon became subject to the laws of the Ter-
ritory relating to railroads, as if the reservation had never existed.”327 In a 
sense, that part of the opinion can be read as saying that personal or real 
property owned by a non-Indian on a reservation can be taxed by a territory 
325 Id. The opinion states that “[b]y an act of Congress confirmatory of the agreement the 
same right of way was relinquished by the United States to the company . . .” Id. (emphasis 
added). The reference to the “same right of way” is confusing, suggesting that the Indians con-
veyed only a right of way to the government. That suggestion is contradicted, however, by the 
opinion also stating that the Indians “surrender[ed] . . . their title to so much of the reservation 
as might be necessary for the legitimate and practical uses of the road.” Id. (emphasis added). 
That language comes from the Congressional Act implementing the conveyance, Act of July 
3, 1882, ch. 268, 22 Stat. 148. The caption of that Act also refers to a sale by the Indians. “An 
act to accept and ratify an agreement with the Shoshone and Bannock Indians for the sale of a 
portion of their reservation in Idaho Territory required for the use of the Utah and Northern 
Railroad, and to make the necessary appropriation for carrying out the same.” Id. (emphasis 
added). It seems clear that the Indians sold a fee interest in their land. As the Act indicates, the 
Indians understood that the land would be used as a right of way by the railroad.
The Act provided that “the right of way over the land relinquished by said agreement 
to the United States for the construction of said Utah and Northern Railroad, and the use 
of the several parcels of land so relinquished intended to be used for depots, stations, sid-
ings, and so forth, for said railroad, are hereby granted to said Utah and Northern Railroad 
Company . . . ,” suggesting that title to the land remained in the government. Id. (emphasis 
added).
Professor Taylor seems to disagree with this reading. he refers to a “right of way granted by 
the Tribe to the railroad.” Taylor, Framework, supra note 23, at 855. he also claims that the 
governing statute “failed to state whether the underlying fee interest was held by the United 
States as trustee for the Tribe or whether the United States acquired and retained full fee title.” 
Id. at 855–56.
326 That question was answered in the affirmative in Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898), see 
discussion infra notes 354−75 and accompanying text.
327 Utah & Northern 116 U.S. at 32. Tit. 18, sec. 1151, now defines rights-of-way running 
through a reservation as constituting “Indian Country.”
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(or state).328 had that been the whole opinion it would have been limited in 
its application. 
2. “Just Rights” of the Indians Are Not Impaired 
But the plaintiff argued the case more broadly, interpreting a treaty between 
the Indians and the federal government as prohibiting the tax because the 
“reservation is excluded from the general jurisdiction of the Territory.”329 The 
Court responded by holding that 
[t]he authority of the territory may rightfully extend to all matters not 
interfering with [the treaty]. It has, therefore, been held that process of its 
courts may run into an Indian reservation of this kind, where the subject-
matter or controversy is otherwise within their cognizance. If the plaintiff 
lawfully constructed and now operates a railroad through the reservation, it 
is not perceived that any just rights of the Indians under the treaty can be 
impaired by taxing the road and property used in operating it.330 
Under the facts of this case, this conclusion was hardly surprising because 
the Indians sold the land to the Federal Government with the understanding 
that a right of way would be granted to the railroad. No rights of the Indians 
would be impaired in this voluntary transaction. The case did not involve a 
state’s power to tax Indians or sanction the exercise of jurisdiction over the 
Indians themselves, who were not a party to the case. Unfortunately, the case 
has led to much confusion and has been cited adversely to the Indians.331
328 It is unclear from the opinion whether the Territory was attempting to tax the land owned 
by the Federal Government. That tax would have been invalid under McCulloch v. Maryland, 
17 U.S. 316 (1819). The opinion states that the tax “was levied under the laws of the Territory 
upon the railroad, its depots, and other property within the reservation . . . .” Utah & Northern, 
116 U.S. at 29 (emphasis added). If “other property” means other property owned by the rail-
road, the tax would not have been imposed on the federal government. 
329 Utah & Northern, 116 U.S. at 31.
330 Id. at 31–32. This language is suggestive of the Williams v. Lee formulation in 1959: 
“absent governing Acts of Congress, the question has always been whether the state action 
infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.” 
358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959). See supra note 315.
331 The first case to cite Utah & Northern was Thomas v. Gay 169 U.S. 264 (1898), see 
discussion infra notes 354−75 and accompanying text. That case upheld the state taxation of 
privately-owned cattle grazing on a reservation under leases with the Indians. Without any dis-
cussion, the cattle were implicitly analogized to the railroad in Utah & Northern, disregarding 
the distinction that the railroad was using property that was “withdrawn” from the reservation 
and that the railroad had no business relation with the Indians, whereas the cattle were on 
reservation land, and the lessees were operating under leases with the Indians. 
In Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980), 
involving a state sales tax on the purchaser of cigarettes on a reservation, Justice Rehnquist 
cited inter alia Utah & Northern for the proposition that “the traditional cases clearly did not 
find that Indian sovereign immunity was contravened by subjecting tribes to the burdens 
inherent in state taxation of the reservation activities of non-Indians.” Id. at 182 (Rehnquist, 
J., concurring in part, concurring in the result in part, dissenting in part). Rehnquist did not 
cite any specific page in Utah & Northern for support. his reliance on Utah & Northern was 
misplaced, however, because the railroad was not conducting its business on the reservation or 
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with the Indians. Furthermore, the economic incidence of the tax did not fall on the Indians, 
with whom the railroad apparently had no dealing, unless it is assumed that the possibility of a 
tax after the sale somehow affected the price at which the Indians sold the land to the govern-
ment. This latter point of tax capitalization cannot be determined because the case is silent on 
how the $6,000 price for the land sold to the Government was agreed upon or why the gov-
ernment would grant a right of way over that land for the same price that is paid for the land 
in fee. See infra note 331. Rehnquist would have been on stronger grounds had the railroad 
sold cigarettes to non-Indians on land that it owned that was located within the boundaries 
of a reservation. 
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 141–42 (1980), see discussion infra 
notes 916−84 and accompanying text, miscited Utah & Northern for the proposition that 
“[l]ong ago the Court departed from Mr. Chief Justice Marshall’s view that ‘the laws of [a 
State] can have no force’ within reservation boundaries.” This description failed to mention 
that Utah & Northern’s property was privately-owned and “withdrawn” from the reservation.
McClanahan v. Arizona, 411 U.S. 164, 168 (1973), see discussion infra notes 519−91 and 
accompanying text, improperly offered Utah & Northern as an example of a state exercising 
sovereignty over non-Indians who undertook activity on Indian reservations, again ignoring 
the private status of the railroad’s property and the fact that it was “withdrawn” from the 
reservation.
Most recently, Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 361–62 (2001), endorsed the description of 
Utah & Northern in the controversial 1958 edition of the Cohen treatise, see discussion supra 
note 11, that: “an Indian reservation is considered part of the territory of the State.” Federal 
Indian Law (U.S. Dep’t. of Interior) 510, and n.1 (1958). Contrary to this description, Utah 
& Northern held that privately-owned property was withdrawn from (i.e., not part of ) the 
reservation. The issue was not whether the reservation was part of the Territory of Idaho. 
For one of the more penetrating discussions of hicks, which held that a tribal court lacks 
jurisdiction to adjudicate a tribal member’s civil claims against state officials who were execut-
ing a search warrant on trust lands for alleged off-reservation crimes, see Gould, Tough Love, 
supra note 11, at 671; Singer, supra note 125, at 642 (“hicks changed fundamental norms in 
the field of federal Indian law in a manner that flew in the face of both established precedent 
and existing federal policy.”).
Professor Singer views Hicks as one example of why over 
the last twenty years, the Supreme Court has led a massive assault on tribal sover-
eignty. Although it has acted to affirm expansive tribal powers over tribal members, it 
has substantially curtailed tribal power over nonmembers, including both non-Indi-
ans and Indians who are not tribal members. At the same time the Court has stripped 
tribes of governmental powers that had previously held in Indian country, it has 
increased the powers of state governments in Indian country. This transfer of power 
from tribes to states has occurred without congressional authorization or executive 
approval; indeed, it contradicts both congressional and executive policy which, in 
recent years, has strongly supported the revitalization of tribal governments.
Id. at 643.
In commenting on Atkinson and Hicks, Professors Duthu and Suagee described the Court 
as making 
abundantly clear that the key animating principle of its Indian law jurispru-
dence is solicitous protection of the interests of nontribal members; the Court 
shows no concern whatsoever for adherence to this nation’s historic promises 
to secure and protect the territorial and political integrity of tribal systems of  
self-government . . . [T]hese decisions continue a trend of increasing judicial activism 
in federal Indian law wherein the Court, and not Congress, assumes the lead role 
[under the Indian Commerce Clause] . . . [T]hese decisions serve to highlight a real, 
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Most significantly, despite what the Court would later claim,332 the case 
had nothing to do with Indian Commerce Clause. 
E.  United States v. Kagama
The above cases involved state taxing statutes. The most prominent non-tax 
case of this period addressing the Indian Commerce Clause involved an 1886 
challenge to a federal statute. In United States v. Kagama,333 the Court upheld 
the power of Congress to adopt the Major Crimes Act.334 The Act, passed in 
1885, set forth seven crimes,335 which if committed in Indian country would 
constitute federal offenses, even if committed by one Indian against another, 
which were the facts in Kagama.336 The Act was significant because it pro-
jected federal law into matters involving solely Indians. 
and quite profound, abdication by the United States Congress of its trust responsi-
bilities to Indian tribes . . . . Congress has largely stood by as the Supreme Court has 
literally rewritten the law relating to the scope of inherent tribal sovereignty.
N. Bruce Duthu & Dean B. Suagee, Supreme Court Strikes Two More Blows Against Tribal Self-
Determination, 16 Nat. Resources & Env’t. 118–19 (2001).
332 See infra note 366 and accompanying text.
333 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
334 18 U.S.C. § 1153. In Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 (1945), the Court held that the Major 
Crimes Act preempted a state statute. “[T]he policy of leaving Indians free from state jurisdic-
tion and control is deeply rooted in the Nation’s history.” Id. at 789. For a general discussion 
of criminal jurisdiction in Indian country, see Robert N. Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction Over 
Indian Lands: A Journey Through a Jurisdictional Maze, 18 Ariz. L. Rev. 503 (1976) [hereinaf-
ter Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction].
335 Murder, manslaughter, rape, assault with the intent to kill, arson, burglary, and larceny. 
Kagama, 118 U.S. at 376.
336 Id. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), held that tribes had no 
jurisdiction over non-Indians for crimes committed on reservations. It was unclear whether 
the critical distinction was between Indians and non-Indians, or Tribal members and non-
members. Relying on Oliphant, Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), held that the tribes lacked 
inherent sovereign power to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians and non-
Indians, but had the power to exclude persons deemed undesirable. The distinction between 
member Indians and non-member Indians was also endorsed by the Court in Colville. See 447 
U.S. at 134; Cohen’s handbook, supra note 7, at 237–43.
Professor Gould characterized Duro as inconsistent with United States v. Mazurie, 419 
U.S. 544 (1975), where the Court stated that tribes possess the attributes of territorial sov-
ereigns over members and nonmembers. Gould, Consent, supra note 6, at 837. Duro was 
modified by Congress, which amended the Indian Civil Rights Act to establish the “inher-
ent power of Indian tribes, hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction 
over all Indians.” Public Law No. 101-511, Sec. 8077, 104 Stat. 1856, 1892–93. In general, 
see Cohen’s handbook, supra note 7, at 237–43. In Mazurie, the Court cited the Indian 
Commerce Clause and the doctrine of trust responsibility to hold that Congress could regulate 
liquor sales in Indian country. 
Oliphant is a Rehnquist opinion that has been widely criticized for using “mostly fragments 
of historical evidence,” citing irrelevant federal statutes, relying on “contradictory opinions 
of executive branch officers, congressional reports on tangentially related legislation, and an 
1878 decision by a maverick district judge. What is most remarkable, though, is not the thin 
historical record on which the Court relied; rather, it is the fact that conjectures about the past 
were used to justify a legal principle fixing the limits of tribal sovereignty. Nowhere does the 
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1.  Inapplicability of the Indian Commerce Clause
The plaintiffs were two Klamath Indians, one indicted for murder of another 
Klamath Indian on a California reservation, and the other for aiding and abet-
ting in that murder.337 A central question in the case was whether the Indian 
Commerce Clause authorized Congress to enact the Major Crimes Act. The 
Court held that it did not, but nonetheless found other, extra-constitutional 
grounds for upholding the statute.338 
With respect to the Indian Commerce Clause, the Court conceded that: 
[I]t would be a very strained construction of this clause, that a system of 
criminal laws for Indians living peaceably in their reservations, which left 
out the entire code of trade and intercourse laws justly enacted under that 
provision, and established punishments for the common-law crimes of 
murder, manslaughter, arson, burglary, larceny, and the like, without any 
Court explain why popular assumptions about tribes’ criminal jurisdiction should override the 
foundation principles’ guarantee that Indian autonomy will be curbed only at the direction 
of Congress.” Getches, Conquering, supra note 14, at 1597. Barsh also challenged Rehnquist’s 
use of history. Russel Barsh, The Betrayal: Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe and the Hunting 
of the Snark, 63 Minn. L. Rev. 609, 610 (1978) (“carelessness with history, logic, precedent, 
and statutory construction”). Cf. Professor Norgren’s criticism of Chief Justice Marshall’s use 
of history in Cherokee Nation, supra note 216.
Professor Williams applies the work of Albert Memmi, who analyzed racism, in criticizing 
Justice Rehnquist’s reasoning. Williams, Barbarism, supra note 7, at 261–65; see also Williams, 
Algebra, supra note 216, at 267–74; Cohen’s handbook, supra note 7, at 226–28; Johnson & 
Martinis, supra note 194, at 11–14. 
Oliphant is cited by many as a watershed case in which the Supreme Court started down 
the path of eviscerating the pre- and extra-constitutional sovereignty doctrine. See, e.g., Peter 
C. Maxfield, Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe: The Whole is Greater than the Sum of the Parts, 
19 J. Contemp. L. 391, 396 (1993). But Williams v. Lee started the Court down that path 
even earlier. See 358 U.S. 217 (1959), discussed infra notes 376−424 and accompanying text. 
Professor Gould describes the Oliphant Court as assuming “virtually independent power to 
limit inherent sovereignty . . . the Court declared that tribes have been implicitly divested of 
inherent power to prosecute non-Indians, because criminal jurisdiction is inconsistent with 
their status.” Gould, Consent, supra note 6, at 813. Gould describes Oliphant and Talton v. 
Mayes as illustrating that “when contests have pitted a tribe against an individual, unless the 
individual was a member of the tribe, the tribe has almost always failed.” Gould, Tough Love, 
supra note 11, at 674.
Professor Frickey argues that Oliphant was a “horrible test case for affirming tribal sover-
eignty in the modern context.” Frickey, Common Law, supra note 15, at 36. Only 50 tribal 
members lived on the reservation compared with nearly 3,000 non-Indians. Id. at 36–37. Bad 
facts make for bad law and I would consider Moe and Colville in that same vein.
337 Kagama, 118 U.S. at 376.
338 Lower court cases had relied on the Indian Commerce Clause for upholding criminal 
jurisdiction in other circumstances. United States v. Cisna, 25 F. Cas. 422 (C.C. Ohio 1835). 
But see United States v. Bailey, 24 F. Cas. 937 (C.C. Tenn. 1834). Kagama recognized that the 
Constitution “is almost silent in regard to the relations of the government which was estab-
lished by it to the numerous tribes of Indians within its borders.” 118 U.S. at 378. 
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reference to their relation to any kind of commerce, was authorized by the 
grant of power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes.339 
2.  The Indians are Wards of the Nation
Despite this concession, and without any textual basis for its analysis, the 
Court announced that the Act was within the powers of Congress.340 In doing 
so, the Court excluded the possibility that sovereign tribes could regulate 
inter-Indian crimes: “The soil and the people within these limits are under the 
political control of the Government of the United States, or the States of the 
Union. There exist within the broad domain of sovereignty but these two.”341
In addition, the Court noted: 
These Indian tribes are the wards342 of the nation. They are communities 
dependent on the United States. Dependent largely for their daily food. 
Dependent for their political rights. They owe no allegiance to the States, 
and receive from them no protection. Because of the local ill feeling, the 
people of the States where they are found are often their deadliest enemies. 
From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of 
dealing of the Federal Government with them and the treaties in which 
it has been promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with it the 
power. . . .
The power of the general government over these remnants of a race once 
powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their pro-
tection, as well as to the safety of those among whom they dwell. It must 
339 Kagama, 118 U.S. at 378–79. Professor Natelson describes Kagama as “reject[ing] the 
Indian Commerce Clause as a source of plenary congressional authority.” Natelson, supra note 
15, at 210. While the Court rejected the application of the Indian Commerce Clause to the 
facts in Kagama, no inference should be drawn about its general applicability.
Professor Clinton describes Kagama as reiterating “the original understanding of the con-
stitutional relationship between the federal government and the states in the area of Indian 
affairs, although the Court relied less on the Indian Commerce Clause as the source of that 
relationship than it had in prior cases.” Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1176. I find the 
reference to “relying less” to be a somewhat generous description: the Kagama Court rejected 
the Indian Commerce Clause outright. I would also disagree with the extent to which earlier 
cases that did not mention the Indian Commerce Clause could be said to have relied on that 
Clause. 
Professor Clinton is surprised that the Court did not rely on the Indian Commerce Clause 
because “at least one Circuit Court previously had sustained the constitutionality of another 
criminal jurisdictional statue for Indian country by directly relying on the Indian Commerce 
Clause.” Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1177 n.348. Professor Milner Ball thinks the 
Indian Commerce Clause “might uphold a code of trade but not a code of law wholly unre-
lated to trade.” Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 51.
340 “It is not at all clear that there is a legitimate basis for attributing such power to Congress. 
The Marshall Court certainly thought the tribes were separate and distinct.” Ball, Constitution, 
supra note 7, at 51.
341 Kagama, 118 U.S. at 379 (emphasis added). This statement obviously ignores the third 
possibility, that the Tribes are sovereigns. 
342 “[I]t is only too easy . . . to dismiss the possibility that wards are bearers of sovereign, 
independent, national integrity.” Ball, John Marshall, supra note 193, at 1188. 
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exist in that government, because it never has existed anywhere else, because 
the theatre of its exercise is within the geographical limits of the United 
States, because it has never been denied, and because it alone can enforce its 
law on all the tribes.343
3.  Nontextual and Nonconstitutional Trusteeship
The Court has been roundly criticized for basing its decision on this “nontex-
tual and nonconstitutional trusteeship authority, rather than relying, as had 
past cases, on the Indian Commerce Clause.”344 Kagama is blatantly incon-
sistent with Worcester,345 where Chief Justice Marshall characterized British 
relations with the Indians (which carried over to the new government) as 
“never intrud[ing] into the interior of their affairs, or interfer[ing] with their 
self government.”346 
In dicta, the Court distorted the essence of Cherokee Nation. The Court 
described Cherokee Nation as holding “that the Cherokees were not a State 
or nation within the meaning of the constitution, so as to be able to main-
tain the suit.”347 But Chief Justice Marshall never held that the Chero-
343 Kagama, 118 U.S. at 383–85. Professor Prakash explores but then rejects the possibility 
that the opinion was based on the Territory–Property Clause of the Constitution. Prakash, 
Against, supra note 180, at 1078 n.54.
344 Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1180. Professor Clinton did not list the prior cases 
in which the Court has supposedly relied on the Indian Commerce Clause. his list would have 
been a good deal longer than mine because he would include cases whose result was consistent 
with the Indian Commerce Clause even if the Court had never cited that Clause. For example, 
he would probably include United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881), which sustained 
Colorado’s prosecution of a non-Indian for the murder of another non-Indian on a reser-
vation within the State. “While McBratney never directly mentioned the Indian Commerce 
clause, the implication was clear that state jurisdiction and sovereignty extended into Indian 
country located within a state where the matter was regulated, taxed, or adjudicated by the 
state and involved no Indian interests directly or indirectly.” Clinton, Dormant, supra note 
22, at 1181–82. See his characterization of Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), id. at 1186, 
1191−93, 1196, 1203, 1227, 1235, 1245. I am not as confident that the Court would have 
applied the Indian Commerce Clause in McBratney if Indian interests had been involved.
345 Professor Frickey, however, suggests that the decision “indicates that Congress has power 
over Indian affairs based more on inherent notions of centralized national power in a colonial 
government than on a strict interpretation of the congressional powers enumerated in the 
Constitution. It is, to that extent, an extension of the Marshall trilogy.” Frickey, Domesticating, 
supra note 15, at 59.
346 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 547 (1832). But see Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, where 
the Court declared that the “[p]lenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has 
been exercised by Congress from the beginning,” 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903), a statement that 
Clinton describes as “demonstrably historically false.” Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 
1179 n.351. Professor Milner Ball describes Lone Wolf as giving “Congress greater power than 
any conferred by the Constitution.” Ball, Constitution, supra note 7 at 54.
347 Kagama, 118 U.S. at 379. The Court argued that if the tribes were foreign nations they 
would have been encompassed by the Foreign Commerce Clause; alternatively, that clause 
would have referred to “foreign and Indian nations.” Id. Presumably this discussion was irrel-
evant. If the Indian Commerce Clause did not apply because there was no relation between a 
criminal code and “commerce,” that same reasoning would apply under the Foreign Commerce 
Clause.
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kees were not a nation, only that they were not a foreign nation: “[T]he 
constitution . . . does not comprehend Indian tribes in the general term ‘foreign 
nations;’ not we presume because a tribe may not be a nation, but because it 
is not foreign to the United States.”348 Rather astonishingly, Kagama ignored 
Marshall’s oxymoronic creation: “domestic dependent nation.” The holding 
in Kagama denies the Indians the very sovereignty that Cherokee Nation and 
Worcester sought to emphasize.
The Court’s rejection of the Indian Commerce Clause is understandable, 
especially in 1886.349 After all, murder, one of the crimes covered, does not 
have any inevitable relationship to commerce, and the Act did not link the 
crimes to any aspect of commerce.350 Even if the concept of “commerce” were 
to be broadened, which would occur in subsequent cases interpreting the 
Interstate Commerce Clause, intra-tribal crimes on a reservation might still 
not be covered. 
348 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 19 (1831).
349 Professor Laurence explains that 
[i]t is not surprising that in 1886 the Court took a narrow view of the limits of 
the Indian commerce clause, for the same was true under the interstate commerce 
clause. In fact, the Court began to broaden its view of the Indian commerce clause 
well before the same development of the interstate commerce clause. For example, in 
United States v. Sandoval, the Court upheld a criminal statute with respect to liquor 
traffic with specific reference to the Indian commerce clause. 
Robert Laurence, The Indian Commerce Clause, 23 Ariz. L. Rev. 203, 225 (1981) [hereinafter 
Laurence, Indian Commerce Clause]. As suggested above, there is no reason to assume that the 
Indian Commerce Clause is to be interpreted in pari materia with the Interstate Commerce 
Clause, although this comment carries less weight when the issue is the interpretation of “com-
merce.” See supra notes 163, 180, 283.
350 The United States argued that the Indian Commerce Clause provided the authority for 
the statute. Relying on Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 190 (1824), the Government argued that 
commerce meant “intercourse.” 
Ever since the adoption of the Constitution in 1789 Congress has exercised the power 
of regulating the intercourse with Indians, and of enacting criminal laws with regard 
to the conduct of Indians and the conduct of white men having intercourse with 
Indians in the Indian country and the reservations within the States.
Brief for the United States, at 6. The Government also argued that the “policy of such legisla-
tion is a question of legislative discretion, and not of judicial cognizance.” Id. at 20. For a 
discussion of the meaning of “commerce” at the time the Constitution was adopted, see supra 
note 163.
Although subsequent (non-Indian) cases came to interpret Congress’s powers under the 
Interstate Commerce Clause very broadly, the Court issued a shot across the bow in United 
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Lopez held that the Gun-Free School Zones Act, which 
outlawed guns within 1,000 feet of a school, was invalid because it did not regulate an activity 
arising out of, or connected with, a commercial transaction that substantially affected inter-
state commerce, and consequently was beyond Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. 
Id. This holding is consistent with Kagama.
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4.  Holding is Unsupported by the History of Relations with the Indians
The pre-constitutional history of relations with the Indians does not justify 
Congress’s power to have enacted the Major Crimes Act. Prior to the Consti-
tution, and even for a period after its adoption, the colonies, the states, and 
the national government did not project their laws into Indian country, at 
least in areas not involving land or trade. And as Marshall noted in Worces-
ter:
[O]ur history furnishes no example, from the first settlement of our coun-
try, of any attempt on the part of the crown to interfere with the internal 
affairs of the Indians, farther than to keep out the agents of foreign powers, 
who, as traders or otherwise, might seduce them into foreign alliances. The 
king purchased their lands when they were willing to sell, at a price they 
were willing to take; but never coerced a surrender of them. he also pur-
chased their alliance and dependence by subsidies; but never intruded into 
the interior of their affairs, or interfered with their self government, so far as 
respected themselves only.351 
Kagama ignored this history and the tribes’ status as domestic dependent 
nations352 by announcing that the Indians were weak, helpless, and dimin-
351 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 547.
352 Professor Wilkinson views Kagama as consistent with McBratney, 104 U.S. at 621, and 
Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 553. Wilkinson, supra note 7, at 24. McBratney involved a murder by a 
non-Indian of a non-Indian on Indian country. The Court upheld state court jurisdiction not-
withstanding the federal General Crimes Act indicated that federal jurisdiction was applicable. 
The Court did not refer to the Indian Commerce Clause presumably because no commerce 
with the Indians existed. Other than this being a “white on white” crime, McBratney was hard 
to reconcile with Worcester. Dean Getches feels that Worcester and McBratney are distinguish-
able “only if one assumes that the murder of one white by another in McBratney was of no 
concern to the tribe on whose reservation it took place. As such, the crime fell outside the 
ambit of ‘Indian affairs,’ the field in which Congress was legislating when it passed the federal 
murder statute.” Getches, Conquering, supra note 14, at 1587. 
New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496, 500 (1946), describes McBratney as applying 
only to “crimes between whites and whites which do not affect Indians.” 
In its amicus brief in McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n, 471 U.S. 195 (1985) discussed 
infra notes 519−91 and accompanying text, the Government described McBratney as a “nar-
row exception[] to Worcester concerning matters not directly affecting the Indians who reside 
on the reservation. No decision of this Court authorizes state regulation or taxation of Indians 
on reservations, in the absence of congressional authorization.” Brief for the United States 
as Amicus Curiae McClanahan v. Arizona, 411 U.S. 164 (1973) (No. 71-834), 1972 WL 
136317, at *6. 
Lone Wolf allowed Congress to unilaterally revoke an Indian treaty and upheld a federal sale 
of tribal land that was invalid under the treaty. A treaty cannot “materially limit and qualify 
the controlling authority of Congress in respect to the care and protection of the Indians.” 
Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 564. Congress has “power over the property of the Indians, by reason 
of its exercise of guardianship over their interests, and . . . such authority might be implied, 
even though opposed to the strict letter of a treaty with the Indians.” Id. at 565. Lone Wolf also 
declared that Congress’s plenary authority over the tribes was a political question, not subject 
to control by the courts. Id. at 568. That view was rejected in United States v. Sioux Nation, 
448 U.S. 371, 413 (1980) (the political question doctrine “has long since been discredited 
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ished in numbers.353 
F.  Thomas v. Gay
Thomas v. Gay354 was the earliest case (1898) in which the Court upheld a 
state tax on non-Indians doing business with a tribe on a reservation. The 
case involved a personal property tax levied by the Territory of Oklahoma 
on cattle owned by non-Indians grazing on the reservation under leases with 
the Indians.355 A federal statute356 authorized the leases but was silent on the 
matter of state taxation.357
The taxpayers-lessees argued that state taxation of the cattle under leases 
authorized by Congress violated the “rights of the Indians and [was] an inva-
sion of the jurisdiction and control of the United States over them and their 
lands.”358
in takings cases, and was expressly laid to rest in Delaware Tribal Business Committee”) and 
Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84 (1977) (Congress’s plenary 
power does “not mean that all federal legislation concerning Indians is . . . immune from 
judicial scrutiny.”). Lone Wolf relied in part on Kagama with respect to the helplessness of the 
Indians. 118 U.S. at 566.
Professor Wilkinson describes the Kagama-McBratney-Lone Wolf cases as “implicitly 
conceptualiz[ing] tribes as lost societies without power, as minions of the federal govern-
ment. Since the tribes were presumptively unable to wield an acceptable level of governmental 
authority, the Court looked to federal or state authority to fill the void.” Wilkinson, supra, 
at 24. The “tribes were fading entities moving toward extinction.” Id. at 27; see also Ball, 
Constitution, supra note 7, at 53; Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 265 (1901) (“The 
North American Indians do not and never have constituted ‘nations’ . . . . In short, the word 
‘nation’ as applied to the uncivilized Indians is so much of a misnomer as to be little more than 
a compliment.”); Cherokee Nation v. S. Kan. Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641, 653 (1890) (“The propo-
sition that the Cherokee Nation is a sovereign in the sense that the United States is sovereign, 
or in the sense that the several states are sovereign . . . finds no support.”). 
353 At one point in the opinion, however, the Court states that the Indians “were, and always 
have been, regarded as having a semi-independent position when they preserved their tribal 
relations; not as states, not as nations, not as possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty, but 
as a separate people, with the power of regulating their internal and social relations, and thus 
far not brought under the laws of the Union or of the State within whose limits they resided.” 
118 U.S. at 381–82. But that description no longer applied because “after an experience of 
a hundred years of the treaty-making system of government, Congress has determined upon 
a new departure—to govern them by acts of Congress.” Id. at 382. The opinion studiously 
avoids any reference to “domestic dependent nation,” or “independent political community,” 
see supra notes 220, 244, and accompanying text.
“After the Civil War, the treaty system had come under attack by Christian reformers, whose 
opinion of Indians was identical to that expressed by Justice Miller in Kagama. Indians were 
said to be wards, not treaty partners.” Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 52.
354 169 U.S. 264 (1898).
355 The tax was not limited to grazing or to reservation land. “[W]hen any cattle are kept or 
grazed, or any other personal property is situated in any unorganized country, district or res-
ervation of this territory, such property shall be subject to taxation in the organized county to 
which said country, district or reservation is attached for judicial purposes . . . .” Id. at 272.
356 Id. at 273.
357 Id. at 272–73.
358 Id. at 273.
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1.  Misstatement of Utah & Northern Railway
In response, the Court cited Utah & Northern for the proposition that “prop-
erty of railway companies traversing Indian reservation are subject to taxa-
tion by the States and Territories in which such reservations are located.”359 
Apparently, the railway property was analogized to the cattle and there the 
analysis ended. The property of the railway could be taxed and therefore the 
cattle could be taxed. Both were privately owned and the Court viewed both 
as being on the reservation. Not discussed was that the railroad had no ongo-
ing business relationship with the Indians and was using property that was 
“withdrawn” from the reservation. By contrast, the owners of the cattle were 
using reservation land under leases with the Indians. 
Moreover, while it is conceivable that a Territorial property tax imposed in 
Utah & Northern might have been passed backward to the Indians through a 
reduction in the price of the land, the Indians sold the land to the Government 
under conditions that hardly suggested the possibility of tax capitalization,360 
whereas the taxpayer-lessees were arguing more plausibly in Thomas that a tax 
on the cattle would affect the value of the Indian-owned land. Today, the tax-
payers would have had a gaggle of economists with computer printouts and 
sophisticated models, but no empirical evidence was offered in 1898.
2.  Indians’ Property Rights Not Seriously Affected
In what would take on greater importance in later cases, especially for Justice 
Rehnquist361 in Colville, infra, the Court rejected the argument that the Indi-
359 Id.
360 One curious aspect, for example, was that the Indians sold the land in fee to the 
Government for $6,000 and the Government granted less than a fee interest (a right of way) 
for the same amount, reinforcing the strong suspicion that no free market existed that was set-
ting the price of the land. See supra note 331.
361 Justice Rehnquist has been described as having “nothing but contempt for Indian cases.” 
Bob Woodward & Scott Armstrong, The Brethren 412 (1979). Dean Getches offers a 
more nuanced view. 
Although some attribute [Rehnquist’s active role in Indian cases] to his relatively 
junior status and a fabled unpopularity of Indian cases among the Court’s members, 
the degree of vigor with which he has asserted his views in Indian law belies a per-
functory or obligatory exercise. his spirited opinions arguing for an historical review 
of facts to guide construction of Indian statutes have been especially significant. 
Getches, Conquering, supra note 14, at 1632–33. Dean Getches also observed that “[i]n a 
spate of cases beginning about the time Rehnquist became Chief Justice in 1986, the Court 
veered away from the foundations of Indian law.” David h. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The 
Rehnquist Court’s Pursuit of State’s Rights, Color Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 Minn. 
L. Rev. 267, 273–74 (2001); see also David J. Bloch, Colonizing the Last Frontier, 29 Am. 
Indian L. Rev. 1, 1 (2004) (“Since 1978, and especially after Rehnquist became its Chief 
Justice, the Court has diminished the inherent powers tribes possessed as domestic dependent 
nations and transferred them to the states at the federal government’s expense but without 
its consent, indeed to the contrary of congressional and executive policy favoring tribal self-
determination.”). 
Professor Frickey has described the Rehnquist Court as 
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ans’ property rights were seriously affected by the Oklahoma tax. The lessees 
argued “that the money contracted to be paid for the privilege of grazing is 
paid to the Indians as a tribe, and is used and expended by them for their own 
purposes, and that if, by reason of this taxation, the conditions existing at the 
time the leases were executed were changed, or could be changed by the leg-
islature of Oklahoma at its pleasure, the value of the lands for such purposes 
would fluctuate or be destroyed altogether according to such conditions.”362 
In classic ipse dixit logic, the Court simply stated “it is obvious that a tax put 
upon the cattle of the lessees is too remote and indirect to be deemed a tax 
upon the lands or privileges of the Indians,”363 thus dispensing with an oth-
deflat[ing] the Indian law canon. The primary reason is that this Court is hardly 
interested in generous construction of federal statutes and other provisions to pro-
mote the lot of disadvantaged peoples . . . [T]his problem is aggravated by the fact 
that the tribes’ usual opponents in Rehnquist Court cases have been the states, and 
that, for the current Court, federalism is a public-law value of extreme importance. 
Frickey, Marshalling, supra note 199, at 424–25 n.180. 
Two other commentators described Chief Justice Rehnquist as taking “the position that the 
states should be the linchpins of the republic. It follows that he sees Indian tribes, with their 
sovereignty and separateness from state governments, as violating his preference for state gov-
ernment.” Ralph W. Johnson & Berrie Martinis, Chief Justice Rehnquist and the Indian Cases, 
16 Pub. Land L. Rev. 1, 2 (1995). “Whatever the subject, Rehnquist manages to construe the 
law to limit or impair the governing powers and jurisdiction of Indian tribes. This is in direct 
conflict with a basic canon of Indian law.” Id. at 18. Writing in 1995, Johnson and Martinis 
concluded that in “the seventy-nine Supreme Court opinions involving Indian claims in which 
Rehnquist has taken part since his appointment to the Court in 1972, he has rarely cast a vote 
in favor of Indian interests.” Id. at 24. 
[h]e believes that state regulations and taxes should apply on reservations, especially 
to non-Indians, unless federal legislation can be found expressing an opposite intent. 
This position reverses a long-standing rule of construction in Indian cases—that state 
law does not apply on a reservation unless Congress clearly expresses that intent. 
Id. at 25. 
Writing in 1983, one commentator describes Rehnquist as moving “during the course of 
the past decade from a centrist position and frequent author of the Court’s unanimous or 
majority opinions in Indian cases through 1978, to become the Court’s most consistent and 
vigorous dissenter.” Robert S. Pelcyger, Justices and Indians: Back to Basics, 62 Or. L. Rev. 29, 
30 (1983).
Professor Fletcher notes that the practice of federal Indian law is in serious normative 
decline “and most likely began to degenerate around the time of the ascension of Chief Justice 
Rehnquist in 1986 and the concomitant trend toward reducing the Supreme Court’s docket.” 
Fletcher, Indian Problem, supra note 11, at 580. “While as Chief Justice, he did not write the 
lead opinions in many Indian law decisions, the doctrinal origins of these cases can be traced 
back to the damage done by then-Justice Rehnquist in the 1970s and early 1980s to founda-
tional principles of federal Indian law.” Id. at 591.
362 Thomas, 169 U.S. at 273.
363 Id. The cases the Court cited as upholding state taxes alleged to have interfered with inter-
state commerce, id. at 273–74, exhibited similar ipse dixit logic. The lessees also cited Pollock v. 
Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), holding that a tax on rents was substantially a 
tax on the lands so that a tax on cattle should also be viewed as a forbidden tax on Indian land. 
The Court dismissed this argument as “fanciful,” with the formal and meaningless response 
that the tax was on cattle and not on rent. Thomas, 669 U.S. at 274. Presumably, a tax on the 
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erwise empirical question. The Court ignored the fact that cattle were being 
removed from the Territory apparently to avoid the tax.364
3.  Indian Commerce Clause
The taxpayers also argued that the tax violated the Indian Commerce Clause. 
The tax interfered with, or imposed a servitude upon lawful commercial inter-
course with the Indians, “over which Congress has absolute control, and in 
the exercise of which control it has enacted the statute authorizing the leasing 
by the Indians of their unoccupied lands for grazing purposes.”365 Astonish-
ingly, the Court claimed that this issue had been decided in favor of the state 
in Utah & Northern,366 notwithstanding that the railroad in that case had not 
even raised an Indian Commerce Clause argument and the opinion makes 
rents having the same economic effects as a tax on cattle would have been struck down by the 
Court.
364 Thomas, 169 U.S. at 264. 
Professor Taylor, with his usual insight, suggests that Thomas and other cases during this 
time period were decided 
during the early part of the allotment process when federal Indian policy sought 
to eliminate tribes as political entities and to hasten the assimilation of Native 
Americans. Given this context, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court paid little 
or no attention to the possible ill effects of their decisions on the tribes. Instead, the 
members of the Court probably viewed territorial taxation as an important part of a 
broad federal policy of closing the frontier, establishing new states, and finishing the 
process of manifest destiny. Given the flawed reasoning and obvious lack of impartial-
ity, [Thomas, Utah & Northern, Phoenix Railroad, and Wagoner v. Evans] should be 
viewed as unworthy of any precedential value. 
Taylor, Framework, supra note 23, at 858–59. he also analyzes other issue in Thomas, which I 
do not address in this Article. See id. at 857–58. 
Allotment sometimes led to the disestablishment of a tribe. See, e.g., DeCoteau v. Dist. 
Cnty. Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 427–28 (1975). Sometimes allotment led to a contraction of the size 
of a reservation. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 333 (1998). 
For a general discussion of the allotment policy, see Frederick E. hoxie, A Final Promise: 
The Campaign to Assimilate the Indians, 1880-1920 (1984); John W. Ragsdale, Jr., The 
Movement to Assimilate the American Indians: A Jurisprudential Study, 57 UMKC L. Rev. 399, 
399-400; John W. Ragsdale, Jr., Indian Reservations and the Preservation of Tribal Culture: 
Beyond Wardship to Stewardship, 59 UMKC L. Rev. 503, 510–13 (1991); Judith V. Royster, 
The Legacy of Allotment, 27 Ariz. St. L. J. 1 (1995); Singer, supra note 125, at 649 (“At the 
time of the allotment acts, Congress intended eventually, but not immediately, to destroy 
tribal government, and it provided that tribal land that ended up in non-Indian hands would 
become subject to state law.”).
In an amicus brief filed in Ramah Navajo School Board v. Bureau of Revenue of New Mexico, 
458 U.S. 832 (1982), discussed infra notes 985−1057 and accompanying text, the Government 
warned that Thomas should not be extended, describing the decision as “[written] at a time 
when Indian reservations were destined for extinction, and condoning only a tax on non-
Indian cattle located on leased land within a reservation, with no subsequent tribal involve-
ment.” Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., 
Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue of N.M., 458 U.S. 832 (1982) (No. 80-2162), 1982 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs 
LEXIS 1162, at *7 [hereinafter Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae]. 
365 Thomas, 169 U.S. at 274.
366 Id. at 275.
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no reference, even in passing, to that Clause. Perhaps realizing that Utah 
& Northern was a frail response to the Indian Commerce Clause argument, 
the Court retreated into the kind of formal, rather than pragmatic, analysis 
that marked its approach to the Interstate Commerce Clause at this time 
but later abandoned.367 The challenged taxes “were not imposed on the busi-
ness of grazing, or on the rents received by the Indians, but on the cattle as 
property of the lessees.”368 Repeating its earlier exercise in ipse dixit reasoning, 
the Court concluded that the tax on the cattle was “too remote and indirect 
to be deemed a tax or burden on interstate commerce,369 so is it too remote 
and indirect to be regarded as an interference with the legislative power of 
Congress.”370 Two frail reeds do not make a convincing argument.
4.  Taxation of Nonresidents
Finally, the case dealt with a theme that would recur in later opinions. The 
taxpayers, nonresidents of the Territory, argued that they did not benefit from 
the Oklahoma taxes and that as nonresidents they were not represented in the 
Oklahoma Legislature. The Court properly rejected this argument: 
Undoubtedly there are general principles familiar to our systems of state 
and Federal [G]overnment, that the people who pay taxes imposed by laws 
are entitled to have a voice in the election of those who pass the laws, and 
that taxes must be assessed and collected for public purposes, and that the 
duty or obligation to pay taxes by the individual is founded in his partici-
pation in the benefits arising from their expenditure. But these principles, 
as practically administered, do not mean that no person, man, woman, or 
child, resident or non-resident, shall be taxed, unless he was represented by 
some one for whom he had actually voted, nor do they mean that no man’s 
property can be taxed unless some benefit to him personally can be pointed 
out.371 
The Court might have noted that the property tax was nondiscriminatory 
and applied equally to residents and nonresidents. Consequently, although 
nonresidents could not vote in Oklahoma elections, their interests were pro-
tected indirectly by residents. As residents pursued their own self-interests 
in making sure that the rate and application of the tax was reasonable, they 
367 This formal approach was judicially interred in Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 274, although 
many earlier cases had foreshadowed its demise. See Thomas, 169 U.S. at 287.
368 Thomas, 169 U.S. at 275.
369 Although the Court referred to interstate commerce, the plaintiffs actually argued that 
the Oklahoma tax violated the Indian Commerce Clause and not the Interstate Commerce 
Clause.
370 Thomas, 169 U.S. at 275. This assertion might have been belied by the record. The syl-
labus of the case states that “[b]efore these taxes became delinquent, plaintiffs in error began 
to remove or attempted to remove their respective property from the territory” although the 
opinion is silent on this fact. Id. at 267. Presumably, the cattle were taken somewhere else for 
grazing, free of the Oklahoma tax (an early example of capital moving in response to a tax). 
Id. 
371 Id. at 276–77.
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were safeguarding the interests of the nonresidents. The Court might have 
also noted that Congress could always intervene to remedy egregious situ-
ations.372
The Court correctly disposed of the taxpayers’ final argument that they did 
not benefit from the use of the tax proceeds:
[I]t cannot be maintained that those plaintiffs whose cattle are within the 
protection of the laws of Oklahoma receive no benefit from the expenditures 
in [the] County. Certainly they have some advantage in the improvement of 
the roads within that county, when they journey to and from the towns and 
settlements in the organized county. They are interested in the prevalence 
of law and order in the communities adjacent to their property, and in the 
provision made for the care of the poor and insane . . . [T]hey have a right 
to send their children to the schools in the organized county.373 
It is no objection to a tax that the party required to pay it derives no ben-
efit from the particular burden; e.g. a tax for school purposes levied upon 
a manufacturing corporation. But, in truth, benefits always flow from the 
appropriation of public moneys to such purposes, which corporations in 
common with national persons receive in the additional security to their 
property and profits.374 
Thomas is rich in themes that will reappear in subsequent cases.375 Future 
cases will cite it for the proposition that a state can tax economic transactions 
between Indians and non-Indians on a reservation, although it is hard to 
imagine that Chief Justice Marshall would have allowed Georgia to tax prop-
erty leased by Worcester and Butler from the Cherokees. The Thomas Court 
had a chance to apply both the pre- and extra-constitutional sovereignty doc-
trine and the Indian Commerce Clause to turn the reservation into a tax-free 
enterprise zone—but did not—and thus started the Indians down another 
trail that continues today. 
V.  Modern Jurisprudence 
A.  Williams v. Lee
In the 20th century, the Supreme Court was fairly quiescent on matters of 
Indian sovereignty until Williams v. Lee,376 a non-tax case. The issue involved 
372 For a discussion of the taxation of nonresidents, see infra notes 1121−29 and accompany-
ing text.
373 Thomas, 169 U.S. at 278.
374 Id. at 280.
375 The case did not raise the intergovernmental tax immunity argument, which would later 
be used to strike down state taxes on the reservation, before eventually being abandoned. 
During its heyday, the doctrine was used to strike down an Oklahoma severance tax on a non-
Indian lessee of Indian coal. Choctaw, Okla. & Gulf R.R. v. harrison, 235 U.S. 292 (1914).
376 358 U.S. 217 (1959). Professor Frickey describes the case as the first “in a contemporary 
context in which non-Indians were involved.” Frickey, Common Law, supra note 15, at 28–29. 
According to Frickey, Williams v. Lee was a wonderful test case. The Navajo Reservation was 
not generally subjected to allotment and retained its Indian character. It had tribal courts to 
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a non-Indian, Williams, selling goods at a general store on the Navajo reser-
vation377 under a license required by the Indian Trader statutes.378 The trader 
sued a Navajo Indian and his wife in the Arizona State courts to collect for 
goods sold on credit at the store.379 
deal with suits by outsiders. And the vendor had no reasonable expectation of immunity from 
tribal regulation. Id. at 30.
377 Unlike other reservations, there were few non-Indians living with the Navajos. Allotments, 
see infra note 675 and the references cited therein, were not made on the Navajo reservation. 
378 25 U.S.C. § 262 provides that “[a]ny person desiring to trade with the Indians on any 
Indian reservation shall, upon establishing the fact, to the satisfaction of the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs, that he is a proper person to engage in such trade, be permitted to do so under 
such rules and regulations as the Commissioner of Indian Affairs may prescribe for the protec-
tion of Indians.” See Warren Trading Post v. Arizona, 380 U.S. 685, infra notes 425–68 and 
accompanying text; Cent. Mach. Corp. v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 448 U.S. 160, infra notes 
469−518 and accompanying text.
379 Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. at 217–18. Sales on credit were common given the widespread 
poverty that existed among the Navajos. 25 C.F.R. 140.23, a regulation promulgated under 
the Indian Trader statutes, provided that “[a] trader may extend credit to Indians, but such 
credit will be at the trader’s own risk.” The Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae argued 
that the case should be resolved on the basis of that regulation and not on the broader issue 
that the Arizona courts have no jurisdiction over tribal Indians with respect to any cause of 
action arising within the Navajo Reservation. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae 
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (No. 39), 1958 WL 91611, at *1. In their petition for 
certiorari, the Lees relied on that regulation but subsequently abandoned this argument in 
their brief before the Court, Id. at *3. Their reason for doing so was that an earlier version of 
the regulation read “[c]redit to Indians will be at the trader’s own risk, as no assistance will be 
given by Government officials in the collection of debts against Indians.” Petitioners’ Reply 
Brief, Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (No. 39), 1958 WL 91609, at *2. The reference 
to “no assistance by Government officials” was deleted “at the request of an association of 
Indian traders,” arguing that “Government Indian agents should at least use moral suasion to 
persuade Indians to meet their obligations.” Id. The Lees thought this history of the regulation, 
which they learned of only after filing their petition for certiorari, made their earlier argument 
untenable. Id. at *3. 
The Government disagreed with the Lees’ reading of the regulation and argued that it oper-
ated to “deprive the state courts of jurisdiction over such a claim.” Brief for the United States 
as Amicus Curiae, supra, at *4. The court below thought the regulation went to the merits 
and not the jurisdictional issue. Id. Rather amazingly, Petitioners’ Reply Brief describes the 
government’s reading of the regulation as “walking out on the quicksand of a construction 
so untenable that we abandoned it because we could not in all conscience urge it upon the 
Court.” Petitioners’ Reply Brief, supra, at *3–4. Presumably, the Lees wanted to win the case 
on the broader jurisdictional issue and not on the narrower issue of how to interpret the 
regulation. “Our purpose, of course, is to win this case. But we are simply unable to read into 
the language of this regulation thus derived the meaning that the Solicitor General professes 
to find therein. We are aware, of course, that it is generally sound judicial administration to 
decide cases narrowly, and that it is specifically the duty of this Court to avoid constitutional 
adjudication whenever litigation can be disposed of on non-constitutional grounds. But we do 
not believe that the basic jurisdictional question involved in the present case can be avoided by 
now inventing a tortured construction of the regulation.” Id. at *4. For the reasons discussed in 
the text, the Indians might have been better off with a narrower decision based on the regula-
tion. But hindsight is always cheap.
According to Professor Berger, the Solicitor General’s lack of emphasis on the inherent 
sovereignty of the Indians was not surprising. 
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1.  The Infringement Test
Justice Black,380 writing for a unanimous court, held that Arizona lacked 
A few months before, the Office of the Solicitor of the Interior Department had 
issued the 1958 revision of the [Cohen] handbook of Federal Indian Law. Where 
Cohen’s chapter on state jurisdiction had opened by declaring that “state laws have 
no force within the territory of an Indian tribe in matters affecting Indians,” the new 
opening statement was that “[f ]ederal power has been interposed so that State laws 
generally have had little force within the territory of an Indian tribe in matters affect-
ing Indians.” The handbook forthrightly admitted that the shift in federal policy 
was behind this diluted language: “Present Federal policy calls for the termination of 
Federal supervision of affairs of Indian tribes desiring such termination, to the extent 
practicable and as soon as termination is feasible. Any discussion of the scope of State 
power over Indian affairs must take that policy, and measures taken to effectuate it, 
into consideration.” [citing Department of Interior, handbook of Federal Indian 
Law 501, 502 (1958)] 
The 1958 handbook nevertheless had proclaimed that “State law does not apply to 
Indian affairs except so far as, and to the extent that, the United States gives or has 
given its consent.” [citing id. at 501]. The Solicitor General’s brief in the Supreme 
Court did not admit to even this much. The Solicitor rejected [the Indian’s argument] 
declaring that “We do not agree that reservation Indians are beyond the reach of all 
state law until Congress specifically provides otherwise.” [citing Brief for the United 
States as Amicus Curiae, 1958 WL 91611, at *5] . . . [The government ultimately 
argued on behalf of the Indians] but only on the narrowest of grounds.
Bethany Berger, Williams v. Lee and the Debate Over Indian Inequality, 109 Mich. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2010). Apparently, Justice Frankfurter and Chief Justice Earl Warren were sym-
pathetic to this argument. Dewi I. Ball, supra note 272. 
Justice Frankfurter is reported to have described Williams v. Lee as an indirect reaffirmation 
of Brown v. Board of Education. Frickey, Common Law, supra note 15, at 29 n.140. Professor 
Gould describes the case as involving “only a minor civil matter initiated in state court by a 
non-Indian.” Gould, Consent, supra note 6, at 839. As my Indian friends remind me, these 
“minor” cases go to the heart of their sovereignty and probably reflected the litigating judg-
ment call described above to abandon a narrow argument based on the regulation, for the 
broader jurisdictional argument.
380 Louis F. Claiborne, a former Deputy Solicitor General of the United States who argued 
many Indian law cases before the Court, described the Court as having very little interest 
in Indian cases, and noted that for many years opinions were assigned to Justices Black or 
Douglas, “both sympathetic to the Indian cause.” Claiborne, supra note 11, at 585. he cites 
the large number of unanimous landmark cases as evidence of the Court’s lack of interest, 
which has generally benefited the tribes. Id. at 586–87. More recently, however, the Court’s 
Indian opinions have become fractured. What is puzzling is why the Court granted certiorari 
in so many Indian cases if it was truly uninterested in them and viewed them as “peewee” cases. 
See infra note 560.
Professor Fletcher, writing in 2007, notes that the Court has heard an average of two Indian 
cases per year since 1953 and occasionally as many as five cases in a single term. Fletcher, supra 
note 361, at 579. Professor Fletcher makes a persuasive and eloquent case that 
the Court identifies an important constitutional concern embedded in a run-of-the 
mill Indian law certiorari petition, grants certiorari, and then applies its decision 
making discretion to decide the “important” constitutional concern. Once that por-
tion of the Indian law case is decided, the Court decides any remaining federal Indian 
law questions in order to reach a result consistent with its decision on the important 
constitutional concern. From the view of a national decision maker such as a Supreme 
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subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction.381 The Court started its 
analysis by referring to Worcester as holding that “[t]he Cherokee Nation . . . is 
a distinct community, occupying its own territory in which the laws of Geor-
gia had no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but 
with the assent of the Cherokees themselves.”382 Justice Black noted, however, 
that Worcester has been 
modified . . . in cases where essential tribal relations were not involved383 
and where the rights of Indians would not be jeopardized, but the basic 
Court Justice, there is much more to a simple Indian law case than a dispute between 
Indians, Indian tribes, and the non-Indian individuals, governments, and entities 
that oppose them. There are questions of equal protection, due process, federalism, 
jurisdiction, congressional and executive power, and more. Indian law disputes often 
are mere vessels for the Court to tackle larger questions; often these questions have 
little to do with federal Indian law. And, since Indian law is not as grounded in the 
Constitution as the other questions, it is more malleable; prone to inconsistencies 
and unpredictability. 
Id. at 580. 
he notes that the Indians are winning fewer of these cases than previously and that a 
“great victory for Indian Country in the twenty-first century consists of convincing 
the Court not to grant certiorari.” Id. at 591.
Id. at 590 (emphasis in original). With Rehnquist and O’Connor having been replaced by 
Roberts and Alito, “the personal interest in Indian law of those departed ‘Westerners’ would 
seem to portend a further decline in Indian law certiorari grants.” Id. at 605.
381 See also Fisher v. Dist. Ct., 424 U.S. 382 (1976); Kennerly v. Dist. Cnty. Ct., 400 U.S. 
423 (1971) (invalidating tribal legislation that authorized state civil court jurisdiction because 
the tribe had not followed the correct procedures). Professor Berger notes that at oral argument, 
Norman Littell, who represented the Indians, could not quite answer the question whether the 
state lacked subject matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction over the Indians. he ultimately 
asked the Court to resolve this question in chambers. Berger, supra note 379. The Lees argued 
that the transaction occurred on the reservation between an Indian and a licensed Indian 
trader pursuant to federal law. “This is a subject-matter expressly and exclusively delegated to 
Congress by the Constitution itself, and accordingly it cannot be made the subject of litigation 
in state courts as long as [the Indian trader statute] remains in force.” Brief for the Petitioners, 
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (No. 39), 1958 WL 91612, at *21. 
For a discussion of the possible effect of President Truman’s veto of the Navajo Rehabilitation 
Bill on the Supreme Court’s decision, see Dewi I. Ball, supra note 272 and Berger, supra note 
379.
382 Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. at 219. Williams’s brief challenged the very notion of Indian 
sovereignty. The brief claimed that Worcester was irrelevant because unlike the Cherokee 
Nation, when the “Navajos became part of the United States there was no such thing as a 
Navajo Tribe in the political sense.” Brief for the Respondents, Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 
(1959) (No. 39), 1958 WL 91610 at *7. “The political entity known as the Navajo Tribe was 
an artificial creature of the federal government, not a recognized nation as was the Cherokee.” 
Id. at *8. “The Cherokee nation was recognized as a political sovereign by Great Britain. The 
United States succeeded to this position.” Id. By contrast, “the United States succeeded to the 
position of Mexico regarding the Navajos” and the “[p]olitical sovereignty of the Navajos was 
recognized by no one, because in fact, there was no sovereign.” Brief for the Respondents, 
supra, at *7.
383 In support of this proposition, Justice Black cited cases: sanctioning suits by Indians 
against outsiders in state courts; allowing state jurisdiction over white-on-white crime; and 
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policy of Worcester has remained384. . . . Essentially, absent governing Acts of 
Congress,385 the question has always been whether the state action infringed 
on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by 
them.386 Cf. Utah & Northern . . . .
Congress has also acted consistently upon the assumption that the States 
have no power to regulate the affairs of Indians on a reservation.387 
2.  Defects in the Opinion
Allowing the case to be brought in the Arizona courts “would undermine 
the authority of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs and hence would 
infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves.”388 Black’s formu-
lation, which would inform some of the Court’s subsequent analysis until 
providing exclusive tribal jurisdiction over crimes committed by non-Indians on Indians, or by 
Indians on non-Indians. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. at 219–20. Professor Milner Ball states that 
none of the cases cited by Justice Black supported the proposition for which they were cited. 
Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 76 n.371. Professor Barsh agrees, arguing that the states had 
no power to act extraterritorially. Barsh, Omen, supra note 15, at 5. Barsh criticizes Black for 
invoking 19th century decisions such as Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240 (1896), which 
“actually relied on federal delegations of power to states under defunct laws.” Id. at 5 (emphasis 
in original). In fairness to Black, there is only one, fairly irrelevant reference to Draper. Barsh 
agrees with Professor Milner Ball that Black’s citations were “inaccurate, inapplicable, or mis-
construed.” Id. at 6. 
384 Black contradicted Chief Justice Marshall’s lengthy discussion in Worcester about why 
the Indians had not given up their sovereignty through their treaties with the United States, 
see supra note 261 and accompanying text, by asserting that “[t]hrough conquest and treaties 
they were induced to give up complete independence and the right to go to war in exchange 
for federal protection, aid, and grants of land.” 358 U.S. at 218. Professor Milner Ball point-
edly notes that Black “did not say how or when tribes were conquered or in which treaties they 
surrendered their sovereignty.” Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 73. Professor Ball might have 
added, “which tribes?” Professor Barsh describes the Court as seeking “to synthesize the shift-
ing and inconstant tide of Indian law, giving shape to the first general principle of tribal juris-
diction and powers to emerge since John Marshall’s time.” Barsh, Omen, supra note 15, at 4.
385 Congress rarely authorizes state taxation. For one example, however, see Indian Oil 
Leasing Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 158, 43 Stat. 244 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 398 (2001)).
386 According to Professor Barsh, Black’s statement “was his own invention, albeit more or 
less consistent with the results of prior federal decisions. It had never before appeared as the 
rule of a case. In fact, Black himself had stated the opposite rule in dictum twelve years earlier 
in New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin.” Barsh, Omen, supra note 15, at 6 (emphasis in original). 
Black never identified the constitutional basis for his formulation. Obviously, the reference to 
“absent acts of Congress” is a reference to the Supremacy Clause, but that would not explain 
the reference to the “infringement” language.
387 Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. at 219–20. 
388 Id. at 223. Justice Black never explained the connection between self-government and 
the lack of access to Arizona courts. Professor Frickey suggests that “self-government includes 
having one’s own courts apply one’s own rules of decision to disputes arising within one’s own 
territory.” Frickey, Common Law, supra note 15, at 30. Professor Laurence is more skeptical, 
describing the Court as “glibly” reaching its conclusion and noting “there was no discussion of 
exactly what it is about the exercise of jurisdiction over a debt arising on the reservation that 
is so intrusive into reservation affairs.” Laurence, Indian Commerce Clause, supra note 349, at 
242.
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superseded by a balancing approach, suffers from three critical defects. 
First, the only case Justice Black cites for the proposition that “absent gov-
erning Acts of Congress, the question has always been whether the state action 
infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled 
by them” is Utah & Northern Railway,389 which he cites with a “cf.” That 
case, however, involved a railroad challenging a property tax imposed by the 
Territory of Idaho on property that was “withdrawn” from the reservation. 
No Indians were parties to the case or had any economic interest in the out-
come. 
To be sure, the railroad argued that treaties between the Indians and the 
federal government prohibited the tax390 and the Court, without any real 
analysis (the defendant made no appearance391 but did file two briefs), stated 
that “[t]he authority of the Territory may rightfully extend to all matters not 
interfering with [the treaty].”392 The Court announced that it did not “per-
ceive[] that any just rights of the Indians under the treaty can be impaired by 
taxing the road and property.”393 No lengthy analysis was needed because the 
Indians sold the land to the United States with the understanding that the 
government would grant a right of way to the railroad. Obviously, the Court 
had no reason to discuss “essential tribal relations,” or whether the rights of 
Indians were jeopardized because the Indians were a willing participant in the 
transaction.394 Because of the subsequent importance that will be attached to 
the italicized language in the excerpt from Williams v. Lee above, the citation 
to an irrelevant case, Utah & Northern is especially troubling. Irrelevancy is 
not cured by using a “cf.”
Second, there is a schizophrenic quality to the opinion in Williams v. Lee 
(perhaps the price paid for unanimity).395 It posits a state’s power to act, short 
of infringing the right of Indians to make their own laws. Yet this power can-
not be reconciled with Justice Black’s statement that “Congress has also acted 
389 For a discussion of Utah & Northern, 116 U.S. 28 (1885), see supra notes 323−32 and 
accompanying text. Professor Milner Ball describes Black’s formulation of the state infringe-
ment language as “his own.” Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 79 n.378. Professor Ball specu-
lates that Justice Black might have been misled by Cohen’s Indian law treatise. Id. 
390 There was no discussion of why the railroad had standing to assert the benefits of a treaty 
the Indians entered into with the government, an issue that would have been relevant if the 
Court were to have struck down the tax on the basis of that treaty. 
391 Id., at 28. 
392 Id. at 31.
393 Id. at 32.
394 For the reasons discussed in the text, the language in Utah & Northern that the “authority 
of the Territory [of Idaho] may rightfully extend to all matters not interfering with [Indian] 
protection,” 116 U.S. at 31, which although similar to Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. at 217, has 
nothing to do with the jurisdictional issue in the latter.
395 Commenting more generally, Professor Laurence describes federal Indian law as schizo-
phrenic. Robert Laurence, Don’t Think of a Hippopotamus: An Essay on First-Year Contracts, 
Earthquake Prediction, Gun Control in Baghdad, The Indian Civil Rights Act, The Clean Water 
Act, and Justice Thomas’s Separate Opinions in United States v. Lara, 40 Tulsa L. Rev. 137, 148 
(2004).
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consistently upon the assumption that the States have no power to regulate the 
affairs of Indians on a reservation.”396 
Third, Black never identified the constitutional basis for his “infringement” 
test. The “absent governing Acts of Congress” is obviously a reference to the 
Supremacy Clause, but that would not explain the “right of reservation Indi-
ans to make their own laws and be ruled by them,” which seems sourced in 
the pre- and extra-constitutional sovereignty of the Indians397 or the Indian 
Commerce Clause.
If Black did not turn Worcester and the Indian Commerce Clause quite on 
their heads, he nonetheless significantly distorted them.398 Under Worcester, 
the states could not regulate or legislate over the Indians without Congres-
sional permission.399 Under Williams v. Lee, permission would now no longer 
be needed; if Congress has not prohibited the state action, the constraint on 
396 358 U.S. at 220 (emphasis added).
397 A few years later in McClanahan, the Court will state that the “trend has been away from 
the idea of inherent Indian sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction and toward reliance on 
federal preemption.” McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973).
398 Professor Dewi I. Ball described the position of the Arizona Superior Court in Williams 
that state courts had civil authority on the reservation unless Congress restricted that power 
as “turning the Indian sovereignty doctrine on its head.” Dewi I. Ball, supra note 272, at 76. 
Ball also noted that Chief Justice Earl Warren was particularly concerned about prohibiting 
entirely state jurisdiction on the reservation. Id. Perhaps the schizophrenic nature of the opin-
ion reflects the price paid to get the Chief Justice to join the majority.
Professor Milner Ball correctly notes that the “Court could have followed Worcester. All 
it needed to do was point out that states have no jurisdiction in Indian country. That would 
have been a simple, obvious, correct resolution of the controversy . . . .” Ball, Constitution, 
supra note 7, at 72. “Worcester has been stood on its head, and Black’s unstated, contradic-
tory assumption about the presence of states in Indian country has become a first principle of 
constitutional Indian law. . . . Since Williams, the creative potential of Worcester for federalism 
has been replaced by a Court-administered federalism that assaults tribal government.” Id. at 
76. I have offered in the text three narrower and less dramatic ways Black could have ruled for 
the Indians.
Commenting in general and not specifically on Williams v. Lee, Professor Clinton notes that 
the assumption that “states possess inherent power over non-Indian activities in Indian country 
which will be found to be preempted only if the federal government, through statute, regula-
tion, or otherwise, has so occupied the field as to prevent state exercise of that inherent power,” 
turns “the original understanding of the Indian Commerce Clause on its head and takes federal 
Indian law back to the confederation period when states continued to assert claims of inherent 
sovereignty in Indian country.” Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1218.
399 Claiborne suggests that the:
[L]imitations and weaknesses of the traditional “pre-emption” and “infringement” 
tests, have led me back to the old idea of residual tribal sovereignty. The obvious 
advantages of this approach are: (1) that, as Wheeler stressed, to determine what pow-
ers remain, one does not look to see what Congress granted, but simply what has 
been taken, all else surviving; (2) that “sovereignty,” as opposed to self-government, 
necessarily implies some authority over a territory; and (3), that the same principle 
usually—although not always—decides both whether tribal authority exists and 
whether State authority is precluded.
Claiborne, supra note 11, at 595 (emphasis in original).
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a legislature will be the Court’s evaluation of the degree of infringement.400 In 
one fell swoop, Black transferred power to both the states and the courts that 
would decide when an “infringement” occurred.401
Post Williams v. Lee cases can now ask whether the challenged state action 
infringes on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be 
ruled by them. This is an amorphous, subjective test402 and one (with the 
benefit of hindsight) that has not favored the tribes.403 Unfortunately for the 
Indians, the “infringement” language has not been broadly interpreted404 and 
has devolved into a malleable balancing test,405 even though nothing in Wil-
liams v. Lee suggests such a test. Indeed, nothing in the case suggests that the 
interests of a state should be taken into account at all.406 But in McClanahan, 
discussed below, Justice Thurgood Marshall will describe Williams v. Lee as 
400 Some commentators would disagree with the characterization in the text. “Williams [v. 
Lee] was greeted as a watershed by advocates of the doctrine of inherent sovereignty. Not 
only did the Court implicitly acknowledge the inherent rights of tribes as being largely coex-
tensive with their territory, it stated explicitly that the fact the plaintiff was non-Indian was 
immaterial.” Gould, Consent, supra note 6, at 823; see Frickey, supra note 15, at 30; see also 
Dewi I. Ball, supra note 272 (“There is no question, the Williams [v. Lee] opinion revitalized 
the Indian sovereignty doctrine and the court’s reliance on the territorial sovereignty of the 
tribes.”); Getches, Conquering, supra note 14, at 1589 (“In its bellwether Williams [v. Lee] deci-
sion, the Court vindicated tribal sovereignty in a modern context.”). Williams v. Lee opened 
“the modern era of federal Indian law.” Wilkinson, supra note 7, at 1. 
401 This transfer of power, which will come to haunt the Indians, makes it difficult to applaud 
the case as vindicating “tribal sovereignty in a modern context—a debt collection case brought 
by a non-Indian merchant against tribal members.” Getches, Conquering, supra note 14, at 
1589. “[S]tates could play a role in the Indian country that Worcester said was extraterrito-
rial to them. The Court had put itself in position to encourage and sanction state forays into 
Indian country.” Ball, John Marshall, supra note 193, at 1187. 
Professor Frickey is kinder to Black. “Black blended the decisions of the Marshall Court and 
the institutional sensitivity of the traditional constructs with the path of subsequent federal 
Indian law.” Frickey, Common Law, supra note 15, at 29.
402 “The most noteworthy thing about the infringement test is how little guidance it gives to 
courts trying to apply it.” Laurence, Indian Commerce Clause, supra note 349, at 242.
403 In no tax case has the infringement argument prevailed, no matter how devastating the 
effect of a state tax might be on a tribe’s economy.
404 Writing around 1998, Claiborne expressed skepticism about the usefulness of the 
Williams v. Lee test:
The so-called ‘infringement’ test is equally vulnerable. The very term ‘self-government’ 
suggests tribal authority only over members. Indeed, there is language in Wheeler 
suggesting as much. So understood, it is very difficult to argue that regulating or 
taxing non-Indians who are merely buying from or selling to Indians is an aspect of 
self-government, or that State regulation and taxation of such non-Indian activities 
infringes ‘the right of the Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.’ It is 
even more difficult to rely on the right of self-government to explain tribal regulation 
of land use by non-Indian residents of a Reservation who have no dealings with the 
Indians. 
Claiborne, supra note 11, at 594 (emphasis in original).
405 See, e.g., Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 457–58 (1995). 
406 Judge Canby suggests that “[i]n theory, at least, [the Williams v. Lee test] precludes state 
interference with tribal self-government no matter how important the state’s interest may be. 
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summarizing a line of cases illustrating that “notions of Indian sovereignty 
have been adjusted to take account of the State’s legitimate interests in regulat-
ing the affairs of non-Indians.”407 This language invited a balancing approach 
in future cases, an invitation which the Court has found irresistible.408 
3.  An Alternative Opinion
What is puzzling is why Justice Black even framed the question the way he 
did. he endorsed the principle that “the States have no power to regulate the 
affairs of Indians on a reservation.”409 Although he cited nothing in support of 
this statement, it is consistent with the Indian Commerce Clause410 and with 
It still clearly precludes the exercise of state adjudicatory jurisdiction over reservation-based 
claims against tribal members.” Canby, supra note 3, at 287. 
407 411 U.S. 164, 171. McClanahan is discussed infra notes 519–591 and accompanying 
text.
408 While the final score is not in, the Indians would appear to have paid dearly for the 
balancing test. Professor Gould reminds us that Williams v. Lee involved “only a minor civil 
matter initiated in state court by a non-Indian.” L. Scott Gould, The Consent Paradigm: Tribal 
Sovereignty at the Millennium, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 810, 839 (1996). Of course, no one can 
predict the damage that might have come from a decision against the Lees.
409 Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1954).
410 The text assumes that Justice Black was using “affairs” as synonymous with “commerce.” 
The case involved a commercial transaction so that “commerce” was involved. For a discussion 
of the meaning of “commerce” and “affairs” see supra note 163.
Professor Clinton describes Williams v. Lee as “[p]erhaps the broadest statement of a dor-
mant commerce clause test before the doctrine came under attack during the 1970s.” Clinton, 
Dormant, supra note 22, at 1184. “[C]areful analysis of the [Williams v. Lee] opinion indicates 
that [Black] offered a dormant Indian Commerce Clause analysis, albeit without directly citing 
the Indian Commerce Clause, which temporarily fell into disuse by the Court after Kagama.” 
Id. at 1185–86. “[T]he facts of [Williams v. Lee], which involved a non-Indian federally licensed 
trader, fairly indicated that the Court thought the scope of its infringement test was coexten-
sive with the scope of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine announced in Worcester.” Id. at 
1186–87. “Since dormant Commerce Clause analyses primarily operate ‘absent governing Acts 
of Congress,’ the Williams infringement test, while not clearly announced and labeled as an 
Indian Commerce Clause test, is best understood in this light.” Id. at 1186. Professor Clinton 
concludes “[t]he broad claim of an exclusive federal authority in Indian affairs asserted in 
Worcester had been transformed into the infringement test of Williams v. Lee.” Id. at 1186. 
The holding in Williams v. Lee is consistent with the results of a dormant commerce clause 
analysis, which will usually be true whenever the Court rules against the state. Nonetheless, 
careful analysis or not, it is hard to see how Black was offering a dormant Indian Commerce 
Clause analysis. First, Black never mentioned that Clause by name. There was a fleeting refer-
ence to it by citation, and that occurred in an irrelevant footnote. 358 U.S. at 219 n.4. The 
Clause was hardly informing Black’s thinking. Second, the Indian Commerce Clause would 
prohibit state legislation adversely impacting on commerce, without any inquiry into whether 
that infringed on the right of Indians to make their own law and be ruled by them. Professor 
Clinton recognizes this latter point. “If, as argued above, the Williams v. Lee test is to be seen 
as the modern incarnation of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, the acceptance of the 
notion that states ‘could protect [their] interests’ in Indian country was fundamentally incon-
sistent with the doctrine.” Clinton, supra, at 1196. Third, in none of the history of the Clause 
that Professor Clinton so painstakingly assembles is there anything suggestive of the Williams 
v. Lee formulation. Fourth, if the Indian Commerce Clause were viewed as granting Congress 
the exclusive powers over Indian affairs, which is Professor Clinton’s view, why would the 
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Worcester. But if the States have no power to regulate the affairs of Indians on 
a reservation, why does it matter whether or not such regulation infringes on 
the rights of Indians to make their own laws?411
One can only imagine what Chief Justice John Marshall would have thought 
of states being able to project their laws onto the reservation provided they do 
not violate a court-made, open-ended “infringement” test. Worcester did not 
evaluate whether Georgia’s laws infringed on the Cherokees’ right to make 
their own laws and be ruled by them (although given their draconian reach 
Court even reach the infringement test? If Arizona violated the Indian Commerce Clause by 
asserting jurisdiction over a commercial transaction occurring on the reservation, the ques-
tion would not be phrased as whether the State’s action infringed on the right of the Indians. 
The action by the State must be legitimate before it can be evaluated as an “infringement.” If 
the state action violates the Indian Commerce Clause, it is unconstitutional ab initio without 
reaching the infringement test. If the states have no power to regulate the commercial affairs 
of Indians on a reservation absent permission from Congress, which did not exist in Williams 
v. Lee (Arizona turned down Congress’s invitation under Public Law 280 to assert jurisdiction 
over the reservation), an Indian Commerce Clause analysis would have ended there. 
If the Indian Commerce Clause is interpreted more like the Interstate Commerce Clause, 
the “infringement” language still cannot be justified. The Interstate Commerce Clause has 
been interpreted to adopt a balancing test, yet nothing in the infringement formulation sug-
gests a role for balancing the interests of a state. The balancing test had yet to emerge at the 
time of Williams v. Lee.
Professor Laurence, however, also thinks Williams involved the Indian Commerce Clause. 
“Once it is recognized that the Williams [v. Lee] test is whether a state has acted ‘within its 
province’, and therefore a dormant commerce clause inquiry, one may look to the more sub-
stantial body of law under the interstate commerce clause for analytical guidance.” Laurence, 
Indian Commerce Clause, supra note 349, at 243. 
For the reasons suggested above, I would reject this characterization. Writing in 1981, 
Professor Laurence thought that 
the Indians’ right “to make their own laws and be ruled by them” probably should 
be seen as tipping the scale towards invalidity of the state regulation. In other words, 
the dormant Indian commerce clause presumes the invalidity of state regulation of 
reservation activity, and the burden is on the state to justify the intrusion into Indian 
activity. 
Id. at 243–44. The post-1981 cases have rejected this suggestion.
411 See supra note 410; Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 74. 
Justice Black apparently thought that Worcester did not control because it had been nar-
rowed, and he was unwilling (or unable) to reinstitute Chief Justice Marshall’s more absolutist 
teachings. But cf. Anderson, supra note 208, at 398:
[A]lthough the Court acknowledged that the holding in Worcester had been diluted 
by McBratney, which provides that the state has exclusive jurisdiction if a non-Indian 
victimizes another non-Indian in Indian country, it nonetheless treated Worcester as 
the most important precedent in federal Indian law. It tried to make sense of Worcester 
in the modern era by developing a test: the state may not assert authority in Indian 
country if that would infringe on the right of reservation Indians to make their own 
laws and be governed by them. 
As subsequent cases illustrate, the modern era has left very little of the teachings of Worcester 
(or of the Indian Commerce Clause’s constraint on state taxation).
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the Court did not need to make such a determination).412 “States could [now] 
play a role in Indian country that Worcester said was extraterritorial to them. 
The Court had put itself in position to encourage and sanction state forays 
into Indian country.”413
In fairness to Black, he was writing during the termination era and Indian 
law scholars and Indian sympathizers feared for the worst. As a leading case-
book states, “one might have expected the Court to authorize state court 
jurisdiction. Indeed, lower court decisions in the first half of the twentieth 
century typically ratified state power in Indian country, reasoning either 
that tribal sovereignty was a dated notion or that express federal action was 
required to oust state jurisdiction.”414 If that is the frame of reference, the 
opinion is a relief because things could have been far worse—a classical glass 
half full rather than half empty opinion. And perhaps it was too late in the 
day to rehabilitate Worcester, especially if a unanimous opinion was the goal. 
But even assuming those constraints, Black could have relied on three nar-
rower grounds in rejecting Arizona’s jurisdiction, any of which would have 
avoided the infringement language. 
First, the 1868 treaty415 establishing part of the Navajo reservation as 
“set[ting] apart” for “their permanent home” a portion of what had been their 
native country, and provided that no one, except United States Government 
personnel, was to enter the reserved area. Implicit in these treaty terms, as it 
was in the treaties with the Cherokees involved in Worcester v. Georgia, was 
the understanding that the internal affairs of the Indians remained exclusively 
within the jurisdiction of whatever tribal government existed.416 
412 The text suggests a third possible defect in Justice Black’s formulation. The statement that 
the “question has always been whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation 
Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them,” cannot be taken seriously if the word 
“always” is to be taken seriously. Chief Justice Marshall never analyzed whether Georgia’s law 
infringed on the right of the Cherokees to make their own laws and instead provided a bright 
line test that prohibited Georgia from projecting its laws onto Indian country. Nothing in the 
opinion suggests that Chief Justice Marshall would have upheld less sweeping Georgia laws. 
The same Chief Justice Marshall, who repelled Georgia’s attempt to project its laws onto the 
Cherokees, would likely have denied jurisdiction to Georgia under facts similar to Williams 
v. Lee.
413 Ball, John Marshall, supra note 193, at 1187.
414 Anderson, supra note 208, at 396.
415 Professor Berger describes the treaty as “sacred to the Navajo people; its signing marked 
the release of the tribe from their confinement at Fort Sumter in Bosque Redondo, New 
Mexico, and the guarantee that they would never again be forced from their homeland.” 
Bethany Berger, Williams v. Lee and the Debate Over Indian Inequality, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 
(forthcoming 2010). 
416 Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 221–22 (1959) (emphasis added). The Court also stated 
that “when Congress has wished the States to exercise [jurisdiction] it has expressly granted 
them the jurisdiction which Worcester v. Georgia had denied.” Id. at 221. Professor Milner 
Ball challenges Congress’s power to delegate jurisdiction to the states. “Worcester said Indian 
country was extraterritorial to the states. Black does not explain how this bar is overcome.” 
Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 73.
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Justice Black referred to this treaty but it is unclear whether he intended it 
as an independent ground for the decision. 
It is immaterial that respondent is not an Indian. he was on the Reservation 
and the transaction with an Indian took place there. The cases in this Court 
have consistently guarded the authority of Indian governments over their 
reservations. Congress recognized this authority in the Navajos in the Treaty 
of 1868, and has done so ever since. If this power is to be taken away from 
them, it is for Congress to do it.417 
The Treaty left no room for a state official to “enter the reserved area.” 
Applying the favorable Indian canons of construction, the sale of the goods 
on the reservation would qualify as an “internal affair” of the Navajos. Given 
this reading, the treaty did not entertain Black’s formulation that a state could 
legislate up to the point where its actions infringe on the right of reservation 
Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them. The language of the 
Treaty itself could be read to deny Arizona jurisdiction.
A second ground for the opinion could have been Arizona’s refusal to 
assume jurisdiction over the reservation pursuant to P. L. 280,418 “if the State 
Legislature or the people vote affirmatively to accept such responsibility.”419 
Arizona had not done this, presumably because it would then have had the 
cost of running the schools on the reservation and providing police protec-
tion and the like. Arizona wanted it both ways: civil jurisdiction without the 
attendant costs.420 
A final ground for a decision could have been the Indian Commerce 
Clause, which the Court never discussed.421 The opinion makes only a pass-
417 Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. at 223.
418 Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 590 (1953) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 1151, 1162, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1360 (2006)). Public Law 280 was an example of 
“when Congress has wished the States to exercise this power [of jurisdiction] it has expressly 
granted them the jurisdiction which Worcester v. Georgia had denied.” Williams v. Lee, 358 
U.S. at 221. Professor Clinton views the Williams v. Lee holding as resting in part on P. L. 280. 
Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1185.
419 Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. at 222.
420 “To date, Arizona has not accepted jurisdiction, possibly because the people of the State 
anticipate that the burdens accompanying such power might be considerable.” Id. at 222–23. 
The Arizona Enabling Act contains a disclaimer of jurisdiction over Indian lands. Sec. 20, 36 
Stat. 569, which is replicated in the Arizona constitution, Ariz. Const. art. XX, § 4. The 
Court would later hold that P. L. 280 jurisdiction did not extend to state taxes. See Bryan v. 
Itasca Cnty., Minnesota, 426 U.S. 373, 379–80 (1976). Professor Frickey agrees that P. L. 
280 “raised a negative inference about congressional intent to allow state courts to exercise 
jurisdiction.” Frickey, Common Law, supra note 15, at 33. But a “negative inference concerning 
state power is not nearly as probative of the extent of tribal sovereignty as direct congressional 
authorization of tribal authority, of course.” Id. Given how little the Williams v. Lee formula-
tion has mattered in tax cases, supporters of the Indians probably would have been happier had 
Black relied more heavily on the negative inference.
421 In Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 
(1980), infra notes 740–915 and accompanying text, the Tribes’ Brief described Williams v. 
Lee as holding “that while the broadest reaches of [Worcester] have been qualified by subse-
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ing reference to the Indian Commerce Clause in an irrelevant footnote and 
only by citation. “The Federal Government’s power over Indians is derived 
from Art. I, Sec. 8, cl.3, of the . . . Constitution . . . and from the necessity 
of giving uniform protection to a dependent people [citing Kagama with no 
page reference].”422 
The Court thus had three grounds for rejecting Arizona’s jurisdiction: the 
1868 treaty, Arizona’s refusal to assume jurisdiction under P. L. 280, and the 
Indian Commerce Clause. Any of these approaches, alone or in combina-
tion, would have avoided the infringement language without further eroding 
the pre- and extra-constitutional sovereignty doctrine. Perhaps Black rejected 
these more narrow approaches in favor of what he saw as a broader and more 
far-reaching protection for the Indians. If so, he would be disappointed by 
subsequent events—Williams v. Lee would turn out to offer none of that pro-
tection.423 “The tribe won Williams v. Lee, but the statement of the standard by 
quent cases, the negative implications of the Indian Commerce Clause are still intact, at least 
when ‘essential tribal relations’ are involved.” Brief of Appellee Indian Tribes, supra note 108, 
at *15. The reference to “essential tribal relations” might have been an attempt in the context 
of litigation to put the best spin on the precedent, but nothing in the history of the Indian 
Commerce Clause suggests this qualification. The Tribes also argued that Williams v. Lee “pre-
served the preemptive effect of the Commerce Clause as interpreted in Worcester, at least in 
cases where self-government was involved.” Brief of Appellee Indian Tribes at 141, Washington 
v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 44 U.S. 134 (1980) (No. 78-630) 1979 
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1818, at *141. Presumably the Brief was referring to the Indian 
Commerce Clause and not the Interstate Commerce Clause. For my responses to the argu-
ment that Williams v. Lee was a Dormant Indian Commerce Clause case, see supra note 410.
422 Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. at 220 n.4. Professor Barsh describes the last part of the quoted 
language as a “condescending nineteenth-century theory the Court need not have endorsed.” 
Barsh, Omen, supra note 15, at 60 n.37.
The footnote’s reference to Kagama, 118 U.S. at 375, is puzzling given Black’s sympathies 
for the Indians. Why would he cite one of the most demeaning cases for a proposition that 
was not even critical to the case? What function the footnote was serving is unclear because the 
case did not involve a challenge to the power of the federal government. And of course Kagama 
rejected the Indian Commerce Clause as the source of Congressional power for enacting the 
Major Crimes Act. In addition, if the essence of Kagama is that the Indians must be protected 
from the states, why does Congress have the power to grant civil jurisdiction to the states? See 
Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 73.
Marston and Fink describe Williams v. Lee as based on the
so-called Indian sovereignty doctrine, which limits state authority over Indians 
and their land by virtue of the quasi-sovereign status of Indian tribes. Under this 
approach, state laws are generally not applicable in Indian country unless Congress, 
in the exercise of its plenary power under the Indian commerce clause, expressly 
provides that state law will apply.
Marston & Fink, supra note 136, at 211. The holding in Williams v. Lee, however, seems 
opposite of their description. Congress does not have to expressly provide that state law applies; 
state law applies unless it infringes on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws 
and be ruled by them.
423 The Court has subsequently rejected the infringement argument in all of the subsequent 
tax cases discussed in this Article.
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which this victory was achieved was to prove inimical to tribal protection.”424 
The Court would henceforth be the arbiter of what state action infringed 
upon the Indians’ right of self-government. Worcester had been displaced. In 
the hands of an ally like Justice Black, the threat to Indian sovereignty was 
minimal, but other justices would soon prove to be less protective.
B.  Preemption and the Indian Trader Cases
1.  Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Commission
The modern era of Supreme Court Indian-state tax jurisprudence begins in 
1965 with Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Commission.425 The Court 
confronted the issue of whether Arizona could levy its generally applicable, 
non-discriminatory, 2% tax on the “gross proceeds of sales, or gross income” 
of a retail trading business on the Navajo Indian reservation.426 The retailer 
was licensed under the Indian Trader statutes.427 
424 Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 72.
425 380 U.S. 685 (1965). The Trading Post was located at Kayenta on the Navajo Reservation 
on lands leased from the Tribe. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, Warren Trading Post Co. v. Ariz. 
State Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965) (No. 115), at 5. 
Professor Taylor adds a useful context:
By 1796, the federal government entered the Indian trade directly and authorized 
the establishment of federally owned and operated trading posts. The purpose of this 
strategy was twofold. First, Congress believed that it could reduce friction on the 
boundaries between Indian and non-Indian territories if federal traders charged fair 
prices and extended reasonable credit. Second, the extension of credit created debts 
that could later be extinguished through land cessions negotiated in treaties. It was 
fairly obvious to Congress and to the Washington administration that this method-
ology for securing territorial concessions might be cheaper than direct payment or 
military action. Indeed, the method was successful and ended a few decades later 
only when private Indian traders prevailed upon Congress to discontinue the system. 
Private traders felt that the federal traders were unfair competition and effectively 
prevented them from making a fair return on their investments. 
Taylor, Framework, supra note 23, at 851–52. 
426 Arizona imposed the tax on “every person engaging or continuing within this state in the 
business of selling any tangible personal property at retail.” Warren Trading Post Co., 380 at 
686 n.1 (quoting Ariz. Rev. Stat. Sec. 42-1312 (1956) (repealed 1988)). The tax functions as a 
retail sales tax and is known as a vendor-based sales tax. Walter hellerstein, Michael McIntyre 
& Richard D. Pomp, Commerce Clause Restraints on State Taxation after Jefferson Lines, 51 Tax 
Law Rev. 47, 92–93 (1995). The Court incorrectly described the taxpayer as “claim[ing] that 
as applied to its income from trading with reservation Indians on the reservation the state tax 
was invalid.” Warren Trading Post Co., 380 U.S. at 686 (emphasis added).
Arizona imposed its tax on the vendor but the analysis should be the same even had the tax 
been imposed on the consumer, which is the way many sales taxes are structured. had the tax 
been imposed on the consumer, an Indian purchaser might have also been protected under 
McClanahan, supra notes 519–91 and accompanying text. See also Moe, infra notes 654–739 
and accompanying text; Colville, infra notes 740–915 and accompanying text.
427 Warren Trading Post Co., 380 U.S. at 685–86. The Supreme Court opinion is silent on 
whether the trading post was owned by Indians. Presumably, this issue was irrelevant to the 
holding. The Indian Trader statutes make it irrelevant whether the vendor is an Indian or non-
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Until 1956, the Arizona tax, adopted in 1935, was never applied to licensed 
Indian traders.428 In 1956, the Arizona Tax Commission adopted a regulation 
providing that any person operating a trading post on the Indian reservation 
was “subject to the tax levied upon retail sales” and that such tax shall be paid 
“on gross proceeds of sales made to Indians residing on the reservation as well 
as off the reservation.”429
Of special significance for this Article, Warren Trading argued that the tax 
violated the Indian Commerce Clause.430 It also charged that the tax was 
inconsistent with the Indian Trader statutes. These challenges were limited 
to sales made on the reservation to reservation Indians.431 Warren Trading 
was not challenging the taxation of sales to non-Indians, presumably because 
this latter group was insignificant and as a litigating matter, not worth the 
risk of diverting the Court’s focus. In addition, such a position would have 
Indian. The relevant inquiry is whether the purchaser is an Indian. See infra notes 730–31, 
781–87 and accompanying text.
According to my colleague, Professor Berger, “the licensed traders were among the very few 
non-Indians living in Navajo country (the others being [Bureau of Indian Affairs] employees 
and missionaries). The Navajos were dependent on the traders for the purchase of their neces-
sities and for the sale of their wools, rugs and jewelry. The traders were also intermediaries 
between largely illiterate communities having no mailing addresses and government agencies 
and distant relatives. In addition, they also functioned as financial intermediaries, cashing 
checks from railroad employers and pension boards. Navajos purchased many goods on credit 
and sold their products to the traders for credit. The traders performed a necessary service 
and were proud of their contributions, but their monopoly power also led to abuse as they 
sometimes took advantage of the Navajos. In 1948, the Navajo Council started leasing trading 
posts for a share of gross sales and limiting the mark-ups that traders could impose on goods.” 
Berger, supra note 379.
Although the Commissioner of Indian Affairs had power under the Indian Trader statutes 
to set prices on the reservation, I can find no record of his ever having done so. 
428 Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant (July 
1964) at 3. The Arizona tax was levied upon Warren Trading’s retail sales starting on November 
1, 1956. After Arizona reversed itself and started levying the tax, California and New Mexico 
followed suit. Brief of Appellant at 15, Warren Trading Post Co. v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n., 
380 U.S. 685 (1965) (No. 115).
429 Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, Warren Trading Post Co. v. Ariz. Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 
685 (1965) (No. 115), at 5.
430 Warren Trading Post Co., 380 U.S. at 686. Warren Trading sought a declaratory judgment 
that the assessment was unconstitutional. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 429 at 2. 
The Superior Court for Maricopa County granted summary judgment in favor of the Tax 
Commission and the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed. Id. The State Supreme Court held 
that State laws apply to the extent they do not conflict with federal Indian laws. Id. In Central 
Machinery, 448 U.S. at 160, infra notes 469–518 and accompanying text, which also involved 
the same Indian Trader statutes discussed in Warren Trading, the United States Government, 
as amicus curiae, argued that the Indian Commerce Clause of its own force preempted the 
Arizona tax. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, 1979 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1414, 
at *12. See infra notes 517–18 and accompanying text.
431 Warren Trading Post Co., 380 U.S. at 686 n.1. The Court did not define “reservation 
Indians,” but presumably it meant Navajos living on the reservation. For a discussion, see 
Pirtle, et al., supra note 19, at 48–52.
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been inconsistent with the language of the statutes, which deals with sales to 
Indians and not non-Indians.
a.  Interference with the Federal Regulatory Scheme 
Justice Black, writing for a unanimous Court, emphasized the long history 
behind the Indian Trader statutes, which originated in 1790.432 These statutes 
provided the Commissioner of Indian Affairs with the sole power and author-
ity to appoint traders to the Indian tribes and to specify the kind and quantity 
of goods and prices at which such goods could be sold to the Indians.433 Pur-
suant to these statutes, the Commissioner promulgated comprehensive and 
detailed regulations 
prescribing in the most minute fashion who may qualify to be a trader and 
how he shall be licensed; penalties for acting as a trader without a license; 
conditions under which government employees may trade with Indians; 
articles that cannot be sold to Indians; and conduct forbidden on a licensed 
trader’s premises.434 
432 Act of July 22, 1790, entitled “An Act to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indian 
tribes,” and the subsequent laws based on it, established key elements of the federal govern-
ment’s Indian policy: the regulation of trade with the Indians; prohibition of purchases of 
Indian lands, punishing non-Indians committing crimes and trespasses against the Indians, 
limiting trade to persons licensed by the government and complying with federal regulations. 
Cohen’s handbook, supra note 7, at 37–38. “With that Act, the legislators gave a practi-
cal and contemporaneous construction to the constitutional clause granting to Congress ‘the 
power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes.’” Id. at 37. Control of Indian affairs, origi-
nally in the War Department, was transferred to the Interior Department in 1849. Professor 
Ansson reports that the Act prohibited the sale of land by any Indians within the United States 
to any person or state, except when done through a treaty under federal authority. Richard J. 
Ansson, Jr., State Taxation of Non-Indians Whom Do Business With Indian Tribes: Why Several 
Recent Ninth Circuit Holdings Reemphasize The Need For Indian Tribes To Enter Into Taxation 
Compacts With Their Respective State, 78 Or. L. Rev. 501, 505 (1999). The current embodi-
ment of the Indian Trader statutes, 25 U.S.C. § 261 et seq., empowers the President to: forbid 
the introduction of goods into the territory of a tribe, to revoke and refuse licenses to trade 
with a tribe, establish penalties for trading without a license, and forbid traders to hire white 
persons as clerks unless licensed to do so. For the regulations under the Indian Trader statutes, 
see 25 CFR § 251.9 et seq. See also 18 U.S.C. § 3113, forbidding introduction of liquor into 
Indian country and providing for revocation of the license of a trader violating this prohibi-
tion. 
433 Warren Trading Post Co., 380 U.S. at 689. Section 261 provides that the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs shall have the sole power to make such rules and regulations as he may deem just 
and proper specifying the prices at which goods are sold to the Indians. 25 U.S.C. § 261. 
434 Warren Trading Post Co., 380 U.S. at 689. Professor Taylor describes the Indian Trader 
statutes as paternalistic and resented by many Indians and their supporters as reflecting the 
guardian/ward relationship [which] places the federal government in the role of pro-
tector and the tribal members in a subordinated position requiring protection. By 
contrast, an analysis that includes considerations of tribal sovereignty places needed 
emphasis on the simple fact that a tribe is a government within the federal system and 
that its governmental integrity is worthy of consideration and encouragement. 
Taylor, Framework, supra note 23, at 862.
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Justice Black concluded:
These apparently all-inclusive regulations and the statutes authorizing them 
would seem in themselves sufficient to show that Congress has taken the 
business of Indian trading on reservations so fully in hand that no room 
remains for state laws imposing additional burdens upon traders. In fact, 
the Solicitor’s Office of the Department of the Interior in 1940 and again in 
1943 interpreted these statutes to bar States from taxing federally licensed 
traders on their sales to reservation Indians on a reservation. We think those 
rulings were correct.435
Justice Black’s opinion reads like a straightforward preemption analysis.436 
435 380 U.S. at 690. In 57 I.D. 124 at 125, the Department of the Interior ruled that 
[t]he regulation of trade with Indian tribes is one of the powers expressly delegated to 
Congress by section 8 of Article I of the United States Constitution. U.S. Const. art. 
I § 8. Congress has exercised this power in statutes restricting trade with the Indians 
and giving exclusive authority to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to regulate such 
trade and the prices at which goods shall be sold to the Indians . . . Where Congress 
has exercised its authority it is axiomatic that the field is closed to State action.
Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant (July 1964), 
supra note 428, at 6. According to the Government, until the Arizona courts ruled differently, 
the position of the Department of the Interior was universally respected. Id. In Warren Trading, 
there was no evidence the Commissioner had regulated prices on the reservation.
436 Under a traditional preemption analysis (developed outside the context of Indian law), 
a court examines the statutory language, its purposes, and the legislative history to determine 
congressional intent. State law is preempted if it “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment 
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” hines v. Davidowitz, 312 
U.S. 52, 67 (1941). In general, a state tax is presumptively legitimate. The Court has warned, 
however, that concepts of preemption developed in other contexts do not automatically apply 
in Indian cases. See infra notes 936, 991 and accompanying text. That would be especially 
true of the presumption that a state tax is legitimate. For a general discussion, see Stephen M. 
Feldman, Preemption and the Dormant Commerce Clause: Implications for Federal Indian Law, 
64 Or. L. Rev. 667, 678–87 (1986).
Writing generally, and not in the context of Indian tax cases, Professor Tribe has described 
the Court as dividing its preemption analysis into three categories: express preemption, where 
Congress has indicated that state regulations were precluded; implicit preemption, where 
Congress has by implication precluded a certain kind of state regulation; and conflict pre-
emption, where Congress did not necessarily focus on preemption of state regulations at all, 
but where the particular state law conflicts directly with federal law. Tribe, supra note 292, at 
1176–77. Warren Trading could be described as either conflict or implicit preemption.
Despite the tone and structure of the Warren Trading analysis, the Court initially did not 
view itself as engaging in a preemption analysis. Just eight years after the decision, the Court 
described Warren Trading as 
no doubt, influenced by the federal licensing requirements, [but] the reasoning . . . 
cannot be so restricted. The Court invalidated Arizona’s tax in part because “Congress 
has, since the creation of the Navajo Reservation nearly a century ago, left the Indians 
on it largely free to run the reservation and its affairs without state control, a policy 
which has automatically relieved Arizona of all burdens for carrying on those same 
responsibilities.” 
McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 171 n.6 (1973), discussed infra notes 
519–91 and accompanying text. This broader approach seems to emphasize the sovereignty 
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The comprehensive, all-inclusive, detailed regulations occupied the field437 
and preempted the State tax.438 Congress had “undertaken to regulate reserva-
tion trading in such a comprehensive way that there is no room for the States 
to legislate on the subject.”439 
Justice Black, however, never explained why the Arizona tax, which was tan-
tamount to a nondiscriminatory sales tax,440 would interfere with the federal 
statutory scheme.441 Justice Black implicitly defined the “field” to encompass 
prices on the reservation, which Congress had provided the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs with the sole power and authority “to specify.”442 The sales tax 
would interfere with this power and authority by affecting prices, and thus 
was preempted.443 
of the Indians and the illegitimacy of Arizona’s claim for revenue because it provided nothing 
for which it could exact a quid pro quo. The existence of any Indian Trader statutes would be 
irrelevant under this view, so no preemption argument would apply. But the lack of state ser-
vices could have been viewed by the Court in a preemption analysis as a reason why Congress 
occupied the field. 
By 1980, however, the Court began citing Warren Trading as an example of when a state law 
“may be pre-empted by federal law,” White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 
142 (1980), and held that “[o]ur decision today is based on the preemptive effect of the com-
prehensive federal regulatory scheme, which, like that in [Warren Trading], leaves no room for the 
additional burdens sought to be imposed by state law.” 448 U.S. at 151 n.15 (emphasis added). 
See also infra note 955 and accompanying text.
Professor Jensen refers to Warren Trading as “the first great Indian law preemption case,” 
Jensen, supra note 9, at 69. he does not comment on Black’s failure to use that term, or on the 
comments in McClanahan, supra.
437 “[F]ield pre-emption may be understood as a species of conflict pre-emption: a state law 
that falls within a pre-empted field conflicts with Congress’s intent (either express or plainly 
implied) to exclude state regulation.” English v. General Electric, 496 U.S. 72, 79 n.5 (1990); 
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947). But compare Tribe, supra note 436.
438 Professor Milner S. Ball views Justice Black as adopting the preemption theory he had 
suggested in Williams v. Lee. Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 101. Why Williams v. Lee 
should be read as suggesting a preemption theory is unclear. The Court did not rely on any 
federal statute to preempt State jurisdiction.
439 Warren Trading Post Co., 380 U.S. at 692 n.18.
440 See hellerstein, McIntyre & Pomp, supra note 426, at 92–93.
441 Justice Black did not address one of the key arguments relied on by the Arizona courts 
below. The Arizona Superior Court, citing Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898), discussed 
supra notes 354–75 and accompanying text, saw no difference between a state being able to 
tax “stock in trade devoted to sale to Indians . . . and taxing the privilege of selling such stock, 
insofar as the rules against non-interference with governmental functions are concerned.” Brief 
of Petitioner-Appellant at 8, Warren Trading Post Co. v. Ariz. Tax Comm’n, (1965) (No. 115)
(describing the reasoning of the Arizona Superior Court, which was affirmed by the Arizona 
Supreme Court). The dissenting opinion by the Arizona Supreme Court would have struck the 
tax under the Indian Commerce Clause. Id.
442 Warren Trading Post Co., 380 U.S. at 688–89.
443 The Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant stated 
the issue as whether “the State’s attempt to tax Indian traders selling to Indians on the reserva-
tion is invalid because Congress has occupied the field by adoption of a comprehensive system 
of statutes regulating such commerce.” Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, 
supra note 428, at 4. The government also raised the fear that if the tax were upheld other 
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The Commissioner, however, had never exercised that power.444 The inter-
ference was more of a theoretical possibility than a real one—an interference 
with the possible exercise of this power in the future. Another Justice might 
have argued that the Commissioner’s unexercised delegation of power meant 
that there was no “plan” for the sales tax to disturb, but Justice Black was one 
of the Indians’ protectors on the Court.445 And as a practical matter, if the tax 
were to be preempted should the Commissioner engage in price controls in 
the future, the Court might as well clear the way now, rather than waiting for 
the Commissioner to actually act.
The Court’s analysis was independent of the economic effects of the sales 
tax (or its preemption). It was enough for Justice Black that the Arizona tax 
“would put financial burdens on [the vendor] or the Indians with whom it 
deals in addition to those Congress or the tribes have prescribed, and could 
thereby disturb and disarrange the statutory plan Congress set up in order to 
protect Indians against prices deemed unfair or unreasonable by the Indian 
Commissioner.”446
b.  Inapplicability of the Indian Commerce Clause 
Black’s approach made it unnecessary to deal with Warren Trading’s Indian 
Commerce Clause argument or the similar argument made by the government 
as amicus curiae.447 Even if no Indian Commerce Clause existed (assuming 
states would follow, which would have a “material effect upon the economic status of the tribes 
which has long been a matter of great federal concern.” Id. at 8.
444 The lack of any serious control over Indian traders led to a class action suit requesting 
that the Secretary of the Interior promulgate regulations governing the traders. Rockbridge v. 
Lincoln, 449 F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 1971) (holding that the district court had jurisdiction to hear 
the case). The suit alleged that the trading posts had monopolies that allowed the vendors to 
charge unduly high prices for inferior products, and to charge any rate of interest. 
445 Professor Jensen views the case as “clearly the product of a Court much more tribal-
friendly than the current one.” Jensen, supra note 9, at 70 n.412.
446 Warren Trading Post Co., 380 U.S. at 691.
447 Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 429, at 8–10. Warren Trading argued, inter alia, 
that just the way a state cannot tax interstate commerce, it cannot tax commerce with Indians. 
The former proposition, however, was overruled in Complete Auto v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 
(1977), which sets forth the constitutional conditions under which a state can tax interstate 
commerce. Even before Complete Auto, however, the doctrine that a state could not tax inter-
state commerce had been whittled away and reduced to formalistic distinctions. See id. Warren 
Trading also cited United States v. Holliday, supra note 171, for the proposition that the phrase 
“Commerce with the Indian Tribes” includes commerce with individual members of those 
tribes. 
The United States in its amicus brief made a similar Indian Commerce Clause argument. 
“[I]t is beyond question that the Constitution forbids a State from imposing a tax upon 
the privilege or right to engage in interstate commerce. Since the Commerce Clause grants 
Congress the same authority over commerce with the Indian tribes as over commerce among 
the several States . . . it similarly prohibits a State from taxing the right to engage in com-
merce with those tribes.” Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Appellant (July 1964), supra note 428, at 4, Warren Trading Post Co. v. Ariz. Tax Comm’n, 
380 U.S. 685 (1965) (No. 115). The United States cited Spector Motor Service v. O’Connor, 
340 U.S. 602 (1951), for the proposition that the Constitution “delegated to the United States 
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other constitutional authority permitted Congress to adopt the Indian Trader 
statutes),448 the Court’s preemption analysis would have remained unchanged 
because it was based on the Supremacy Clause.449 In other words, the pre-
emption analysis would have been dispositive even if there were no Indian 
Commerce Clause. 
On the other hand, if no Indian Trader statutes existed, the Court would 
have had to confront the Indian Commerce Clause argument. The argument 
would then have been that the Clause, on its own, prohibited any state reg-
ulation or tax from applying to on-reservation commercial transactions.450 
In addition to the Indian Commerce Clause, two other possible arguments 
would have been that the tax violated Worcester’s pre- and extra-constitutional 
the exclusive power to tax the privilege to engage in interstate commerce.” Id. The Arizona tax 
was a “transaction privilege tax,” levied on the vendor and not the purchaser, which facilitated 
an argument based on Spector. Spector, however, was subsequently overruled by Complete Auto, 
supra. 
The United States also argued that “even if the Commerce Clause were not an exclusive 
delegation of power in this area, Arizona’s attempt to tax Indian traders selling to reservation 
Indians would be invalid because Congress has occupied this field and left no room for the 
action taken by the State.” Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support 
of Appellant (July 1964), supra note 428, at 4. Warren Trading made a similar argument. Brief 
for Appellant, supra note 400, at 10–11. Black’s opinion is consistent with this part of the 
Government’s Memorandum and Warren Trading’s brief.
The Papago Tribe in its amicus brief argued that the Indian Commerce Clause preempted 
the Arizona sales tax in the first instance so that the issue of the Indian Trader statutes should 
be irrelevant. Brief of the Papago Tribe as Amicus Curiae at 2, Warren Trading Post Co. v. 
Arizona Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965) (No. 115). Analytically, this is a fundamental 
point that Black does not address. (The Papago Tribe is now known as the Tohono O’odham 
Nation. See infra note 453.) 
448 The Indian Commerce Clause is presumably the source of Congress’s power to pass the 
Indian Trader statutes.
449 Professor Clinton argues that there “is no federal supremacy clause for Indian tribes and 
that any federal legislative activity that might affect Indian tribes or their lands requires their 
formal consent, through treaty or analogous procedure.” Clinton, Supremacy, supra note 7, at 
118.
450 Professor Taylor cites Warren Trading for the proposition that “[s]tates, in contrast [to 
Congress] have virtually no power over Indian affairs unless Congress grants it to them.” 380 
U.S. at 687 n.3. Taylor, Framework, supra note 23, at 862. The footnote relied on by Taylor 
reads “[c]ertain state laws have been permitted to apply to activities on Indian reservations, 
where those laws are specifically authorized by acts of Congress, or where they clearly do not 
interfere with federal policies concerning the reservations.” 380 U.S. at 687 n.3 (citing inter alia 
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898), Utah & N. Ry. 
Co. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28 (1885)) (emphasis added). Whether “states have virtually no power 
over Indian affairs unless Congress grants it to them” depends on how a Court interprets the 
italicized language, supra. Also, the structure of a preemption argument is that a state has the 
power it is exercising unless prohibited by federal law, which is contrary to Professor Taylor’s 
reading.
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sovereignty doctrine,451 or that it failed the Williams v. Lee test452 (which 
Black also authored). Because of the Indian Trader statutes, however, the case 
lent itself to a straightforward preemption type of analysis and the Com-
merce Clause, Worcester/sovereignty, and Williams v. Lee arguments would 
await another day.453
c.  Arizona’s Right of Taxation 
Justice Black never had to answer the fundamental question of whether Ari-
zona had the right to levy a sales tax in the first instance. Whether Black 
intended it or not, the implicit structure of his argument was that Arizona 
had the right to levy a sales tax unless Congress prohibited it. That approach 
could be read as consistent with Williams v. Lee on the assumption that a state 
sales tax would not infringe on the right of the Navajos to make their own 
laws and be ruled by them. If Black did not mean to endorse this proposition, 
however, it would have been more cautious and agnostic if he had explicitly 
issued the classic caveat that “assuming for the sake of argument,” that Ari-
zona had the right to levy a sales tax, it would nonetheless conflict with the 
Indian Trader statutes. That caveat would preserve the possibility that if there 
were no Indian Trader statutes, the Indian Commerce Clause would have to 
be confronted.
451 Justice Black cited Worcester essentially for the proposition that the federal government 
permitted the Indians largely to govern themselves free from state interference and had exer-
cised a sweeping and dominant control over persons who wished to trade with Indians. Warren 
Trading Post Co., 380 U.S. at 687–88. Worcester was cited more in support of the preemption 
argument than in establishing the sovereignty of the Indians as an independent ground for the 
Court’s holding. 
452 A Williams v. Lee argument would have proceeded along the lines that the Arizona sales 
tax made it less likely that the Tribe could impose its own sales tax in the future, but if it did, 
less revenue would be raised than if the State had no sales tax. This reduction in tribal revenue 
would have secondary and tertiary effects on governance. See infra note 453.
453 The United States filed a brief as amicus curiae in support of Warren Trading in July 
1964. Memorandum for the United States, supra note 428. In December 1964, the United 
States filed a second memorandum, arguing that Williams v. Lee provided an additional and 
sufficient ground for ruling in favor of Warren Trading. Memorandum for the United States, 
Warren Trading Post Co. v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 685 (Dec. 1964)(No. 115). 
“Indian self-government cannot be a meaningful enterprise if the power of the tribe to tax 
transactions with Indians on the reservation is drained by duplicate State taxation of the very 
same transactions.” Id. at 3. See supra note 452.
Although the Navajos had no sales tax, the Papago Tribe had enacted a 3% privilege tax on 
the gross receipts from sales made on its reservation. See Brief of the Papago, supra note 447, 
at 1. The government’s reference to “duplicate taxation” might have been a reference to the 
Papago tax. 
In reviewing a draft of this Article, Professor Fletcher alerted me that the Tribe is now 
known as the Tohono O’odham Nation. According to the Tribe’s home page, the name change 
occurred in 1986. http://www.tonation-nsn.gov/great_seal.aspx. Papago means “bean people,” 
http://www.accessgenealogy.com/native/tribes/pima/papagoindianhist.htm, and is apparently 
derogatory. 
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d.  Lack of State Services 
Justice Black made an additional argument in Warren Trading that could be 
read as reinforcing the preemption analysis, but one that also had a due pro-
cess flavor (although he did not cite that clause), suggesting Arizona could 
not impose the tax at all. he emphasized that the federal government—
and not Arizona—provided roads, education, and other services needed by 
the Indians.454 “[S]ince federal legislation has left the State with no duties 
or responsibilities respecting the reservation Indians, we cannot believe that 
Congress intended to leave to the State the privilege of levying this tax.”455 In 
short, Arizona provided nothing on the reservation for which it could ask a 
tax in return.456 
On one hand, under a preemption analysis Congress could be viewed as 
taking the lack of services into account when it passed the Indian Trader 
statutes, making it clear that a state did not have the right to impose a sales 
tax in the first instance. On the other hand, the way Justice Black phrased 
the issue is consistent with a Due Process Clause analysis,457 which would be 
independent of a preemption argument458 (or an Indian Commerce Clause 
argument). As Justice Frankfurter formulated the test (albeit not in a case 
involving the Indians):
454 Justice Black described the Navajo Reservation as being set apart as a “permanent home” 
for the Navajos in a treaty made with the “Navajo nation or tribe of Indians” on June 1, 
1868. Warren Trading Post Co., 380 U.S. at 686. Notwithstanding the minor role this reference 
played, Justice Marshall in McClanahan described Warren Trading as “this Court [interpret-
ing] the Navajo treaty to preclude extension of state law—including state tax law—to Indians 
on the Navajo Reservation.” McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164, 175 
(1973).
455 Warren Trading Post Co., 380 U.S. at 691. By contrast, in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. 
United States, 319 U.S. 598 (1943), upholding a state estate tax on restricted Indian personal 
property, Justice Black stressed that “Oklahoma supplies for [the Indians] and their children 
schools, roads, courts, police protection, and all the other benefits of an ordered society.” Id. at 
608–09. he also found little effective tribal government. Id. at 603.
456 In its amicus brief, the Papago tribe made a similar argument. See Brief of the Papago 
Tribe as Amicus Curiae, supra note 447, at 10.
457 Justice Black never cited the Due Process Clause, which makes it hard to characterize 
that Clause as an independent ground for the holding in Warren Trading. In White Mountain, 
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Stewart and Rehnquist in dissent, suggested that if a state 
provided no services to a taxpayer, the Due Process Clause might prohibit the levying of a 
tax. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 158 (1980) discussed infra note 
874.
One commentator reports that Stewart made an extemporaneous comment during a visit 
to Boalt Law School to the effect that any case the Court decides in Indian law is stillborn and 
has no precedential value. Robert S. Pelcyger, Justices and Indians: Back to Basics, 62 Or. L. 
Rev. 29, 31 (1983).
458 In Central Machinery, discussed infra note 481–493 and accompanying text, Justice 
Stewart in dissent assumed that Black’s argument was a second independent ground for the 
decision. See Cent. Mach. Co. v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 448 U.S. 160, 168 (1980) (Stewart, 
J., dissenting).
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A state is free to pursue its own fiscal policies, unembarrassed by the 
Constitution, if by the practical operation of a tax the state has exerted its 
power in relation to opportunities which it has given, to protection which 
it has afforded, to benefits which it has conferred by the fact of being an 
orderly, civilized society.459
That test is whether property was taken without due process of law, or, if 
paraphrase we must, whether the taxing power exerted by the state bears 
fiscal relation to protection, opportunities and benefits given by the state. 
The simple but controlling question is whether the state has given anything 
for which it can ask return.460 
Arizona provided no opportunities, protection, or benefits to the reserva-
tion. “Congress has, since the creation of the Navajo Reservation nearly a 
century ago, left the Indians on it largely free to run the reservation and its 
affairs without state control, a policy which has automatically relieved Ari-
zona of all burdens for carrying on those same responsibilities.”461 Arizona 
provided nothing for which it could exact a tax as a quid pro quo and Justice 
Black might have viewed the State’s attempt to raise money from activities on 
the reservation as illegitimate and unjustified, an argument that would apply 
regardless of the existence of the Indian Trader statutes.
The inherent weakness with this type of argument is the amorphous nature 
of government-provided benefits, opportunities, and protections. Arizona 
provided services that inured, at least indirectly, to the Navajos. Both Warren 
Trading and the Indians were the joint beneficiaries of the State’s roads that 
connected to the reservation, which facilitated the delivery of inventory to 
the retailer for sale to its Indian customers.462 Arizona also provided police 
and fire protection to persons and property traveling on those roads. More 
fundamentally, the Court has come to require very little of a state under the 
Due Process Clause. Police and fire protection, the benefit of a trained work 
force, and the advantages of a civilized society will suffice.463 Nonetheless, as 
Justice Black’s comments suggest, the equities were on the side of the Indians 
because Arizona provided them with no direct services. 
459 Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney, 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940).
460 Id.
461 Warren Trading Post Co., 380 U.S. at 690.
462 The state-maintained roads would also facilitate access to the reservation by potential 
non-Indian customers. The issue before the Court, however, was limited to the taxation of sales 
made to Indians. Apparently the federal government provided the roads on the reservation 
and not the State. Id. One often cited state benefit is the provision of a judicial system, which 
facilitates commercial activities. But as Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), held, Arizona 
courts would have no jurisdiction over suits arising from sales by Warren Trading to reservation 
Indians, at least if the State had not assumed civil jurisdiction under P. L. 280. See supra note 
418–20 and accompanying text.
463 Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cnty. of L.A., 441 U.S. 434, 445 (1979). 
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e.  Tribal Sales Taxes and Double Taxation 
In Warren Trading, the Navajos did not have their own tribal sales tax, although 
the Arizona Papago Tribe did.464 Warren Trading argued that the combined 
imposition of the Papago tax and the Arizona tax would “discourage qualified 
persons from being traders on the Papago Reservation, or discourage com-
merce among the Papagos, or necessitate the repeal of the Papago tax to lessen 
the commercial burden.”465 The holding in Warren Trading would ensure that 
no double taxation would result should a tribe impose its own sales tax on 
reservation sales to Indians. Only a state tax would be prohibited. As will be 
seen, however, Warren Trading has no bearing on the double taxation that 
would result from sales to non-Indians466 (or even from sales to Indians who 
are not members of the tribe imposing the tax).467 Consequently, for these 
purchasers the Court will allow the simultaneous imposition of tribal and 
state sales taxes (with no credit or other relief to mitigate the double taxation), 
despite the devastating effect this might have on a tribal economy.468
464 See supra notes 447, 453. One of the oldest tribal taxes was imposed by the Muscogee 
Indians in 1857. Sharon O’Brien, American Indian Tribal Governments 232 (1989). 
That tax appears to be a personal property tax, levied on all goods offered for sale, at the rate 
of one percent.
465 Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 429, at 15. This point would also be the basis of 
a Williams v. Lee argument. See supra notes 376–424 and accompanying text. 
This argument assumes that a tribal tax would not be inconsistent with the Indian Trader 
statutes. Black’s opinion, however, although limited to the Arizona sales tax, could be read 
as suggesting that a tribal sales tax would also be precluded by the Indian Trader statutes. If 
Congress intended that the Commissioner should have the freedom to control prices on the 
reservation, then a tribal tax, just as much as a state tax, could disturb and disarrange the statu-
tory plan Congress had set up in order to protect the Indians against prices deemed unfair or 
unreasonable. In other words, the Indian Trader statutes would protect Indian purchasers from 
the actions of their tribe, as well as those of the State. 
The Indian Trader statutes, however, allow the governing body of an Indian reservation 
[to] assess from a trader such fees, etc. as it may deem appropriate.” Warren Trading Post Co., 
380 U.S. at 689. Black also stated in referring to the Arizona tax that 
[t]his state tax on gross income would put financial burdens on appellant or the 
Indians with whom it deals in addition to those . . . the tribes have prescribed, and 
could thereby disturb and disarrange the statutory plan Congress set up in order to 
protect Indians against prices deemed unfair or unreasonable by the Indian.
Id. (emphasis added). Together, these references would seem to support a tribal sales tax.
466 Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 482 (1976), discussed 
infra notes 654–739 and accompanying text.
467 Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 
155–56 (1980), discussed infra notes 740−915 and accompanying text.
468 But see infra notes 890–93, 909–10, 1315–17, 1349–55 and accompanying text. 
01-Pomp.indd   1017 12/23/2010   11:03:38 AM
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2443846
1018 SECTION OF TAXATION
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 63, No. 4
2.  Central Machinery v. Arizona State Tax Commission
Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona State Tax Commission,469 authored by Justice 
Marshall,470 involved the same Arizona sales tax and Indian Trader statutes at 
issue in Warren Trading. Despite losing Warren Trading, Arizona now sought 
to tax the on-reservation sale of eleven farm tractors to the Gila River Tribe 
by an off-reservation corporation.471 
Warren Trading had already held that the Indian Trader statutes preempted 
the Arizona sales tax. The issue in Central Machinery was whether its fact pat-
tern fell within the statute. If it did, the sales tax would be preempted under 
Warren Trading.
a.  Differences with Warren Trading 
Two differences with Warren Trading were that: (1) the vendor in Central 
Machinery did not have a permanent place of business on the reservation; 
and (2) it was not licensed to engage in trade with Indians on the reservation 
under the Indian Trader statutes.472 The Arizona Supreme Court found these 
differences sufficient to uphold the tax.473 Justice Marshall, by contrast, found 
them irrelevant and applied Warren Trading to strike down the Arizona sales 
tax. 
The Court was properly untroubled that Central Machinery had not 
obtained a license under the Indian Trader statutes and had no permanent 
place of business on the reservation. The statute and the regulations required 
Central Machinery to obtain a license. The statute made it a crime for “[any] 
person . . . to introduce goods, or to trade without a license” in Indian coun-
469 Cent. Mach. Co. v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980).
470 Dean Getches describes Marshall as “something of a specialist in Indian law, and his col-
leagues seemed glad for his leadership, content to let him perform an unpopular duty.” Getches, 
Conquering, supra note 14, at 1653. Dean Getches describes Justices Marshall, Brennan, and 
Blackmun as generally “loyal to the tradition of respecting tribal rights and sovereignty as 
subject only to congressional modification. Justice Marshall and Brennan wrote a dispropor-
tionately large number of the key Indian decisions of the modern era, including about a third 
of all Indian decisions between 1973 and 1983. Justice Blackmun usually joined with Marshall 
and Brennan on sovereignty-related cases.” Getches, Conquering, supra note 14, at 1630–31. 
See generally Robert Laurence, Thurgood Marshall’s Indian Law Opinions, 27 how. L. J. 3, 61 
(1984) [hereinafter Laurence, Thurgood Marshall]; Rebecca Tsosie, Separate Sovereigns, Civil 
Rights, and the Sacred Text: The Legacy of Justice Thurgood Marshall’s Indian Law Jurisprudence, 
26 Ariz. St. L. J. 495 (1994).
471 Central Machinery, 448 U.S. at 161. The sale was made to Gila River Farms, an enter-
prise of the Gila River Indian Tribe. The vendor paid the tax to Arizona under protest. It was 
stipulated that Central Machinery would pay any refund to Gila River Farms. Id. at 162 n.2. 
The Court cited Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. at 157 n.13, for the proposition that 
it is irrelevant whether a sale was made to a tribal enterprise rather than to a tribe. Central 
Machinery, 448 U.S. at 164 n.3.
472 Id. at 161. 
473 Id. at 164.
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try474 and a regulation provided for the licensing of “itinerant peddlers.”475 
Furthermore, the purpose of the statute—to prevent fraud on the Indi-
ans476—would be easily circumvented if a vendor could eliminate the pro-
tections intended by the Indian Trader statutes simply by not obtaining a 
license,477 or by not having a permanent place of business on the reserva-
tion.478 In addition, a vendor that failed either condition should not be able 
to capitalize on that fact to bring itself outside the purview and regulatory 
regime of the statute.479 
Justice Marshall had no problem concluding that the sale of the tractors 
occurred on the reservation because that was the place where: the sale was 
solicited, the contract was executed, and delivery and payment were made.480 
474 Id. at 165 (emphasis added).
475 Id. (emphasis added). In the early days of the country, itinerant peddlers were the rule 
rather than the exception. Persons licensed to trade with the Indians would often bring goods 
onto the reservation, exchange them for furs, and leave. Prucha, Policy, supra note 60, at 
66–71, 85.
476 h.R. Rep. No. 474, 23d Cong., 1st Sess., 11 (1834), stated that the purpose of the 
Indian Trader statutes was to prevent the Indians from being defrauded. Central Machinery, 
448 U.S. at 163. Despite this purpose of the statute and the language of the Indian Trader 
statutes, Professor Taylor argues that a state personal income tax should also be preempted, 
the same as a sales tax. his argument is based more on policy considerations than on statutory 
construction. Taylor, Framework, supra note 23, at 891–94.
477 Curiously, the sale of tractors was approved by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, notwith-
standing the lack of a license. Central Machinery, 448 U.S. at 165 n.4. Professor Taylor states 
that the Court “acknowledged that no federal law enforcement officials seemed to care that 
such transactions were commonplace,” Taylor, Framework, supra note 23, at 864. In support of 
that proposition, Professor Taylor cites Central Machinery, 448 U.S. at 165 “[i]t is the existence 
of the Indian Trader statutes, then, and not their administration, that pre-empts the field of 
transactions with Indians occurring on reservations,” which does not provide the support for 
which it is cited. See Taylor, supra, at 864 n. 174.
The Bureau also approved the tribal budget, which allocated money for the sale. Central 
Machinery, 448 U.S. at 165 n.4. Apparently the Bureau either thought no license was required 
or was indifferent about whether one was. The Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae 
states without any citation that “in practice no ‘license’ is issued for a single transaction.” Brief 
for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Cent. Mach. Co. v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n 1979 U.S. 
S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1414, at *7. Justice Marshall acknowledged that the Bureau had approved 
the contract of sale and tribal budget but did not respond to the argument that that approval 
could be read as de facto approval of the Arizona sales tax.
478 Central Machinery, 448 U.S. at 165.
479 On the other hand, a vendor might wish to be covered by the statute in order to have a 
sale exempted from a state sales tax under Warren Trading. In any event, the statute should not 
be elective based on the desires of the vendor.
480 Central Machinery, 448 U.S. at 161, 165. In Warren Trading, the sale obviously took place 
on the reservation and the Court never even mentioned this issue. 
The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) is not overly concerned with where a sale takes 
place. Nonetheless, the UCC defines a sale as the “passing of title from the seller to the buyer 
for a price.” UCC Sec. 2-106. “Unless otherwise explicitly agreed title passes to the buyer at the 
time and place at which the seller completes performance with reference to the delivery of the 
goods.” UCC Sec. 2-401(2). Consequently, if title passes on the reservation, the UCC would 
support an argument that a sale occurred there.
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In essence, Marshall applied the holding in Warren Trading to anyone selling 
on a reservation, whether or not licensed, and whether or not the sale was 
a one-time event. Justice Marshall had no need under the facts of Central 
Machinery to define what constitutes a sale on the reservation.
b.  Stewart’s Dissent 
i.  Marshall Misapplied Warren Trading. Justice Stewart dissented, 
joined by Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens. Justice Stewart agreed that 
Warren Trading stated the correct principles but disagreed about their applica-
tion. “The question . . . is not whether the appellant may be required to have 
a license, but . . . whether the state tax ‘runs afoul of any congressional enact-
ments’ dealing with the affairs of reservation Indians . . .”481 Before answering 
this question, Stewart articulated the two grounds of Warren Trading. First, 
the Arizona tax in Warren Trading could disturb and disarrange the statutory 
plan Congress had set up in order to protect the Indians against prices deemed 
unfair or unreasonable. Second, Arizona had no responsibility for servicing 
the reservation and thus no right to levy a tax.482 Justice Stewart then con-
cluded that neither of these conditions was satisfied in Central Machinery.
ii.  The Sale Was Isolated and Occasional. Stewart emphasized the iso-
lated nature of the sale of tractors and contrasted it with the continuous trad-
ing that existed in Warren Trading. In the latter case, “the financial burdens 
of state taxation would have impaired the Commissioner’s ability to prescribe 
‘the kind and quantity of goods and the prices at which such goods shall be 
sold to the Indians,’ 25 U.S.C. Sec. 261, and might have threatened the very 
existence of the resident trader’s enterprise, on which the tribe depended for 
its essential commerce.”483 Because the sale of the tractors was an isolated 
transaction, it posed no risk of “jeopardiz[ing] those federal and tribal inter-
ests involved in the thorough regulation of on-reservation merchants trading 
continuously with the Indians—the situation dealt with in Warren Trading 
Post.”484 Moreover, the “reasonableness of the terms of sale may be guaran-
teed, as they were in this case, by the Commissioner’s review of them.”485
Stewart’s description of Warren Trading is a tad hyperbolic486 because the 
Commissioner had never exercised his power to set prices either before or 
after that case. Moreover, nothing in that case suggested that if the Arizona 
tax were upheld, the existence of the trading post would be threatened, thus 
jeopardizing the Navajos.
481 Central Machinery, 448 U.S. at 167 (Stewart, J. dissenting).
482 Id. at 168. Justice Stewart implicitly assumed that Justice Black’s discussion of Arizona 
not having the right to tax because it provided no services was a second independent ground 
for the decision and not part of the preemption argument. See supra note 458 and accompany-
ing text. 
483 Central Machinery, 448 at 169.
484 Id. 
485 Id. (emphasis added).
486 Ironically, Justice Stewart accused Marshall of being hyperbolic when he concluded that 
there was “no room” for the Arizona sales tax. Id.
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Justice Stewart’s emphasis on the “occasional” or “isolated” nature of the 
transaction was both inconsistent with the regulatory scheme and with the 
goal of the statute. First, nothing in the statute required that a trader be 
engaged in a continuous course of selling. To the contrary, the regulations 
issued under the statute specifically anticipated the existence of “itinerant 
peddlers” and required them to obtain a license.487 The regulations did not 
define an “itinerant peddler” but presumably encompassed persons without 
a permanent place of business, the very sort who were likely to make isolated 
or occasional sales on the reservation. 
Second, given that the goal of the statute was to protect the Indians from 
being defrauded, it should be irrelevant whether a transaction was occasional, 
isolated, or continuous. Indeed, the likelihood of fraud might be even higher 
in the case of an isolated sale where the vendor might not care about any 
ongoing business relationship.
Finally, the relevance of an “isolated” sale is not apparent. A one-time sale 
might be so significant in dollar amount that it dwarfs whatever else might 
occur on the reservation during the rest of the year. To take an extreme exam-
ple, suppose there was a one-time sale of an airplane for $25 million. That 
this might be a one-time, isolated sale would be irrelevant in terms of the 
potential for fraud. 
Even assuming less extreme facts, transactions in subsequent years might 
show that an earlier transaction was not isolated. If in subsequent years, for 
example, Central Machinery sold other farming equipment to the Tribe, the 
earlier sale of the tractors, with the benefit of hindsight, would not appear to 
be “isolated.”488 
For Justice Stewart, the question of a license was irrelevant. Indeed, Justice 
Stewart could have viewed the Bureau of Indian Affairs as having granted a 
de facto license to Central Machinery without that characterization changing 
his analysis. his view was that not all sales on the reservation, even by trad-
ers licensed under the statute, fell within Warren Trading. That a vendor was 
licensed did not automatically mean that the Arizona sales tax was invalid 
if the sale was an isolated transaction. Warren Trading had no application 
to Central Machinery because the transaction was isolated and the Commis-
sioner of Indian Affairs had approved the sales price, including the tax. In 
contrast, for Justice Marshall it was enough that the sale “took place” on the 
reservation.
iii.  Arizona Provided No Services. With respect to the second ratio-
nale of Warren Trading—that Arizona had no responsibility for servicing the 
reservation and thus no right to levy a tax—Justice Stewart emphasized that 
Central Machinery did business throughout Arizona and derived substantial 
benefits from State services provided at the taxpayer’s expense. “Thus, quite 
487 Bureau of Indian Affairs Rules on Financial Activities, 25 C.F.R. § 140.9(b)(2010).
488 At the time the tax consequences of the earlier sale were being litigated, the events in the 
subsequent years might not have yet occurred. Even if they had, whether those events could be 
introduced in the litigation over the earlier years would depend on a state’s rules of evidence.
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unlike the circumstances in Warren Trading, the State in this case has not 
been relieved of all duties or responsibilities respecting the business it would 
tax.”489 he scolded the majority for not following the “settled teaching of 
the Court’s [Indian law] decisions . . . that every relevant state interest is 
to be given weight,”490 and that “limits inherent in the principles of federal 
preemption . . . [require] a careful inquiry into pertinent federal, tribal, and 
state interests, without which a rational accommodation of those interests is 
not possible.”491 While subsequent cases will require this type of inquiry,492 
describing that approach as “settled teaching” at this point in time as part of 
a preemption analysis was a bit of a stretch.
These statements, however, were irrelevant to the second rationale of War-
ren Trading. To be sure, Warren Trading’s only business was on the reser-
vation whereas Central Machinery’s business was based off the reservation. 
The relevant question, however, was not whether Arizona was relieved of 
all duties and responsibilities respecting Central Machinery, “the business it 
would tax,”493 but rather was it relieved of duties and responsibilities on the 
reservation. Justice Stewart never answered that question. Furthermore, it was 
inconsistent for him to have stressed the isolated nature of the sale, while 
simultaneously stressing the State’s “legitimate governmental interest in rais-
ing revenues.” If the sale was isolated, then little weight should be given to the 
State’s inability to tax it. More generally, a state will typically have an interest 
in raising revenue from a tax. If too much weight is placed on this interest, 
the analysis will be unfairly biased in favor of a state.
Finally, Justice Stewart did not explain why Arizona’s revenue interests 
would not be properly protected by its ability to tax Central Machinery’s off-
reservation sales under its sales tax, or to tax its profits from those sales under 
the State’s corporate income tax. At stake was only the sales tax on an isolated 
transaction. 
489 Central Machinery, 448 U.S. at 170 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
490 Id. at 170 (citing Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 
447 U.S. 134, 157 (1980), discussed infra notes 740–915 and accompanying text; White 
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 144 (1980), discussed infra notes 916–84 
and accompanying text; McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973), dis-
cussed infra notes 519–91 and accompanying text).
491 Id.
492 See, e.g., Dep’t of Taxation & Fin. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., 512 U.S. 61, 73 (1994) (“If 
the balance of federal, state, and tribal interests favors the State, and federal law is not to the 
contrary, the State may impose its levy [Colville] and may place on a tribe or tribal members 
‘minimal burdens’ in collecting the toll.”); Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 
450, 459 (1995). For an insightful discussion of Milhelm Attea, see Sarah Krakoff, Undoing 
Indian Law One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism and Tribal Sovereignty, 50 Am. U. L. Rev. 
1177, 1239–40 (2001). In Stewart’s defense, he was probably relying on language in White 
Mountain, a companion case to Central Machinery, infra notes 967–68, and accompanying 
text.
493 Central Machinery, 448 U.S. at 170 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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c.  Powell’s Dissent 
Justice Powell, writing only for himself in dissent, argued that recent cases 
undermined the notion that the Indian Trader statutes preempted all state 
regulation (apparently a reference to the Arizona sales tax).494 The two cases 
he cited, however, Moe495 and Colville,496 dealt, inter alia, with sales to non-
Indians, who are not covered by the Indian Trader statutes.497
i.  The BIA Approved the Sale. Powell also echoed Justice Stewart’s 
argument that because the Bureau of Indian affairs approved all aspects of 
the sale, and that the contract price included costs attributable to the Arizona 
sales tax, “there is no danger that ordinary state business taxes upon the seller 
will impair the Bureau’s ability to prevent fraudulent or excessive pricing. To 
hold the seller immune from state taxes otherwise due upon a single trans-
action with the Indians gives the non-Indian seller a windfall or the Indian 
buyer an unwarranted advantage over all others who deal with the seller.”498 
ii.  Was the Commissioner Aware He Was Approving the Arizona Sales 
Tax? What is clear is that Central Machinery added the amount of the tax 
to the price of the tractors499 and that unlike Warren Trading, the Commis-
sioner of Indian Affairs reviewed the contract price.500 What is unclear from 
all of the opinions, however, was whether the Commissioner of Indian Affairs 
was even aware that the contract price he approved included the Arizona 
sales tax. If he were indeed unaware, then it would be reasonable to apply 
Warren Trading to preempt the Arizona tax. This would preserve his abil-
ity to impose price controls in the future.501 But if the Commissioner were 
aware that he was approving the sales tax, the tax could hardly be described as 
“disturb[ing] and disarrang[ing] the statutory plan Congress set up in order 
to protect Indians against prices deemed unfair or unreasonable by the Indian 
Commissioner.”502 
494 Id. at 172 (Powell, J., dissenting). he also drew a distinction between the scope of the reg-
ulations that apply to those making continuous sales on the reservation, like Warren Trading, 
and those making a single sale, like Central Machinery. Id. at 171–72. he distinguished Warren 
Trading as dealing with the former and not the latter.
495 Moe v. Confederate Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976). See infra notes 
654–739 and accompanying text.
496 Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
See infra notes 740–915 and accompanying text.
497 See infra notes 725, 786.
498 Central Machinery, 448 U.S. at 173 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
499 Id. at 162.
500 Id. at 169. Justice Powell in dissent stated that “[s]ince a seller not licensed to trade 
with the Indians must secure specific federal approval for each isolated transaction, there is 
no danger that ordinary state business taxes upon the seller will impair the Bureau’s ability to 
prevent fraudulent or excessive pricing.” Id. at 173. The “approval” is apparently a reference 
to 25 U.S.C. §§ 262, 264 (2009), see Central Machinery, 448 U.S. at 171, which refers to the 
approval needed to trade with the Indians, but does not require that the Bureau approve the 
price of any specific or particular transaction.
501 See discussion supra notes 440–45.
502 Warren Trading Post Co. v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 685, 691 (1965).
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Justice Marshall asserted that the Bureau approved the contract of sale 
and the tribal budget, which allocated money for the purchase,503 but never 
opined on whether the tax was explicitly stated. Justice Stewart stated that 
“the reasonableness of the terms of sale may be guaranteed . . . by the Com-
missioner’s review of them.”504 What Justice Stewart never says, however, 
is whether the tax was explicitly stated so that the Commissioner could be 
viewed as having actually approved it. Justice Powell noted that the contract 
price was approved by the Bureau and included the tax,505 but again did not 
discuss whether it was separately stated. Rather surprisingly, an issue critical 
to the dissent was never addressed.
The Commissioner was an executive branch employee. No one in the dis-
sent addressed how the actions of the executive branch could overrule the 
intent of the legislative branch. In other words, assuming arguendo that Con-
gress intended that no state sales tax be imposed on the sale of any goods to 
the Indians under the facts of Central Machinery, the executive branch could 
not act in a way inconsistent with that intent without raising a separation of 
powers issue. Under this view, whether the executive branch approved the 
Arizona sales tax or not would be irrelevant. 
d.  Implications of the Decision 
The decision in Central Machinery has two secondary effects. First, the opin-
ion eliminates the double taxation that otherwise would result should a tribe 
levy its own sales tax on the same transaction that a state seeks to tax.
Second, off-reservation vendors might now be encouraged to enter the res-
ervation to “solicit and execute the contract of sale and to receive payment,”506 
in order to sell without the sales tax, circumstances that Justice Stewart sug-
gested “are certain to characterize all sales to reservation Indians after today’s 
decision.”507 Although Justice Stewart offered this observation as a criticism 
of the majority, it is not clear why, if this were to occur, it should be criticized 
rather than lauded. True, the State will lose sales taxes, assuming that the 
transaction would have otherwise occurred off-reservation. But if the result of 
the decision is that the range of on-reservation goods and services increased, 
perhaps exerting downward pressure on prices, the Indians should benefit. 
While it is hard to imagine a Walmart or Lowe’s changing their business 
model in order to sell tax-free on the reservation, a vendor of goods of especial 
interest to the Indians might.508 
503 Central Machinery, 448 U.S. at 165 n.4.
504 Id. at 169 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
505 Id. at 173 (Powell, J., dissenting).
506 Id. at 170 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
507 Id.
508 On the downside, the possibility exists that a transaction having no nexus with the res-
ervation might be manipulated or “papered over” to justify a vendor’s failure to collect a sales 
tax. Professor Laurence, however, is skeptical that this tax avoidance would occur. “No attorney 
would be quite so quick to give a client such advice, for to do so probably will remove juris-
diction over disputes over the contract from the state court.” Laurence, Thurgood Marshall, 
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Most importantly, however, the combination of Warren Trading and Cen-
tral Machinery, makes it clear that the Indian Trader statutes apply to all sales 
on a reservation, whether continuous or isolated, and whether the vendor is 
licensed or unlicensed. Because of the sweeping holding of these cases (espe-
cially of Central Machinery, which would seem to swallow Warren Trading) 
and the rise of remote vendors (e.g., those selling over the Internet, through 
mail order catalogs, cable television, and 800 telephone calls), the issue of 
whether a sale takes place on- or off-reservation becomes critical.509 
The place of sale was not at issue in Warren Trading. That case involved a 
sale made at a store located on the reservation to an Indian. Presumably, all 
the relevant elements of the sale occurred on the reservation: solicitation, 
execution of the contract, passage of title, passage of risk, delivery, and pay-
ment. The sale could not have taken place anywhere else.
had all the elements of a sale occurred off the reservation, by contrast, 
the Indian Trader statutes would not have applied. For example, if an Indian 
purchased a good in downtown Phoenix, paid at the store, took possession 
there, and subsequently brought the item back to her home on the reserva-
tion, the Indian Trader statutes would be inapplicable.510 This off-reservation 
sale, and Warren Trading’s on-reservation sale, represent the polar points on a 
continuum between which numerous permutations are possible. 
In effect, Justice Marshall viewed Central Machinery as falling closer to the 
“on-reservation” end of the continuum. “Appellant’s salesman solicited the 
supra note 470, at 61. Two caveat are in order. First, the state may have jurisdiction, perhaps 
under Public Law 280. See supra notes 418–20 and accompanying text. Second, a seller that 
had received payment by cash or credit card might not care about this issue because it would 
have no need to sue the purchaser. On the other hand, a seller might care about jurisdiction 
over potential suits involving a warranty that it issued or alleged defects in the merchandise. 
For a discussion of whether Williams v. Lee prevents Indian plaintiffs from suing in the state 
courts, see Carole E. Goldberg, Rebecca Tsosie, Kevin K. Washburn, Elizabeth Rodke 
Washburn, American Indian Law: Native Nations and the Federal System 651 (6th 
ed. 2010).
509 Warren Trading and Central Machinery will strike down a sales tax only if it would other-
wise be applicable. A remote vendor must have nexus with the reservation (or with the state in 
which the reservation was located) in order to be required to collect that state’s sales or use tax. 
Under Quill v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992), that requirement has two components: 
due process nexus and commerce clause nexus. If either does not exist, a vendor would not 
have to collect any sales (or use) tax in the first place, regardless of Warren Trading and Central 
Machinery. For a discussion of Quill, see infra notes 710–74. Even if a vendor does not collect 
the sales or use tax, the purchaser is still nonetheless obligated to pay any applicable use tax. See 
Richard D. Pomp, State and Local Sales Taxation, ch.6 (6th ed. 2009).
510 The sale at the Phoenix store would not be covered by the statute’s precondition that 
a person “introduce goods, or to trade” without a license “in the Indian country, or on any 
Indian reservation.” 25 U.S.C. § 264 (2006). The Phoenix vendor would not be “introducing 
goods” on the reservation and not trading in Indian country or on any reservation. Professor 
Taylor claims that the opinion itself suggests that if a transaction occurred off-reservation, the 
Arizona sales tax would have then applied. he cites Central Machinery in support of that asser-
tion. 448 U.S. at 164 n.3. I do not find support in that citation for his proposition. Taylor, 
Framework, supra note 23, at 900.
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sale of these tractors on the reservation, the contract was made there, and pay-
ment for and delivery of the tractors also took place there.”511 “The contract of 
sale . . . was executed on the . . . [r]eservation, and delivery and payment were 
effected there.”512 Because no element of the sale apparently occurred at the 
vendor’s off-reservation location,513 Justice Marshall had no trouble conclud-
ing that the Indian Trader statutes applied. 
e.  Defining a Sale 
The opinion thus had no need to provide guidance about what constituted a 
reservation sale. Transactions with remote vendors, however, raise that very 
question.514 Ambiguity abounds on such basic issues such as where a contract 
is executed or where a payment is made (or even where delivery occurs in 
the case of downloaded intangible property). In a world of remote vendors 
and electronic commerce, situsing a sale can be more difficult than it was in 
either Warren Trading or Central Machinery, especially if intangible property 
is involved.
Whatever rules are developed should further the goal of the statute, which 
the Court stated was to protect the Indians from fraud.515 Internet web sites, 
mail order catalogs, off-reservation stores and the like that do not cater exclu-
sively, or even primarily, to the Indians do not raise the potential for fraud 
with which the statute is concerned. In contrast, activities specifically directed 
at the Indians, such as solicitation on the reservation, raise exactly that pos-
sibility. This difference suggests that in determining where a sale takes place 
great weight should be given to the nature of the solicitation.
Consider, for example, a catalog of goods marketed only to Indians. 
Assume the catalog is not distributed generally but is limited to Indian res-
ervations. Consistent with the goal of the Indian Trader statutes, which is to 
prevent fraud, a good ordered from such a catalog should be considered to be 
an on-reservation sale without pondering the niceties of where the contract 
was executed, where a credit card payment occurred, or where delivery took 
place. In other words, while the statute requires some connection with the 
reservation, the concept of where a sale takes place should be elastic enough 
to encompass situations that fall within the goal of protecting the Indians 
against fraud without any searing inquiry into the elements of a contract.516 
511 Central Machinery, 448 U.S. at 161.
512 Id. at 164.
513 Professor Taylor claims that “tribal representatives visited the off-reservation business 
location of the trader to view the farm machinery,” citing 448 U.S. 160, 161 in support of that 
statement. Taylor, Framework, supra note 23, at 899. I cannot find that support. 
514 See infra note 516 and accompanying text.
515 Central Machinery, 448 U.S. at 163.
516 Professor Taylor also recognizes the difficulty of situsing a sale but would resolve the issue 
by determining the place of destination. Professor Taylor argues that “the focus [should] be 
on the purchaser and the location of the use of the property. Central Machinery’s requirement 
of an on-reservation transaction could be satisfied if the purchaser is the Tribe or one of its 
members and if the property purchased is used wholly or primarily on the reservation.” Taylor, 
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The majority’s reference to place of execution, payment, and delivery should 
be viewed as merely descriptive and suggestive rather than prescriptive. That 
is, as a sufficient condition for finding an on-reservation sale but not a neces-
sary one.
f.  The Solicitor General and the Indian Commerce Clause 
The parties understandably argued the case in the context of Warren Trading. 
The Solicitor General, appearing amicus curiae on behalf of the taxpayer, did 
so as well.517 The Solicitor General also made an eloquent appeal to the Indian 
Commerce Clause:
No more than the Foreign Commerce Clause, the Indian Commerce Clause 
is not the exact counterpart of the Interstate Commerce Clause. Indeed, 
its purpose is, in many respects, very different. From the start, the Indian 
Commerce Clause was understood to authorize complete and absolute federal 
regulation of white-Indian relations of a kind and degree then unthinkable—
and even now not entirely familiar—in respect of non-Indian commerce 
Framework, supra note 23, at 900. I agree that this approach “would simplify things consider-
ably and dispense with a case-by-case analysis of every transaction” and the various facts involv-
ing its completion. Id. In many cases our two approaches would reach similar conclusions. 
My problem is that the focus on the purchaser, who must be an Indian for the statute to be 
triggered in the first instance, and the location of the use of the property have less to do with 
furthering the goal of the statute than does focusing on the nature of the solicitation. Professor 
Taylor’s formulation would also appear to reach goods bought off-reservation but delivered 
onto the reservation.
The problem of situsing a transaction is even more difficult in the case of a service, as state-
tax lawyers well appreciate. The Indian Trader statutes, drafted in an earlier era when manu-
facturing and mercantile activities dominated economic activity, covers “goods,” 25 U.S.C. §§ 
263–64 (2009), and merchandise, § 264, but not services. Moreover, the statute’s references 
to “trader,” “trade” or “trading,” §§ 262–64, anticipate the provision of a good or merchandise 
but not a service. Other provisions refer to horses, liquor, weapons, instruments of husbandry, 
articles of clothing, skins and furs, and cooking utensils, all examples of tangible personal 
property and reflecting the nature of the economy when the statutes were drafted. See Brief of 
the State of New Mexico, Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832 (1982) 
(No. 80-2162), 1982 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1165, at *51–52 [hereinafter Brief of the State 
of New Mexico]; see also United States ex rel. Keith v. Sioux Nation Shopping Ctr., 488 F. 
Supp. 496 (D.S.D. 1980); Palm Springs Spa, Inc. v. Cnty. of Riverside, 95 Cal. Rptr. 879 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1971).
Professor Taylor argues that “the statute itself, which, although it refers to goods, is broad 
enough to extend to the sale of services.” Taylor, Framework, supra note 23, at 902. Because the 
possibility of fraud is not limited to the sale of goods and can arise in the case of services, I agree 
with Professor Taylor about the need to cover that case; however, I am less sanguine that the 
statutory language is malleable or elastic enough to cover services despite the strong policy rea-
sons for doing so. Accord Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980) (No. 78-1177), 1979 U.S. S. 
Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1279, at *16 n.9. (“References to ‘goods’ in [the Indian Trader statutes] and 
the commonly accepted meaning of the term ‘trader,’ make it clear that sales of services are not 
governed by these provisions.”). But see Laguna Indus. v. New Mexico Taxation & Revenue 
Dep’t., 845 P.2d 167 (1992), aff’d, 855 P.2d 127 (1993).
517 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Cent. Mach. Co. v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 
448 U.S. 160 (1980) (No. 78-1604), 1979 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1414, at *5.
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between the States . . . [The Indian Commerce Clause] reserved to the 
national government exclusive authority—absent delegation—to regulate 
intercourse with the Indian tribes, so long as they maintained their separate 
organization within their own territory . . . We must remember that those 
who wrote the Indian Commerce Clause spoke of Indian ‘nations,’ with 
whom it was appropriate to execute treaties . . . But, as it happens, the 
specific history of the Indian Commerce Clause itself confirms its purpose 
to nationalize white-Indian relations and wholly to exclude State authority to 
regulate that intercourse.
Before the Constitution, there had been much vying between the States 
and the national Congress over authority to deal with the Indian tribes. The 
matter was ambiguously compromised in the Articles of Confederation, 
which, in Article IX, granted Congress “the sole and exclusive right and 
power of . . . regulating the trade and managing all affairs with the Indians,” 
but then exempted Indians who were “members of any of the States” and 
purported to preserve “the legislative right of any State within its own lim-
its.” As Madison wrote in The Federalist No. 42, that was an “endeavour 
to accomplish impossibilities.” he construed the new Indian Commerce 
Clause as resolving the dilemma by giving the national government exclu-
sive authority over intercourse with the Indian tribes, whether within the 
States or elsewhere. Ibid. Although it was not always followed in practice, 
Madison’s view, not surprisingly, has generally been accepted as sound con-
stitutional doctrine.
Indeed, during the ensuing century, this Court expressly asserted that “there 
can be no divided authority” between federal and State governments in 
Indian affairs. [The Kansas Indians]. And, after rehearing the history of the 
Indian Commerce Clause as intentionally altering the scheme of the Articles 
of Confederation the Court concluded that “Congress now has the exclusive 
and absolute power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes.” [United 
States v. Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey]. See, also, [United States v. Holliday]. 
Nor do we appreciate that the Court has retreated from that principle in 
more recent times.518 
518 Id. at *13–17 (emphasis added). The author of that brief was apparently Claiborne, see 
supra note 11, who also authored The Trend of Supreme Court Decisions in Indian Cases, supra 
note 11. Freed of the constraints of a brief, he elaborated in that article on his views of the 
Indian Commerce Clause: 
The Constitution expressly recognizes the separateness of Indian Tribes, as quasi-
sovereign political entities. As Chief Justice Marshall noted long ago, the Supremacy 
Clause impliedly recognizes Indian Tribes as distinct political communities by 
effectively ratifying and continuing in force “treaties heretofore made,” almost all  
which . . . would be appropriate. So, also, the Commerce Clause, in speaking of 
“commerce with the Indian tribes” as something different from “commerce between 
the States,” necessarily separates the Indian Tribes from the States. And, finally, the 
exclusion of “Indians not taxed” from the population on the basis of which a State’s 
Representatives are apportioned, makes it clear that Indians maintaining tribal 
relations, even though within the boundaries of a State, are separate and exempt 
from State jurisdiction. Significantly, this provision was repeated in the Fourteenth 
Amendment, ratified in 1868. . . . Taken together, I believe it fair to say that these 
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With Warren Trading as precedent, it was easy enough for the Court to 
ignore these arguments. The opinion makes no mention of the Solicitor Gen-
eral’s argument and never refers to the Indian Commerce Clause.
C.  The Distinction Between On- and Off-Reservation Activities
1.  McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission
Eight years after Warren Trading, the Indians won what would prove to be a 
costly victory in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission; costly because 
the Court gratuitously relegated Worcester to that of a “backdrop.”519 The issue 
was whether Arizona could levy its nondiscriminatory, personal income tax520 
provisions reflect a constitutional understanding, agreed to by the original States for 
themselves and all future States to be admitted on an equal (and no more advanta-
geous) footing, that the Indian Tribes and their remaining territory were separate 
sovereignties, off limits to State intervention . . . I also believe there is a constitutional 
basis for the special rule—not accounted for by recognition that Indian Tribes are 
“sovereign” within their Reservations—to the effect that, in some circumstances at 
least, non-Indians trading with Indians in Indian country are exempted from regu-
lation and taxation by their State. This requires a finding that Tribes are under the 
special protection of the United States. I believe such a rule can be derived from the 
Indian Commerce Clause. That Clause, of its own force, arguably precludes State 
interference with white–Indian intercourse, until and unless Congress otherwise pro-
vides. . . . To be sure, this is not obvious on the face of the constitutional text. But it 
is familiar history that the Indian Commerce Clause was intended to eliminate the 
divided authority between the Nation and the States which was apparently condoned 
by the Articles of Confederation in respect of white–Indian relations. This is reflected 
in the debates of the Constitutional Convention and in The Federalist; more impor-
tant, it has been noted by the Court in Worcester, and as late in 1876 in Forty–Three 
Gallons of Whiskey. The upshot is that regulation of the intercourse with the Indian 
Tribes is, by the Constitution, committed to the United States exclusively. The State 
can intervene only by leave of federal authority, and it bears the burden of showing 
such permission. In short, instead of looking for preemptive legislation (as in Warren 
Trading Post), we should be noting the absence of statutes delegating authority to the 
State.
Claiborne, supra note 11, at 597–98.
519 McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
520 Arizona provided that a tax be “levied, collected, and paid for each taxable year upon the 
entire net income . . . of every resident of this state.” Id. at 166 n.3. McClanahan conceded 
she was a resident within the meaning of the statute. Id. Because of this concession, the Court 
was not “called upon to determine whether a reservation is a part of the corpus of a surround-
ing state, but only whether a reservation that is admitted to be part of a state may nevertheless 
enjoy exceptions to that state’s plenary power.” Barsh, Omen, supra note 15, at 14. While this is 
a good lawyer-like distinction, today the consensus is that a reservation is part of a state. 
Justice Marshall described the case as requiring the Court to “reconcile the plenary power 
of the States over residents within their borders with the semi-autonomous status of Indians 
living on tribal reservations.” McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 165. Coming from a friend of the 
Indians, this phrasing of the issue is odd and troubling. Why would Marshall make such a 
broad and sweeping concession that was unnecessary to the analysis? Literally, the concession 
was dictum, but symbolically it was a damaging proposition.
Professor Barsh interprets this phrasing as “implying that tribal sovereignty is an exception 
to a presumption in favor of state power.” Barsh, Omen, supra note 15, at 13. 
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on income earned by a Navajo who lived and worked on the reservation.521 
McClanahan522 had $16.20 withheld from her salary and, in a case of first 
impression,523 filed for a refund.524
521 McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 166. Professor Wilkinson notes that McClanahan was not 
a tribal employee. Wilkinson, supra note 7, at 60. That point would be relevant under the 
old intergovernmental immunity doctrine, which immunized federal employees and instru-
mentalities from state taxation (as well as immunizing state employees from federal taxation). 
Tribes and tribal employees were analogized to federal instrumentalities and federal employees 
and immunized from state taxation. McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 167. As a non-tribal employee, 
McClanahan would not have been encompassed by that doctrine. See id. at 169–70. But by the 
time of the case, the intergovernmental immunity doctrine had been abandoned. The Court 
had long held that states could levy an income tax on federal employees and that the federal 
government could levy its income tax on state employees. Id. at 167. The more important 
point is that the inapplicability of the intergovernmental immunity doctrine does not mean 
that a state has the power in the first place to tax an Indian on a reservation. Whether a state has 
the power to tax is independent of whether an Indian might have once had a right (no longer 
applicable) to be exempted from that tax.
The “freedom from state jurisdiction was a function of the nature of Indian nations and 
Indian country. It did not arise from a notion that tribes are federal instrumentalities.” Ball, 
Constitution, supra note 7, at 69.
522 Professor Taylor describes McClanahan as a “secretary,” Taylor, Framework, supra note 23, 
at 862, but the opinion is silent on her occupation. In a phone conversation with the author, 
Ms. McClanahan described her position as a teller with the First Navajo National Bank, now 
part of Wells Fargo. There were other Navajos also protesting their state income taxes. As an 
aside to those whose ancestors had their names changed upon entering the United States, many 
Navajos were given “American” names, which is how a 100% full-blooded Navajo ended up 
with the name “McClanahan.”
523 McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 165. 
524 McClanahan brought the suit in the Arizona courts, just like any other taxpayer seeking a 
refund. The State claimed she owed a further $11.84 in tax. McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n, 
484 P.2d 221, 222 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1971).
Arizona had not accepted civil jurisdiction over the reservation under Public Law 280. 
The government as amicus curiae argued that Arizona wanted it both ways: it did not accept 
Congress’s invitation to assume jurisdiction over the Navajo reservation but nonetheless 
wanted to tax income earned on the reservation by a Navajo. Brief of the United States as 
Amicus Curiae, McClanahan, 411 U.S. 164 (No. 71-834), 1972 WL 136317, at *3–4 [herein-
after Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, McClanahan]. A similar argument was made 
in Williams v. Lee, supra notes 419–20 and accompanying text.
McClanahan reserved the question of whether a grant to a state of civil jurisdiction over 
causes of action between Indians, or to which Indians are parties, was a congressional grant 
of power to tax reservation Indians. McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 178 n.18. That question was 
negatively answered in Bryan v. Itasca Cnty., 426 U.S. 373 (1976), which struck down a per-
sonal property tax on a mobile home owned by a tribal member. The Court held that a grant 
of civil jurisdiction to Minnesota under Public Law 280 did not allow that State to levy a tax 
on personal property located on a reservation. For an astute discussion of Public Law 280, see 
Carole E. Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction over Reservation Indians, 
22 UCLA L. Rev. 535 (1975). See also Jensen, supra note 9, at 67–68; Canby, supra note 3, 
at 258–85.
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a.  Interpreting the 1868 Treaty 
Justice Thurgood Marshall, writing again for a unanimous Court,525 held that 
an 1868 treaty between the United States and the Navajo Nation prohibited 
the Arizona tax.526 The treaty provided, in relevant part,
that a prescribed reservation would be set aside “for the use and occupation 
of the Navajo tribe of Indians” and that “no persons except those herein so 
authorized to do, and except such officers, soldiers, agents, and employees 
of the government,527 or of the Indians, as may be authorized to enter upon 
Indian reservations in discharge of duties imposed by law, or the orders of 
the President, shall ever be permitted to pass over, settle upon, or reside in, 
the territory described in this article.”528 
The treaty dealt with the right of entry onto the reservation, and Mar-
shall acknowledged, as he had to, that the language did not deal with state 
taxes at all.529 Nor was Arizona attempting to enter the reservation in vio-
lation of the treaty.530 But Justice Marshall refused to read the treaty as a 
525 Claiborne has expressed surprise that McClanahan was a unanimous decision. Claiborne, 
supra note 11, at 586. he attributes the unanimity to the “relatively low priority of Indian cases 
in the Supreme Court.” Id. Another possibility is that unanimity was “purchased” by Marshall 
at the cost of watering down Worcester.
526 Marshall described McClanahan as involving a “narrow” question. McClanahan, 411 
U.S. at 168. Marshall noted that Arizona was not attempting to tax non-Indians on the reser-
vation or Indians off the reservation. Id. at 167–68. In Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai 
Tribes, discussed infra notes 654–739 and accompanying text, the Court upheld a state tax 
on non-Indians purchasing cigarettes on the reservation. In Confederated Tribes of the Colville 
Indian Reservation, discussed infra notes 740–915 and accompanying text, the Court extended 
Moe to non-member Indians. In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw Nation, discussed 
infra notes 1359–72 and accompanying text, the Court upheld the Oklahoma income tax on 
Indians working on a reservation but living off-reservation.
Marshall incorrectly described Utah & Northern Railroad Co. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28, 29 
(1885), as involving the “exertions of state sovereignty over non-Indians who undertake activi-
ties on Indian reservations.” McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 168. The property that was being taxed 
in Utah & Northern, however, was “withdrawn” from the reservation. See supra notes 323–32 
and accompanying text. 
527 Few non-Indians (soldiers, agents, or government employees) lived on the reservations 
when the treaty was negotiated. One implication is that little thought was given by either 
Congress or the courts in the early to mid-19th century about the power and rights the Indians 
might have over non-Indians on the reservation. See Gould, Consent, supra note 6, at 818. 
The Treaty of hopewell, for example, anticipated that non-Indians would leave the Cherokee 
lands. Id. 
528 McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 174. The State conceded that it could exercise neither civil nor 
criminal jurisdiction over the reservation. For Justice Marshall, that “would seem to dispose of 
the case.” Id. at 179. But of course it did not. had the State won, and if McClanahan refused 
to pay what she owed in excess of what was withheld, see supra note 524 and accompanying 
text, Arizona would have had a judgment against her that the State could then have asked the 
Navajo courts to enforce.
529 McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 174.
530 The treaty allowed “employes [sic] of the government” to enter the reservation. Id. Arizona 
was not a state at the time that the treaty was signed, so presumably the “government” was a 
reference to the United States.
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contract between parties dealing at arm’s length with equal bargaining posi-
tions.531 he summoned one of the so-called Indian canons of construction 
with its roots in Worcester532 (unintentionally demonstrating how malleable 
the canon was): “doubtful expressions are to be resolved in favor of the weak 
and defenseless people who are the wards of the nation, dependent upon its 
protection and good faith.”533 When combined “with the tradition of Indian 
independence . . . it cannot be doubted that the reservation of certain lands 
for the exclusive use and occupancy of the Navajos and the exclusion of non-
Navajos from the prescribed area was meant to establish the lands as within 
the exclusive sovereignty of the Navajos under general federal supervision.”534 
531 Id. 
532 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 555 (1832). The canons have been applied 
to interpreting treaties, statutes, executive orders, regulations, and the like when the meaning 
of a provision is unclear. The canons implement two broad propositions: that Indian rights are 
to be construed broadly and that restrictions on those rights are to be construed narrowly. See 
Jensen, supra note 9, at 29; Erik M. Jensen, Chickasaw Nation: Interpreting a Broken Statute, 
97 Tax Notes 1195 (Dec. 2, 2002); Frickey, Common Law, supra note 15, at 12, 58, 73 
(“[A]lthough Congress had the authority to destroy Indian rights, the assumption was that 
Congress would not do so lightly, and thus canons of interpretation protecting tribal inter-
ests were applied to statutory as well as treaty interpretation.”); Frickey, Domesticating, supra 
note 15, at 73 (“Unfortunately, however, the current Court has badly depreciated the canons, 
reducing them from clear statement requirements to be considered at the outset of the inter-
pretive analysis to mere tiebreakers that apply only if the court would otherwise flip a coin. No 
such tie ever emerges in its analysis of these disputes because the current Court venerates state 
sovereignty and has little respect for tribal independence. Consequently, the canons have lost 
most of their influence.”); Frickey, Common Law, supra note 15, at 58 (“The canons of inter-
pretation that once seemed to influence strongly, if not control, outcomes in federal Indian law 
cases have lost their force in the context of significant nonmember interests.”).
Professor Jensen argues that Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84 (2001), treated 
the canons “as little more than rules of convenience.” Jensen, supra note 9, at 31. For a general 
discussion of the canons, see Cohen’s handbook, supra note 7, at 119–28; Lauren Natasha 
Soll, The Only Good Indian Reservation Is a Diminished Reservation? The New and Diluted 
Canons of Construction in Indian Law, 41 Fed. Bus. News & J. 544 (1994); Wilkinson & 
Volkman, supra note 7, at 617–20; supra note 130 and the references therein.
533 McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 174 (emphasis added) (quoting Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 
363, 367 (1930)). Despite Marshall’s language, Professor Frickey criticizes using the canon to 
protect disadvantaged minorities: “[T]he Indian law canon is essentially structural and insti-
tutional and was not established to promote equality or to combat political powerlessness. 
Much more important, the Court has committed the same error, and its error threatens to 
destroy much of the force of the Indian law canon.” Frickey, Marshalling, supra note 199, at 
425. Bryan v. Itasca County characterizes McClanahan as establishing a rule against finding that 
“ambiguous statutes abolish by implication Indian tax immunities.” 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976) 
(emphasis added). The use of the term “immunity” suggests that Marshall first determined that 
Arizona had no power to tax McClanahan and then determined that the treaty did not grant 
Arizona that power. But that was not the structure of the opinion.
534 McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 174–75. Justice Marshall then noted that “[i]t is thus unsur-
prising that this Court has interpreted the Navajo treaty to preclude extension of state law—
including state tax law—to Indians on the Navajo Reservation. Id. at 175 (citing Warren 
Trading Post Co. v. Ariz. Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 269 
(1959)). Warren Trading, however, relied on the federal Indian Trader statutes and not on the 
treaty, and Williams allowed Arizona to take actions provided it did not infringe on the right of 
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Justice Marshall never identified what constituted the “doubtful expression.” 
Justice Marshall was equally unconvincing when he described Congress as 
consistently acting on the assumption that Arizona lacked jurisdiction over 
Navajos living on the reservation.535 his support was twofold. First, when 
Arizona entered the Union, it disclaimed, inter alia, all right and title to lands 
lying within its boundaries owned or held by any Indian or tribe.536 Marshall, 
however, does not justify the leap between disclaiming title in land and the 
State’s inability to tax income earned on the reservation.537 
b.  Interpreting the Arizona Enabling Act 
Second, and also unconvincing, Justice Marshall cited the Arizona Enabling 
Act, which provided, inter alia, that “nothing . . . shall preclude [Arizona] 
from taxing . . . any lands and other property outside of an Indian reservation 
owned or held by an Indian.”538 he was unperturbed by the lack of any refer-
ence to the taxation of income:
Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them. Neither case supported Marshall.
Whether McClanahan should be read as limited to only Navajos living on the reservation 
or would apply to members of other tribes also living on the reservation was subsequently 
addressed in Colville in the context of cigarette taxes. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of 
the Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980); see infra notes 781–87 and accompanying text. 
The Colville Court held that the state could not tax the sale of cigarettes to members of the 
tribe on whose reservations the sale took place, but could tax the sale to non-tribal members. 
Colville, however, involved what the Court viewed as a tax avoidance situation involving a tribe 
trying to market a tax exemption. Id. The question is whether the distinction between tribal 
and non-tribal members will be limited to tax avoidance situations or is intended by the Court 
to apply more generally. 
Professor Taylor argues forcefully that in the case of income taxes, no distinction should 
exist between Indians who are tribal members and Indians who are not. Scott A. Taylor, The 
Unending Onslaught on Tribal Sovereignty: State Income Taxation of Non-Member Indians, 91 
Marq. L. Rev. 917, 959 (2008) [hereinafter Taylor, Onslaught]. Arizona, for example, should 
not be able to tax McClanahan even if she was a non-tribal member. Id. he makes a strong 
case on policy and normative grounds. he also reads McClanahan as supporting that reading, 
claiming that “when Justice Marshall concluded that state power to tax did not extend to 
on-reservation activities of ‘reservation Indians,’ he clearly meant Indians who were members 
of the tribe and also those Indians who were members of other tribes.” Id. at 958. Even if 
Marshall “clearly” meant non-tribal members, which seems doubtful, this would be dictum.
535 McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 175. 
536 “Even after the rapid westward movement of the frontier made the policy of physi-
cally separating tribes from the states impossible, the federal government sought to protect 
the Indians’ autonomy by denying newly admitted states jurisdiction over the tribes within 
state boundaries.” Robert N. Clinton, Reviewing Russel Lawrence Barsh & James Youngblood 
Henderson, The Road: Indian Tribes and Political Liberty, 47 U. Chi. L. Rev. 846, 846 (1980).
537 If McClanahan were receiving rental income from reservation land, she could argue that 
an income tax on that rent should be viewed as a tax on the source of that income, the land, 
and that a tax on reservation land would be inconsistent with Arizona having disclaimed all 
right to reservation land. See supra note 536 and accompanying text. however strained that 
argument might be, McClanahan was earning income from the provision of her services and 
not from the ownership of land.
538 McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 176. Similar provisions are found in the enabling acts of many 
western states, as well as in state constitutions.
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It is true, of course, that exemptions from tax laws should, as a general 
rule, be clearly expressed.539 But we have in the past construed language far 
more ambiguous than this as providing a tax exemption for Indians . . . and 
we see no reason to give this language an especially crabbed or restrictive 
meaning.540
how Marshall took a statute that implicitly exempted land on the reser-
vation and interpreted it as granting an exemption from an income tax is 
a remarkable act of legerdemain.541 This non sequitur cannot be explained 
away simply because other ambiguous language might have been generously 
construed.542 There was simply no ambiguity in the Enabling Act in the first 
539 The Enabling Act did not refer to any “exemption,” but presumably Marshall is treating 
the land on the reservation as exempt. Technically, land would be “exempted” only from a tax 
that it would otherwise be subject to. For example, no one would say that land in New Mexico 
is “exempted” from an Arizona property tax because Arizona would have no jurisdiction in the 
first place over land in New Mexico.
If the reservation land is immune from state taxation under the Indian Commerce Clause, 
for example, or because of the pre- and extra-constitutional sovereignty doctrine, the reference 
to “exemptions” would be irrelevant.
540 McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 176.
541 Marshall might just as well have argued that the treaty reference to “property” includes 
cash or other consideration, and thus covered McClanahan’s salary.
Professor Jensen argues that where doubt arises as to congressional intent, doubt should 
favor the Tribes:
[I]n the taxation context, the application of the canons should mean that the imposi-
tion of federal or state taxes on persons or transactions within Indian country—taxes 
that might harm a tribe’s economic position even if the taxes are nominally imposed 
on nontribal parties—ought to be disfavored (and limitations on tribal taxing power 
similarly ought to be disfavored). Because of its plenary power over Indian affairs, 
Congress can impose, or permit states to impose, taxes that have unhappy conse-
quences for tribes—and it can limit tribal taxing power—but, if Congress is going 
to do any of those things, its intentions should be clear. If the intentions are not 
clear—if, that is, there is legitimate doubt about what Congress intended—the can-
ons point toward resolving that doubt in favor of the affected tribes.
Jensen, supra note 9, at 30.
That position, which would be strengthened by an appeal to the Indian Commerce Clause 
rather than a canon, would have been a more satisfying way of dealing with McClanahan than 
the tortured analysis by Marshall and would have better served the long-term interests of the 
Indians.
542 Justice Marshall also relied on the Buck Act, 4 U.S.C. § 105 et seq. (2009). Section 
106(a) grants to the states general authority to impose an income tax on residents of federal 
areas, but section 109 provides that nothing in section 106 shall be deemed to authorize the 
levy or collection of any tax on or from any Indian not otherwise taxed. he recognized that 
this language did not make it clear whether the reference to “any Indian not otherwise taxed” 
covered reservation Indians earning their income on the reservation, and held that the Buck 
Act could not be read as an affirmative grant of immunity to reservation Indians. McClanahan, 
411 U.S. at 176–77. Certainly the Buck Act could be read as merely preserving the status 
quo with respect to state taxation of the Indians at the time the Act was enacted. Nonetheless, 
Justice Marshall found that “Congress’s intent to maintain the tax-exempt status of reserva-
tion Indians is especially clear in light of the Buck Act.” Id. at 176. Ironically, Marshall found 
clarity in the Buck Act’s ambiguity and ambiguity in the Navajo Treaty and Arizona Enabling 
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place.543
c.  Mischaracterizing the Sales Tax as an Income Tax 
Justice Marshall apparently thought that the line between taxes on land and 
those on income had already been blurred in Warren Trading: “Indeed, it is 
somewhat surprising that the State adheres to this distinction in light of our 
decision in Warren Trading wherein we invalidated an income tax which Ari-
zona had attempted to impose within the Navajo Reservation.”544 
The first problem with this statement was that Warren Trading involved a 
sales tax and not a personal income tax, which was the type of tax imposed on 
McClanahan. Indeed, it would have been very difficult to have argued that an 
Arizona personal income tax on the owners of the Warren Trading Post was 
inconsistent with the Indian Trader statutes covering the sale of goods, or that 
a personal income tax could somehow “disturb and disarrange the statutory 
plan Congress set up in order to protect Indians against prices deemed unfair 
or unreasonable by the Indian Commissioner.”545 Justice Marshall’s confusion 
probably arose because the Arizona sales tax in Warren Trading was levied 
on the “gross proceeds of sales, or gross income.”546 To those not schooled in 
state taxation, the reference to gross income might have suggested an income 
tax.547
The second problem with this statement is that Warren Trading struck 
down the Arizona sales tax on the basis of the Indian Trader statutes. Those 
statutes had no application in McClanahan, which did not involve a vendor 
selling property to the Indians.
Marshall rejected the difference between a tax on land and a tax on income 
on jurisdictional grounds:
Act. One senses that Marshall was driven more by results than by logic in McClanahan. In 
Warren Trading, the Court held that the Buck Act did not apply to Indian reservations. Warren 
Trading, 380 U.S. 685, 692 n.18 (1965).
543 Commenting not specifically on McClanahan, Claiborne, supra note 11, notes generally 
that the Court has stretched its interpretations of treaties and statutes involving taxation of 
Indians:
The Court has stretched provisions of treaties and statutes to the breaking point to 
find federal pre-emption of State intervention. Even with respect to State taxation of 
Reservation Indians, it is very difficult to point to any provision of federal law that 
does more than exempt tribal land. And, certainly, we can find nothing expressly 
foreclosing State regulation or taxation of non-Indians on a Reservation, even when 
their activities immediately affect the Indian community. I suspect that this statutory 
pre-emption approach will yield nothing more. To press it any further would expose 
the pretense too starkly. 
Claiborne, supra note 11, at 594.
544 McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 180–81 (emphasis added).
545 Warren Trading, 380 U.S. at 691.
546 Id. at 685. See also supra note 426 and accompanying text. Justice White made the same 
error in the companion case of Mescalero. See infra note 626 and accompanying text. 
547 After all, “gross income” is a term defined in section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code.
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however relevant the land–income distinction may be in other contexts, 
it is plainly irrelevant when, as here, the tax is resisted because the State is 
totally lacking in jurisdiction over both the people and the lands it seeks to 
tax. In such a situation, the State has no more jurisdiction to reach income 
generated on reservation lands than to tax the land itself.548
But the jurisdictional issue was controlled by the language of the treaty, which 
arguably drew exactly the distinction Arizona suggested.
In Marshall’s defense, it might be observed that in 1868, when the treaty 
was signed, the predominant state tax was the property tax, not the income 
tax.549 The property tax, consequently, would be the logical focus of the Treaty 
and the Enabling Act. Each of these enactments, moreover, could be read as 
adopting a Worcester-sovereignty argument that prohibited any injection of 
Arizona law onto the reservation.
d.  Further Erosion of Worcester 
When Marshall turned to Worcester, however, his discussion would prove 
anathema to the Indians.550 Although his discussion was dicta because the 
holding relied on the 1868 Treaty and the Arizona Enabling Act, it would 
nonetheless take on great significance coming from one of the Indians’ stron-
gest allies,551 writing for a unanimous Court.552
Justice Marshall referred to the “Indian sovereignty doctrine”553 of 
Worcester as “undergo[ing] considerable evolution in response to changed 
circumstances.”554 “[N]otions of Indian sovereignty have been adjusted to 
take account of the State’s legitimate interests in regulating the affairs of non-
Indians.”555
548 McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 181. Speaking generally about Marshall’s statutory interpreta-
tion in McClanahan, Professor Laurence writes that “McClanahan forthrightly reached long to 
find a tax immunity.” Laurence, Thurgood Marshall, supra note 470, at 84.
549 See Ely, supra note 310.
550 See, e.g., Justice Rehnquist’s opinions in Colville, discussed infra notes 740–915 and 
accompanying text, Central Machinery, discussed infra notes 469–518 and accompanying text, 
and Ramah, discussed infra notes 985−1057 and accompanying text.
551 This is not the first time that the Indian cause might have been undercut by their friends. 
See Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 44–46.
552 It is also possible, of course, that Justice Marshall’s discussion of Worcester was the price 
Marshall had to pay for unanimity.
553 Professor Clinton feels that Marshall left “entirely unclear” “which doctrine(s) [he] 
thought were involved in the ‘the Indian sovereignty doctrine.’” Clinton, Dormant, supra note 
22, at 1192. I think it is clear, however, that Marshall was referring to the pre- and extra-consti-
tutional sovereignty doctrine. Nonetheless, Professor Clinton concludes that “[c]areful analysis 
of the McClanahan opinion, however, demonstrates that the Indian sovereignty doctrine ref-
erence in McClanahan may have been the dormant Indian Commerce Clause.” Id. at 1193. 
While the result in McClanahan, which struck down the personal income tax, is consistent 
with the Indian Commerce Clause, assuming “commerce” existed, Marshall made it clear that 
he was not relying on that clause. See infra notes 573–77 and accompanying text. 
554 McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 171 (1973).
555 Id.
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[T]he trend556 has been away from the idea of inherent Indian sovereignty 
as a bar to state jurisdiction and toward reliance on federal pre-emption557 
. . . . The modern cases thus tend to avoid reliance on platonic notions of 
Indian sovereignty558 and to look instead to the applicable treaties and stat-
utes which define the limits of state power559 . . . . The Indian sovereignty 
556 As usual, Professor Laurence cuts to the chase. “A ‘trend’? Perhaps, more accurately, Justice 
Marshall is the ‘trend-setter.’” Laurence, Indian Commerce Clause, supra note 349, at 23.
557 According to one commentator critical of this statement, “[t]he laws have not changed, 
but the fashion or trend apparently has.” Minnis, supra note 7, at 299 n.59.
“The authority Marshall offers for this critical departure from inherent Indian sovereignty 
is the companion Mescalero opinion. The relevant passage in Mescalero is the one that cites 
McClanahan for its authority. It is a tight little closed loop.” Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 
103. See infra note 601.
558 With his trademark wit, Professor Jensen writes that this “was not intended to flatter 
Plato.” Jensen, supra note 9, at 25 n.134. Jensen describes Marshall as disparagingly referring 
to platonic notions of sovereignty, but nonetheless describes the case as a “great victory for 
preemption.” Id. at 73 n.438.
Professor Barsh warns that if “there are no general ‘platonic’ notions of tribal sovereignty, 
but merely the applicable treaties and statutes, the way is opened for distinguishing the status 
of each of some two hundred tribes. The legal costs and uncertainties necessarily resulting from 
the adoption of that rule necessarily chill reservation development.” Barsh, Omen, supra note 
15, at 21. Perhaps this is why McClanahan has come to be broadly interpreted, and freed from 
its roots in an Arizona Treaty and Enabling Act. 
Faulting Justice Marshall’s “platonic” language is perhaps unfair when McClanahan her-
self conceded that Worcester’s “broad territorial notion of Indian tribal jurisdiction” had been 
modified. Brief for Appellant, McClanahan, 411 U.S. 164 (No. 71-834), 1972 WL 136308, 
at *10.
559 Marshall cited Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962), and the 1958 edi-
tion of Cohen’s treatise in support for the statement in the text. Kake would seem to be irrel-
evant as precedent. The 1958 edition was characterized as “propagandistic” by Professor Milner 
Ball, and it provided a simple but incorrect test for the validity of state taxes on Indians: 
[T]hey will be disallowed if they “substantially impede or burden the functioning of 
the Federal Government.” No need to worry about tribal self-government. Perhaps 
[the 1958 edition] was the inspiration for transforming the sovereignty of Indian 
nations into a “platonic notion.” Perhaps, too, it inspired judicial termination of the 
tribes. Williams, Mescalero, and McClanahan recycle the Bureau’s propaganda and 
offer it as modern law.
Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 103. But Marshall also cited favorably the 1958 edition for 
another proposition:
State laws generally are not applicable to tribal Indians on an Indian reservation 
except where Congress has expressly provided that State laws shall apply. It follows 
that Indians and Indian property on an Indian reservation are not subject to State 
taxation except by virtue of express authority conferred upon the State by act of 
Congress.
McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 170–71 (citing U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Federal Indian Law 
845 (1958)). Interestingly, Marshall does not cite that edition using Cohen’s name but instead 
cites it as “U.S. Dept. of the Interior.” If Marshall truly believed the quoted language, however, 
the whole tenor of the opinion would have been different. The treaty and enabling act would 
have been examined to see whether they granted taxing authority, not whether they prohibited 
the tax.
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doctrine is relevant, then, not because it provides a definitive resolution of 
the issues in this suit, but because it provides a backdrop560 against which 
the applicable treaties and federal statutes must be read. It must always 
be remembered that the various Indian tribes were once independent and 
sovereign nations, and that their claim to sovereignty long predates that of 
our own Government. Indians today are American citizens.561 They have 
the right to vote, to use state courts, and they receive some state services.562 
560 Professor Jensen suggests that if “nothing else, the backdrop of sovereignty has historically 
meant that state power is presumed not to apply to tribal members in Indian country.” Jensen, 
supra note 9, at 74.
Professor Laurence views McClanahan as a clear statement that a different approach to 
supremacy questions from what occurs outside Indian cases is appropriate and that the sov-
ereignty of the tribe justifies that result. Laurence, Indian Commerce Clause, supra note 349, 
at 239.
561 The Citizenship Act of 1924 provides that all “non-citizen Indians born within the ter-
ritorial limits of the United States” are declared to be citizens of the United States. 43 Stat. 
253. As citizens, Indians are entitled to vote in federal elections. Means v. Wilson, 522 F.2d 
833 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 958 (1976). Prior to the Act, Indians could become 
citizens only through naturalization, although some became citizens under treaties or specific 
statutes. “Indians had to be made citizens so that the great experiment in coercive civiliza-
tion could continue without possible legal impediments. Citizenship was conferred to benefit 
the government, not the tribes.” Lawrence Barsh & James Youngblood henderson, The 
Road: Indian Tribes and Political Liberty 96 (1980), cited in Ball, Constitution, supra 
note 7, at 11 n.39. The Fourteenth Amendment, adopted in 1868, provided that “all persons 
born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens 
of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
The Indians were not covered by the amendment because they were viewed as owing their 
allegiance to their tribes and not to the United States. Tiger v. W. Inv. Co., 221 U.S. 286 
(1911); Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884). See Walter Berns, Taking the Constitution 
Seriously 35–36 (1987). 
Some Indians do not accept that they can be made citizens of the United States. Ball, 
Constitution, supra note 7, at 11. Some Indians, such as the traditional hopi and Iroquois, 
reject U.S. citizenship in favor of their own Indian citizenship under tribal sovereignty. Facts 
About Native Americans, homahota Consulting, http://www.homahotaconsulting.com/
faqs.html. The Iroquois issue their own passports. When the United Kingdom refused to rec-
ognize these passports, the Iroquois national lacrosse team could not play in the 2010 world 
championship. Iroquois Nationals Lacrosse, http://iroquoisnationals.org/.
562 During oral argument at the Arizona Court of Appeals, counsel for McClanahan con-
ceded that Arizona spent money on education and welfare within the Navajo reservation. 
See Brief for Appellee, McClanahan, 411 U.S. 164 (No. 71-834), 1972 WL 136309, at *34. 
Counsel also acknowledged that reservation Indians had the right to vote in Arizona, the 
right to serve on a jury, and a “practically guaranteed representation in the Arizona house of 
Representatives.” Id. at *36. The State’s brief asked whether the Indians should “receive all the 
benefits of state citizenship, but none of the burdens of such citizenship . . . ?” Id. at *37–38.
The reality is more complicated, however, than that suggested by the State’s brief. Congress 
has not authorized taxation of income earned by an Indian working on a reservation but has 
authorized state taxation of reservation activities in certain other, albeit limited, circumstances. 
See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 398, 398c (2010) (state can tax production of Indian-owned reservation 
minerals but the tax cannot become a lien against the property). The large amount of federal 
expenditures on the reservation has multiplier effects that inure to the benefit of a state; simi-
larly, with respect to tribal expenditures. McClanahan’s brief asserted that 80% of the State’s 
share of categorical aid was paid by the federal government and that general assistance was fur-
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But it is nonetheless still true, as it was in the last century, that “the relation 
of the Indian tribes living within the borders of the United States . . . [is] an 
anomalous one and of a complex character . . . . They were, and always have 
been, regarded as having a semi-independent position when they preserved 
their tribal relations; not as States, not as nations, not as possessed of the full 
attributes of sovereignty, but as a separate people, with the power of regulat-
ing their internal and social relations, and thus far not brought under the 
laws of the Union or of the State within whose limits they resided.”563
This language in McClanahan, which further narrowed Worcester, “was 
viewed by a good many as signaling the demise of tribal sovereignty, now a 
‘platonic notion’ and a ‘backdrop.’ . . . McClanahan seemed to suggest that in 
the future tribal powers would be defined in the first instance by Congress, 
not by original sovereignty.”564 “[T]he decision announced that the doctrine 
of inherent sovereignty would henceforth serve more as an ideal than as a rule 
of law.”565 
Because McClanahan involved an Indian living and working on the reser-
vation, why did Worcester not provide a “definitive resolution”? Chief Justice 
John Marshall, who declared that the “power to tax is the power to destroy,”566 
would probably have struck down a Georgia tax on the income of Worcester 
and Butler; a tax on the income of a Cherokee would have been an a fortiori 
nished by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and by the Navajos. Also, the BIA provided most 
of the support for its boarding schools and for vocational education. The majority of support 
for public schools on the reservation came from federal sources; other support came from local 
taxation of real property interests located on the reservation. All roads were federally financed, 
as was the development of water supplies and sanitation systems. The Tribe maintained its own 
police force. In short, most government services on the reservation were provided by either the 
federal government or the Tribe. Reply Brief for Appellant, McClanahan, 411 U.S. 164 (No. 
71-834), 1972 WL 136313, at *13–14.
563 McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 172–73 (emphasis added). More recently, Justice Thomas 
described federal Indian policy as “schizophrenic.” United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 219 
(2004) (Thomas, J., concurring).
Professor Frickey points out the irony in the “involuntary displacement of indigenous 
peoples from their lands and their political subjugation by a self-proclaimed superior 
sovereignty . . . in a country that began by declaring itself independent of colonial status and 
that soon adopted a Constitution that has served as a model for restraining the abuse of public 
power.” Frickey, Domesticating, supra note 15, at 33.
564 Wilkinson, supra note 7, at 60. On a more positive and sanguine note, Professor Getches 
describes McClanahan as “perhaps the definitive modern-era case,” Getches, Conquering, supra 
note 14, at 1590, and views it as supporting a “movement toward revitalization of tribal gov-
ernments,” id. at 1593.
In its amicus brief, the United States argued that “Congress has consistently acted on the 
assumption that in the absence of its express authorization the States have no power to regulate 
or tax Indians on a reservation.” Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, McClanahan, 
supra note 524, at *4.
565 Gould, Consent, supra note 6, at 825.
566 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819) (“That the power to tax 
involves the power to destroy . . . .”). But see Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 
U.S. 218, 223 (1928) (holmes, J., dissenting) (“The power to tax is not the power to destroy 
while this Court sits.”) (overruled in part).
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case. And although Worcester dealt with criminal jurisdiction, Justice Thur-
good Marshall recognized that “the rationale of the case plainly extended to 
state taxation within the reservation.”567
Justice Thurgood Marshall did not try to distinguish the tax cases from 
the nontax cases that he cited as illustrating a narrowing of the Worcester 
doctrine. The tax cases he cited involved: Indians who left the reservation, 
becoming assimilated into the general community;568 Indians conducting 
activities off-reservation;569 and non-Indians conducting activities on Indian 
reservations.570 None supported his assertion that the sovereignty doctrine 
did not provide “a definitive resolution of the issues [in McClanahan],”571 at 
least for tax issues, and none came close to involving a state tax on income 
earned exclusively on the reservation by an Indian residing there. But even the 
nontax cases Marshall cited did not support his point.572 
e.  Inapplicability of the Indian Commerce Clause 
Justice Marshall also failed to emphasize the Indian Commerce Clause hold-
ing in Worcester.573 Marshall’s emphasis on Worcester’s extra-constitutional 
567 McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 169.
568 Id. at 171 (citing Okla. Tax Comm’n v. United States, 319 U.S. 598 (1943)).
569 Id. at 172 (citing Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973), for the proposi-
tion that the “trend has been away from the idea of inherent Indian sovereignty as a bar to state 
jurisdiction and toward reliance on federal pre-emption.”).
570 Id. at 168 (citing Utah & N. R.R. Co., 116 U.S. 28 (1885), discussed supra notes 323–32 
and accompanying text, and Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1878), discussed supra notes 
354–75 and accompanying text). 
571 Id. at 172.
572 See Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 103.
573 Nonetheless, Professor Laurence states, with no page citation to the opinion, that Marshall 
identified the Indian Commerce Clause as one of the “legal theories available to account for 
the barrier that exists to the exercise of state jurisdiction on the reservation.” Robert Laurence, 
Thurgood Marshall’s Indian Law Opinions, 27 howard L. J. 3, 22 (1984).
McClanahan made an Indian Commerce Clause argument, see Reply Brief for Appellant, 
McClanahan, supra note 562, at *9–10, which apparently had no more of an impact on Marshall 
than did the Solicitor General’s argument in Central Machinery. See supra notes 517–18 and 
accompanying text. One potential obstacle in applying the Indian Commerce Clause to strike 
down the Arizona tax was that McClanahan lived and worked on the reservation and earned 
all her income there, so that “commerce with the Indian tribes,” might not have existed, at least 
under a narrow interpretation of what constitutes “commerce.” That problem was avoided by 
relying on the Treaty as prohibiting the Arizona tax. 
For Indian Commerce Clause purposes, it should be irrelevant that the case involved an 
individual and not a tribe. True, the Indian Commerce Clause refers to “Tribes” and not 
“Indians.” An earlier draft of this provision did refer to “Indians” but was later changed to 
“Tribes.” See supra notes 169–71 and accompanying text. No explanation was given for the 
substitution and the Court has never relied on this history to distinguish “Indians” from 
“Tribes.” To the contrary, the Court seems to have rejected the difference in terminology as 
having any significance. See supra note 171.
As in Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), discussed supra notes 421–22 and accompany-
ing text, the Indian Commerce Clause is referred to in McClanahan only once in an irrelevant 
footnote, and not by name but rather by citation, for the proposition that the “source of federal 
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sovereignty discussion is understandable because it dominates that opinion, 
but if he were going to gratuitously entertain erosions of that doctrine, why 
not at least undo some of that damage by emphasizing the importance of the 
Indian Commerce Clause?
The answer may lie in a footnote, in which Justice Marshall explained that 
“in almost all cases federal treaties and statutes define the boundaries of fed-
eral and state jurisdiction.”574 Although he made that statement to explain 
why it is unnecessary to reach the more abstract “platonic” question of Indian 
sovereignty, it would also explain why the Indian Commerce Clause had no 
major role to play in his thinking.575 
Put differently, the Indian Commerce Clause would have its greatest role 
to play if no federal treaties or statutes applied, for then the question would 
be starkly presented whether a state statute was excluded by the Clause.576 
authority over Indian matters . . . is now generally recognized [to derive] from federal respon-
sibility for regulating commerce with Indian tribes and for treaty making.” McClanahan, 411 
U.S. at 172 n.7 (citing U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3). That footnote in turn referred to a foot-
note in Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. at 219 n.4, which cited the Indian Commerce Clause and 
Kagama. The Williams footnote cited Kagama for the proposition that the federal government’s 
power is also derived “from the necessity of giving uniform protection to a dependent people.” 
Williams, 358 U.S. at 217 n.4 (citing United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886)).
A short time later in Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982), see infra text 
accompanying notes 1058–1130, Justice Marshall replaced the reference to “treaty making” 
in the McClanahan footnote: “when Congress acts with respect to the Indian tribes, it gener-
ally does so pursuant to its authority under the Indian Commerce Clause, or by virtue of its 
superior position over the tribes.” 455 U.S. at 155 n.21 (emphasis added). he does not identify 
the source of Congress’s “superior position,” but presumably it would not involve any constitu-
tional provision and seems to refer to Kagama. Presumably Marshall dropped the reference to 
treaty making because it no longer occurs, and hadn’t occurred since 1871, see supra note 304 
and accompanying text. he could not identify the Indian Commerce Clause as the “exclusive” 
source of federal authority without overruling Kagama.
Professor Wilkinson thinks that Marshall’s McClanahan footnote rejected the proposition 
that the Indian Commerce Clause precludes all state authority on the reservation. Wilkinson, 
supra note 7, at 60 n.34. That seems to be a safe conclusion because nothing in Marshall’s 
opinion suggests that the Indian Commerce Clause precludes any state authority—let alone 
all state authority.
Professor Milner Ball claims that the “broadest modern reading of the Commerce Clause 
does not support congressional power to take away all aspects of Indian national sovereignty.” 
Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 50.
Professor Clinton views the McClanahan footnote as “nominally repudiat[ing] the extra-
constitutional source of power it created in the notion of trusteeship by announcing that all 
federal power in Indian affairs is derived from the Indian Commerce Clause and the power to 
make treaties.” Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1165 n.324. he does not address the new 
phrasing in Merrion.
574 McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 172 n.8. Professor Laurence states that the footnote’s assertion 
“is just not true.” Laurence, Indian Commerce Clause, supra note 349, at 249.
575 Professor Laurence, however, included McClanahan as a case dealing with the Dormant 
Commerce Clause. Laurence, Indian Commerce Clause, supra note 349, at 247.
576 Under those circumstances, the Williams v. Lee doctrine would also apply because there 
would be no congressional acts on point. hence, the Court would need to decide if the state 
action infringed on the Indians’ right to self-government.
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Justice Marshall made passing reference to this possibility, but he did so in 
the context of his sovereignty argument and not in the context of the Indian 
Commerce Clause. If no treaty or legislation applied, the issue of “residual 
Indian sovereignty” would have to be reached, but he dismissed this situation 
as “something of a moot question . . . of little more than theoretical impor-
tance, however, since in almost all cases federal treaties and statutes define the 
boundaries of federal and state jurisdiction.”577 That sentence would read the 
same if “the Indian Commerce Clause” (or Williams v. Lee) were substituted 
for “residual Indian sovereignty.”
Given Marshall’s generous application of the pro-Indian canon of construc-
tion, which would interpret many statutes as covering taxes notwithstanding 
that their language did not refer to them, as was true in McClanahan, it is 
easy to appreciate his view that “residual sovereignty” (or Williams v. Lee or 
the Indian Commerce Clause) would have no role to play.578 But certainly 
the entire waterfront of taxation could hardly be expected to be covered by 
treaties and statutes, no matter how generously interpreted.
Without examining all of the existing treaties and statutes and the panoply 
of state taxes that could be imposed on the myriad ways of earning income 
or doing business on a reservation, Justice Marshall’s use of the term “moot” 
seems unwarranted at best and certainly unduly optimistic. If no treaty or 
statute applied (or even existed), the implications of the Indian Commerce 
Clause issue would have to be confronted.
f.  Inapplicability of  Williams v. Lee 
Arizona’s principal argument was that its personal income tax did not violate 
the Williams v. Lee doctrine because it was taxing individual Indians and not 
the Tribe. Consequently, the tax could not infringe on Indian rights of self-
government.579 Marshall did not challenge the premise that Arizona had the 
right to tax in the first place. Instead, he suggested that the tax might have an 
577 McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 172 n.8. To the extent this statement is true, it greatly narrows 
the Williams v. Lee doctrine. The reality is that in McClanahan there was no explicit federal 
statute either authorizing the state income tax at issue or exempting the Indians from such a 
tax. 
Significantly, Justice Marshall wrote no opinions in which this inquiry beyond 
supremacy needed to be addressed. This is, in part, of course, because he applies 
supremacy analysis so vigorously on behalf of the tribes. It may also be because he 
thinks there is little to such inquiry. [The footnote] suggests so, rather explicitly.
Laurence, Thurgood Marshall, supra note 470, at 81.
578 Professor Laurence, writing in 1984, concluded that when “a state seeks to exercise juris-
diction on the reservation, Justice Marshall’s eggs are in the supremacy clause basket. A third 
of his opinions deal with that situation. All prohibit the activity; all are decided on preemption 
grounds; all suggest the supremacy clause will always answer the question.” Laurence, Thurgood 
Marshall, supra note 470, at 80. Professor Laurence recognizes that the “Court as a whole is not 
as consistent as Justice Marshall.” Id. (citing Colville and Moe).
579 McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 179.
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impact on tribal self-determination.580 But instead of expanding on this point 
and breathing some life into the infringement test,581 Justice Marshall viewed 
the Williams v. Lee infringement test as inapplicable because that doctrine 
“dealt principally with situations involving non-Indians.”582 In these situa-
tions,
both the tribe and the State could fairly claim an interest in asserting their 
respective jurisdictions. The Williams test was designed to resolve this con-
flict by providing that the State could protect its interest up to the point 
where tribal self-government would be affected. The problem posed by this 
case is completely different. Since [McClanahan] is an Indian and since her 
income is derived wholly from reservation sources, her activity is totally 
within the sphere which the relevant treaty and statutes leave for the Federal 
Government and for the Indians themselves.583
Presumably, Marshall did not mean that Williams v. Lee was inapplicable 
when only Indians are involved, but rather that under the facts of the case the 
tax conflicted with the 1868 Treaty and the Enabling Act.584 Williams v. Lee 
applies only “absent governing Acts of Congress,”585 and such acts existed in 
the form of the Treaty and the Enabling Act. Considering Justice Marshall’s 
view that federal statutes and treaties will in almost all cases preempt state 
580 “In fact, we are far from convinced that when a State imposes taxes upon reservation 
members without their consent, its action can be reconciled with tribal self-determination.” 
Id. at 179. 
581 Dean Getches notes that “Arizona and other states had been perverting the Court’s cryp-
tic statement in [Williams v. Lee] . . . to presume that states could exercise jurisdiction on the 
reservation absent evidence of a direct clash with tribal government.” Getches, Conquering, 
supra note 14, at 1590. This “perversion,” however, is exactly what Justice Black’s formulation 
in Williams invited.
582 McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 164. Professor Jensen criticizes this statement as inaccurate and 
counterintuitive. Jensen, supra note 9, at 62 n.365. The plaintiff in Williams v. Lee was a non-
Indian, but there is no reason to think that doctrine would be inapplicable if only Indians were 
involved. The opinion does not discuss the identity of McClanahan’s employer. Marshall must 
have assumed the employer was an Indian. McClanahan’s employer was a bank, presumably a 
legal entity. See supra note 522.
The Arizona Court of Appeals held that the test was not “whether the income tax infringes 
on [McClanahan’s] rights as an individual . . . but whether such a tax infringes on the rights of 
the [tribe] to be self-governing.” McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 164.
583 Id. at 179–80. 
584 Professor Clinton suggests that Marshall might have confused the discredited inter-
governmental tax immunity doctrine with the dormant Indian Commerce Clause. Clinton, 
Dormant, supra note 22, at 1194, but there is no evidence of that.
585 McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 180 n.21.
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taxes,586 there would seem to be little room left for applying the Williams v. 
Lee doctrine.587
g.  An Alternative Approach 
What is puzzling is that Marshall could have written the same opinion with-
out undercutting Worcester. Indeed, he essentially viewed the case as involving 
a “narrow issue,”588 controlled by the Treaty and Enabling Act: “We hold that 
by imposing the tax in question on this appellant, the State has interfered 
with matters which the relevant treaty and statutes leave to the exclusive prov-
ince of the Federal Government and the Indians themselves.”589 To be sure, 
his reading of the Treaty and Enabling Act was unconvincing and he appealed 
to Worcester for assistance, but reducing Worcester to a “backdrop” did not 
add weight to his already strained interpretation. In short, the Indians would 
come to pay a high price for a holding that could have been reached with far 
less damage.
The structure of the opinion is inconsistent with Marshall’s professed 
belief that state laws generally are not applicable to tribal Indians on reserva-
tions except where Congress has expressly provided otherwise.590 If he really 
believed that, of course, he would have examined the Treaty and Enabling 
Act to see if Congress expressly provided for the Arizona income tax rather 
than examining them to see if they exempted the Indians. his search for an 
exemption in the Treaty and Enabling Act is more consistent with his descrip-
tion of the case as reconciling the “plenary power of the States over residents 
within their borders with the semi-autonomous status of Indians living on 
tribal reservations.”591 
Like Williams v. Lee, there is a schizophrenic quality to the opinion. Like 
Williams v. Lee, the opinion could have been written more narrowly, and with 
less damage to the long-term interests of the Indians. Both were unanimous 
opinions and perhaps the lack of consistency in each reflected the need to 
bring along otherwise dissenting Justices. 
586 Id. at 176–78.
587 In dicta, Marshall responded to Arizona’s argument that the Williams v. Lee doctrine 
was inapplicable because the state was taxing an Indian and not a tribe or land on the reserva-
tion. According to the State, Williams v. Lee applies only to tribes. Rejecting this distinction, 
Marshall emphasized that tribes are composed of individual Indians, so that the “question has 
always been whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their 
own laws and be ruled by them.” Id. at 181 (emphasis added) (citing Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 
217, 220 (1959)). “In this case, appellant’s rights as a reservation Indian were violated when 
the state collected a tax from her which it had no jurisdiction to impose.” Id.
588 McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 168.
589 Id. at 165.
590 Id. at 171. his treatment of Arizona’s refusal to assume jurisdiction under Public Law 280 
as evidence of it lacking taxing jurisdiction is consistent with this view. Id. at 177–78.
591 Id. at 165 (emphasis added); see also supra notes 580–81 and accompanying text. 
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2.  Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones
Justice Marshall’s emphasis on McClanahan’s living and working on the res-
ervation592 explains the difference in result between McClanahan and its com-
panion case, Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones.593 The latter dealt with the Sierra 
Blanca Ski Enterprises, owned and operated by the Mescalero Tribe on land 
adjacent to its reservation in New Mexico and leased from the United States 
592 A tribal member living on the reservation but earning his or her income off-reservation is 
probably subject to a state income tax under Mescalero. See infra notes 648–52 and accompany-
ing text. Although Jensen states that “it is not clear whether an enrolled member of a tribe who 
earns income within a reservation but lives outside it may have his income taxed by the state,” 
Jensen, supra note 9, at 66, Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995), 
discussed infra notes 1359–72, upheld a state tax under those circumstances. 
In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114 (1993), the Court applied 
McClanahan to Indians who lived in “Indian country,” which includes formal and informal 
reservations, dependent Indian communities, and Indian allotments, whether restricted or 
held in trust by the United States. Id. at 123; see also Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band 
Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 511 (1991) (“[T]he test for determining whether 
land is Indian country does not turn upon whether that land is denominated ‘trust land’ or 
‘reservation.’ Rather, we ask whether the area has been ‘validly set apart for the use of the 
Indians as such, under the superintendence of the Government.’”). 
For federal criminal jurisdiction, Congress has defined Indian country statutorily:
[It encompasses](a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the 
jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any 
patent, and including rights-of-way running through the reservation; (b) all depen-
dent Indian communities within the borders of the United States whether within the 
original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without 
the limits of a state; and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not 
been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same. 
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2010).
The treatment of rights-of-way running through the reservation as Indian country would 
seem inconsistent with Utah & Northern where the right-of-way was treated as “withdrawn” 
from the reservation. See supra notes 323–32 and accompanying text. Indian country is not 
dependent on the existence of a tribe. The definition “generally applies to questions of civil 
jurisdiction.” Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 527 (1998). (A 
footnote in DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2 (1975), had previ-
ously stated that section 1151 “generally applies as well to questions of civil jurisdiction.”) In 
Venetie, the Court emphasized that the three categories set forth in section 1151 concern land 
that is “validly set apart for the use of the Indians as such, under the superintendence of the 
Government.” 522 U.S. at 529. Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 653 n.5 (2001), 
warned that the definition in section 1151 does not address a tribe’s sovereignty over nonmem-
bers on non-Indian fee land. For stylistic convenience, I use the term “reservation” throughout 
this Article rather than the broader and more accurate term, “Indian country.”
Apparently the first use of the term “Indian country” was the Royal Proclamation of 1763, 
discussed supra note 60 and accompanying text. See Wilkinson, supra note 7, at 89.
593 411 U.S. 145 (1973). “When the Mescalero analysis is placed alongside McClanahan, 
the conclusion must be that federal regulation is construed broadly and state law is presumed 
invalid with respect to on-reservation activity, while the opposite is true of off-reservation 
activity.” Laurence, Indian Commerce Clause, supra note 349, at 239.
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Forest Service.594 The case involved the New Mexico gross receipts tax and 
use tax. Despite the Court’s references to the gross receipts tax at places in the 
opinion as an income tax,595 that tax is equivalent to a sales tax.596 The Court 
allowed New Mexico to tax the gross receipts generated by sales of tangible 
personal property and services at the resort (ski rentals, lift tickets, food, or 
beverages) but barred the use tax on tangible personal property purchased 
outside of New Mexico and brought into the State to construct two ski lifts. 
Justice White wrote for a six-person majority,597 breaking the unanimity that 
had accompanied Williams, Warren Trading, and McClanahan.
a.  Revisiting McClanahan 
In the court below, the Mescalero Tribe argued that its 1883 treaty with 
the United States vested exclusive jurisdiction “over the tribe” in the fed-
eral government,598 basing this argument in part on the Indian Commerce 
Clause.599 Justice White, however, rejected
the broad assertion that the Federal Government has exclusive jurisdic-
tion over the Tribe for all purposes and that the State is therefore prohib-
ited from enforcing its revenue laws against any tribal enterprise “whether 
the enterprise is located on or off tribal land.” Generalizations on this 
subject have become particularly treacherous. The conceptual clarity600 
of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall’s view in Worcester has given way to more 
594 The resort was developed under the auspices of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 
(IRA), using funds lent by the federal government. Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 146.
595 Id. at 157, 160, 162–63.
596 hellerstein, McIntyre & Pomp, supra note 426, at 90–92.
597 Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 146, 159. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Marshall, Blackmun, 
Powell, and Rehnquist joined Justice White. Justice Douglas dissented in part joined by Justices 
Brennan and Stewart.
598 Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 489 P.2d 666, 668 (N.M. Ct. App. 1971).
599 In its brief before the Supreme Court, the Tribe argued that New Mexico had no author-
ity to tax the Tribe because the federal government had exclusive jurisdiction over it. The Tribe 
based this argument in part on the Indian Commerce Clause. Brief of the Mescalero Apache 
Tribe, Mescalero, 411 U.S. 145 (No. 71-738), 1971 WL 134307, at *14–16 [hereinafter Brief 
of the Mescalero Apache Tribe, Mescalero]. Arguing by analogy to Congress’s preemption of 
state control of liquor sales to Indians regardless of whether the sale occurred off-reservation, 
the Tribe asserted that the power to regulate commerce with the tribes extends to the entire 
nation and not just Indian country. Id. at *15. “Whether the enterprise is located on or off 
tribal land is not the criteria to determine if the state may tax the Tribe. The relevant factors 
are whether the enterprise is under federal control and regulation and is meeting the goals of 
federal Indian policy.” Id. at *16.
600 Professor Clinton writes:
If this dicta were limited to cases involving Indian commerce occurring outside of 
Indian country, of the type involved in Mescalero Apache Tribe, the suggestion of a 
limit on or erosion of “the conceptual clarity” of Worcester, perhaps, may have been 
logically consistent with earlier cases. The extension of the Justice White’s comments, 
however, to the assumption of the existence of state authority over Indian commerce 
occurring on reservations is very peculiar in light of the cases that he cites. 
Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1198.
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individualized treatment of particular treaties and specific federal statutes, 
including statehood enabling legislation, as they, taken together, affect 
the respective rights of States, Indians, and the Federal Government. See  
McClanahan601 . . . The upshot has been the repeated statements of this 
Court to the effect that, even on reservations, state laws may be applied 
unless such application would interfere with reservation self-government 
or would impair a right granted or reserved by federal law602 [Williams v. 
Lee].603 Even so, in the special area of state taxation, absent cession of juris-
diction or other federal statutes permitting it, there has been no satisfactory 
authority for taxing Indian reservation lands or Indian income from activities 
carried on within the boundaries of the reservation, and McClanahan lays to 
rest any doubt in this respect by holding that such taxation is not permis-
sible absent congressional consent.604
601 Worcester involved both treaties and statutes. See supra notes 288–96 and accompanying 
text. Contrary to White’s assertion, Chief Justice Marshall himself engaged in an “individual-
ized treatment of particular treaties and specific federal statutes,” although the analysis in that 
part of Worcester was overshadowed by the tone and number of pages spent on the pre- and 
extra-constitutional sovereignty issue. See supra notes 268–69 and accompanying text.
White’s citation of McClanahan for the proposition that the “conceptual clarity of Mr. 
Chief Justice Marshall’s view in Worcester has given way to more individualized treatment of 
particular treaties and specific federal statutes” illustrates the damage done by Justice Thurgood 
Marshall’s unwarranted concession in McClanahan. 
Justice White’s citation of McClanahan for the proposition that Worcester had been eroded, 
Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 148 (citing McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 
(1973)), was mirrored in McClanahan by Justice Marshall’s citation of Mescalero in support 
of the same proposition: “Finally, the trend has been away from the idea of inherent Indian 
sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction and toward reliance on federal pre-emption [citing 
Mescalero],” McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 172 (citing Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 148), a quite remark-
able example of circular citations. Accord Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 103. See supra note 
557.
602 This statement is criticized by Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1198–99. 
603 Justice White cited Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962), in addition to 
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959). Kake undercut Worcester by stating that “a reservation 
was in many cases a part of the surrounding State or Territory, and subject to its jurisdiction 
except as forbidden by federal law.” Kake, 369 U.S. at 72. Kake has been strongly criticized. See 
Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 102 (citing Monroe E. Price & Robert N. Clinton, Law 
and the American Indian 439 (2d ed. 1983)). In Kake, no reservation even existed, mak-
ing it irrelevant as precedent for White’s statement. Professor Milner Ball feels that Mescalero 
“constitutes a major revision of Worcester and the Kansas Indians,” id., but I think Williams v. 
Lee deserves the blame as well.
In its brief, the Tribe argued that the “action of the state interferes with the tribe’s right 
to self-government. The tribe is seeking stability through economic development of its land 
resources on and near the reservation. Such development means continuity of tribal integ-
rity and customs while assuring the tribal sovereignty.” Brief of the Mescalero Apache Tribe, 
Mescalero, supra note 599, at *12. The brief asserted that Williams v. Lee “not only holds that 
the state law may not be applied where it interferes with a tribe’s right to self-government, but 
also lays down a very narrow area in which tribal relationships were considered not to be jeop-
ardized by action.” Id. at *12–13. The latter point is an overly generous reading of the case.
604 Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 147–48 (emphasis added). With respect to taxation of activities 
on a reservation, Justice White might have better served, not by citing McClanahan, a case the 
Court described as involving a “narrow question,” 411 U.S. at 168, but rather by resurrect-
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White cited only “McClanahan” with no page reference for his dictum that 
“in the special area of state taxation, absent cession of jurisdiction or other 
federal statutes permitting it, there has been no satisfactory authority for tax-
ing Indian reservation lands or Indian income from activities carried on within 
the boundaries of the reservation . . . .”605
The problem with relying on McClanahan as support for this broad propo-
sition is the emphasis of that case on the 1868 Treaty with the Navajos and on 
the Arizona Enabling Act, and the Court’s statement that it was dealing with 
a “narrow question.”606 If McClanahan actually held that such taxation is not 
permissible absent congressional consent, there would have been no need to 
have analyzed the treaty and Enabling Act to determine if they prohibited the 
tax. Instead, the focus would have been on whether they permitted taxation 
that was otherwise prohibited. Worcester would have been better precedent 
for Justice White’s broad proposition, except that Marshall had gratuitously 
eviscerated it in McClanahan.
Presumably, Justice White’s citation to McClanahan, without a specific 
page reference, was to that case’s discussion of the sovereignty doctrine “with 
its concomitant jurisdictional limit on the reach of state law.”607 That doc-
trine, however, was ultimately denigrated to the status of a “backdrop,”608 a 
thumb on the scale of justice. The Indian Commerce Clause might have been 
better support; Justice Marshall, however, had not developed that theme in 
the companion case of McClanahan.
Apart from the lack of clarity about the basis for Justice White’s asser-
tion, he also does not explain why the immunity from taxation is limited to 
a tax on land and a tax on income. What about severance taxes, sales taxes, 
fuel taxes, franchise taxes, hotel occupancy taxes, and the like? If either the 
pre- and extra-constitutional sovereignty doctrine of Worcester or the Indian 
Commerce Clause is the underpinning for his pronouncement, no distinc-
tion should be made by type of tax. In addition, for a tribe seeking to encour-
age non-Indian investment, Justice White’s tax-free zone is of little value. 
Investors want the assurance of knowing their income, as well as that of their 
Indian investors, will be free of state taxation, an assurance that could be 
ing Worcester and re-emphasizing The New York Indians, The Kansas Indians, and the Indian 
Commerce Clause. See also California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 
215 n.17 (1987) (“We have repeatedly addressed the issue of state taxation of tribes and tribal 
members and the state, federal, and tribal interests which it implicates. We have recognized 
that the federal tradition of Indian immunity from state taxation is very strong and that the 
state interest in taxation is correspondingly weak. Accordingly, it is unnecessary to rebalance 
these interests in every case.”).
605 Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 148 (emphasis added).
606 McClanahan. 411 U.S. at 168. The McClanahan Court held “that by imposing the tax in 
question on this appellant, the State has interfered with matters which the relevant treaty and 
statutes leave to the exclusive province of the Federal Government and the Indians themselves.” 
Id. at 165.
607 Id. at 171.
608 Id. at 172.
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provided by an invigorated Indian Commerce Clause but not by White’s 
framework.
Justice White does not explain why state taxation is a “special area.” “Spe-
cial” because of a lack of state services on the reservation? “Special” in the 
sense of not being controlled by any precedent? “Special” because taxation is 
an inherent aspect of sovereignty? “Special” in that tax revenue is the lifeblood 
and key to a tribe’s independence and weaning itself from the federal trough? 
“Special” because of the “encompassing” federal statutes and treaties?609 “Spe-
cial” because of Worcester or the pre- and extra-constitutional sovereignty of 
the Indians? “Special” because of McCulloch v. Maryland?610
b.  Inapplicability of McClanahan to Off-Reservation Activities 
Mescalero involved off-reservation activities. Unlike on-reservation activities, 
“[a]bsent express federal law to the contrary, Indians going beyond reserva-
tion boundaries have generally been held subject to nondiscriminatory state 
law otherwise applicable to all citizens of the State.”611 None of the cases 
Justice White cited for this principle,612 however, dealt with taxes, but he 
saw no reason to treat taxes differently: “That principle is as relevant to a 
State’s tax laws as it is to state criminal laws,”613 an odd assertion given that he 
had earlier referred to the “special area of taxation.” Apparently, that “special-
ness” was limited to on-reservation activities, without any explanation about 
why taxes are not “special” when off-reservation activities are involved. White 
never considered whether the Indian Commerce Clause might have a special 
role to play in the case of taxation.614
c.  The New Mexico Enabling Act 
Justice White cited the New Mexico Enabling Act as support for the dif-
ference in taxation of on- and off-reservation activities. The Enabling Act 
provided that “nothing herein . . . shall preclude the said State from taxing, 
609 See Laurence, Indian Commerce Clause, supra note 349, at 249.
610 See supra notes 228, 328, 566; infra note 1154. 
611 Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 148–49.
612 See id. at 149 (citing Puyallup Tribe v. Dep’t of Game, 391 U.S. 392, 398 (1968); 
Organized Vill. of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 75–76 (1962); Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 
681, 683 (1942); Shaw v. Gibson–Zahniser Oil Corp., 276 U.S. 575 (1928); Ward v. Race 
horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896)).
613 Id.
614 None of the cases he cited, see Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 148–49, discussed the Indian 
Commerce Clause:
Why is the result different when the sovereign tribe leaves the reservation? Mescalero 
is not as clear as McClanahan on this point. Part of the reason is stare decisis, but 
most of the Court’s discussion is of the intergovernmental-immunity doctrine, a non-
Indian concept in current disfavor. In short, it appears that off-the-reservation Indian 
governments are treated like other governments.
Laurence, Indian Commerce Clause, supra note 349, at 239–40.
I would put it a tad differently: off the reservation Indians are treated like non-Indians.
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as other lands and other property are taxed, any lands and other property out-
side of an Indian reservation owned or held by any Indian615 . . . [and] shall 
be exempt . . . to such extent as Congress has prescribed . . . .”616 Although 
the Enabling Act referred to only taxes on land or other property, such as a 
property tax, which was the dominant state tax at that time,617 the Court 
asserted with no discussion or explanation that “[i]t is thus clear that . . . 
New Mexico retained the right to tax, unless Congress forbade it, all Indian 
land and Indian activities located or occurring”618 off reservation. The “it is 
thus clear” was anything but clear: with no discussion or support, the Court 
simply expanded the Treaty’s reference to “lands and other property” to all 
“activities,” which included the activities at the ski enterprise.
This broad reading of the Enabling Act’s limited reference to the taxation of 
land and property would seem inconsistent with the favorable Indian canon 
of construction applied in McClanahan.619 That is, even if Justice White 
found the Enabling Act’s reference to taxing land or other property ambigu-
ous enough to include the New Mexico gross receipts tax—a tax levied on the 
sale of property rather than on the ownership of property—that ambiguity 
should have been resolved in favor of the Tribe pursuant to the canon of con-
struction laid down in McClanahan (with its roots in Worcester).
615 The Court ignored arguments made by the Tribe and its amicus that the reference to 
“Indians” does not encompass “Indian tribes.” See, e.g., Brief of Montana Inter-Tribal Policy 
Board as Amicus, Mescalero, 411 U.S. 145 (No. 71-738), 1972 WL 136293, at *12. This 
argument was not frivolous because other parts of the Enabling Act referred to Indian tribes, 
suggesting that the reference to Indians rather than Indian tribes was intentional and not 
inadvertent. In other contexts the distinction would be irrelevant, including under the Indian 
Commerce Clause.
616 Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 149. The New Mexico Constitution contains an identical provi-
sion. N.M. Const. art. XXI, § 2.
617 See Ely, supra note 310.
618 Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 149–50 (emphasis added).
619 Whether the Indian canons of construction have any ongoing vitality is problematic. 
Moreover, the canon that assumes Congress intends its statutes to benefit the tribes is 
offset by the canon that warns us against interpreting federal statutes as providing tax 
exemptions unless those exemptions are clearly expressed. Nor can one say that the 
pro-Indian canon is inevitably stronger—particularly where the interpretation of a 
congressional statute rather than an Indian treaty is at issue. This Court’s earlier cases 
are too individualized, involving too many different kinds of legal circumstances, to 
warrant any such assessment about the two canons’ relative strength
Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 95 (2001). See also Erik M. Jensen, Chickasaw 
Nation: Interpreting a Broken Statute, 97 Tax Notes 1195 (Dec. 2, 2002); United States v. 
Dann, 470 U.S. 39, 47–50 (1985); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 
U.S. 237, 255–57 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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d.  Section 465 of the IRA 
Equally surprising was the Court’s interpretation of section 465 of the Indian 
Reorganization Act (IRA)620:
[A]ny lands or rights acquired pursuant to any provision of the Act shall 
be taken in the name of the United States in trust for the Indian tribe or 
620 The IRA, also known as the Wheeler Act, drafted by Felix Cohen and John Collier 
(then Commissioner of Indian Affairs), supra notes 11 and 29, was a response to the Meriam 
Report, which documented the failures of the allotment policies and the horrible living condi-
tions of the Indians. The report was also highly critical of the federal bureaucrats in charge of 
Indian policy and administration. The IRA attempted to promote tribal independence and 
cultural pride by: providing for tribal constitutions; encouraging tribal enterprises through 
federal loans; providing for the acquisition of land or rights in land for the use of tribes; and 
exempting such lands from state taxation. The IRA rejected the prior allotment policy and 
attempted to turn the governance of Indian country back to the tribes. “The reforms of the 
[IRA] and related policies allowed the beginnings of a revival of tribalism. Tribal councils and 
courts reorganized or began operating formally for the first time.” Wilkinson, supra note 7, 
at 21. For background on the IRA, see Bradley B. Furber, Two Promises, Two Propositions: The 
Wheeler–Howard Act as a Reconciliation of the Indian Law Civil War, 14 Seattle U. L. Rev. 
211 (1991). 
Dean Washburn notes that although Felix Cohen is perhaps best known for his handbook 
of Federal Indian Law, see supra note 11, “his most stubborn legacy was his work in helping 
draft the IRA constitutions that continue to govern many tribes today. It is because of these 
constitutions that Cohen remains a highly controversial figure in federal Indian law. For while 
the handbook has been revised, many tribal constitutions have been stubbornly resistant to 
change.” Kevin K. Washburn, Book Review, Felix Cohen, Anti-Semitism and American Indian 
Law, 33 Am. Indian L. Rev. 583, 592 (2009). For a discussion of tribal governments and 
tribal constitutions, see Canby, supra note 3, at 65–75. Without even mentioning Cohen’s 
role, Professor Williams describes the IRA as permitting 
tribes to adopt Anglo-style constitutions and by-laws in a mimetic effort toward civi-
lized ‘self-government.’ In virtually every case, of course, these ‘self-governing’ articles 
of government were drafted by the Bureau of Indian Affairs in the Department of 
Interior, which in turn coerced the tribes into adopting Anglicized structures of gov-
ernment.
Williams, Algebra, supra note 216, at 276–77. But see supra note 94.
For a more nuanced view, see Wilkinson, supra note 7, at 22:
Traditional governance came naturally in reasonably tight-knit, cohesive societies. 
Evolution into more elaborate forms of government would have occurred most 
smoothly on reservations composed solely of tribal Indians and tribal land. When the 
reservations were opened, true traditional governments were essentially doomed in 
most tribes, and the authority of any form of tribal rule was undermined. With the 
land base slashed back once again and with strange new faces within most reserva-
tions, tribal councils and courts went dormant.
“When Congress enacted the [IRA], it stopped the allotment process. But it did nothing 
to reverse the conquest, or to provide guidance to the Court for the post allotment era. It 
might have helped tribes consolidate or reacquire lands, or even have paid reparations.” Gould, 
Consent, supra note 6, at 844. President Theodore Roosevelt referred to the allotment policy 
as “a mighty pulverizing engine to break up the tribal mass.” 35 Cong. Rec. S90 (1901); see 
generally, Cohen’s handbook, supra note 7, at 1039–57.
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individual Indian for which the land is acquired, and such lands or rights 
shall be exempt from State and local taxation.621 
Putting aside whether a reference to the taxation of land should be inter-
preted to cover a sales or a use tax,622 there was a threshold question of whether 
this statute even applied to the ski resort, which was built on land leased from 
the United States Forest Service for a term of 30 years. The land was not 
acquired for the Tribe, and was not held in trust for the Tribe as required 
under the Act.
Justice White was unfazed by these statutory obstacles, although he 
acknowledged that the ski resort was “not technically ‘acquired’ ‘in trust for 
the Indian tribe.’”623 Without any discussion about why the Act required that 
land be acquired and held in trust for the Tribe, or about the differences in 
rights and obligations between a landlord and lessee compared with a trustee 
and beneficiary, or whether the statute would have been satisfied if the federal 
land were placed into a trust for the benefit of the Tribe and why that was not 
done, Justice White merely announced that section 465 applied:
[A]s the Solicitor General has pointed out, “it would have been meaningless 
for the United States, which already had title to the forest, to convey title 
to itself for the use of the Tribe.”624 We think the lease arrangement here in 
question was sufficient to bring the Tribe’s interest in the land within the 
immunity accorded by s. 465.625
621 Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 155 (quoting 25 U.S.C. Sec. 465). The exemption of the land 
from state and local taxation reflected an abundance of caution because a state (or its subdivi-
sion) would not be able to levy an ad valorem tax on the value of the property owned by the 
federal government. See, e.g., United States v. Allegheny Cnty., 322 U.S. 174, 192 (1944).
622 Justice White’s interpretation of the Enabling Act’s reference to the taxation of land, 
which he extended to include “activities,” see supra notes 538–91 and accompanying text, 
indicates a willingness to broadly interpret that statute.
623 Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 156 n.11 (emphasis added).
624 Professor Barsh asks whether “any lease of federal land to a tribe [is] therefore automati-
cally trust land, even if the Secretary of the Interior never processes it in accordance with the 
applicable statute?” Barsh, Omen, supra note 15, at 18.
625 Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 156 n.11. The Government’s brief argued that taxing the land 
“would unjustifiably create a windfall to the [s]tate and deprive the [t]ribe of the immunity it 
clearly would have had if non-federal (previously taxable) land had been made available to it. 
Surely Congress intended no such anomalous result.” Brief for the United States as Amicus 
Curiae, Mescalero, 411 U.S. 145 (No. 71-738), 1972 WL 137541, at *14. It is unclear what 
the government’s reference to “taxing the land” refers to. Certainly a state could not impose 
an ad valorem property tax on land owned by the federal government, whether it was leased or 
held in trust. The issue in this part of the opinion did not involve the taxation of the land, but 
whether the statute applied.
The Court also rejected the broad claim that the IRA rendered a ski resort a federal instru-
mentality that was constitutionally immune from state taxation. Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 150–55. 
Professor Barsh claims that the “federal instrumentality idea is hostile to tribal self-government 
because it limits lawful tribal activities to those that serve federal objectives.” Barsh, Omen, 
supra note 15, at 17. In any event, the instrumentality doctrine has been abandoned.
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having overcome that threshold statutory requirement and having con-
cluded that the Act applied, White then mischaracterized the New Mexico 
sales tax as an income tax,626 which he concluded the IRA did not forbid:
[i]t is true that a statutory tax exemption for “lands” may, in light of its con-
text and purposes, be construed to support an exemption for taxation on 
income derived from the land. But, absent clear statutory guidance, courts 
ordinarily will not imply tax exemptions627 and will not exempt off-reserva-
tion income from tax simply because the land from which it is derived, or 
its other source, is itself exempt from tax.628
This rule of construction, while true outside of Indian tax cases, flies in the 
face of Justice Marshall’s Indian canon of construction in McClanahan and 
his generous interpretation of the 1868 Treaty and the Arizona Enabling Act. 
The most sensible way of reconciling these two inconsistent doctrines is to 
view Mescalero’s statement as applying only to off-reservation situations. Cer-
tainly if state tax laws are not applicable on a reservation except where Con-
gress has expressly provided, which was Justice White’s view, albeit dictum, 
why should the Indians have the burden of showing that a tax exemption 
exists? An exemption is relevant only if a tax would otherwise apply; if state 
tax laws do not apply, that should be the end of the inquiry.
Justice White’s mischaracterization of the New Mexico sales tax as an 
income tax, troubling for what it suggests about the Court’s understanding 
of state taxes, was nonetheless harmless error. Under the Court’s approach, 
the statute would no more forbid sales taxes than income taxes. Likewise, his 
willingness to characterize a statutory requirement that the land be held in 
trust as a “technicality” was also harmless error because in the end it did not 
matter for this issue whether section 465 of the IRA even applied. That sec-
tion did not cover sales or (income) taxes even if the statutory preconditions 
were satisfied, but it would become relevant for the use tax.
The Court reached a different—and surprising—conclusion when it turned 
to the use tax on tangible personal property bought outside New Mexico and 
brought into the State. At issue was personalty installed in the construction 
of the ski lifts and permanently attached to the realty.629 The Court opined 
that these permanent improvements would be exempt from a property tax 
under section 465; in a leap of logic, White concluded that the same immu-
626 Justice Black made the same error in Warren Trading, mischaracterizing the Arizona sales 
tax as an income tax. See Warren Trading Post Co. v. Ariz. Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 685, 686 
(1965). Justice Marshall then perpetuated this error in McClanahan. McClanahan v. State Tax 
Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 180–81 (1973).
627 For criticism of this rule, see Erwin N. Griswold, Note, An Argument Against the Doctrine 
that Deductions Should Be Narrowly Construed as a Matter of Legislative Grace, 56 harv. L. 
Rev. 1142 (1943).
628 Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 155–56. Nor did the legislative history of section 465 support an 
exemption. Id. at 157. But see Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956) (striking down federal 
income tax on the sale of timber as inconsistent with the General Allotment Act of 1887).
629 Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 158 (citing Stipulation of Facts).
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nity should extend to the use tax on the property.630 The “use of permanent 
improvements upon land is so intimately connected with use of the land itself 
that an explicit provision relieving the latter of state tax burdens must be con-
strued to encompass an exemption for the former.”631 
e.  The Illogic of the Opinion 
As state tax lawyers will appreciate, White’s logic is inconsistent with the 
structure and administration of the sales and use tax.632 Sales taxes and use 
taxes distinguish between tangible personal property, which is almost always 
taxable, and real property, which is almost always exempt.633 In the case of 
tangible personal property, this determination is made at the time of pur-
chase. The future use of the property does not typically determine its taxable 
status; otherwise, the administration of the tax would be nigh impossible. A 
consumer might buy mortar, sheetrock, bricks, or shingles at Lowe’s or home 
Depot, all of which will likely become permanently attached to, or incorpo-
rated into, realty. States would typically treat the purchases as taxable tangible 
property and not as exempt real property.634
The use tax is a backstop to the sales tax. The rationale is that if an item 
were taxable if purchased in-state, it should be subject to the use tax if pur-
chased out-of-state and brought into the state. Otherwise, consumers would 
have an incentive to purchase goods out-of-state to the detriment of local 
vendors and to the state fisc. Conversely, if an item were exempt if purchased 
in-state, it should be exempt from the use tax if purchased out-of-state to 
avoid discriminating against interstate commerce.635 The Court’s opinion 
turns the rationale of a use tax upside down by exempting tangible personal 
property purchased outside New Mexico that would have been taxable if pur-
chased inside the State.636 The Court provided the Tribe with an incentive to 
purchase items outside the State, unless the exemption was to be extended 
630 Id.
631 Id.
632 It was also inconsistent, as Justice White recognized, with the Court’s intergovernmental 
immunity cases, which held that use taxes were not to be viewed as property taxes. See, e.g., 
United States v. Detroit, 355 U.S. 466, 474 (1958).
633 See generally Pomp, supra note 177, at 6-33 to 6-34.
634 A common rule is that a contractor would pay sales tax on the purchase of the personal 
property but would not be required to charge its customer sales tax. The theory is that the 
contractor passes the sales tax through to the customer. Minn. Dep’t of Revenue, Sales 
Tax Fact Sheet No. 128 (July 2010); see generally John F. Due & John L. Mikesell, Sales 
Taxation 98–100 (1983).
635 See Pomp, supra note 177, at 9-1. 
636 A credit is provided against the use tax for any sales taxes (or use taxes) paid to other states 
on the purchase in order to avoid discriminating against interstate commerce. An exemption 
for goods purchased out-of-state that would have been taxable if purchased in-state would be 
constitutional because interstate commerce can be favored over intrastate commerce. A state 
legislature, however, is unlikely to put its own merchants at a disadvantage by encouraging 
out-of-state purchases so that such exemptions are rare. 
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to items purchased in New Mexico for attachment to realty, contrary to the 
rationale of the use tax.
f.  Geographical Restrictions on the Indian Commerce Clause 
Justice White made no mention of the Indian Commerce Clause,637 
although it figured prominently in the Tribe’s brief. Textually, the Clause is 
not geographically constrained. It does not refer to commerce occurring in 
Indian country or on reservations but rather “Commerce . . . with the Indian 
Tribes.” At the time of the Constitution, the majority of Indians lived in 
enclaves and presumably no thought was given to their having commercial 
enterprises or activities elsewhere. If commercial dealings with the Tribe are 
under the exclusive control of the federal government pursuant to the Indian 
Commerce Clause, the location of this activity should not matter.
On the other hand, some geographical limitations seem to be consistent 
with the clause. It is hard to imagine, for example, that the Indian Commerce 
Clause would immunize a purchase made by the Tribe on a shopping trip 
to Santa Fe. Would purchases made by the Mescalero in Phoenix for the ski 
resort be exempt from New Mexico’s Uniform Commercial Code or other 
commercial statutes?638 Nonetheless, the ski resort was adjacent to the reser-
vation and was a commercial enterprise that had the imprimatur of Congress, 
which could be used to distinguish it from these other, more extreme situ-
ations.639
Picking up on this theme, Justice Douglas,640 concurring in part and dis-
senting in part, joined by Justices Brennan641 and Stewart, attempted to 
637 Nonetheless, Professor Laurence views Mescalero as dealing with the dormant Indian 
Commerce Clause. Laurence, Indian Commerce Clause, supra note 349, at 247.
638 See Natelson, supra note 15, at 212. Professor Natelson raises the argument that if the 
Indian Commerce Clause granted Congress the exclusive powers of regulation, then “Indians 
visiting New York City would not have to obey the Big Apple’s traffic laws. In the face of such 
difficulties, the Supreme Court has acknowledged exclusivity in some cases, but rejected it 
in others. The border between the two domains has been less a border than a smudge.” Id. 
Natelson’s examples show that taking the “exclusivity” argument seriously can produce uncom-
fortable, if not odd, results. But his examples also show that we have not taken the exclusivity 
language seriously, not necessarily that the exclusivity interpretation is wrong. Nevertheless, 
perhaps a territorial limitation has to be read into the exclusivity argument; although that limi-
tation is not obvious from the language of the Clause, it is consistent with the “separateness” of 
the Indians at the time of the Constitution and the Ratifying Conventions.
639 “McClanahan reduced the state’s province to practically nothing in Indian-Indian res-
ervation activities, Mescalero expands the province to practically everything in off-reservation 
activities.” Laurence, Indian Commerce Clause, supra note 349, at 248.
640 According to Dean Getches, “Douglas favored Indians only when their interests over-
lapped with other, higher concerns of his such as civil rights. he sharply curbed Indian rights, 
going against established doctrine, when he feared that tribal sovereignty would clash with 
his preference for wildlife conservation.” Getches, Conquering, supra note 14, at 1632 n.284. 
Claiborne describes Douglas’s bias in favor of the Indians as tempered by his conservationist 
instincts. Claiborne, supra note 11, at 585.
641 Justice Brennan has been described as “generally supportive of Native American rights.” 
Dewi I. Ball, supra note 272. 
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breathe some life into the Indian Commerce Clause and free it of any territo-
rial limitations:
The power of Congress granted by [the Indian Commerce Clause] is an 
exceedingly broad one. In the liquor cases,642 the Court held that it reached 
acts even off Indian reservations in areas normally subject to the police 
power of the States. The power gained breadth by reason of historic experi-
ences that induced Congress to treat Indians as wards of the Nation.643
“The powers of Congress ‘over Indian affairs are as wide as State powers 
over non-Indians. . . . One illustration of its extent is shown by the liquor 
cases already cited. . . . There is no magic in the word ‘reservation.’”644 Doug-
las’s unarticulated premise was that if Congress can regulate off-reservation 
activities under the Indian Commerce Clause, then a state cannot regulate 
such activities. hence, New Mexico could not tax the Mescalero on its off-
reservation ski enterprise.645
The dissent also argued that the statute’s reference that “any lands or rights 
acquired pursuant to the IRA should be exempt from state taxation” covered 
the New Mexico sales tax, which Douglas also misdescribed as an income tax: 
“There is no more convincing way to tax ‘rights’ in land than to impose an 
income tax on the gross or net income from those rights.”646 “If [the statute] 
be thought to be ambiguous, we should resolve the ambiguity in favor of the 
tribe.”647 The dissent did not identify the nature of the ambiguity.
Mescalero holds that tribes and Indians receive no special tax treatment of 
their off-reservation activities unless Congress dictates otherwise.648 This doc-
trine advances two economic objectives, neither of which favors the Indians 
or rises to a constitutional imperative. First, it furthers competitive equity in 
that off-reservation Indian- or tribally-owned enterprises are treated the same 
642 Congress has provided a comprehensive scheme of regulating liquor within Indian coun-
try. This regulation dates back to colonial times. Current law has its roots in an 1834 statute 
and makes it a crime to sell, give away, introduce, or attempt to introduce intoxicating bever-
ages within Indian country. “Indian country” is broadly defined. For a general discussion, see 
Cohen’s handbook, supra note 7, at 889–92. Perrin v. United States, 232 U.S. 478 (1914). 
In Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 715–16 (1983), the Court removed from the tribes their 
power to regulate liquor.
643 Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. at 159 (1973).
644 Id. at 161. 
645 Professor Clinton describes the Douglas dissent as representing “perhaps, the last grand 
defense of the Worcester dormant Indian Commerce Clause doctrine offered in the Supreme 
Court.” Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1199.
646 Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 162.
647 Id. Even if the dissent properly characterized the New Mexico tax as a sales and use tax 
and not an income tax, it might have reached the same conclusion by resolving what it thought 
was an “ambiguity” in the statute in favor of the Tribe. The dissent also would have held the ski 
enterprise to be a federal instrumentality. Id.
648 Cf. Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264, 282–83 (1898), supra notes 354–75 and accompany-
ing text, which refused to grant special treatment for those doing business with the Indians on 
a reservation.
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as their non-Indian competitors.649 Both, for example, would charge the same 
amount of state and local sales tax on an equivalent transaction. Also, both 
would pay the same amount of property taxes on identically owned proper-
ties.650
Second, Indians working off-reservation are subject to the same local and 
state income taxes as their non-Indian co-workers, even if the former live on-
reservation.651 Consequently, a business’s salary structure will not be skewed 
by Indian employees being freed of taxes that apply to their co-workers.652 
Neither of these economic objectives, however, is the concern of the Indian 
Commerce Clause.
D.  The Cigarette Cases
1.  Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead 
Reservation 
With his typical insight, Dean Getches sets the stage for Moe:
In the 1970’s, tribes throughout the country began to make use of 
McClanahan’s affirmation that reservation activities were not subject to 
state taxation. The viability of reservation businesses had historically been 
frustrated by their locations, typically far from transportation and com-
mercial centers, and by the absence of a trained work force. . . . The most 
rewarding businesses were those whose products were typically subject to 
high state taxes—cigarettes, liquor, and fireworks. Cigarette sales were espe-
cially attractive because of potentially high volumes, a large ratio of taxes to 
wholesale price, and relatively low regulatory burdens. “Smokeshops” run 
by enterprising tribal members popped up on many reservations.653
649 The amicus brief of the Montana Inter-Tribal Policy Board, on the other hand, argued 
that 
it would be an absurd and cruel result if the tax exemption of Indian tribes were inter-
preted to apply only to activities on the reservations. Many of the nation’s Indians 
were restricted to economically unviable lands—largely those unwanted by the white 
man—as reservations. To effectively restrict their tax immunity to such areas would 
compound this injustice, and serve to shackle the tribes to such lands forever.
Brief of Montana Inter-Tribal Policy Board as Amicus Curiae, McClanahan v. State Tax 
Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973) (No. 71-834), 1972 WL 136314, at *11.
650 Of course, an off-reservation vendor might well view it as unfair if it competes with on-
reservation vendors that enjoy a tax advantage. See Warren Trading Post Co., infra notes 425–68 
and accompanying text; Central Machinery, infra notes 469–518; Moe, infra notes 654–739 
and accompanying text; Colville, infra notes 740–915 and accompanying text.
651 Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 148–49. 
652 Cf. Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg., 252 U.S. at 80 (1920). McClanahan had the theoretical 
effect of encouraging reservation employers to hire Indians rather than non-Indians. In theory, 
an employer would be able to pay less salary to Indian employees, who would be exempt from 
state income taxation, than to non-Indian employees who would be taxable. This preference 
assumes that state income taxes are reflected in salaries and that non-Indian employees actually 
compete for jobs with Indian employees.
653 Getches, Conquering, supra note 14, at 1600.
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Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation654 
addressed the Montana cigarette excise tax,655 a subset of sales taxes,656 whose 
legal incidence was imposed on the purchaser and not the retailer.657 As is 
654 Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463, 
465 (1976). The Tribes and their chairman joined in the suit.
655 The Montana cigarette tax was 12 cents on each package sold within the State; 4.5 cents 
of the tax was allocated to the state’s general fund. Montana argued that the general fund 
was used for the support of state government, including the educational system, which ben-
efited Indians and non-Indians alike. Brief for Appellants, Moe, 425 U.S. 463 (Nos. 74-1656, 
75-50), 1975 WL 173493, at *6. Montana claimed that the loss in tax revenue was over 
$591,000. Id.
Another issue in the case, largely ignored by the Court, involved the Montana personal 
property tax on motor vehicles owned by tribal members residing on the reservation. The lower 
court held that the State could not impose this tax on Indians residing on the reservation, and 
the Supreme Court affirmed without any detailed or lengthy analysis. Moe, 425 U.S. at 469.
656 See generally, Pomp, supra, note 177, at 6-11 to 6-13. 
657 The Montana statute provided that the cigarette tax “shall be conclusively presumed to 
be [a] direct [tax] on the retail consumer precollected for the purpose of convenience and 
facility only.” Moe, 425 U.S. at 482. had the tax been levied on the Indian vendor rather than 
on the purchaser, McClanahan would have also applied to strike the tax, at least on sales to 
Indians. The Indian Trader statutes that preempted the Arizona sales tax imposed on the ven-
dor in Warren Trading would also preempt the Montana tax on sales to Indians. The analysis 
in Warren Trading was not a function of the legal incidence of the tax, only on whether the 
purchaser was an Indian. See supra note 426.
Dean Getches accuses the Court of “defer[ring] to a presumption in the Montana law that 
the tax falls on the retail consumer, and thereby avoided looking at the realities of the tax’s 
impact on the tribe. The state’s jurisdiction to impose the tax came through this loophole.” 
Getches, Conquering, supra note 14, at 1600–01. As a tax on consumption, the economic inci-
dence of a cigarette excise is intended to fall on the purchaser. For decades, cigarette excise taxes 
were fairly low and demand relatively price inelastic so that consumers probably did bear the 
economic incidence of the tax. Recent increases in the level of the tax and changing attitudes 
about smoking makes the incidence of cigarette excise taxes more uncertain. See Pomp, supra 
note 177, at 6–12 n.48.
The legal incidence of a tax is independent of its economic effects. Legal incidence is a 
matter of statutory interpretation. Economic incidence involves a determination of whose 
economic position is affected by the tax. For example, the legal incidence of a tax might be 
imposed on a vendor, but the economic incidence will fall on the consumer if the vendor 
increases its price by the amount of the tax and there is no decline in the aggregate amount of 
sales. For many years, this probably described the taxation of cigarettes. 
In United States v. Tax Commission of Mississippi, the Court held that if a “[s]tate requires 
that its sales tax be passed on to the purchaser and be collected by the vendor from him, this 
establishes as a matter of law that the legal incidence of the tax falls upon the purchaser.” 421 
U.S. 599, 608 (1975); see also Coeur D’Alene Tribe v. hammond, 384 F.3d 674 (9th Cir. 
2004) (legal incidence of a motor fuel tax was on a tribe who bought from a non-Indian dis-
tributor that collected the tax from the tribe). Hammond grew out of a challenge by the Coeur 
D’Alene Tribe to Idaho’s motor fuels tax. Parallels exist with Wagon, infra notes 1290-1358 
and accompanying text. For a very nice summary of the Idaho litigation, see Mark J. Cowan, 
Anatomy of a State/Tribal Tax Dispute: Legal Formalism, Shifting Incidence, Potatoes, and the 
Idaho Motor Fuel Tax, 8 Journal of Legal Tax Research 1 (2010).
If the legal incidence of a sales tax is on the purchaser, the tax cannot be applied to sales 
to the United States. If the state does not require that the sales tax on the vendor be passed 
forward and collected from the consumer, then United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720 
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typical with cigarette taxes, the Montana excise tax was collected by making 
the wholesaler purchase tax stamps, which were affixed to each pack. The cost 
of the stamps was assumed to be passed forward to the retailer, who in turn 
was assumed to pass the tax forward to the customer. In this manner, the 
cigarette tax was prepaid through the purchase of the stamps.658
The case arose when a reservation Indian who operated a smokeshop on 
trust land leased from the Tribes was arrested for failing to possess a cigarette 
retailer’s license and for selling unstamped cigarettes to both Indians and non-
Indians.659 Justice Rehnquist,660 writing for a unanimous court, treated these 
two situations separately, allowing Montana to tax the cigarettes sold to non-
Indians but prohibiting it from taxing sales to Indians.661
a.  Revisiting Mescalero and McClanahan 
Justice Rehnquist started his substantive analysis by repeating Mescalero’s 
description (dictum) of McClanahan:
[I]n the special area of state taxation, absent cession of jurisdiction or other 
federal statutes permitting it, there has been no satisfactory authority for 
taxing Indian reservation lands or Indian income from activities carried on 
within the boundaries of the reservation, and McClanahan lays to rest any 
doubt in this respect by holding that such taxation is not permissible absent 
congressional consent.662
For a Justice with a reputation as being unsympathetic to the Indians,663 
endorsing this sweeping generalization was curious. Justice Rehnquist could 
(1982), holds that tax can be collected on sales to the federal government. Id. at 739. The 
Court has held that “in determining whether a tax is within the state’s constitutional power, we 
look to the incidence of the tax and its practical operation, and not its characterization by state 
courts.” Int’l harvester Co. v. Wis. Dep’t of Taxation, 322 U.S. 435, 441 (1944).
658 But see Int’l Harvester Co., 322 U.S. at 441.
659 Moe, 425 U.S. at 467. Pursuant to Public Law 280, Montana had assumed criminal 
jurisdiction over the Indians on the Flathead Reservation. Confederated Salish & Kootenai 
Tribes of Flathead Reservation v. Moe, 392 F. Supp. 1297, 1301 (D. Mont. 1975). The Tribes’ 
Brief stated that just like Arizona in McClanahan, Montana had not assumed taxing jurisdic-
tion over the Indians. Brief for the Appellees (and Cross-Appellants), Moe, 425 U.S. 463 (Nos. 
74-1656, 75-50), 1975 WL 173495, at *20 [hereinafter Brief for the Appellees (and Cross-
Appellants), Moe]. “[T]he state has not assumed general jurisdiction over tribal members on 
the Reservation, and there is no way the state can enforce against tribal members the tax laws in 
question. Jurisdiction is the power to compel, and the state lacks that power here.” Id. at *25.
660 Woodward and Armstrong report that Justice Rehnquist was assigned to write Moe 
because his Christmas skit displeased Chief Justice Burger. Woodward & Armstrong, supra 
note 361, at 412. They also quote a Supreme Court Justice referring to Indian cases as “peewee” 
cases. Id. at 58. Woodward and Armstrong describe Rehnquist’s opinion in Moe as “wip[ing] 
away decades of Douglas’s opinions,” but they do not specify which ones. Woodward & 
Armstrong, supra, at 412.
661 In Colville, infra notes 740–915 and accompanying text, the Court upheld the Washington 
cigarette tax on non-member Indian purchasers. See infra text accompanying notes 707–10. 
662 Moe, 425 U.S. at 475–76 (quoting Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 
(1973)) (emphasis added).
663 Woodward & Armstrong, supra note 361, at 412.
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have distinguished McClanahan.664 The language he cited above referred to 
taxes on land or income; Moe involved an excise tax on sales. McClanahan 
interpreted a treaty with the Navajo Nation and the Arizona Enabling Act,665 
which were similar to, but not identical to, the Treaty of hell Gate and the 
Montana Enabling Act in Moe.666 McClanahan involved an employee; Moe 
involved a smokeshop competing with off-reservation smokeshops. Rehn-
quist’s subsequent emphasis on tax avoidance could have been another distin-
guishing feature.667
Indeed, Justice Marshall, the author of McClanahan, did not think he was 
issuing the broad holding that Mescalero was now being cited as endorsing; to 
the contrary, he based his decision on the interference by Arizona “with mat-
ters which the relevant treaty and statutes leave to the exclusive province of the 
Federal Government and the Indians themselves.”668 Marshall also described 
the issue in McClanahan as a “narrow one.”669 Nonetheless, Marshall, who was 
still on the Court, had no reason to object to the elevation of McClanahan 
into a broad principle of tax immunity for the Indians on the reservation.
Justice Rehnquist relied on the lower court’s finding, unchallenged by 
Montana, that the treaty and statutes involved in Moe were “essentially the 
664 The Tribes argued that their situation was similar to that in McClanahan. See Brief for the 
Appellees (and Cross-Appellants), Moe, supra note 659, at *17–21.
665 Justice Rehnquist described McClanahan as involving “the language of the Navajo treaty 
and the applicable federal statutes ‘which define the limits of state power.’” Moe, 425 U.S. at 
475. 
666 The Tribes’ brief before the U.S. Supreme Court described its argument before the dis-
trict court as involving the Indian Commerce Clause, the Treaty of hell Gate, and rejecting 
the claim that Montana had jurisdiction under Public Law 280. Brief for the Appellees (and 
Cross-Appellants), Moe, supra note 659, at *10. The Tribes’ arguments at the district court level 
apparently took place before the Supreme Court’s decision in McClanahan, but the district 
court ruled after McClanahan was decided.
The Tribes’ brief before the Supreme Court relied on McClanahan and argued that its Treaty 
of hell Gate “closely parallel[ed]” the Navajo treaty in McClanahan. Id. at *18. The Tribes 
also argued that neither treaty “specifically immunizes the tribal group from state taxation, 
but, as recognized in McClanahan, the general rule of interpreting Indians’ treaties in favor 
of the tribes, Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930), which justifies immunizing the 
Navajo from Arizona taxation, McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 175–76 
(1972), also justifies immunizing the tribal parties here from Montana taxation.” Brief for the 
Appellees (and Cross-Appellants), Moe, supra note 659, at *18–19. The Tribes also argued that 
the Arizona Enabling Act was similar to the Montana Enabling Act. Id. at *19–20.
667 See infra notes 706–14 and accompanying text.
668 McClanahan v. Arizona, 411 U.S. 164, 165 (1973) (emphasis added).
669 Id. at 168. In Colville, infra notes 740–915, Rehnquist would subsequently make clear 
that he viewed McClanahan as applying only to Indians on a reservation and did not extend to 
those doing business with them. he would repeat Marshall’s caveat that McClanahan involved 
a “narrow question.” Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 
U.S. 134, 178 (1980) (citing McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 168). Under Rehnquist’s view, whether 
the Montana tax was on the vendor or the purchaser would be irrelevant. If imposed on the 
vendor, McClanahan would apply only to sales by that vendor to Indians; if imposed on the 
purchaser, McClanahan would apply only to Indian purchasers.
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same as those involved in McClanahan.”670 This statement was made with no 
elaborate discussion or analysis. Accordingly, Justice Rehnquist viewed the 
combination of McClanahan and Mescalero as prohibiting the taxation of 
Indian property, income, sales, or other activities of Indians on the reserva-
tion671 unless Congress provided otherwise, a proposition certainly consistent 
with Worcester,672 which the Court did not cite, and with the Indian Com-
merce Clause, which Rehnquist subsequently tried to inter. Rehnquist would 
subsequently limit McClanahan to Indians only, and not those doing business 
with them.673
b.  No Congressional Authorization for the Montana Tax 
Rehnquist rejected every argument made by Montana that either distinguished 
McClanahan or asserted a federal statutory basis supporting its powers of 
taxation.674 The Court explicitly denied Montana’s argument that the General 
670 Moe, 425 U.S. at 477 (citing an unpublished opinion of the District Court, Jurisdictional 
Statement, App. 73, 81 n.9). This statement was reaffirmed at 392 F. Supp. 1297 and at 
392 F. Supp. 1325 without any further discussion. Rehnquist accepted the statement in the 
unpublished opinion and declared that “it would serve no purpose to retrace our analysis in 
this respect in McClanahan.” Moe, 425 U.S. at 477. hence, Moe proceeded as if McClanahan 
controlled.
671 Rehnquist recognized that the Court in McClanahan looked “to the language of the 
Navajo treaty and applicable federal statutes ‘which define the limits of state power,’” Moe, 425 
U.S. at 475–76, a recognition that is inconsistent with Mescalero’s more sweeping generaliza-
tion based on McClanahan, which he endorsed.
672 The State described Worcester as arising “out of another age and another time. Indians like 
many other minority groups, were not then citizens and were not members of society in the 
usual sense. That situation no longer prevails. Enlightened constitutional concepts demand a 
boldly different approach which obliterates racial distinctions.” Brief for the Appellants, Moe, 
425 U.S. 463 (No. 74-1656), 1975 WL 173493, at *13 [hereinafter Brief for the Appellants, 
Moe]. The Tribes argued that under the holding in McClanahan, “‘applicable treaties and fed-
eral statutes’ [are] pertinent . . . against the ‘backdrop’ of the doctrine of Indian sovereignty,” id. 
at *17 (citing McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 172), and that “[w]hile recognizing certain qualifica-
tions to that doctrine as defined in [Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557 (1832)], the 
Court found that the aspect of that doctrine that precludes state jurisdiction continues today 
unless expressly revoked by Congress,” id. 
673 See infra note 839 and accompanying text.
674
In attempting to distinguish McClanahan, the state pointed to a variety of factors: 
reservation Indians benefited from expenditures of state revenues for education, wel-
fare, and other services, such as a sewer system; the Indians had the right to vote and 
to hold local and state office; and the Indian and non-Indian residents within the 
reservation were substantially integrated as a business and social community. The 
District Court also found, however, that the Federal Government “likewise made 
substantial payments for various purposes,” and that the Tribe’s own income con-
tributed significantly to its economic well-being. Noting this Court’s rejection of a 
substantially identical argument in McClanahan, see 411 U.S. at 173, and n.12, and 
the fact that the Tribe, like the Navajos, had not abandoned its tribal organization, 
the District Court could not accept the State’s proposition that the tribal members 
“are now so completely integrated with the non-Indians . . . that there is no longer 
any reason to accord them different treatment than other citizens.” 392 F. Supp. at 
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Allotment Act675 granted it taxing powers over the Indians. The Court also 
1315. In view of the District Court’s findings, we agree that there is no basis for dis-
tinguishing McClanahan on this ground.
Moe, 425 U.S. at 476.
675 General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887). The Act’s benign 
goal was to break up the reservations and communally-owned tribal land by transferring title 
to a certain sized parcel to the federal government, which would hold it in trust for the benefit 
of an Indian typically for a 25 year period (with both shorter or longer periods possible). While 
in trust, the land would be inalienable and free from state tax:
The theory was that, when the trust period ended and the land was transformed 
into fee simple status, the Indian owners would be assimilated into the agricultural 
economy. Reservations would disappear over time, and the “Indian problem” would 
be solved. It never turned out that way. Allotment was a disastrous policy. When the 
allotments became alienable, sometimes much more quickly than originally planned, 
huge amounts of Indian land were lost through sales and tax foreclosures.
Frickey, Common Law, supra note 15, at 15.
The expectation was that few Indians would be sufficiently “civilized” to choose allot-
ments, but that those who did could be considered eligible material for citizenship by 
virtue of their ownership and cultivation of land. The system also assumed that those 
who held allotments could freely dispose of them in contracts with whites; that many 
would; and that Indians would often not secure favorable terms. These expectations 
largely came to pass.
White, supra note 196, at 711–12. 
“[M]any of the tracts were located beyond tribal members’ customary habitats, making 
them difficult to reach. Tribal members were given as little as ten dollars to purchase seeds and 
implements, making it difficult or impossible for them to farm.” Gould, Consent, supra note 
6, at 829.
Because allotted land could be sold soon after it was received, many of the early allot-
tees quickly lost their land through transactions that were unwise or even procured by 
fraud . . . Even if sales were for fair value, Indian allottees divested of their land were 
deprived of an opportunity to acquire agricultural and other self-sustaining economic 
skills, thus compromising Congress’s purpose of assimilation.
Cnty. of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 
254 (1992); see also Arrell Morgan Gibson, The American Indian 507–10 (1980).
The federal government started allotting land as early as 1798. Land Tenure History, Indian 
Land Tenure Found., http://www.iltf.org/resources/land-tenure-history (last visited Sept. 
20, 2010). Some treaties provided for allotment-type provisions. See Keweenaw Bay Indian 
Cmty. v. Naftaly, 452 F.3d 514, 516–21 (6th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1053 (2006).
As early as the 1820’s a common pattern emerged. Speculators bought land from 
Indians and then “borrowed” their money back, often in exchange for overpriced 
goods, including whiskey . . . After selling their allotments Indians sometimes “took 
to the swamps,” sometimes scavenged off their settler neighbors, or sometimes lived 
in huts on land that had not been cleared for settlement. Eventually, most became 
destitute or emigrated. 
White, supra note 196, at 712. “Allotment would enable the government to inculcate in 
Indians the ‘habits of industry and civilization’ that grow out of owning private property and 
pursuing the Jeffersonian ideal of the yeoman farmer.” Getches, Conquering, supra note 14, at 
1623. 
Land that was left over after being allotted was typically sold to settlers, which might 
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have been the real goal of the Act from the outset. Another less benign motive was to 
“deliberately . . . break down tribal cohesion and the authority of traditional tribal leaders by 
changing the Indian land tenure system from communal tribal ownership to individually-
owned allotments.” Clinton, Supremacy, supra note 7, at 179. The settlers buying surplus land 
could serve as role models, “inspiring the Indians to progress along the path to civilization. 
Within a generation or two the tribes would fade, the reservations would vanish, and Indians 
would be assimilated into the larger community.” Getches, Conquering, supra note 14, at 
1623. 
It was the widely held, but erroneous, view of federal officials during the entire nine-
teenth century that the poverty of Indians resulted from their inability to appreci-
ate and embrace the benefits of private property and understand how agriculture, 
through hard work, could enrich a person and that person’s family. These officials 
viewed Native Americans as primitive hunter-gatherers devoid of Christianity and 
civilization. . . . The historical record is another matter . . . [B]efore Europeans arrived 
intensive agriculture was common among Native Americans in most regions in North 
America where soil and climate supported it.
Taylor, Onslaught, supra note 534, at 941–42.
Some of the allotted land was not suited for farming but even if it were, the Indians often 
lacked the necessary agricultural skills. When the Indians attained the land in fee, they would 
sometimes sell it or lease it. heirs would often show no interest in using the land and would 
thus sell it to non-Indians.
The policy failed. Indians did not reject their cultural roots, even as many became 
landowners. The tribes struggled but survived, and reservations remained, albeit with 
large numbers of non-Indian occupants. These new arrivals had taken up homesteads 
on the surplus lands or had purchased parcels from Indian allottees. The announced 
goals of the Allotment Act were not realized, but an enormous amount of land passed 
into non-Indian hands.
Getches, Conquering, supra note 14, at 1623.
Some 150,000 Indians were landless by 1933 and many tribes were destitute. To Grant 
to Indians Living Under Federal Tutelage the Freedom to Organize for Purposes of Local Self-
Government and Economic Enterprise: Hearings on S. 2755 and S. 3645 Before the S. Comm. 
on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong. 59 (1934). For a discussion of allotment, see Ragsdale, supra 
note 364, at 510–13; Stuart Banner, how the Indians Lost their Land 257–90 (2005). 
Professor Milner Ball claims there was no constitutional basis for allotment. Ball, Constitution, 
supra note 7, at 71.
Between the General Allotment Act of 1887 and the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 
Indian landholdings were reduced from 138 million acres to around 50 million acres. Kevin 
Gover, An Indian Trust for the Twenty-First Century, 46 Nat. Resources J. 317 (2006). Twenty 
million of the approximately 50 million were essentially unusable for agriculture. Readjustment 
of Indian Affairs: Hearings on H.R. 7902 Before the Committee on Indian Affairs, House of 
Representatives, 73rd Cong. 15 (1934). More than 26 million acres of allotted land were trans-
ferred out of Indian hands once they passed out of trust status. Wilkinson, supra note 7, at 
20. Sixty million of the 86 million acres lost to Indians were due to the surplus lands being 
sold to non-Indians. Id. “Some of this individual allotted land was sold by arms-length trans-
actions and some of it was lost by fraud, sharp dealing, mortgage foreclosures, and tax sales.” 
Id. “Allotment and the other assimilationist programs that complemented it devastated the 
Indian land base, weakened Indian culture, sapped the vitality of tribal legislative and judicial 
processes, and opened most Indian reservations for settlement by non-Indians.” Id. at 19. This 
trend in lost land has been reversed. “As tribes were gaining in the scope of their legal authority, 
tribal land ownership also grew by sixteen million acres from 1970 to 1992.” Getches, supra, 
at 1593.
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rejected the argument that tax immunity for the Indians would constitute an 
invidious discrimination against non-Indians.676 Finally, the Court rejected 
John Collier, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, see supra note 620, realized “that 2/3 of 
American Indians were drifting towards complete impoverishment” because of allotment. 
Ansson, supra note 432, at 508. “Tribal governmental entities were also in total disarray as the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), over the opposition of traditional Tribal government leaders, 
asserted its authority to appoint leaders for the Tribe.” Id.
The policy of allotment was abandoned in 1934, by the Indian Reorganization Act, dis-
cussed supra notes 594, 620, 675, and infra note 1128, with the result that Indian country 
can consist of tribal land, allotted trust land owned by individual Indians, fee land held by 
Indians, fee land held by non-Indians, federal, state, county, or municipal land. This pattern 
is often referred to as a “checkerboard,” although a patchwork quilt might be more appro-
priate. Furthermore, the surface estate might be owned by an individual and the subsurface 
estate might be owned by a tribe, the United States, or a private entity. Wilkinson, supra 
note 7, at 9. In extreme cases where little land remained in Indian hands, reservations might 
be disestablished. In other cases, the reservation might have been reduced in size. The Indian 
Reorganization Act provided that “[t]he existing periods of trust placed upon any Indian lands 
and any restrictions on alienation thereof are hereby extended and continued until otherwise 
directed by Congress.” 25 U.S.C. § 462 (2010). 
National policy again swung in the opposite direction in 1953, when Congress unan-
imously endorsed the concept of termination—that is, disestablishment of Indian 
tribes as political, legal, and self-governing entities. One hundred nine tribes were 
terminated under this policy, though several have been reconstituted. In addition, 
Congress enacted Public Law 280, which gave most states authority to declare juris-
diction over reservations, with or without tribal consent . . . By the early 1960s the 
federal government realized that termination, like the 1887 assimilation policy, was 
detrimental to Indian welfare. Congress changed federal Indian policy again, this 
time to embrace tribal self-determination and self-sufficiency. Indian tribes are now 
encouraged to govern themselves, to enhance tribal economic development, and to 
provide for tribal education. Indian tribes strongly endorse the national policy of 
self-determination.
Johnson & Martinis, supra note 194, at 4–5; see also Michael C. Walsh, Terminating the Indian 
Termination Policy, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 1181 (1983).
“[I]n 1970, President Nixon announced that the federal government should encourage 
Tribes to attain levels of economic and political development. Since President Nixon’s pro-
nouncement, the guiding federal policy has encompassed facilitating Tribal economic and 
political development.” Ansson, supra, at 509. See also Emma R. Gross, The Origins of Self-
Determination Ideology and Constitutional Sovereignty, cited id. at n.51. The Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, enacted in response to President Nixon’s 
leadership, “encouraged Tribes to expand their education, health, and infrastructure programs 
through federal grants and contracts. Under this Act, Tribes have been allowed to assume the 
administrative responsibility for programs that had been previously administered by the BIA.” 
Id. at 509-10.
676 Justice Rehnquist thought the discrimination argument was foreclosed by Morton v. 
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974). See Moe, 425 U.S. at 480. Mancari established that the unique 
relationship between the federal government and the Indians can justify preferences that could 
not be justified for other racial groups: “As long as the special treatment can be tied rationally 
to the fulfillment of Congress’s unique obligations toward the Indians, such legislative judg-
ments will not be disturbed.” Mancari, 417 U.S. at 555. Obviously, if this argument were 
accepted “every piece of legislation dealing with Indian tribes and reservations . . . would be 
erased and the solemn commitment of the Government toward the Indians would be jeop-
ardized.” Id. at 552. “Like Crow Dog before it, however, Mancari invited decisions in which 
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the argument that the Tribes had abandoned their tribal organization.677
The Court concluded that the Montana cigarette sales tax on purchases 
made by Indians “conflict[s] with the congressional statutes which provide the 
basis for decision with respect to such impositions,”678 citing McClanahan 
and Mescalero. Presumably, the “statutes” were the Treaty of hell Gate and 
the Montana Enabling Act.
The structure of the opinion with respect to Indian purchasers was to start 
with the sweeping generalization based on McClanahan and then reject Mon-
tana’s attempt to distinguish that case. In short, the assumption was that the 
State had no power to tax because “the treaty and statutes upon which the 
Tribe relies in asserting the lack of state taxing authority ‘are essentially the 
same as those involved in McClanahan.’”679 Montana had the burden of iden-
tifying congressional authorization to tax. The State unsuccessfully argued 
that there was a federal statutory basis permitting the tax.680
c.  Application of McClanahan 
With no federal statute authorizing the Montana tax, Justice Rehnquist sim-
ply applied what had now become the “general rule” of McClanahan to ciga-
rette taxes on Indian purchasers. he did not attempt to uncover the analytical 
foundations of the proposition that “in the special area of state taxation, 
absent cession of jurisdiction or other federal statutes permitting it, there has 
been no satisfactory authority for taxing Indian reservation lands or Indian 
income from activities carried on within the boundaries of the reservation.”681 
he did not explain why a cigarette excise tax should be treated as a tax on land 
or income.682 Apparently the McClanahan rule, as interpreted by Mescalero, 
had become one that “everyone knows.”683 Justice Rehnquist was undaunted 
by the cigarette tax being neither a tax on land nor a tax on income. he 
the distinctions that it had drawn to protect the rights of tribes and Indians would be turned 
around.” Gould, Consent, supra note 6, at 836. Professor Frickey cites Mancari for the proposi-
tion that the Court has “explicitly rejected the notion that the congressional power over Indian 
affairs is extra-constitutional.” Frickey, Common Law, supra note 15, at 72.
677 Moe, 425 U.S. at 476.
678 Id. at 480–81. 
679 Id. at 477.
680 Id. at 476. Professor Fletcher describes Moe as a balancing test, Fletcher, Indian Problem, 
supra note 11, at 601–02 n.175 (citing Moe, 425 U.S. at 480), but I would disagree because 
neither McClanahan nor Mescalero, upon which Moe relies, adopted such a test. 
681 Moe, 425 U.S. at 475–76 (citing Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973)) 
(emphasis added).
682 The tax was imposed on the purchaser so Justice Rehnquist had no need to explore how 
McClanahan would apply if the tax were imposed on the vendor. 
683
All of us concerned with tax theory and policy rely heavily on “everybody knows” 
propositions, often without being conscious of the fact. When we go out of our way 
to identify and to analyze these basic assumptions, challenging and exciting con-
clusions often emerge. And even when we come away from such exercises without 
having reached solid conclusions, the questions that we have raised are themselves 
fascinating. 
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merely cited McClanahan, which involved an income tax, although the rel-
evant Arizona Treaty and Enabling Act did not refer to income taxes at all, 
and Mescalero,684 which the Court mistakenly believed involved an income 
tax. his position was consistent with the Indian Commerce Clause, which 
the Tribes had argued below (but less significantly) before the Court.685
d.  The Indian Commerce Clause 
If Rehnquist were willing to apply Mescalero’s sweeping endorsement of 
McClanahan to strike down the Montana excise tax on non-Indian purchas-
ers, essentially overturning Thomas v. Gay,686 he would be deified by the Indi-
ans and their supporters rather than vilified. But his fall from grace started 
immediately with his treatment of the Indian Commerce Clause.
The Indian Commerce Clause was implicated because of a jurisdictional 
issue in the court below. The jurisdictional issue arose because the case was 
initially heard by a three-judge federal court. At that time, 28 U.S.C. 2281 
required that a case raise a constitutional issue, other than the Supremacy 
Clause, in order to convene a three-judge panel in a federal district court.687 
Rehnquist concluded that the vendor license fee and excise taxes on purchases 
by Indians “conflict[ed] with the congressional statutes which provide the 
basis for decision with respect to such impositions.”688 By itself, that conflict 
would not satisfy Section 2281. he stated his reasoning in a footnote:
[T]he basis for the invalidity of these taxing measures, which we have 
found to be inconsistent with existing federal statutes, is the Supremacy  
Clause . . . and not any automatic exemptions689 “as a matter of constitu-
tional law” either under the Commerce Clause690 or the intergovernmental-
Norman B. Ture, Taxation and the Distribution of Income, in Wealth Redistribution and 
the Income tax (Arleen A. Leibowitz ed. 1978).
684 Moe, 425 U.S. at 480–81.
685 See supra note 666.
686 See supra notes 354–75 and accompanying text. 
687 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1973), repealed by Act of Aug. 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-381, § 1, 
90 Stat. 1119. “The tribes in Moe had sought to convene a three judge district court, entitling 
them to a direct appeal to the Supreme Court. . . . The Court’s dislike for such appeals is legend 
and justified.” Laurence, Indian Commerce Clause, supra note 349, at 250.
688 Moe, 425 U.S. at 480–81 (citing McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164 (1972); 
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973)). Justice Rehnquist never specifically 
identified which congressional statutes conflicted with the Montana tax, but presumably it was 
the Treaty and Enabling Act. See supra note 678 and accompanying text..
689 Rehnquist’s reference to the lack of an “automatic exemption” has led to much hand-
wringing about the Indian Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Richard D. Agnew, Note, The Dormant 
Indian Commerce Clause: Up in Smoke?, 25 Am. Indian L. Rev. 353, 374 (2000–01) (the foot-
note in Moe “arguably trumps” the dormant Indian Commerce Clause, a “virtual squashing” 
of a future dormant Indian Commerce Clause argument). Professor Clinton speculates that 
the footnote was intended to “announce the final demise of any judicially enforceable dormant 
Indian Commerce Clause limitations. Nevertheless, the effort was so cleverly disguised . . . 
that the point must have been lost on most of the remaining members of the Court, as its later 
decision in Colville suggests.” Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1205.
690 In the footnote, Justice Rehnquist referred to the “Commerce Clause,” but presumably he 
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immunity doctrine.691 . . . If so, then the basis for convening a three-judge 
court in this type of case has effectively disappeared, for this Court has 
expressly held that attacks on state statutes raising only Supremacy Clause 
invalidity do not fall within the scope of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2281. . . . here, 
however, the District Court properly convened a Sec. 2281 court, because at 
the outset the Tribe’s attack asserted the unconstitutionality of these statutes 
under the Commerce Clause,692 a not insubstantial claim since Mescalero 
and McClanahan had not yet been decided.693 
This assertion that Mescalero and McClanahan addressed the Indian Com-
merce Clause issue is perplexing.694 McClanahan involved an interpretation of 
a treaty with the Navajos, and the Arizona Enabling Act. Mescalero concerned 
a treaty, the New Mexico Enabling Act, and the Indian Reorganization Act. 
Mescalero and McClanahan were traditional Supremacy Clause cases that did 
not rely on the Indian Commerce Clause.
Justice Rehnquist’s view that the Indian Commerce Clause had no role 
to play695 because of Mescalero and McClanahan may explain his failure to 
meant the Indian Commerce Clause and not the Interstate or Foreign Commerce Clauses. The 
Tribes had argued below that the Indian Commerce Clause gave Congress the exclusive power 
to regulate commerce with Indian tribes. See Brief for the Appellees (and Cross-Appellants), 
Moe, supra note 659, at *10. That argument was repeated before the Supreme Court without 
much elaboration. Id. Rehnquist might have been comparing the automatic exemption under 
the Indian Commerce Clause to the automatic exemption under the Interstate Commerce 
Clause from state taxes imposed on the privilege of conducting an interstate business. That 
“automatic” exemption, however, was struck down one year later in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. 
v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977) (overruling Spector Motor Serv. v. O’Connor, 340 U.S. 602 
(1951)). See supra note 447.
In Colville, infra notes 740–915 and accompanying text, the Tribes argued that Rehnquist’s 
reference to an “automatic constitutional exemption” should be limited to situations involving 
discrimination or infringement on tribal government, Brief of Appellee Indian Tribes, Colville, 
supra note 108, at *68, an obvious attempt at damage control.
691 Professor Milner Ball interprets this comment to mean that “inherent Indian sovereignty 
does not count.” Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 105, but that seems to be an overly broad 
interpretation of the intergovernmental doctrine. 
The origins of the “automatic exemption” language seem to be Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. 
Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342, 365–66, where the Court rejected the proposition that restricted 
Indian lands and the proceeds from them were—as a matter of constitutional law—automat-
ically exempt from state taxation.
692 Presumably, the reference is to the Indian Commerce Clause but Rehnquist did not 
specify. See supra note 690.
693 Moe, 425 U.S. at 481 n.17. One commentator describes Moe as “complet[ing] the emas-
culation of the Indian commerce clause and initiat[ing] a frustrating new Indian war. Since 
Moe, Indian tribes throughout the United States have been fighting an escalating battle against 
state taxing authorities encouraged by this opinion.” Minnis, supra note 7, at 289.
694 Neither McClanahan nor Mescalero involved the question of a three-judge federal court. 
Neither case originated in the federal courts so that section 2281 was not implicated. Mescalero 
rejected the intergovernmental immunity doctrine but said nothing about the Commerce 
Clause. See Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 162–63.
695 “Selling cigarettes in Indian Country by a tribe to non-tribal members is patently Indian 
commerce and thus a subject that the state—absent federal authorization—should have no 
power to materially burden.” Minnis, supra note 7, at 298.
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even acknowledge the Solicitor General’s brief. The government argued that 
the Indian Commerce Clause “ousts State jurisdiction over all matter within 
Indian Reservations that significantly touch tribal interests and reserves that 
area for federal regulation. This is, in effect, the approach of [Worcester] as 
‘modified’ in [Williams v. Lee].”696 By failing to even mention the Solicitor 
General’s brief, Rehnquist was reacting the same as Justice Marshall in Central 
Machinery, making for strange bedfellows.697
e.  Non-Indian Purchasers 
One final issue remained: whether Montana could tax non-Indian purchas-
ers. In terms of the revenue at stake, the viability of the smokeshops, and 
the concomitant effects on the tribal economy, this issue overshadowed the 
immunity the Court had just provided to Indian purchasers. Given Jus-
tice Rehnquist’s endorsement of Mescalero’s broad reading of McClanahan, 
it might have been expected that non-Indians would be treated the same 
as Indians and be similarly immunized from State taxation.698 Without any 
real discussion, however, the Court drew a distinction between Indian pur-
chasers, whom Montana could not tax, and non-Indian purchasers, whom 
Montana could tax:699 “The Tribe would carry these cases significantly further 
than we have done, however, and urges that the State cannot impose its ciga-
rette tax on sales by Indians to non-Indians because ‘[i]n simple terms, [the 
Indian retailer] has been taxed, and . . . suffered a measurable out-of-pocket 
loss.’”700
696 Brief for the United States, Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation, 
447 U.S. 134 (1980) (No. 78-630), 1979 WL 213469, at *25–26 [hereinafter Brief for the 
United States, Colville]. Williams v. Lee was actually inconsistent with the Indian Commerce 
Clause, see supra note 410, but declaring that would not be good lawyering. The government’s 
spin on Williams v. Lee attempted to make the best of an inconvenient precedent. See Williams 
v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
One commentator notes that Justice Rehnquist, in his book, Supreme Court: how It 
Was, how It Is (1987), describes the Commerce Clause as providing that Congress should 
have the power “to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states,” 
failing to cite the Indian Commerce Clause at all. Minnis, supra note 7, at 298. “The Indian 
Commerce Clause has been ellipsed by the judiciary.” Id. 
697 See supra notes 517–19 and accompanying text.
698 The Indian Commerce Clause would not distinguish between Indian and non-Indian 
purchasers; indeed, an off-reservation, non-Indian traveling to the reservation purposely to 
purchase cigarettes would be more likely to constitute “commerce” than an Indian resident on 
the reservation. Rehnquist’s dismissal of the Indian Commerce Clause made these questions 
moot. See Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 161.
699 “Clearly, the Moe opinion never affirmatively considered the source of state power to tax 
or otherwise regulate non-Indian activities in Indian country, including non-Indian commerce 
with Indians, it simply assumed that such state power existed in the absence of federal preemp-
tion.” Clinton, supra note 22, at 1228 (emphasis added).
700 Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 481 (1976). Rehnquist 
provided no citation for the quoted language but presumably it is from the Tribes’ brief. See 
infra note 701 and accompanying text. Professor Laurence interprets this argument to be a 
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The opinion does not describe the nature of the retailer’s loss, but the Tribes’ 
brief defined the loss as it being
forced to pay money to the state, and . . . forced to do this as a precondition 
to operating an independent business under tribal regulation. This is a gross 
interference with freedom from state regulation, even assuming the tribal 
member can recoup all of the money he had to advance (interest-free) for 
state purposes.701 
In other words, the Tribes argued that even if the state can tax the non-Indian 
purchasers, the vendor cannot be forced to collect the tax.702 The Tribes did 
not make the broader argument that McClanahan applied to exempt the non-
Indian purchasers.
In rejecting the Tribes’ claim, the Court cited the district court’s finding 
that under the Montana statute the legal incidence of the cigarette tax was on 
“the non-Indian consumer or user who saves the tax and reaps the benefit of 
the tax exemption.”703 Exactly how this was a response to the Tribes’ argument 
is unclear. The question was not whether the consumer had the obligation 
to pay the cigarette tax, the consumer did,704 but whether the Indian vendor 
could be forced to collect it. The issue was jurisdictional in nature, and the 
district court’s views on the legal incidence of the tax were beside the point.
An analogy can be drawn with a state’s use tax. A consumer purchasing a 
good from a remote vendor is subject to a state’s use tax; the jurisdictional 
issue is whether that vendor can be forced to collect the use tax.705 The juris-
dictional issue is not resolved by stating that the consumer is subject to the 
use tax. If the consumer was not taxable in the first instance, the jurisdictional 
issue would not even arise because there would be no tax to collect.
But Justice Rehnquist was hardly going to give Montana the battle but not 
the war by holding that the vendor did not have to collect the tax:
dormant commerce clause argument. Laurence, Indian Commerce Clause, supra note 349, at 
251.
701 Brief for the Appellees (and Cross-Appellants), Moe, supra note 659, at *23.
702 Professor Clinton describes Moe as reaching a “startling holding,” which is “totally incon-
sistent with the Indian Commerce Clause.” Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1203. 
703 Moe, 425 U.S. at 481–82. Under the Tribe’s view, the finding by the District Court 
that “it is the non-Indian consumer or user who saves the tax and reaps the benefit of the tax 
exemption,” id., would be irrelevant. 
Professor Milner Ball thinks that Justice Rehnquist’s description of the “tax as falling on 
non-Indian consumers rather than the tribe,” is “questionable and assumes that state taxing 
power is appropriate on reservations so long as its burden is not borne by the tribes.” Ball, 
Constitution, supra note 7, at 103–04. This comment seems to confuse the legal incidence of 
the tax, which Rehnquist’s comments focus on, with the economic incidence of the tax, which 
Ball seems to focus on. The distinction between legal and economic incidence should be irrel-
evant under the Indian Commerce Clause.
In California State Board of Equalization v. Chemehuevi Tribe, the tribal smokeshops unsuc-
cessfully tried to distinguish Moe and Colville on the grounds that the legal incidence of the 
California tax fell on the vendor.
704 See Mont. Code Ann. §§ 16-11-133, 16-11-148 (2005).
705 See Quill v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
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[T]he competitive advantage which the Indian seller doing business on 
tribal land enjoys over all other cigarette retailers, within and without the 
reservation, is dependent on the extent to which the non-Indian purchaser 
is willing to flout his legal obligation to pay the tax. Without the simple 
expedient of having the retailer collect the sales tax from non-Indian pur-
chasers, it is clear that wholesale violations of the law by the latter class will 
go virtually unchecked.706
f. Tax Avoidance 
Justice Rehnquist was undoubtedly correct in implying that many non-In-
dians who shopped for exempt cigarettes on the reservation were not going 
to voluntarily pay the tax they were seeking to avoid.707 Tax avoidance would 
706 Moe, 425 U.S. at 482. Professor Clinton describes Rehnquist as “simply assum[ing] away, 
without discussion, the most critical question in the case—whether states could tax commerce 
with Indian tribes consistent with the Indian Commerce Clause and, if so, what limitations, if 
any, existed on such state taxing power.” Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1204.
It is possible that if the purchase by a non-Indian were exempt (contrary to the holding in 
Moe), the consumer would not benefit by the full amount of the state tax that would other-
wise be paid on off-reservation sales. The on-reservation vendor could raise the price of the 
cigarettes to appropriate some of the benefit of the exemption. Professor Barsh reports that 
the Director of Revenue of Washington State estimated that about 55–80% of the tax savings 
(prior to Moe and Colville, see infra) were passed on to non-Indian purchasers, with the balance 
being appropriated by the retailer. Barsh, Omen, supra note 15, at 29. See infra note 891.
707 Jenkins Act, 15 U.S.C. § 377 (1949) (repealed and reenacted Pub. L. No. 111-154 
(2010)), adopted in 1949, requires vendors that sell or transfer for profit cigarettes in interstate 
commerce (e.g., over the Internet or by mail) to anyone other than a licensed distributor to 
report all sales and shipments into a state. Id. § 376. Violators are guilty of a misdemeanor and 
subject to fines of not more than $1,000 and imprisonment of not more than 6 months. Id. § 
377. Compliance with the Jenkins Act is uneven and some tribes claim that as sovereigns they 
are not subject to the law. The Jenkins Act, http://www.free-cigarettes.com/thejenkinsact.html. 
The Government Accounting Office estimates that three-quarters of all Internet sellers do not 
report sales pursuant to the Jenkins Act. Special Report: Internet Tobacco Sales, Campaign for 
Tobacco-Free Kids, http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/reports/internet.
The Jenkins Act applies only to sales in interstate commerce. A sale of cigarettes by a tribe 
to residents of the same state in which the tribe is located might not be viewed as constituting 
interstate commerce, notwithstanding that the cigarettes were manufactured in other states. If 
this view prevailed, and if the sales to non-Indians in Moe involved consumers from Montana, 
the Jenkins Act would not apply.
(For other federal law on cigarettes, see the Contraband Cigarette Trafficking Act, 18 
U.S.C. Chapter 114, §§ 2341–46; Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331–41; Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco health Education Act of 1986, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 4401–08.)
A recent “survey of the websites of Internet vendors that sell to U.S. consumers found that 
158, or more than one in five, were located on Indian Tribal lands, with 80 percent of all 
Tribal-land Internet sellers based on Seneca Tribal lands. . . . The survey also found that the 
websites of Internet vendors based on Tribal lands were more likely than those of foreign or 
other domestic Internet sellers to say explicitly that they sold tax-free cigarettes, kept all con-
sumer information private, and did not report any information to tax authorities.” The Pact 
Act and Indian Tribes, Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/
research/factsheets/pdf/0362.pdf. 
State tax administrators do not always find the Jenkins Act useful. They may receive the 
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likely be reduced if the tax were collected from non-Indians, but whether the 
vendors had a legal obligation to do so was the issue before the Court, and 
Rehnquist’s argument was a classic example of assuming the conclusion.708
names and addresses of persons purchasing cigarettes free of tax, but the limited amount 
involved per purchaser does not justify robust administrative enforcement efforts. In the aggre-
gate, however, the lost revenue is impressive. In 2005, the states estimate a revenue loss of as 
much of $1.4 billion annually in uncollected tobacco taxes through Internet sales. Special 
Report: Internet Tobacco Sales, Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, http://www.tobaccofreek-
ids.org/reports/internet. Excise taxes are even higher today than in 2005, so the revenue loss 
should be even greater.
In 2010, Congress enacted the Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking Act of 2009 (PACT Act), 
Pub. L. No. 111-154, 124 Stat. 1087 (2010), requiring retailers of cigarettes who sell to those 
who are not in the physical presence of the seller at the time of sale, to comply with all state and 
local laws in the jurisdiction where those products are being delivered and to pay any existing 
state or local excise taxes in advance of the sale or delivery. The PACT Act also provides that 
the United States Postal Service shall not deliver any packages that it knows or has a reasonable 
cause to believe contains cigarettes. Violations are subject to civil penalties, as well as felony 
criminal prosecution punishable by imprisonment of up to three years.
Although the PACT covers only the United States Postal Service, in 2005 UPS Inc. had 
already agreed to stop delivering cigarettes to individuals in the United States under an agree-
ment reached with former New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer. DhL had previously 
banned cigarette deliveries as well. In 2006, FedEx followed suit. Consequently, the only 
remaining shipper of any significance was the United States Postal Service. Michael Gormley, 
UPS Agrees to End Cigarette Deliveries to Individuals, Citizens Freedom Alliance, Inc.: 
The Smoker’s Club (Oct. 24, 2005), http://www.smokersclubinc.com/modules.php?nam
e=News&file=article&sid=2229; Fed Ex Delivers New Policy to Fight Contraband Cigarettes, 
AllBusiness (Feb. 10, 2006), http://www.allbusiness.com/retail-trade/food-stores/4488562-1.
html. I understand, however, that new carriers are coming forth to fill the vacuum, although 
presumably they will not be shipping the amounts that the Post Office, DhL, FedEx, or UPS 
were previously delivering.
The PACT was challenged by Red Earth LLC d/b/a Seneca Smokeshop and by Aaron 
J. Pierce, both in the business of selling cigarettes over the Internet and through the mail 
and by telephone. They alleged that the Act violated the Due Process, Equal Protection, and 
Commerce Clauses, the Tenth Amendment, and was void for vagueness and inconsistent with 
the sovereign rights of Native Americans. On July 30, 2010, the United States District Court 
for the Western District of New York granted a preliminary injunction. Red Earth LLC v. 
United States, Nos. 10-CV-530A, 10-CV-550A, 2010 WL 3061103 (W.D.N.Y. 2010). 
708 This “tax avoidance” routinely occurs when consumers purchase goods from remote ven-
dors that do not have to collect the home state’s use tax. The consumer is required to pay that 
use tax even if the vendor does not collect it. Most consumers do not pay the use tax under 
these conditions.
A non-Indian (and, as Colville, see infra notes 826–29 and accompanying text, would make 
clear, a non-member of the tribe) who bought unstamped cigarettes on the reservation would 
be subject to a use tax. Anyone purposely buying cigarettes on the reservation in order to avoid 
the state tax could not be expected to voluntarily pay the use tax. If a vendor on the reserva-
tion was not required to collect the use tax, Montana would not be helpless, however. Besides 
the federal initiatives described supra note 707, a state could follow the lead of Massachusetts 
and identify cars making major purchases on the reservation and stop and search those cars 
when they leave the reservation. This approach was once used by Massachusetts to discour-
age its residents from buying cheaper liquor across the border at New hampshire-owned 
stores, free of a sales or excise tax, which New hampshire does not impose. During major 
holidays, Massachusetts had stationed its state police in the parking lots of these stores. They 
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Justice Rehnquist’s analysis reflected his understandable lack of sympathy 
with the facts, which on a concrete rather than abstract level were not helpful 
for the Indians. After all, non-Indians presumably shopped on the reservation 
to avoid the Montana tax to the detriment of both the state fisc and the stores 
located off-reservation that competed with the smokeshops. This was hardly 
an appealing case for the Indians.709 Rehnquist’s response was based more on 
policy grounds than on legal grounds.
Viewed more broadly, the tax avoidance that Rehnquist thought he was 
stopping is ubiquitous under the Interstate Commerce Clause and was not 
sui generis to the Indians. That clause prevents a state from requiring out-of-
state vendors to collect the state’s sales or use taxes unless “nexus” exists. A 
vendor that has no physical presence in the state and only advertises through 
the mail, television, radio, or the Internet, and ships goods into the state 
using the U.S. mail or common carriers, has no Commerce Clause nexus 
and cannot be forced to collect any sales or use taxes.710 If the consumer does 
not voluntarily pay the use tax, which most individuals do not, tax avoidance 
results. The vendor may well be a “co-conspirator” by advertising that it will 
not collect any sales tax without informing the purchaser that a use tax may 
be due.711
noted the Massachusetts license plate numbers of cars whose drivers just made large pur-
chases and radioed the information to officers located on the Massachusetts side of the border, 
who stopped and searched the cars. Philip Shishkin, Tax-Free Liquor Lures Buyers, Stirring 
Crossborder Tensions, Wall St. J., Sept. 8, 2009, at A18, available at http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB125236461011390855.html. 
Part of the strategy was the hope that a few high profile incidents would have an in terrorem 
effect, just the way the Internal Revenue Service likes to have a high profile conviction for tax 
evasion during the height of the filing season. Martin S. Kaplan, What the IRS Doesn’t 
Want You to Know 39 (9th ed. 2004). The right of Montana, however, to station its employ-
ees on the reservation over the objections of a tribe is more problematic than Massachusetts’s 
right to station its employees in the parking lots of New hampshire liquor stores.
709 The district court ruled for the State on the issue of sales to non-Indians and ruled for 
the Indians on the issue of sales to Indians. Montana appealed and the Tribes cross-appealed. 
In retrospect, the question can be raised whether the Tribes should have cross-appealed on an 
issue having such unsympathetic facts.
710 Quill v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992). A vendor must also have Due Process 
nexus, which requires that it purposefully avail itself of the taxing state’s marketplace. For a 
discussion of Quill, see Pomp, supra note 177, at 3-1 to 3-3, 3-18 to 3-32, 9-70 to 9-75, and 
9-82; infra note 774. Typically, Due Process nexus will be an easier test to satisfy than will 
Commerce Clause nexus. But in the case of rented property, for example cars, the lessor may 
satisfy the Commerce Clause because its leased property will be in a state, but not satisfy the 
Due Process Clause if the lessor has no knowledge of where its property is located. See id. at 
3-30 to 3-31.
711 Colorado recently adopted a law requiring certain remote vendors to either collect taxes 
voluntarily or notify their customers of their use tax obligation and send a report to the appro-
priate tax department outlining the customer’s purchases. The Direct Marketing Association 
filed suit on June 30, 2010 arguing that the law is unconstitutional. See Direct Mktg. Ass’n 
v. huber, Case No. 1:2010cv01546 (D. Colo. 2010); see also the Jenkins Act, supra note 707; 
Amazon.com LLC v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Taxation & Fin., 877 N.Y.S.2d 842 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
2009).
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To combat this type of tax avoidance in the case of cigarettes, Montana, 
which does not have a general sales tax,712 makes it a misdemeanor to use or 
consume unstamped cigarettes.713 Tax avoidance can arise not only in the 
case of purchases from Indians, but also from purchases over the Internet or 
from vendors in a state (or country) having lower cigarette taxes (or none at 
all). If no Commerce Clause nexus exists, Montana cannot make the seller 
collect its cigarette tax714 and must depend on the voluntary compliance of 
the consumer.
Justice Rehnquist’s fears about cigarette tax avoidance mirrored on a small 
scale a much more severe and pervasive problem that exists in states with 
general sales taxes. he did not seem to recognize that what he viewed as the 
non-Indian purchaser’s “flouting his obligation” was not unique to the sale of 
cigarettes on a reservation. The difficulty of collecting a tax from a consumer 
who purchases tangible personal property outside the state is a pervasive 
problem faced by all jurisdictions with general sales taxes. 
Of course, that fact alone does not mean that Rehnquist should have been 
estopped from dealing with the problem of cigarette tax avoidance, even 
if there is a larger problem of general sales tax avoidance. Nonetheless, his 
distinction between exempt Indian consumers and taxable non-Indian pur-
chasers is troubling because he never defended that line drawing; instead, he 
asserted it indirectly by accusing the Tribe of “carry[ing] these cases signifi-
cantly further than we have done,”715 without explaining his response. If the 
problem of tax avoidance is serious, Congress is the appropriate body to act.
At the heart of Moe was the proposition that “in the special area of state 
taxation, absent cession of jurisdiction or other federal statutes permitting it, 
there has been no satisfactory authority for taxing Indian reservation lands 
or Indian income from activities carried on within the boundaries of the 
reservation.”716 What is ironic is that Justice Rehnquist read the quoted lan-
guage above loosely and expansively to cover a cigarette excise tax. If the lan-
guage was elastic enough to apply to excise taxes on sales to Indians, then why 
did it not cover sales to non-Indians?717 And why was Montana presumed to 
have power to tax sales to non-Indians in the first place?
712 Montana is just one of five states that do not have a broad-based state sales tax. The oth-
ers are Delaware, New hampshire, Oregon, and Alaska. See generally Pomp, supra note 177, 
at 6-2 to 6-3.
713 Mont. Code Ann. § 16-11-133 (2005) (providing, inter alia, that a person who uses or 
consumes a cigarette within Montana, which is taken from a package that does not bear the 
required tax stamp, is guilty of a misdemeanor). Presumably, this statute applies whether that 
cigarette is smoked on- or off-reservation. A person can be imprisoned and subject to fines and 
penalties. See infra note 737.
714 See Quill v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992); supra note 710.
715 Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 481 (1976).
716 Id. at 475–76 (quoting Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973)).
717 “Moe resulted from the judicial evolution away from a legalistic approach to Indian law 
and toward an amorphous pre-emption balancing test premised on a backdrop.” Minnis, supra 
note 7, at 299. Rehnquist is no fan of balancing and would resist his analysis being character-
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g.  Burdens of Collecting the Montana Tax 
Rehnquist also perfunctorily dismissed the Tribes’ argument that to make the 
Indian retailer an “‘involuntary agent’ for collection of taxes owed by non-In-
dians is a ‘gross interference with [its] freedom from state regulation’” under 
Warren Trading.718 he described the burden as “minimal,”719 and not strictly 
a tax at all,720 allowing him to bypass the troubling language in Mescalero 
“dealing with the ‘special area of state taxation,’”721 which was the rationale 
ized in that manner. Moreover, because Rehnquist upheld the Montana tax on sales to non-
Indians, Minnis’s reference to “preemption” is unclear and seems unsupported by the Court’s 
analysis. But see infra note 719.
718 Moe, 425 U.S. at 483. The district court recognized that a distinction between immune 
Indian purchases and taxable non-Indian purchasers would impose complicated problems 
of enforcement, and thus “deferred passing on these problems pending a decision by [the 
Supreme Court].” Id. at 468 n.6. Although Rehnquist claimed that “[w]e, of course, express 
no opinion on this question,” id., the Court seemed to do exactly that. And in Colville, infra 
notes 740–915 and accompanying text, the Court referred to Moe as upholding “the collec-
tion requirement, as applied to purchases by non-Indians, on the ground that that it was a 
‘minimal burden’ designed to aid the State in collecting an otherwise valid tax,” 447 U.S. 134, 
151 (1980) (citing Moe, 425 U.S. at 483), but also claimed that Moe “expressed no opinion 
regarding the ‘complicated problems’ of enforcement that distinctions between exempt and 
nonexempt purchasers might entail,” id. at 151–52 (citing Moe, 425 U.S. at 480–81 n.16.)
719 Feldman thinks that McClanahan’s reference to a “state’s legitimate interests” and in 
Moe to a “minimal burden” “prestaged a revolution in state jurisdiction cases: the Court’s 
express adoption of a balancing test to determine the extent of state power in Indian country.” 
Feldman, supra note 436, at 675 (emphasis added). I find nothing to support that statement. 
It is also unlikely that Justice Rehnquist, who has expressed disdain for balancing tests both in 
the context of Indian cases and elsewhere, see Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 
941, 962 (1982); Kassel v. Consol. Freightways, 450 U.S. 662, 687–92 (1981); Nat’l League 
of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 876 (1976), would agree. See also Clinton, Dormant, supra 
note 22, at 1214. Nonetheless, Chickasaw Nation, infra notes 1271–89, 1359–72 and accom-
panying text, referred to this part of Moe as a balancing test. 515 U.S. 450, 458 (1995). See 
also supra note 717.
Professor Clinton notes the inconsistency between a balancing test and the dormant Indian 
Commerce Clause “first announced in Worcester [which] was a bright-line rule that automati-
cally excluded state authority from any matter that involved Indian affairs in order to protect 
the exclusive congressional power in the area.” Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1215.
720 Moe, 425 U.S. at 483.
721 Id. Justice Rehnquist did not address the burden that would be placed on the retailer 
from having to verify whether the purchaser was a tribal member, the burden in keeping the 
records necessary to obtain a refund from the state for the tax paid on the cigarettes sold to 
tribal members, or the time value of money involved between the purchase of the stamps and 
the refund.
For an approach by New York to reduce these burdens by allowing cigarette retailers to 
purchase unstamped cigarettes based on an estimate of the amount of Indian purchasers, see 
Department of Taxation & Finance of New York v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., 512 U.S. 61, 66 
(1994), which upheld these regulations against constitutional attack. The history of cigarette 
taxation in New York is long and tortuous. Despite winning Milhelm Attea, litigation contin-
ues. 
In 1995, George Pataki became Governor of New York. During the campaign, he promised 
leaders of the New York Association of Convenience Stores that he would make it a priority 
to end cigarette tax evasion on Indian lands. When the Tax Department did not enforce the 
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for not taxing cigarette sales to Indians. Moreover, Rehnquist saw “nothing 
Milhelm Attea regulations, the Association filed suit. In 1996, the Tax Department adopted 
new regulations and gave the tribes four months to either negotiate plans with the state to 
apply their own tribal surcharge or face collection of taxes by the State. That same year, the 
state supreme court ruled in favor of the Association, requiring that New York either enforce 
existing regulations or suspend cigarette taxes statewide. By 1997, the Tax Department negoti-
ated interim compacts with a majority of tribes and began enforcing its regulations, including 
intercepting shipments of untaxed cigarettes. In the same year, the appellate division upheld 
the State supreme court’s opinion except for requiring that the taxes be suspended statewide 
if the Tax Department did not enforce the regulations. Later that year, protests took place on 
several reservations. Protestors burned tires along the Thruway and Interstate 81. Governor 
Pataki suspended enforcement of the Tax Department’s regulations. Fearing further violence, 
in 1997 Governor Pataki suspended the regulations and halted enforcement of the tax.
In 1998, the court of appeals overturned the appellate division and remanded the case to 
the State supreme court. On remand, the court upheld the Tax Department’s suspension of the 
regulations. In 2000, the appellate division upheld the State supreme court. When the U.S. 
Supreme Court denied certiorari, the litigation ended, with the result that the State was legally 
not collecting taxes on sales by the Indians to non-Indians.
In 2000, New York made it unlawful for any common or contract carrier (UPS, FedEx) to 
knowingly transport cigarettes to any person in New York who is not authorized under the 
statute to receive such cigarettes, which would include individual consumers. The following 
year, the United States District Court held that the statute discriminated against interstate 
commerce both on its face and in effect. Santa Fe Natural Tobacco Co. v. Spitzer, 2001 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 7548 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). That decision was overturned by the Second Circuit in 
Brown & Williamson v. Pataki, 320 F.3d 200 (2nd Cir. 2003).
In 2003, Governor Pataki and the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe reached a tentative agreement 
on land claims, casino, and tax issues. The Tribe agreed to collect and retain taxes equivalent to 
state and local taxes on their cigarette sales to non-Indians so their prices were comparable to 
those of surrounding non-Indian retailers. The agreement fell apart when the Tribe voted out 
the leaders who negotiated it. The Tax Department then published draft regulations on collect-
ing cigarette taxes. In response, the Seneca Indians launched a public relations campaign and 
the Tax Department postponed the start of tax collection, and in the following year, suspended 
indefinitely the start of tax enforcement, fearing possible violence. In 2005, legislation was 
enacted requiring the Tax Department to begin collecting cigarette taxes. In 2006, Governor 
Pataki refused to enforce any tax collection.
In 2006, a group of retailers and the Association sought an order directing the Governor 
to collect cigarette taxes. In 2007, the State supreme court dismissed the suit on the lack of 
standing. In a separate case, the State supreme court issued an injunction barring the Tax 
Department from implementing the tax collection law.
In 2008, the City of New York filed suit in the federal district court seeking an order barring 
eight of the largest cigarette dealers on a Long Island Indian reservation from selling cigarettes 
tax-free to the public. In 2009, the court issued a temporary injunction but stayed it to give 
the Tribe a chance to appeal. In coordinated raids, Cayuga and Seneca Counties seized untaxed 
cigarettes from the Cayuga Indian Nation’s convenience stores. The State supreme court ruled 
that there was sufficient legal authority for the raids, but the appellate division of the State 
supreme court granted a preliminary injunction against the counties from prosecuting felony 
tax evasion charges, pending a subsequent hearing. In 2009, the State supreme court ordered 
the Cayuga Indian Nation to stop selling untaxed cigarettes and ruled that the counties could 
hold onto the cigarettes seized during their 2008 raids as evidence. The appellate division of 
the State supreme court overturned this case. In 2010, the Tax Department proposed new reg-
ulations. NYS Tax Department Proposes Regulation to Address Issue of Tax-Free Sales of Cigarettes 
to Indians, N.Y. State Dep’t of Tax. & Fin. (Feb. 23, 2010), http://www.tax.state.ny.us/
press/2010/cigreg02232010.htm. Most recently, the Cayuga Nation won a case immunizing 
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in this burden which frustrates tribal self-government” under the Williams v. 
Lee doctrine,722 which was not exactly an exhaustive treatment of the issue:723 
“We see nothing in this burden which . . . runs afoul of any congressional 
enactment dealing with the affairs of reservation Indians.”724 
h.  Inapplicability of Warren Trading 
The Tribes also made a Warren Trading argument,725 which Rehnquist easily 
them from prosecution for selling untaxed cigarettes on the reservation. Cayuga Indian Nation 
of N.Y. v. Gould, 930 N.E.2d 233 (N.Y. 2010). As this Article goes to press in September of 
2010, there are both federal and state injunctions in place against the tax department. The 
federal suit involving the Senecas and Cayugas argues that New York lacks jurisdiction to regu-
late Indian nations. The State suit challenges on procedural grounds the expedited manner in 
which the Tax Department adopted regulations. Carolyn Thompson, NY Appeals Court Halts 
Indian Cigarette Tax Plan, Indian Country Today (Sept. 7, 2010), http://www.indiancoun-
trytoday.com/national/NY-appeals-court-halts-Indian-cigarette-tax-plan-102104144.html. 
For further details ad nauseum, see 15-Year Chronology of NYS Tax Evasion/Enforcement Issue, 
N.Y. Ass’n of Convenience Stores, http://www.nyacs.org/documents/15-yearchronology.
pdf. See also infra note 733. The story is far from over.
722 Moe, 425 U.S. at 483. For a criticism of this treatment of Williams v. Lee, see Ball, 
Constitution, supra note 7, at 104–05; Barsh, Omen, supra note 15, at 35 (“[If Rehnquist is 
right] it is difficult to see what it was in Williams [v. Lee] that did frustrate tribal self-govern-
ment.”). Professor Ball’s comments indicate the frustration that many commentators feel about 
the uselessness of the infringement doctrine.
The Tribes’ brief argued that if Montana could impose its tax then the Indians would be 
deterred from ever imposing their own tax, which would preclude raising needed revenue. That 
deterrence, the Tribes argued, would violate Williams v. Lee. Brief for the Appellees (and Cross-
Appellants), Moe, supra note 659, at *23–24.
A Williams v. Lee argument could also be based on the critical role the exemption from state 
tax served in generating economic activity for the Tribes. Rehnquist implicitly rejected this 
argument by describing the competitive advantage of the Indian seller as dependent on the 
extent to which the non-Indian purchaser was willing to flout his legal obligation to pay the 
tax. A Williams v. Lee argument was inconsistent with Justice Rehnquist’s characterization of 
the case as involving tax avoidance.
723 “Other cases are similar in their paucity of discussion of the infringement test.” Laurence, 
Indian Commerce Clause, supra note 349, at 243.
724 Moe, 425 U.S. at 483. 
725 
[In Warren Trading] a non-Indian who traded with Indians on the Navajo Reservation 
was held to be exempt from the Arizona gross proceeds tax, basically because of fed-
eral preemption in the field of Indian commerce. here, the Indian commerce involves 
Indians selling to non-Indians. Surely, if a non-Indian is exempt from state tax laws 
because of Indian commerce, then an Indian also is exempt.
Brief for the Appellees (and Cross-Appellants), Moe, supra note 659, at *24. This argument 
focused improperly on the identity of the vendor rather than on the identity of the purchaser, 
which is the focus of the Indian Trader statutes. 25 U.S.C. section 261 provides that “[t]he 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall have the sole power . . . to make such rules and regula-
tions as he may deem just and proper specifying . . . the prices at which . . . goods [are] sold to 
the Indians,” 25 U.S.C. § 261 (emphasis added). The Tribes’ argument could have been better 
couched in terms of the Indian Commerce Clause.
Although the Tribes’ brief asserts that the vendor in Warren Trading was a non-Indian, which 
seems likely, Black’s opinion was silent on the point. Rehnquist does not mention whether the 
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disposed of:
[T]hat case involved a gross income tax imposed on the on-reservation sales 
by the trader to reservation Indians. Unlike the sales tax here, the tax was 
imposed directly on the seller, and, in contrast to the Tribe’s claim, there 
was in Warren no claim that the State could not tax that portion of the 
receipts attributable to on-reservation sales to non-Indians. Our conclusion 
in Warren that assessment and collection of that tax “would to a substan-
tial extent frustrate the evident congressional purpose of ensuring that no 
burden shall be imposed upon Indian traders for trading with Indians on 
reservations,” does not apply to the instant case.726
Warren Trading was probably not the Tribes’ strongest argument.727 Justice 
Rehnquist’s response was correct, but a bit wide of the mark. his attempt 
to distinguish Warren Trading as involving a gross income tax on the ven-
dor misunderstood that Arizona was applying a sales tax measured by gross 
receipts.728 The Montana excise tax was a subset of sales taxes. Moreover, Jus-
tice Black’s analysis in Warren Trading did not turn on the legal incidence of 
the tax. Legal incidence is irrelevant to the goal of the Indian Trader statutes, 
which is to prevent fraud.729
The reason that Warren Trading had no application is straightforward: the 
Indian Trader statutes govern only sales to Indians.730 Congress was concerned 
about the Indians being defrauded. The assumption was that non-Indians 
needed no protection. Any discussion in Warren Trading, or Central Machin-
ery, of the Indian Trader statutes was irrelevant to sales to non-Indians.731
Indian vendors in Moe were licensed as Indian Traders, a point that Central Machinery would 
make irrelevant four years later. See supra notes 469–518. 
726 Moe, 425 U.S. at 482 (emphasis added).
727 See supra notes 725–26; infra notes 728–31. 
728 See supra note 426. Rehnquist’s mischaracterization, although not inspiring confidence, 
was harmless error.
729 The Arizona sales tax in Warren Trading was imposed on the vendor and Moe involved 
a Montana excise tax imposed on the consumer. But had Arizona imposed its tax on the 
consumer, the preemption issue would have been the same. The Indian Trader statutes, which 
are intended to protect the Indians from fraud, are indifferent to how a statute is drafted. 
Moreover, under the common pattern of sales taxation, though not followed by Arizona, the 
tax is required to be collected from the consumer. Under this pattern, the legal incidence is 
typically viewed as falling on the consumer. See United States v. Tax Comm’n of Miss., 421 
U.S. 599, 599, 608 (1975); supra note 657.
730 25 U.S.C. section 261 provides that the “Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall have 
the sole power . . . to make such rules and regulations as he may deem just and proper 
specifying . . . the prices at which such goods [are] sold to the Indians.” 25 U.S.C. § 261 
(emphasis added).
In Colville, discussed infra notes 740–915 and accompanying text, the Court states without 
any support or discussion that the Indian Trader statutes were not intended to cover sales to 
Indians who were not members of the tribe on whose reservation the sale was being made. 447 
U.S. 134, 155–56 (1980). The relevant part of the statute, however, refers only to “Indians.” 
25 U.S.C. § 261 (2010). 
731 Justice Rehnquist stated that “there was in Warren no claim that the State could not tax 
that portion of the receipts attributable to on-reservation sales to non-Indians,” Moe, 425 U.S. 
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More fundamentally, however, a preemption argument like that in Warren 
Trading suggests that a state has the right to impose a tax in the first instance 
unless it conflicts with a federal statute.732 The flaw in the part of Rehnquist’s 
opinion dealing with the non-Indian purchasers is that he never established 
why Montana had that right. Without that right being established, there 
would be no legitimate tax for the Indian Trader statutes to preempt.
Justice Rehnquist’s sense of outrage that the Indians were somehow co-con-
spirators in tax avoidance drove his analysis. The holding in Moe impacted, 
perhaps severely, reservation smokeshops throughout the country.733 What 
was not directly impacted by the case, however, was tribal revenue. Any 
decline in smokeshop business that resulted from having to collect the Mon-
tana tax on sales to non-Indians directly affected the Indian retailer but did 
not directly affect Tribal revenues. The Tribes did not tax the sale of cigarettes 
and did not tax the profits of the smokeshops. Nor did the Tribes operate any 
smokeshops on their own. 
As in Warren Trading, the Tribes in Moe had not imposed their own excise 
tax on the sale of the cigarettes.734 Moe, like Warren Trading, has the salu-
tary effect of avoiding any double taxation of Indian consumers should the 
Tribes enact such a tax in the future; double taxation of non-Indian consum-
ers would nonetheless occur.
at 482, suggesting that the issue had been conceded. What was actually said was that “[a]ppel-
lant’s challenge to these statutes is limited to the State’s attempt to apply them to gross income 
from sales made on the reservation to reservation Indians.” Warren Trading Post Co. v. Ariz. 
State Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 685, 686 n.1 (1965); see supra text accompanying note 431.
732 See supra notes 425–68 and accompanying text. 
733 “Rehnquist turned an opinion that was in favor of the Indians into an opinion that 
indicated that in most cases they would lose.” Woodward & Armstrong, supra note 361, at 
412. “Instead of resolving a tribal-state dispute, Moe and its progeny have greatly exacerbated 
it and have created a significant potential for physical violence and even open hostilities.” 
Minnis, supra note 7, at 291. This warning came true when New York tried to enforce its 
cigarette regulations against the Seneca, who closed down a 30 mile stretch of the New York 
State Thruway in protest. See Irving, Seneca Nation Angered by New York Cigarette Tax Law, 
News from Indian Country (Dec. 2008), available at http://indiancountrynews.net/index.
php?option=com_content&task=view&id=5305&Itemid=33 (last visited Sept. 20, 2010): 
[A] massive protest riot by the Seneca Indians from the Cattaraugus Reservation in 
Western New York closed down sections of the New York State Thruway and parts of 
Routes 5, 20, and 17. Eleven people were arrested, twelve State Troopers were taken 
to the hospital, and a dozen police cars were damaged. In the wake of the protests, 
state officials reached an agreement with the Seneca leaders: the state would pull back 
the troopers that had been placed at the reservations if the Senecas would return to 
the bargaining table to once again attempt to reach an agreement. The talks broke 
down within two days, resulting in another protest rally at the Capitol.
See also Karen L. Folster, Comment, Just Cheap Butts, or an Equal Protection Violation?: New 
York’s Failure to Tax Reservation Sales to Non-Indians, 62 Alb. L. Rev. 697, 707–08 (1998); 
supra note 721.
734 The tribes were authorized by their constitution to tax cigarette sales within the reserva-
tion, but they had not done so at the time of the litigation. Brief for the Appellees (and Cross-
Appellants), Moe, supra note 659, at *10.
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Left unaddressed was the effect of the Montana tax on the Tribes’ economic 
development and whether that violated Williams v. Lee.735 Indian livelihoods 
were presumably affected, with indirect consequences for the Tribe.736 These 
issues were presented in the next cigarette tax case the Court would hear, 
Colville.
i.  An Alternative: Drawing a Line Between the Right to Impose a Tax and 
the Obligation of a Vendor to Collect a Tax. 
With the benefit of hindsight, the Indians might have been better off drawing 
a line between Montana’s right to tax a transaction occurring on the reserva-
tion and its right to make a vendor collect the State’s use tax on cigarettes sold 
to non-Indians.737 The analogy would be with a state’s right to make an out-
of-state vendor collect that state’s use tax even if it could not make that same 
vendor collect the state’s sales tax.738 This distinction would make no differ-
ence in Moe, where collecting the Montana tax eliminated the tax advantage 
of on-reservation purchases, but would be of substantial significance in cases 
735 The State’s brief contained a cryptic reference to the tribal council approving the purchase 
of cigarettes for resale by tribal members and “charg[ing] an administrative fee for the service.” 
Brief for the Appellants, Moe, supra note 672, at *6. The brief did not mention how much 
was raised by this fee. The Tribes’ brief also refers to this administrative fee without giving 
the amount. Brief for the Appellees (and Cross-Appellants), Moe, supra note 659, at *10. The 
Court did not mention this fee.
The Court also showed little concern for the vendors located off-reservation who presum-
ably were losing much business because of the tax-free sale of cigarettes on-reservation. See, 
e.g., Folster, supra note 733, at 710, indicating that off-reservation vendors were losing about 
$1 billion a year in sales.
736 In Colville, the Court described Moe as establishing the principle that a state may impose 
a nondiscriminatory tax on non-Indian customers even if it “seriously disadvantages or elimi-
nates the Indian retailer’s business with non-Indians.” 447 U.S. 134, 151 (1980). Moe had the 
effect of closing numerous smokeshops around the country, along with the resulting unem-
ployment. See, e.g., Gene Mustain, Defiant Tribes of the Seneca Nation and Two Other Tribes 
Have Refused to Accept a State Tax Deal Designed to Level the Playing Field Between Indian 
and Upstate Merchants, N.Y. Daily News (May 4, 1997), available at www.nydailynews.com/
archives/news/1997/05/04/1997-05-04_defiant_tribes_the_seneca_na.html (last visited Sept. 
20, 2010); David B. Caruso, Indian Smoke Shops Feeling Heat on Taxes, REZNET, available at 
www.reznetnews.org/article/Indian-smoke-shops-feeling-heat-taxes-39180 (last visited Sept. 
20, 2010).
737 Because Montana does not have a general sales tax, it does not have a use tax. Montana, 
however, makes it a misdemeanor for a resident to consume a cigarette within the state “taken 
from a package that does not bear the required” stamps (referred to as an “insignia” in the 
statutes). Mont. Code Ann. § 16-11-133 (2005). See supra note 713.
738 Compare the companion cases of McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944), and 
General Trading Co. v. Iowa, 322 U.S. 335 (1944). In Dilworth, Justice Frankfurter refused 
to require an out-of-state vendor to collect the sales tax levied by the customer’s home state 
whereas in General Trading, under nearly identical circumstances, he required the out-of-state 
vendor to collect the home state’s use tax imposed on the customer. Once the Court cleared the 
way for states to require out of-state vendors to collect the use tax, little litigation subsequently 
occurred on the requirements for requiring the collection of a sales tax. Justice Rehnquist does 
not address this issue. See also Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 104.
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where the tax at issue would not be collected by an Indian or a tribe on 
behalf of the ultimate taxpayer. This distinction would have established (or 
reinforced) the proposition that a state does not have the power to tax trans-
actions occurring in Indian country between the Indians and third-parties,739 
whether the third parties are Indians, as was true in Moe, or non-Indians. 
This distinction would be of critical importance in the case of income taxes, 
severance taxes, property taxes, and other so-called direct taxes, as opposed to 
indirect taxes like sales tax.
2.  Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation
In Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation,740 the Tribes 
purposely operated their own smokeshops from which they earned profits, 
and also taxed the sale of cigarettes, generating another source of revenue.741 
The Tribes could thus demonstrate how they were directly affected by the 
Washington tax.742 Several issues were presented, but the most significant 
according to the Court was whether the Tribal taxes or the Tribes’ earning 
revenue from the smokeshops “ousted” the State of Washington’s cigarette 
tax on purchases by nonmembers of the Tribes.743 The legal incidence of the 
Washington tax was on the purchaser.744 Colville was a splintered opinion 
739 In its next major cigarette case, Colville, see infra notes 740–915 and accompanying text, 
the Court refers to Thomas v. Gay as rejecting the essence of this proposition. See infra 846–56 
and accompanying text.
740 447 U.S. 134 (1980). The consolidated cases involved the Confederated Tribes of the 
Colville Reservation, Makah, and Lummi Tribes, and the Yakima Indian Nation.
741 Dean Getches states that after Moe, “several tribes restructured their operations, making 
it easier to demonstrate the impact of state taxation.” Getches, Conquering, supra note 14, 
at 1601. The Colville Tribes were one of those. “Prior to the time Moe reached the Supreme 
Court, the Colville Tribes, aware of the dangers posed by the sparse facts of Moe, carefully con-
structed a tribal tobacco enterprise utilizing the protection of every available element of federal 
and Indian law.” Pirtle, et al., supra note 19, at 28.
742 The Court described the Indian dealers as making a large majority of their sales to non-
Indian residents of nearby communities who bought on the reservation especially to take 
advantage of the claimed exemption from the state taxes. The savings of approximately $1 per 
carton, “makes the trip worthwhile. All parties agree that if the State were able to tax sales by 
Indian smokeshops and eliminate that $1 saving, the stream of non-Indian bargain hunters 
would dry up.” Colville, 447 U.S. at 145. 
Colville also involved Washington’s motor vehicle, mobile home, camper, and travel trailer 
taxes. The State conceded that it could not impose these taxes on vehicles used wholly within 
the reservation. Id. at 162 n.29. In a very short part of the opinion, the Court struck down 
these taxes, relying on Moe. Id. at 163.
743 Id. at 138. Washington also imposed its general five percent sales tax on the sale of tan-
gible personal property to the sale of cigarettes. Id. at 145. Because of Moe, this tax did not 
apply to on-reservation sales to reservation Indians. Id. at 150–51.
744 Id. at 142 n.9. The Tribes disputed this interpretation of the statute, arguing the legal 
incidence was on them. Brief of Appellee Indian Tribes, Colville, supra note 108, at *122. 
Washington also imposed a products tax on cigars and pipe tobacco. Wash. Rev. Code, § 
82.26. The district court concluded that that tax fell upon the Indian sellers and not upon 
the non-Indian purchasers. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation v. Washington, 
446 F. Supp. 1339, 1355 n.15 (E.D. Wash. 1978), rev’d, 447 U.S. 134 (1980). The State did 
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with Justice White writing for the majority, and Justices Rehnquist, Brennan, 
and Stewart writing separate concurrences and dissents.745 
a.  Why Moe Did Not Resolve Colville. 
Moe did not resolve Colville for six reasons: (1) unlike in Moe, the Tribes 
here imposed their own taxes on cigarette sales and obtained further revenues 
by participating in the cigarette enterprise at the wholesale or retail level,746 
and could demonstrate that they were directly affected by the Washington 
tax;747 (2) there was no claim in Moe that reservation smokeshops were put 
out of business but in Colville the lower court found that the combination 
of Tribal and Washington taxes would “destroy” the cigarette business;748 (3) 
not appeal from this holding and agreed that this tax could not be imposed on sales by tribal 
dealers. Colville, 447 U.S. at 140 n.2; Appellants’ Opening Brief, Colville, 447 U.S. 134 (No. 
78-630), 1979 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1817, at *93. The district court also upheld the sales 
tax as applied to sales of goods to non-Indians other than cigarettes. The Tribes did not contest 
this holding presumably because the heart of their litigating strategy was that the tribal sales 
tax on cigarettes ousted the state tax.
The State never contended that: it could impose its excise taxes on reservation Indians with 
respect to activities taking place solely within reservations boundaries; the land, whether held 
in fee or trust, or in any restricted status, made any difference regarding the tax liability of 
Indian retailers; or congressional consent to the state assumption of civil and criminal jurisdic-
tion over Indian reservations pursuant to Public Law 280 included the assumption of state tax-
ing jurisdiction over Indian tribes and Indians residing on the reservation. Brief of Appellants, 
Colville, 447 U.S. 134 (No. 78-630), 1979 WL 200126, at *55.
745 According to Dean Getches, the “Court did not reach its decision easily. The case was 
vigorously debated . . . from almost the opening day of the 1979 Term until its close in June, 
1980.” Getches, Conquering, supra note 14, at 1602. Apparently, Justice Brennan drafted what 
he thought was going to be the majority opinion, denying Washington the right to tax all res-
ervation sales to Indians. Brennan initially wrote that non-member Indians should be treated 
the same as members. Id. at 1603 n.129. 
746 The Tribes’ brief also stated that in Colville there was a more comprehensive pattern of 
tribal regulation than in Moe. See Brief of Appellee Indian Tribes, Colville, supra note 108, at 
*86–88. The Court did not address this distinction.
As more fully discussed in Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005), 
infra notes 1290–1358 and accompanying text, a tribe that acts simultaneously as a taxing 
sovereign as well as an entrepreneur might gain nothing economically from imposing a tax. In 
other words, whether the tribe receives $20 in tax and $80 in profit or $100 in profit and no 
tax is economically the same. Under such circumstances, double taxation is a formal argument 
because the injury a tribe is complaining about is the impact of the state tax on economic activ-
ity on the reservation. And that impact is the same whether a tribe has $100 in profits and no 
tax or $80 in profits and $20 in tax.
747 In Moe, the tribes received revenue from an “administrative fee.” See supra note 735. In 
Colville, Washington argued that this fee meant that Moe was indistinguishable from Colville 
because tribal revenue was actually at stake in each case. See Brief of Appellee Indian Tribes, 
supra note 108, at *50. The district court in Moe did not view the fee as tantamount to a tax 
stating that “the tribes have not imposed any tax on the cigarettes sold in the smokeshops.” 
Confederated Salish of Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 
392 F. Supp. 1325, 1313 (D. Mont. 1975).
748 See Brief for the United States, Colville, supra note 696, at *26–27. The Tribes’ expert 
witness testified that if the tribal and state excise taxes were applied to sales on the reservation, 
the Indian stores “would have a price disadvantage and could no longer successfully compete 
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the Tribes documented that cigarette revenues financed tribal services;749 (4) 
Washington required a more onerous level of record keeping than Montana 
did in Moe;750 (5) Moe left open the question of whether a state could tax pur-
chases by Indians who were not members of the taxing tribe (no disagreement 
existed that a state could not tax sales to tribal members);751 and (6) Washing-
ton seized shipments of unstamped cigarettes en route to the reservation from 
wholesalers outside the state.752
b.  “Rehabilitating” the Indian Commerce Clause 
As in Moe, the Court was also faced with an initial jurisdictional issue involv-
ing whether a three-judge federal court was properly convened below under 
section 2281.753 In response to Justice Rehnquist’s footnote in Moe, which 
perhaps was a conscious attempt to inter the Indian Commerce Clause,754 
Justice White engaged in a rehabilitation of sorts:755
There is language in that [Moe] footnote, however, which suggests that the 
insubstantiality of Commerce Clause756 claims such as those before us flows 
from [Mescalero and McClanahan]—both of which were decided before the 
present suits were filed . . . . Neither Mescalero nor McClanahan “inescapably 
render[s] the [Tribes’ Commerce Clause] claims frivolous” because neither 
with nearby cigarette retailers located off the Reservation.” Brief of Appellee Indian Tribes, 
Colville, supra note 108, at *110. The district court felt that the “State tacitly concedes the 
Tribes’ source of cigarette tax revenue would dry up if they were forced to add the State tax to 
the costs of their cigarettes. . . . Thus, each tribe’s ability to fund its sponsored programs would 
suffer substantial interference.” Id.; see also id. at *88–89. But see supra note 746.
749 The tax revenues were devoted in part to social services, such as a home for the elderly and 
alcohol rehabilitation. Pirtle, et al. supra note 19, at 29.
750 See infra notes 822–25 and accompanying text.
751 Initially, Washington asserted that it could tax all tribal cigarette sales, even if the buyer 
were an Indian. The State based this argument on its acceptance of civil jurisdiction under 
Public Law 280. After this theory was rejected in Bryan v. Itasca County, Washington aban-
doned the argument with respect to tribal members. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of 
Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 142 n.8 (1980).
752 Despite these considerable differences, Justice White thought that the Court in Moe “con-
sidered a state taxing scheme remarkably similar” to Colville. 447 U.S. at 150. Although the 
Court does address the differences, the statement may offer an insight into White’s mindset. 
See also John Fredericks III, State Regulation in Indian Country: The Supreme Court’s Marketing 
Exemptions Concept, A Judicial Sword Through the Heart of Tribal Self-Determination, 50 Mont. 
L. Rev. 49, 50 (“Colville was factually similar to Moe.”).
753 See supra notes 687–93 and accompanying text. 
754 See supra note 689. 
755 The Tribes’ briefs also emphasized the importance of the Indian Commerce Clause. In a 
scholarly section of the brief authored by Professor Clinton, the Tribes argued that the state tax 
was prohibited by the Indian Commerce Clause. Brief of Appellee Indian Tribes, supra note 
108, at *69–90. In an attempt to distinguish Moe, the brief argued that the Indian Commerce 
Clause refers to “Tribes” and not “Indians.” Moe involved an Indian and not a tribe. Id. at *81. 
This was a clever way to distinguish Moe, but was without any support in the case law. See 
supra note 171.
756 Like Rehnquist in Moe, White does not distinguish between the Indian Commerce 
Clause and the Interstate Commerce Clause. Presumably he means the former.
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holds that that Clause is wholly without force in situations like the present. 
And even [the Moe footnote] merely rejects the stark and rather unhelpful 
notion that the Commerce Clause provides an “automatic exemptio[n] as 
a matter of constitutional law” in such cases. It does not take that Clause 
entirely out of play in the field of state regulation of Indian affairs.757 
White’s rehabilitation takes on even more force because he wrote Mescalero. 
But as will be seen, his comment was more rhetoric than reality.
c.  The Right of a Tribe to Impose Its Own Tax 
Turning to the merits of the case, the Court first rejected Washington’s argu-
ment that the Tribes had no power to impose their cigarette taxes on nontribal 
purchasers.758 Justice White acknowledged that the “power to tax transactions 
occurring on trust lands and significantly involving a tribe or its members is 
a fundamental attribute of sovereignty which the tribes retain unless divested 
of it by federal law or necessary implications of their dependent status.”759 
Unfortunately for the Indians, he did not stop there and proceeded to condi-
tion this “fundamental attribute of sovereignty.” The power of taxation may 
be exercised over nonmembers so far as they accept “privileges of trade, resi-
dence, etc., to which taxes may be attached as conditions.”760 This tension in 
the source of the power of taxation—whether it is an inherent power or one 
conditioned on the consent of the persons taxed—would remain unresolved 
until Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe761 clarified that taxation is an “an essen-
tial attribute of Indian sovereignty because it is a necessary instrument of 
757 Colville, 447 U.S. at 147–48. The Court also found that the Tribes’ attack on the seizure 
of cigarettes bound for the reservation presented a sufficient Indian Commerce Clause argu-
ment to support the convening of a three-judge panel. Id. at 148–49.
The Tribes’ briefs limited the reference to “automatic” in the Moe footnote to situations 
involving discrimination or infringement on tribal government. “Notwithstanding the lack 
of any automatic constitutional exemption for Indians generally, a constitutional violation is 
shown when a tribe demonstrates either discrimination against Indian commerce by state law 
or state impairment of the political and economic relations of the tribal governments them-
selves.” Brief of Appellee Indian Tribes, supra note 108, at *113. 
758 The term “nontribal purchasers” presumably encompassed both non-member Indians 
and non-Indians. This argument was directed at the Colville, Makah, and Lummi Tribes, the 
legal incidence of whose tax fell on the purchaser. The legal incidence of the Yakima tax did not 
fall on the purchaser. Colville, 447 U.S. at 152 n.28. White also perfunctorily dismissed the 
argument that federal statutes and treaties preempted the Washington tax. Id. at 155.
759 Id. at 152. In a 2001 case striking down a Navajo hotel occupancy tax applied to non-
members staying at a non-Indian owned hotel on non-Indian fee land located within the 
reservation, the Court emphasized the narrowness of the Colville excerpt in the text, stressing 
the reference to “trust land” and “significantly involving a tribe or its members.” Atkinson 
Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 653 (2001). See supra note 331; infra notes 592, 759, 
762, 880, 1075. 
760 Colville, 447 U.S. at 153. Justice White allowed for the possibility that tribal powers in 
general might be “divested” because of the Tribe’s dependent status. Divestiture might occur if 
tribal sovereignty were inconsistent with the “overriding interests of the National Government.” 
White’s examples of divestiture involved only non-tax cases. Id. at 153–54.
761 455 U.S. 130 (1982), discussed infra notes 1058–1130 and accompanying text. 
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self-government and territorial management.”762
762 Id. Merrion put into sharp focus the difference in how the power of taxation is conceptu-
alized. The taxpayers in Merrion had entered into a lease to exploit resources on the reservation. 
Id. at 135. Many years later, the Tribe adopted a severance tax, which it sought to impose on 
Merrion. Because the power of taxation was held to be an inherent attribute of sovereignty, the 
Court upheld the tax. Id. at 136, 159. For earlier cases upholding Indian taxes on narrower 
grounds, see Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947, 950 (8th Cir. 1905), and Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 
U.S. 384 (1904). Merrion held that the power to tax “derives from the tribe’s general authority, 
as sovereign, to control economic activity within its jurisdiction, and to defray the cost of pro-
viding governmental services by requiring contributions from persons or enterprises engaged 
in economic activities within that jurisdiction.” 455 U.S. at 137. But see Atkinson Trading Co. 
v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001), supra notes 331, 592, 759, 762; infra notes 880, 1075, which 
may limit Merrion.
Professor Ansson reports that taxation is one of the six inherent powers that tribes possess. 
The others are: “the power to determine form of government, the power to define conditions 
for membership, power to administer justice and enforce laws, the power to regulate domestic 
relations of its members, and the power to regulate property use.” Richard J. Ansson, Jr., State 
Taxation of Non-Indians Whom do Business With Indian Tribes: Why Several Recent Ninth Circuit 
Holdings Reemphasize the Need for Indian Tribes to Enter into Taxation Compacts with their 
Respective State, 78 Or. L. Rev. 501, 502 (1999).
In Merrion, the Secretary of the Interior had approved the tribal taxes. In Kerr-McGee Corp. 
v. Navajo Tribe, 471 U.S. 195 (1985), a non-Indian taxpayer attacked the right of the Navajos 
to impose a business activities tax and a possessory interest tax without the approval of the 
Secretary of the Interior. The Navajos had never adopted a constitution pursuant to the IRA. 
Chief Justice Burger, writing for a unanimous Court, held that such approval was not required. 
“The [IRA] does not provide that a tribal constitution must condition the power to tax on 
Secretarial approval. Indeed the terms of the IRA do not govern tribes, like the Navajo, which 
declined to accept its provisions.” Id. at 198. Even tribes that have constitutions dependent on 
government approval of their taxes can amend such constitutions to remove that requirement. 
Id. at 199. The government is “firmly committed” to tribal self-government and the power to 
tax is “an essential attribute of such self-government.” Id. at 201. The Court recognized that 
tribal governments can achieve “independence from the Federal Government only by financ-
ing their own police force, school and social programs.” Id. at 201. The Court also emphasized 
that Congress could if it wanted erect “checkpoints that must be cleared before a Tribal Tax can 
take effect.” Id. at 198 (citing Merrion, 455 U.S. at 155). 
Upon receipt of the decision in Kerr-McGee, the Navajo Tribal Council declared that day 
to be a holiday known as “Navajo Nation Sovereignty Day.” Krakoff, supra note 12, at 1166. 
Professor Williams, however, issues a dissenting view about the case. 
The Navajos have assumed the essential trappings of a ‘civilized’ government that 
lend to their actions a legitimacy no longer requiring, perhaps, the closely monitored 
federal supervision present in Merrion. They vote like the white man, they elect their 
representatives like the white man, they tax like the white man. They even provide 
the same type bureaucratic judicial morass to dissatisfied taxpayers as the white man. 
Therefore, they must be possessed of a similar normative vision as the white man.
Williams, Algebra, supra note 216, at 283. See also Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 
645 (2001), discussed supra notes 331, 759, 762; infra notes 880, 1075, which appears to 
curtail Merrion by conditioning the taxation of non-Indians on their consent, at least in some 
circumstances.
Professor Krakoff thinks that the combination of Atkinson and Hicks, discussed supra notes 
269, 331; infra notes 830, 1075, 1077, means that “tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians exists 
only in very limited circumstances.” Sarah Krakoff, Undoing Indian Law One Case at a Time: 
Judicial Minimalism and Tribal Sovereignty, 50 Am. U. L. Rev. 1177, 1233 (2001).
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d.  The Washington Tax Is Not Preempted by Either the Tribal Tax or Federal 
Statutes 
After upholding the power of the Tribes to impose their own tax, the Court 
turned to their principal argument. The Tribes argued that their taxation and 
operation of the cigarette business ousted the Washington tax. They con-
ceded that most purchasers were non-Indians looking to buy cigarettes free of 
the State tax. If both the tribal and the Washington tax applied,763 however, 
reservation sales would be at a competitive disadvantage and substantial rev-
enues would be forfeited, revenues that were financing essential governmen-
tal services including programs to combat poverty and underdevelopment.764 
Because of the threat to tribal revenue,765 the Tribes alleged that the Wash-
ington tax was pre-empted by federal statutes regulating Indian affairs,766 was 
763 As referred to above, this “double tax” argument was a formal one. See supra note 746.
764 Colville, 447 U.S. at 154.
765 The Court agreed that
Indian tobacco dealers make a large majority of their sales to non-Indians—residents 
of nearby communities who journey to the reservation especially to take advantage 
of the claimed tribal exemption from the state . . . taxes . . . All parties agree that if 
the State were able to tax sales by Indian smokeshops . . . the stream of non-Indian 
bargain hunters would dry up. In short, the Indian retailer’s business is to a substan-
tial degree dependent upon his tax-exempt status, and if he loses that status his sales 
will fall off sharply. 
Id. at 145.
766 These statutes included the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, the Indian Financing Act 
of 1974, the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, and the Indian 
Trader statutes. Colville, 447 U.S. at 155. 
The Solicitor General’s brief made a broader sovereignty argument: 
[The rights of the Yakima Nation] to govern within its diminished territory free of 
State interference is not a privilege conferred by federal law, but, rather, the resid-
uum of aboriginal sovereignty—the role of treaties and statutes being primarily to 
limit, territorially or otherwise, the extent of tribal autonomy . . . This approach 
is, moreover, consistent with the Court’s tradition of treating interference with the 
right of tribal self-government as an independent ground for excluding the applica-
tion of State law, separate from a conflict with federal legislation. E.g., [Mescalero, 
McClanahan, Moe]. 
Brief for the United States, Colville, supra note 696, at *44–45.
These cases would not seem to support the argument. Mescalero had nothing to do with 
taxation on a reservation, and Moe relied on McClanahan, which relied on the 1868 Treaty and 
the Arizona Enabling Act. Id. at *45 n.5.
The government once again emphasized the Indian Commerce Clause:
The analysis is simply that the Constitution itself—as exemplified in the Indian 
Commerce Clause—ousts State jurisdiction over all matter within Indian Reservations 
that significantly touch tribal interests and reserves that area for federal regulation. 
This is, in effect, the approach of [Worcester] as “modified” in Williams v. Lee . . . Or 
more modestly, it can be said that State law is pre-empted when the tribe, acting 
within the sphere of its residual sovereignty, has “occupied the field.”. . . In neither 
case, however, is it strictly necessary to invoke “particular treaties and specific federal 
statutes.”. . . Rather, the doctrine has been described as deriving from a “general pre-
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inconsistent with the principles of tribal self-government, and was invalid 
under the negative implications of the Indian Commerce Clause.767 With 
respect to that Clause, the Tribes argued that the Washington tax “interferes 
with prerogatives concerning relations with the tribes which are constitu-
tionally reserved exclusively to the federal government.”768 Accordingly, they 
challenged the right of Washington to levy the tax on non-Indians in the first 
place, regardless of whether they had a Tribal tax or whether federal statutes 
existed that would preempt the tax. Rehnquist never addressed that issue in 
Moe.
Justice White, however, shared the same tax avoidance mindset that domi-
nated the Moe analysis. he thought the Tribes had no more claim to the 
moral high ground than did the tribes in Moe. The Court viewed the Tribes 
in each case as merely asserting the right to market a tax exemption. 
had White wanted, he could have limited Moe. The impact on the Tribes 
was less immediate in Moe, which is why the Colville Tribes restructured 
their cigarette taxes.769 Compared to Colville, tribal revenues in Moe were 
not directly affected because the Tribes were not directly involved in the sale 
of cigarettes: they did not tax such sales and did not act as a retailer or dis-
tributor. Moe could have been distinguished and limited on this ground with 
emption analysis” that builds on broad principles of allocation of powers and duties 
with respect to Indians as between federal and State authority.
Id. at *46.
767 Brief of Appellee Indian Tribes, supra note 108, at *5. The Solicitor General proposed a 
simple analytical framework. 
For the usual case in which State regulation or taxation directly reaches non-Indians 
within a Reservation but also touches tribal interests, the controlling principle was 
summarized two decades ago in Williams v. Lee . . . To this basic rule we need only 
add that State jurisdiction will also be defeated if it invades an area preempted by 
federal regulation, or tribal regulation authorized by federal law.
Brief for the United States, Colville, supra note 696, at *25.
768 Brief of Appellee Indian Tribes, supra note 108, at *30. The Tribes characterized Worcester 
v. Georgia as “specifically premised upon the negative implications of the Indian Commerce 
Clause.” Id. 
The appellants in their brief argue that the State of Washington should be given ple-
nary authority to regulate the Indian tribes in their own regulation and taxation of 
on-reservation tobacco sales to Indians and non-Indians. The power to regulate trade 
with the Indian Tribes, however, is textually committed to Congress by [the Indian 
Commerce Clause]. The appellants ask for nothing less than a judicial amendment 
to the Constitution so as to empower the States, or at least Washington State, to 
regulate trade with the Indian tribes. What the appellants seek is the evil the Indian 
Commerce Clause was designed to avert.
Brief of Amici Curiae Quinalt Indian Nation, Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the 
Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980) (No. 78-630), 1979 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs 
LEXIS 1314, at *15–16. 
769 See supra notes 653, 741–52 and accompanying text.
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Colville viewed as presenting a new question.770
The reality, however, is that Moe already had a negative effect on the smoke-
shops, with the concomitant secondary and tertiary effects on a tribe’s econ-
omy. After Moe, the smokeshops could, of course, continue selling exempt 
cigarettes to Tribal members. But non-Indians, who paid a “new” state tax, 
would no longer have an incentive to go out of their way to purchase now-
taxable cigarettes on the reservation if they could buy identically taxed ciga-
rettes closer to home. If the smokeshops were a major source of employment 
for reservation Indians, the negative spillover effects on economic develop-
ment were obvious. 
The Colville majority had no interest in distinguishing or limiting Moe; it 
viewed the Tribes in each case as co-conspirators in tax avoidance:
It is painfully apparent that the value marketed by the smokeshops to per-
sons coming from outside is not generated on the reservations by activities 
in which the Tribes have a significant interest. What the smokeshops offer 
these customers, and what is not available elsewhere, is solely an exemption 
from state taxation.771 . . . We do not believe that principles of federal Indian 
law, whether stated in terms of pre-emption, tribal self-government, or oth-
erwise, authorize Indian tribes thus to market an exemption from state taxa-
tion to persons who would normally do their business elsewhere.772 
770 The Tribes’ brief argued that “in Moe there was no showing that imposition of the state 
tax would have any impact on the Tribes whatsoever.” Brief of Appellee Indian Tribes, supra 
note 108, at *52. The majority dismissed this difference between the two cases in a footnote: 
“Moe makes clear that the Tribes have no vested right to a certain volume of sales to non-
Indians, or indeed to any such sales at all.” Colville, 447 U.S. at 151 n.27. Professor Milner 
Ball thinks the Court “appears impatient with any delay in prosecution of the subtle state tax 
war on the tribes.” Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 109.
771 Anna-Marie Tabor notes,
This attitude may reflect in part the Court’s attitude toward the cigarette business 
at issue in Colville. It may also be symptomatic of a general distrust for taxation 
and a belief that the right to impose taxes must be earned by the sovereign power. 
The Court failed, however, to explain why tax-based competition would be any less 
appropriate between a tribe and a state than it would be between two states, appear-
ing to hold tribal taxation to a different and higher standard than state taxation. 
Anna-Marie Tabor, Sovereignty in the Balance: Taxation by Tribal Governments, 15 U. Fla. J. L. 
& Pub. Pol’y 349, 369 (2004).
Professor Milner Ball is undoubtedly correct in thinking that the quoted language in the 
text “is a repetition of the pejorative reference in the earlier Moe case to Indian sellers profiting 
from purchasers who were willing to flout their obligation.” Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, 
at 107.
772 Colville, 447 U.S. at 155. “Capital-poor, thinly populated, and short on transportation 
and communications infrastructure, tribes can do little to attract new business ventures other 
than to create local regulatory and tax advantages.” Barsh, Reservation Wealth, supra note 5, at 
572. These constraints would also describe many small developing countries.
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Notably missing from this list was the Indian Commerce Clause,773 but it 
was clear that nothing other than a direct federal mandate would convince 
the Court that the sales to non-Indians were immunized from tax.
An additional fear motivated the Court. If a tribal tax were to oust the 
state tax, what would keep the Tribes from imposing a trivial sales tax and 
operating gas stations, liquor stores, and department stores on the reservation 
free of the Washington sales tax?774 Could a tribal cigarette tax or sales tax of 
773 Perhaps the Court thought that the reference to “pre-emption” encompassed the Indian 
Commerce Clause.
774 See Colville, 447 U.S. at 155. The Tribes’ brief stated that “it is a common feature of state 
tax programs to set lower tax rates relative to surrounding states in order to encourage business 
or industry to locate in that state. Indian tribes should not be denied the same instruments of 
policy which are commonplace among the states.” Brief of Appellee Indian Tribes, supra note 
108, at 63 n.38.
Some commentators have criticized the Court for not appreciating that the states routinely 
engage in marketing tax incentives through the use of tax holidays, credits, exemptions, and 
other special provisions, and therefore the Indians should not be singled out for criticism. See, 
e.g., John Fredericks III, State Regulation in Indian Country: The Supreme Court’s Marketing 
Exemptions Concept, A Judicial Sword Through the Heart of Tribal Self-Determination, 50 Mont. 
L. Rev. 49, 64 (1989). These incentives have been attacked as violating the dormant Interstate 
Commerce Clause, but the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to rule on them. The closest it came 
was DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, which challenged Ohio’s tax incentives in part on the 
grounds that they were an unconstitutional discrimination against interstate commerce. 547 
U.S. 332, 338 (2006). The Court never reached the merits in that case, holding that the plain-
tiffs did not have standing. Id.
A state adopting a tax incentive voluntarily concedes part of its tax base in the short-term; 
the hope is that the incentive encourages so much new economic activity that would not oth-
erwise have occurred that the increased tax revenue will offset the cost of the incentive in for-
gone taxes. Colville did not involve the Tribe conceding its own tax base. As the Court viewed 
Colville, the Tribe was trying to give away the State’s tax base, an entirely different matter. Of 
course, when a state like Delaware chooses not to have a sales tax, it attracts purchasers from 
other states. If these purchasers do not voluntarily pay the use tax when they return home, the 
result is that Delaware is negatively impacting other states’ revenues, the way a tribe would be 
doing if it could sell cigarettes free of state tax.
Professor Taylor claims that “the Supreme Court, under a due process line of analysis, per-
mits tax-free interstate catalogue, mail-order, and internet sales of goods.” Taylor, Onslaught, 
supra note 534, at 961. This statement contains two minor errors. First, the Court has ruled 
in Quill v. North Dakota that the Due Process Clause requires remote vendors that purposely 
avail themselves of a state’s marketplace to collect the sales or use tax on such transactions, 
but only if the “substantial nexus” requirement of the Commerce Clause is satisfied. 504 U.S. 
298 (1992). Remote vendors of the type referred to by Professor Taylor are purposely availing 
themselves of the marketplace; hence, it is the Commerce Clause and not the Due Process 
Clause that is the rub. Second, the Court has clearly held that the consumer is obligated to pay 
the use tax on the transaction so that there is no “tax-free” purchase; the issue is whether the 
vendor can be required to collect that tax on the sale, which was one of the issues in Moe and 
Colville. With the exception of goods that have to be registered (e.g., cars, planes, boats) and 
purchases by businesses (at least the larger ones), most purchasers do not voluntarily pay the 
use tax. See Pomp, supra note 177, at 6-36 to 6-39.
had Colville been decided in favor of the Tribes, a non-Indian could buy goods at a reser-
vation department store free of the Washington sales tax. The consumer would, however, be 
subject to Washington’s use tax. See Wash. Rev. Code § 82.12.020 (2010). “There is levied 
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0.0001%, for example, oust a state tax?775 The line-drawing and compliance 
problems were obvious, at least to a Court that had already upheld a Montana 
tax on sales to non-Indians in Moe.
The Tribes cited numerous statutes and treaties they claimed preempted 
Washington’s taxes. This argument became relevant only once the Court 
rejected the Tribes’ position that the State had no power in the first place to 
levy a tax. Justice White had no trouble rejecting the authorities the Tribes 
identified: the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,776 the Indian Financing 
and collected from every person in this state a tax or excise for the privilege of using within 
this state as a consumer any: (a) Article of tangible personal property acquired by the user in 
any manner . . . .” Id. § 82.12.020(1). Voluntary compliance with the use tax by individuals is 
low and Washington would want the use tax collected by the department store. The question 
would then become whether the Tribe could be required to collect the State’s use tax, even 
though Washington would not have been able to tax sales on the reservation (had Colville been 
decided in favor of the Tribes). As suggested in the text, see notes 737–39 and accompanying 
text, the Court could have held in Moe that a state has no right to tax sales made on the reserva-
tion, whether to Indians, non-member Indians, or non-Indians, but that the use tax nonethe-
less had to be collected by the vendor. That would eliminate the fear of massive tax avoidance. 
This result would not appease the Indians because it would deprive them of the tax advantage 
they were seeking, but it would establish an important principle that would benefit them in 
cases involving other types of taxes, such as income taxes, severance taxes, or property taxes 
where a consumer is not seeking the advantage of not paying a sales tax on a purchase.
Suppose, however, that a tribal vendor were required to collect the Washington use tax but 
refused. Tribal sovereign immunity would prevent a suit by the State against a tribe. Okla. Tax 
Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 514 (1991). The Court 
has suggested that a state could enforce its cigarette tax without proceeding directly against 
a tribe—which it cannot do—by: proceeding against individuals as agents of the tribe for 
failing to collect the tax; collecting taxes from wholesalers off-reservation; seizing cigarettes 
off-reservation; entering into collection arrangements with a tribe; or seeking Congressional 
legislation. Id. See, for example, Dep’t of Taxation & Finance v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., where 
the Court upheld New York’s use of quotas on untaxed cigarettes shipped to the reservations 
based on “probable demand” for cigarettes by Indians. 512 U.S. 61, 76 (1994). The Supreme 
Court reversed the lower court, which found that the regulatory scheme violated the Indian 
Trader statutes. “The ‘balance of state, federal, and tribal interests in this area’ thus leaves more 
room for state regulation than in others.” Id. at 73 (citation omitted); see also Snyder v. Wetzler, 
603 N.Y.S.2d 910 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993), aff’d, 644 N.E.2d 1369 (N.Y. 1994); State ex rel. 
Okla. Tax Comm’n, 815 P.2d 667 (Okla. 1991); Gord v. Wash. Dept. of Revenue, 749 P.2d 
678 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987). Some of these approaches could be extended to the department 
store hypothetical.
Professor Ansson notes that after the Potawatomi decision, supra, state and tribes began 
entering into cigarette compacts. Ansson, supra note 432, at 545.
775 Justice Brennan in dissent stated that “these fears are substantially overdrawn,” but did 
not offer any specific reasons for his insouciance. Colville, 447 U.S. at 173. 
776 For a discussion of the Indian Reorganization Act, see Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 
U.S. 145, 150–52 (1973). According to howard, one of that Act’s sponsors, “[t]he program 
of self-support and of business and civic experience in the management of their own affairs, 
combined with the program of education, will permit increasing numbers of Indians to enter 
the white world on a footing of equal competition.” Id. at 152 (quoting 78 Cong. Rec. 11,732 
(1934) (remarks of Rep. howard)). Washington’s brief repeated this quote and asked how that 
goal would be “served by providing the Indian[s] with a huge competitive advantage over non-
Indian cigarette retailers?” Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 744, at *81.
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Act of 1974, the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 
1975, the Washington Enabling Act, and treaties. he concluded that while 
these showed a “congressional concern with fostering tribal self-government 
and economic development, none goes so far as to grant tribal enterprises sell-
ing goods to nonmembers an artificial competitive advantage over all other 
businesses in a State.”777 The inference was that Washington had the right to 
tax unless prohibited by Congress. had the State only the powers given to it 
by the government, White would have noted that none of the federal statutes 
had anything to do with taxes.778 
White held that the Washington Enabling Act immunized reservation land 
and land-derived income from tax by the State;779 at issue here, however, were 
sales taxes assessed against nonmembers of the Tribe.780 There were no treaties 
directly on point.
e.  Rejection of Warren Trading 
Justice White also had no trouble dismissing the Indian Trader statutes dis-
cussed in Warren Trading.781 In Moe, Rehnquist’s treatment of Warren Trad-
ing was wrong on most points782 but ultimately right in its conclusion that 
the Indian Trader statutes governed only sales to Indians and not sales to 
non-Indians. But that interpretation had no relevance in Colville where the 
issue was not non-Indians, but rather nonmember Indians. The Indian Trader 
statutes do not distinguish between member and nonmember Indians, refer-
777 Colville, 447 U.S. at 155. he also dispensed with the Washington Enabling Act as having 
nothing to do with nonmembers of the Tribes. Id. at 156. It is not clear in this context whether 
Justice White was using the term “nonmembers of the Tribes,” to mean non-Indians and non-
member Indians, or only non-member Indians.
778 Dean Getches describes White as dealing with the preemption argument in “a conclusory 
way”: 
It took him less than a page to dismiss five federal statutes and several treaties alleged 
to be in conflict with the state’s taxation of reservation sales. The gist of the deci-
sion was that the tribe should not be able to use its sovereign status to its economic 
advantage . . . .
Getches, Conquering, supra note 14, at 1604. More fundamentally, a preemption analysis 
assumes the state has the right to tax unless prohibited by Congress.
Professor Milner Ball finds an “impressive array of federal legislation regulating Indian 
commerce, supporting tribal economic development, prohibiting Washington from taxing 
reservation land and income, approving the tribal tax ordinance, and sanctioning tribal self-
government. Even so, Justice White found no preemption of the state tax.” Ball, Constitution, 
supra note 7, at 108.
779 Colville, 447 U.S. at 156. Justice White did not quote the Enabling Act, but it does not 
refer to income.
780 Id. Professor Fletcher notes that the Court is “suspicious of the authority asserted by 
Indian tribes over nonmembers.” Fletcher, Supreme Court, supra note 14, at 163. The “Court 
has acted to protect the economic interests of non-Indians, non-Indian-owned companies, and 
the tax base of state and local governments—all at the direct expense of tribal economic and 
taxation interests.” Id.
781 Colville, 447 U.S. at 155–56.
782 See supra notes 725–32 and accompanying text.
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ring only to “Indians.”783 Moreover, the congressional intent of protecting 
the Indians from being defrauded784 would apply to nonmember Indians as 
well. Both the language and intent of the statutes would reject any distinc-
tion between member and nonmember Indians.785 Nonetheless, without any 
783 25 U.S.C. § 261 (2006) provides that the Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall have the 
sole power to make such rules and regulations as he may deem just and proper specifying the 
prices at which goods are sold to the Indians.
784 h.R. Rep. No. 23-474, at 11 (1834), stated that the purpose of the Indian Trader stat-
utes was to prevent the Indians from being defrauded. Central Machinery Co. v. Ariz. Tax 
Comm’n, 448 U.S. 160, 163 (1980); see supra notes 476–79 and accompanying text. 
785 More generally, the term “Indian” has no single definition. One possible origin of the 
term was Christopher Columbus, who thought he had landed on parts of the Indies and called 
the inhabitants Indians. Prucha, The Great Father, supra note 25, at 6. 
As a general rule . . . there are two qualifications for a person to be considered an 
Indian: 
(1) the person has some Indian blood; and 
(2) the person is recognized as an Indian by members of an Indian tribe or com-
munity. 
Federal law defines “Indian” in many different ways. The Bureau of the Census defines 
Indians as individuals who identify themselves as Indians. The BIA [Bureau of Indian 
Affairs] generally defines an Indian as a person who: 
(1) is a member of a tribe recognized by the federal government; 
(2) lives on or near a reservation; and (3) is one-quarter or more Indian ancestry. 
The Indian Education Act of 1988 uses a much broader definition that encompasses 
people of one-eighth Indian ancestry, self-identified Indians, residents of state reser-
vations, and urban Indians.
Comm. on Indian Affairs, The Tribal Nations of Montana: A handbook for 
Legislators 19 (1995), available at http://opi.mt.gov/pdf/TitleI/MTTribal.pdf. Condition 
(2) of the BIA definition especially seems problematic.
The Office of American Indian Trust of the U.S. Department of the Interior comments 
that:
It is important to understand the difference between the ethnological term “Indian” 
and the political/legal term “Indian.” The protections and services provided by the 
United States for tribal members flow not from an individual’s status as an American 
Indian in an ethnological sense, but because the person is a member of a tribe rec-
ognized by the United States and with which the United States has a special trust 
relationship. This special trust relationship entails certain legally enforceable rights 
and responsibilities.
Frequently Asked Questions Concerning American Indians & Alaska Natives, U.S. Dep’t of 
health & human Servs., http://aspe.hhs.gov/SelfGovernance/faqs.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 
2010).
According to the U.S. Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Indian Affairs, the term 
“Native American” came into usage in the 1960s to denote the groups served by the BIA, 
that is, American Indians and Alaska Natives (Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts of Alaska). Later, 
some federal programs broadened the term to include Native hawaiians and Pacific Islanders. 
Many Indian groups objected to this subsequent expansion of the term. Today, the preferred 
practice is to use individual tribal affiliations whenever possible, otherwise to use “American 
Indian.” See id. Eskimos and Aleuts in Alaska, however, are two culturally distinct groups and 
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analysis, Justice White merely announced that the statutes incorporated a 
“congressional desire comprehensively to regulate businesses selling goods to 
reservation Indians but no similar intent is evident with respect to sales by 
Indians to nonmembers of the Tribe.”786 Of course, the statutory language 
expressed exactly that intent.787
f.  Inapplicability of Williams v. Lee (Again)
White was similarly dismissive of the Tribes’ Williams v. Lee argument. In 
Moe, a Williams v. Lee argument was difficult because no tribal revenue was 
directly at stake. In Colville, by contrast, the Indian taxes were purposely 
are sensitive about being referred to as an “Indian”; instead, these groups prefer to be referred 
to as “Alaska Native.” Id.; see also Stephen L. Pevar, The Rights of American Indians and 
Their Tribes 1 n.* (2002) (preferring the term “Indian” to “Native American” because most 
Indians and Indian organizations use the term “Indian,” and virtually all federal laws and agen-
cies related to Indian affairs use “Indian”). 
“The term ‘Indian Tribe’ means any Indian or Alaska Native tribe, band, nation, pueblo, vil-
lage or community that the Secretary of the Interior acknowledges to exist as an Indian tribe,” 
25 U.S.C. § 479a (2006), pursuant to the Federally Recognized Indian Tribe List Act of 1994, 
Pub. L. No. 103-454, § 102, 108 Stat. 4791, 4791 (1994); see also William C. Canby, Jr., 
American Indian Law in a Nutshell 4 (5th ed. 2009) (“At the most general level, a tribe is 
simply a group of Indians that is recognized as constituting a distinct and historically continu-
ous political entity for at least some governmental purposes.”). 
Although the terms “Indian tribe” and “Indian nation” “have been used interchangeably in 
Indian treaties and statutes[] . . . the term nation usually refers to a government independent 
from any other government, possessing the power of absolute dominion over its territory and 
people.” Pevar, supra, at 21. As such, Indian tribes are not nations because their autono-
mous power over their land and people has been limited by the federal government. See id. 
Nevertheless, “[s]ome tribal governments prefer to call themselves nations rather than tribes, 
often reflecting the belief that the United States has no right to exercise any power or authority 
over them.” Id.
786 Colville, 447 U.S. at 155–56 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The Tribes’ Brief was 
no more persuasive in Colville than in Moe on the Indian Trader issue. See supra notes 725–32 
and accompanying text.
In Warren Trading Post, the Court held an Arizona tax on the gross proceeds of a 
federal trader doing a retail trading business with Indians on the reservation to be pre-
empted. In the instant case, the circumstances are reversed in that it involves Indian 
federal traders selling to non-Indians, but the reasoning of this Court suggests that 
the ultimate conclusion ought to be the same. 
[S]ince the federal traders are Indians, the preemptive scope of the statutes should be 
broader in scope. 
Brief of Appellee Indian Tribes, supra note 108, at 117–18. The Tribes’ Colville argument 
repeated the same error made in Moe in focusing on the identity of the vendor rather than the 
identity of the customers. The Indian Trader statutes disregard whether the vendor is an Indian 
or not. The Brief also argued that the holding in Warren Trading was not directly implicated 
in Moe because “so far as the opinion reveals, [the Indian retailers] neither applied for nor 
obtained federal traders licenses.” Id. at *119 n.71. This argument was held to be irrelevant in 
Central Machinery, 448 U.S. at 164; see supra notes 469–518 and accompanying text. In their 
Petition for Rehearing, Colville, 447 U.S. 134 (No. 78-630), 1980 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 
1628, at *9–10, the Tribes refined the Indian Trader argument.
787 See supra notes 783–86 and accompanying text.
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structured so that tribal revenue was directly implicated. The Tribes argued 
that a loss of taxes would interfere with their self-government by depriving 
them of revenue for financing essential government programs.788 The destruc-
tion of a major sector of their economy would seem to satisfy even a narrow 
interpretation of infringement.
g.  Value Generated on the Reservation 
After misciting McClanahan for the proposition that “[t]he principle of tribal 
self-government . . . seeks an accommodation between the interests of the 
tribes and the Federal Government, on the one hand, and those of the State, 
on the other,”789 which suggests a balancing test, the Court concluded that 
the interest in raising revenue is: 
788 Colville, 447 U.S. at 154. The Tribes’ Brief identified the amounts that the Colville Tribe 
earned from its cigarette tax and stated that the revenue was used for a broad spectrum of 
governmental programs, but did not express the amounts as a percentage of what was spent in 
the aggregate on such programs. Brief of Appellee Indian Tribes, supra note 108, at *7–8. The 
Tribes argued that the state tax would dry up sales and jeopardize the governmental programs 
the tribal tax financed. Id. at 13. The Brief contrasted this result with that in Williams v. Lee, 
where “the interference with self-government struck down by the Court was simply an ‘under-
mining’ of the authority of tribal courts.” Id. at *60. For a discussion of tribal courts, see Frank 
Pommersheim, The Contextual Legitimacy of Adjudication in Tribal Courts and the Role of the 
Tribal Bar As an Interpretive Community: An Essay, 18 N.M. L. Rev. 49 (1988).
Washington argued that Williams v. Lee was inapplicable because it merely preserves the 
immunity of reservation Indians from state law but does not protect non-Indians. “Nothing 
in the concept of ‘tribal self-government’ would allow an Indian Tribe to market its immunity 
from state law to non-Indians.” Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 744, at *30. The State 
also argued that the Tribes “failed to demonstrate that elimination of cigarette sales as a revenue 
source would threaten the self-governing ability of the Tribes.” Id. “No one claims that the 
Tribe will be unable to govern their members if they cannot raise revenues by selling cigarettes 
to non-Indians.” Id. at *69. 
[O]nly a little more than two percent of the Yakima Tribe’s revenues expended on 
governmental and tribal programs were derived from its cigarette tax. Certainly, elim-
ination of this revenue source could well reduce the amount of revenues that the Tribe 
could spend elsewhere, but it can hardly be said to actually threaten the self-governing 
ability of the Tribe. 
Id. at 70. 
[T]he record . . . is devoid of any evidence relating to the impact of the Tribes’ inabil-
ity to market a tax exemption upon the self-governing ability of the Tribe. There is no 
evidence as to the percentage of cigarette tax revenues expended on tribal programs. 
There is no evidence as to which—if any—tribal programs will be curtailed as a result 
of the loss of cigarette tax revenues derived from sales to non-Indians. 
Id. at 73. 
789 Colville, 447 U.S. at 156 (emphasis added). The Court referred to McClanahan v. State 
Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164, 179 (1973), in support for the statement in the text, but the 
page cited does not mention the federal government. The language presumably being cited 
actually reads: “[i]n these situations, both the tribe and the State could fairly claim an interest 
in asserting their respective jurisdictions.” Id. Apparently, the Court took it for granted that 
the federal government should be allied with the Indians. Presumably, that implicit judgment 
reflects the guardian or trust philosophy, discussed supra notes 36, 215, 257, 352, 434 and 
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strongest when the revenues are derived from value generated on the reser-
vation by activities involving the Tribes and when the taxpayer is the recipi-
ent of tribal services. The State also has a legitimate governmental interest 
in raising revenues, and that interest is likewise strongest when the tax is 
directed at off-reservation value and when the taxpayer is the recipient of 
state services. . . . Washington’s taxes are reasonably designed to prevent the 
Tribes from marketing their tax exemption to nonmembers who do not 
receive significant tribal services and who would otherwise purchase their 
cigarettes outside the reservations.790 
“Washington does not infringe the right of reservation Indians to ‘make 
their own laws and be ruled by them’ merely because the result of imposing 
its taxes will be to deprive the Tribes of revenues which they currently are 
receiving.”791 
Justice White was attempting to formulate some principled line-drawing 
that would stop what he viewed as illegitimate tax avoidance while protecting 
legitimate economic activities. he was unwilling to place definitive weight on 
whether a state tax negatively impacted tribal revenue, as that would shelter 
tax avoidance. Nonetheless, if the loss in revenue meant the curtailment of 
spending on police, fire, education, or welfare, the case for treating a state 
tax as infringing on a tribe’s ability to govern is more compelling. More sym-
pathetic facts for the Indians may well produce a different outcome from 
Colville,792 especially because a few years later the Court acknowledged that 
tribes “can gain independence from the Federal Government only by financ-
ing their own police force, schools, and social programs.”793
The Court seemed to be incorporating a balancing test as part of the Wil-
liams v. Lee tribal self-government test. In weighing the respective interests of 
the parties, the Court placed no weight on an activity like the purchase and 
resale of cigarettes, which did not reflect value “generated on the reservation 
accompanying text and why the Solicitor General appears as amicus curiae on behalf of the 
Indians.
One of the earliest examples of balancing a state’s interests against federal interests under 
the dormant Interstate Commerce Clause occurred in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 
U.S. 761 (1945). One of the traditional arguments against balancing, that the Court sits 
as superlegislature and violates the separation of powers doctrine, was also expressed in that 
case by Justices Black and Douglas dissenting. See id. at 784–95 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 
795–96 (Douglas, J., dissenting). In the case of state taxes, however, the primary tests set forth 
in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977), see supra note 186 and the refer-
ences cited therein, do not involve balancing.
790 Colville, 447 U.S. at 156–57.
791 Id. at 156 (citation omitted). 
792 In Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 819 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1987), the Ninth Circuit 
struck down Montana taxes on coal. The taxes “interfere[d] with tribal economic development 
and autonomy. The state interests they promote[d] may or may not [have been] sufficiently 
legitimate to overcome these conflicts, but even if they [were], the taxes [were] not narrowly 
tailored in pursuit of these interests.” Id. at 903.
793 Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 195, 201 (1985).
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by activities in which the Tribes have a significant interest.”794 To the Court, 
the Tribes were only marketing an exemption to transitory non-Indians, just 
the way Moe characterized the Indians there as benefiting from purchasers 
“willing to flout” their legal obligations.795 Washington, on the other hand, 
had what the majority viewed as a legitimate interest in protecting its tax base 
and raising revenue from the nonmember purchasers who benefited from off-
reservation, State-provided services. 
Superficially, “value generated on the reservation” suggests a promising tool 
to separate out legitimate and worthy activities from those that reek of tax 
avoidance.796 The problem, however, is that the concept does not provide a 
bright-line test. Retailers, for example, generate value by buying large quanti-
ties from wholesalers and distributors and reselling in small quantities to con-
sumers. If they did not generate any value, retailers would not be profitable 
and would be out of business. 
The smokeshops generate value the way department stores add value. 
Indeed, department stores merely do on a large scale what the smokeshops 
do on a small scale. Each buys in bulk at wholesale and resells at retail. But 
cigarettes are highly taxed, easy to transport, and easily resold free of tax. The 
Court viewed them as contraband. The Court was less concerned about a 
rigorous definition of generating value and more concerned about tax avoid-
ance.
The Court’s reference to “value generated on the reservation” has remained 
undeveloped.797 Did the Court use the term in a cultural context? Would 
794 Moe, 447 U.S. at 155.
795 See 425 U.S. at 482.
796 In an amicus brief in Ramah Navajo School Board, infra notes 1024–30 and accompanying 
text, the Government, in an attempt to minimize the precedential value of Colville, described 
the case as a “brake on the abusive exploitation of a tax exemption [and] as announcing an 
exception, not the general rule.” Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, 
supra note 364, at *3. One commentator suggests that the “Court’s analysis seems to implicate 
a ‘value added’ theory of taxation of the type utilized by the European economic community,” 
Fredericks, supra note 752, at 64, but there is no support for this proposition.
797 The only subsequent U.S. Supreme Court case to refer to Colville’s “value generated” was 
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, which involved California’s regulation of tribal 
bingo. 480 U.S. 202 (1987), superseded by statute, Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 
100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988). The State argued based on Colville that the Band was “merely 
marketing an exemption from state gambling laws.” Id. at 219. The Court responded by noting 
that the Band was “not merely importing a product onto the reservation for immediate re-sale 
to non-Indians.” Id. The Band “built modern facilities which provide recreational opportuni-
ties and ancillary services to their patrons, who do not simply drive onto the reservations, 
make purchases and depart, but spend extended periods of time there, enjoying the services 
the Tribes provide.” Id. The Maine Supreme Court reached the opposite holding, striking 
down tribal bingo. Penobscot Nation v. Stilphen, 461 A.2d 478 (1983). See also hoopa Valley 
Tribe v. Nevins, 881 F.2d 657, 659 (9th Cir. 1989), Indian Country, U.S.A. v. Oklahoma, 829 
F.2d 967, 986 (10th Cir. 1987); Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 819 F.2d 895, 899 (9th 
Cir. 1987); Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v. Waddell, 50 F.3d 734, 739 (9th 
Cir. 1995); Winnebago Tribe of Neb. v. Stovall, 216 F. Supp. (D. Kansas 2002); Winnebago 
Tribe of Neb. v. Morrison, 512 F. Supp. 2d (D. Kansas 2007), Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. City 
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the Court have been more accepting of products like jewelry, rugs, pots, and 
dream catchers, which it might have viewed (albeit patronizingly) as more 
“Indian”?798 Or did it want to see a greater investment in labor and capital 
than that represented by the buying and reselling of cigarettes?799 Or was the 
term meant to refer to activities that, unlike cigarettes, did not compete with 
off-reservation activities? If there was no such competition, off-reservation 
businesses would not be disadvantaged by an exemption, and the State would 
not lose tax revenue. 
Presumably, the Court would have been no more sympathetic in Colville 
if instead of cigarettes the Tribe sold gasoline or liquor. But if a tribe grew its 
own tobacco on the reservation, which it used in the manufacturing of ciga-
rettes on the reservation, would that tip the scale in favor of ousting a state 
tax?800 Similarly, if on the reservation a tribe explored for and produced its 
Vending of Muskogee, 1991 Okla. LEXIS 47, *22 (Apr. 23, 1991). These cases all struggle, 
unsuccessfully in my opinion, to breathe life into the value generated concept but do little 
more than use terms like “the tribe’s contribution to the product,” “the product was created on 
the reservation,” or “the tribe invested considerable time and resources.”
According to one commentator, “[i]t is hard to see the relevance of this ‘value generated’ 
theory, at least as it has been applied by the court, other than as a means of giving political 
justification to a rule that prohibits tribes from ‘marketing exemptions.’” Fredericks, supra note 
752, at 63.
798 “I doubt that retailers generally would be happy with the implication that they add no 
value to the economies in which they operate, but one can nevertheless understand the Court’s 
conclusion that the activity in Colville was not distinctively Indian.” Jensen, supra note 9, at 
79.
There is some mystery about what the Court meant by “value generated on the res-
ervation.” If the enterprise in Colville did not constitute value generated on the res-
ervation, we may wonder what the Court thinks of the similar services and market 
exploitation that are integral to the United States economy. Does the Court think 
these are values generated on the continental United States? 
It is difficult to escape the impression that Justice White, and the Court had in mind 
a particular view of what constitutes legitimate Indian business: the only good Indian 
economy is a primitive one. “Value generated on the reservation” seems to translate: 
selling blankets, pots, jewelry, and headdresses to non-Indian tourists. Or spearing 
fish and hunting game with bows and arrows.
Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 108. 
799 The Connecticut Department of Revenue Services ruled that sales of meals prepared 
and served within Indian country are not subject to the State sales tax because the value of 
the meals is generated within Indian country. Similarly, sales of lodging located within Indian 
country are not subject to the State sales tax because the value of the lodging is generated 
within such country. Conn. Dep’t of Rev. Serv., Rul. No. 2002-3.
800 In Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, the Tribes bought the 
cigarettes from distributors located outside of Washington. 447 U.S. 134, 144 (1980). 
Colville and Moe are especially and bitterly ironic since the business taxed and subject 
to elimination was tobacco. Tobacco and its smoking were the Indians’ idea, a “value 
generated” on their land. Perhaps the Court saw no irony. For Indians, the pipe and 
its smoking are religious; tobacco is a gift. Originally, Indians gave away tobacco 
and the technology of its growth and smoking. Because tobacco as a commodity 
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own oil, which it refined into gasoline that it sold at its own gas stations on 
the reservation, would that satisfy the Court? Activities that are commonly 
viewed as, or defined under federal or state law, as manufacturing, mining, or 
production801 should satisfy the “value generated” rubric.802 
The Court’s reference to the taxpayer’s being the recipient of “tribal 
services”803 is even less likely than “value generated” to resolve future cases. 
Services come in many sizes and shapes. To the extent a tribe might maintain 
roads; provide police, fire, or ambulance services; provide a judicial system; 
or have laws governing commercial activities, a non-Indian who purchases 
goods on the reservation can be viewed as the beneficiary of Indian-provided 
services.804 The Court has been willing to accept the benefits of an “organized 
society” as satisfying the Due Process Clause.805
h.  Indian Commerce Clause Limited to Preventing Discrimination 
With respect to the Indian Commerce Clause, Justice White made two 
statements suggesting an earlier, more halcyon period. “It can no longer be 
seriously argued that the Indian Commerce Clause, of its own force, auto-
matically bars all state taxation of matters significantly touching the political 
was a non-Indian concept, perhaps the Court thought its value could not have been 
Indian-generated. 
Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 110. If Professor Ball is correct, there is an additional irony. 
The British colonists grew tobacco, which exhausted the soil and led to the taking of Indian 
land. See supra note 42.
801 In White Mountain v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980), infra notes 916–84 and accom-
panying text, Ramah Navajo School Board v. New Mexico, 458 U.S. 832 (1982), infra notes 
985–1057 and accompanying text, and Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982) 
infra notes 1058–1130 and accompanying text, involving timber, construction services, and 
minerals respectively, the states did not claim that no value was being generated on the reserva-
tion. These cases, however, all involved non-Indians providing the good or service.
802 Professor Taylor raises the question whether a non-Indian who buys a Whopper at a 
Burger King owned by an Indian trader on the Navajo reservation would be subject to the 
Arizona transaction privilege tax (sales tax). Taylor, Framework, supra note 23, at 896–97. he 
and I would reach the same conclusion—that the transaction should be exempt. I would reach 
that conclusion, however, under the value generated language of Colville; he would apply the 
Indian Trader statute. My problem with his analysis is that the Indian Trader statutes apply 
only to sales to Indians. Id. The Connecticut Department of Revenue Services would also 
exempt this sale because the value would be generated on the reservation. See supra note 799.
803 Colville, 447 U.S. at 157.
804 The difficulty of weighing and comparing services can be illustrated by assuming that 
the threat of crime is much higher on the reservation than off the reservation. In that case, 
the value of a tribal police force might well be greater than the value of a State trooper off-
reservation. The Indians might also be the beneficiaries of off-reservation educational programs 
that teach about ethnic diversity, tolerance, or more specifically, about the culture and history 
of local tribes. These difficulties are hopeless.
In Atkinson Trading, the Court was unimpressed by the benefits provided by the Navajo to 
the patrons of a non-Indian owned hotel located on fee land within a reservation. See supra 
note 759 and the references cited therein.
805 Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 190 (1989).
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and economic interests of the Tribes.”806 The “Clause may have a more lim-
ited role to play in preventing undue discrimination against, or burdens on, 
Indian commerce.”807 But what earlier period was he referring to when the 
Clause did automatically bar state taxation of matters significantly touching 
the political and economic interests of the Tribes?808 And more limited than 
what? he offered no examples and would have been hard pressed to have 
done so.809
Applying his new formulation of the Indian Commerce Clause, Justice 
White merely noted that Washington’s taxes were applied in a nondiscrimi-
natory manner to all transactions in the State and that while the result of 
the State and Tribal taxes was to “lessen or eliminate tribal commerce with 
nonmembers, that market existed in the first place only because of a claimed 
exemption from these very taxes. The taxes under consideration do not bur-
den commerce that would exist on the reservations without respect to the 
exemption.”810 This assumed the conclusion: the issue was whether Wash-
ington had the right to assert its tax. Once again, the view that the Indians 
were engaged in the illegitimate marketing of an exemption, not worthy of 
protection, drove the analysis.811
806 Colville, 447 U.S. at 157 (citing Moe, 425 U.S. at 481 n.17) (emphasis added). Because 
Justice White had earlier described a similar statement by Rehnquist in Moe as “unhelpful,” id. 
at 148, that he would now be endorsing it is odd.
807 Colville, 447 U.S. at 157 (emphasis added). The Tribes’ brief argued that the State tax, 
when added to the Tribal taxes, imposed a multiple tax burden on Indian commerce that was 
not shared by off-reservation commerce. 
By analogy to the Interstate Commerce Clause decisions of this Court, this result is 
impermissible. A state may no more discriminate against Indian than foreign or inter-
state commerce. The Washington State tax does not give credit for taxes paid to the 
Tribes, and, if imposed, will not only discriminate against, but will actually destroy 
the protected commerce. 
Brief of Appellee Indian Tribes, supra note 108, at 16. 
“[T]he result achieved by the Burger Court leaves the dormant interstate commerce clause 
doctrine a far more potent limit on the exercise of state power than the negative implications of 
the Indian commerce clause. As a general rule, states may not impose the burdensome multiple 
taxation sanctioned in Colville.” Robert N. Clinton, State Power Over Indian Reservations: A 
Critical Comment on Burger Court Doctrine, 26 S.D. L. Rev. 434, 441 (1981). But see supra 
note 746.
808 Perhaps he was referring to all the times that the federal government and the tribes cited 
the Clause; if so, the Court disregarded each one of these as a source of protection.
809 In commenting on an earlier draft of this Article, Professor Fletcher speculates that the 
Court may have simply been sending a message to the tribes and the Solicitor General to cease 
making this type of argument. 
810 Colville, 447 U.S. at 157. “The argument that the Tribe’s tax exemption is justified 
because to remove it would burden commerce created by the exemption is indeed circular, 
and the Court rightly rejected it.” Laurence, Indian Commerce Clause, supra note 349, at 228. 
The first of his comments goes right to the heart of the Court’s misanalysis; the second seems 
wrong—the Court did not reject it but rather endorsed it. 
811 Apparently, Colville had originally been decided in favor of the Tribe and assigned to 
Justice Brennan. Regarding the Indian Commerce Clause, Brennan had written “rarely does 
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In a sense, the Indians were asking to be treated the same as out-of-state 
vendors that do not have nexus with Washington and thus do not have to 
collect the State’s sales tax. And the Court responded by treating them worse. 
That is, as discussed above,812 had non-tribal members or non-Indians pur-
chased cigarettes in another state or foreign country, the out-of-state retailer 
without nexus could not have been required to collect the Washington excise 
tax, and almost certainly the consumer would not have voluntarily paid it 
upon returning home.813 Any advantage of the lower rate would have inured 
to the benefit of the purchaser, albeit because of his or her noncompliance 
with the law. Unlike the out-of-state vendors, the Indians have nexus with 
Washington by virtue of their location within the State; their protection from 
being made involuntary tax collectors would be sourced in the Indian Com-
merce Clause rather than in the Due Process and Interstate or Foreign Com-
merce Clauses that protect out-of-state vendors. 
i.  Role of a Credit for the Tribal Taxes 
One sliver of hope for the Indians in future cases is that the Court seemed 
to preserve an opportunity for the Tribes to offer empirical evidence that a 
state tax burdened commerce with them, notwithstanding that this approach 
would be inconsistent with viewing the Tribes as marketing a tax exemption. 
We cannot fault the State for not giving credit on the amount of tribal taxes 
paid. It is argued that if a credit is not given, the tribal retailers will actually 
be placed at a competitive disadvantage, as compared to retailers elsewhere, 
due to the overlapping impact of tribal and state taxation. While this argu-
ment is not without force, we find that the Tribes have failed to demonstrate 
that business at the smokeshops would be significantly reduced by a state tax 
without a credit as compared to a state tax with a credit.814
the talismanic invocation of constitutional language or rigid conceptions of state and tribal 
sovereignty shed light on difficult problems” of state power on reservations. Preso, supra note 
41, at 461. As Brennan circulated drafts, it became apparent that he had lost a majority and 
asked Chief Justice Burger to reassign the opinion. Prior to reassignment, Justices White and 
Rehnquist circulated drafts suggesting that the Indian Commerce Clause had no effect until 
Congress acted. Id. This view seems entirely unwarranted by the history of the Clause.
812 See Quill v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
813 The purchasers would have been taxable upon their return because of possessing the 
untaxed cigarettes in the State. See Wash. Rev. Code § 82.24.020(1) (2010). Assuming the 
reservation is considered part of Washington within the meaning of the statute, the purchasers 
would have become taxable upon taking possession of the untaxed cigarettes on the reserva-
tion.
814 Colville, 447 U.S. at 157 (emphasis added). Once the Court rejected the Indian 
Commerce Clause and Williams v. Lee arguments, the tribes were left arguing that the multiple 
taxation resulting from the imposition of both a state and tribal tax on the same transaction or 
activity was invalid. I have suggested that this was an entirely formal argument. See infra notes 
890–903, 1349–54 and accompanying text. 
The tribes have had more success politically in negotiating tax compacts with the states, 
which eliminate or reduce that multiple taxation. See Mark J. Cowan, Double Taxation in 
Indian Country: Unpacking the Problem and Analyzing the Role of the Federal Government in 
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The Court responded to the Tribes’ plea for a credit with an empirical 
argument rather than a conceptual analysis. Whatever the force of the Tribes’ 
argument, the reality is that a credit would not make much of a difference 
under the facts of Colville. A credit would merely ensure that on-reservation 
sales of cigarettes would bear the same total tax as off-reservation sales. Pur-
chasers living off-reservation would have no tax incentive to drive onto the 
reservation if there were more conveniently located local stores (unless the 
smokeshops undercut the price that cigarettes were selling off-reservation). 
The Tribes would continue to lose sales because, even with a credit, they 
would lose the tax advantage they were seeking. 
The group that would be most affected by a credit would be taxable pur-
chasers living on the reservation. The credit would mean that the total tax 
on cigarettes would be the same for sales made on- or off-reservation. Such 
persons would have no tax incentive to purchase cigarettes off-reservation as 
they otherwise would if no credit existed.815 A credit would also be significant 
Protecting Tribal Governmental Revenues, 2 U. Pitt. Tax Rev. 93, 133–36 (2005) [herein-
after Cowan, Double Taxation]. See National Conference on State Legislatures and National 
Congress of American Indians, Government to Government: Models of Cooperation Between 
States and Tribes 72-77 (2002), reporting that nearly “every state that has Indian lands within 
its borders has reached some type of tax agreements with the tribes.” Id. at 72. One commen-
tator reported that 200 agreements exist that require a tribe to collect taxes that approximate 
the taxes that would be collected by non-tribal retailers, with the tribes keeping or sharing the 
revenue. Anna-Marie Tabor, Sovereignty in the Balance: Taxation by Tribal Governments, 15 U. 
Fla. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 349, 398 (2004). 
Another commentator claims that after Cotton Petroleum removed the fear of preemption 
from the states, no tax sharing agreements have been concluded. Jeanne S. Whiteing, Tribal 
and State Taxation of Natural Resources on Indian Reservations, 7 Nat. Resources & Env’t L. 
Rev. 17, 59 (1993). Whiteing also claims that federal legislation was once discussed that would 
prohibit state taxes on reservation natural resources, or provide a federal tax credit for tribal 
taxes or state taxes. Id. Nothing has come of these suggestions and the current political climate 
is not conducive to such discussions. See also U.S. Dept. of Federated highway Administration, 
American Indian Sales of Motor Fuels: Assessment of Reporting and Policy Recommendations 11-13 
(2005); National Conference of State Legislatures, Piecing Together the State-Tribal Tax Puzzle 
3-9 (2005).
For an earlier discussion of tax collection compacts, see Barsh, Reservation Wealth, supra 
note 5, at 575–76.
Professor Cowan notes that the details of compacts can vary, but typically the state will 
recognize the tribe as exempt from taxation. In return, the tribe will “collect the state tax from 
nonmembers and remit a set percentage of the collections . . . .” Cowan, supra, at 133–34. 
For a concise discussion of the various compacts, see Cohen’s handbook, supra note 7, at 
725–26.
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 adopted a series of tax incentives that 
apply only to reservations, which were intended to deal with the issue of multiple taxation. 
Id. at 136. Professor Cowan also discusses a congressional proposal to allow a federal income 
tax credit for taxes paid in Indian country, id. at 140–41, and discusses other creative roles for 
Congress, id. at 142–49. See also The Indian Tribal Government Tax Status Act of 1982, which 
granted the tribes many of the federal tax advantages of being a state. Int. Rev. Code of 1986, 
sec. 7871.
815 A credit would allow the tribes to increase their tax to the amount of the state tax without 
increasing the cost to a purchaser. If the credit encouraged taxable purchasers that lived or 
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if the Indians were willing to undercut the price of off-reservation cigarettes 
by reducing on-reservation prices and absorbing the reduction in profits. 
The Court well understood that the credit would not be an economic vic-
tory for the Tribes: 
It is evident that even if credit were given, the bulk of the smokeshops’ pres-
ent business would still be eliminated, since nonresidents of the reservation 
could purchase cigarettes at the same price and with greater convenience 
nearer their homes and would have no incentive to travel to the smokeshops 
for bargain purchases as they do now.816
The Court also understood that non-tribal members and non-Indians 
living on the reservation who might otherwise drive off-reservation to buy 
cigarettes free of the Tribal tax would, with a credit, be encouraged to buy on-
reservation. Presumably, these two categories of purchasers would be outside 
of any concern that the Tribes were marketing a tax exemption because they 
were already on the reservation.
But the Tribes have not shown whether or to what extent this would be 
the case, and we cannot infer on the present record that by failing to give a 
credit Washington impermissibly taxes reservation value by deterring sales 
that, if credit were given, would occur on the reservation because of its loca-
tion and because of the efforts of the Tribes in importing and marketing the 
cigarettes.817 
Consequently, the Court left the smokeshop door open a crack, treating 
Colville in part as a failure of proof case,818 although it might be an unusual 
situation where a tribe could capitalize on that opening.
White’s handling of the credit issue is ironic (if not gratuitous). Granting 
a credit would address his concerns about the marketing of a tax exemp-
tion. Because a credit would ensure that purchasers paid the same overall tax 
burden (presumably the Tribal tax would be equal to the State tax),819 there 
would be no exemption to market. Consequently, White rejected the very 
approach that would have resolved his concerns about the Indians having an 
unfair advantage by marketing an exemption.
worked on the reservation to buy on the reservation rather than off-reservation, the increase in 
the tribal tax (compared with a post-Colville world with no credit) would help offset the loss in 
tax revenue from the off-reservation purchasers who would have no tax reason to purchase on 
the reservation even with a credit. 
816 Colville, 447 U.S. at 158. In other contexts, such as corporate or personal income taxes, 
where the tax would not directly affect the price of a good, the issue of a credit could be more 
important.
817 Id. 
818 Compare Cotton Petroleum, infra notes 1224–25 and accompanying text.
819 As long as a tribal tax is less than the state tax, a credit will have the effect of taxing all 
cigarette sales on the reservation at the state rate. Whether a tribe has no tax, a very low tax, or a 
tax equal to the state tax will not affect the amount of tax paid by the purchaser—that amount 
will be determined by the state rate. Consequently, a tribe has an incentive to increase its tax 
to the maximum amount that will be creditable.
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j.  Preemption and Collection Burdens 
The Court made short shrift of four remaining issues. First, the Tribes’ taxes 
did not preempt the State taxes. “There is no direct conflict between the state 
and tribal schemes, since each government is free to impose its taxes without 
ousting the other,”820 another example of ipse dixit reasoning.821 
Second, Moe had allowed Montana to impose minimal burdens on Indian 
vendors to aid in collecting the tax. Justice White concluded that Washing-
ton’s collection burdens on the Tribe were “legally indistinguishable” from 
those upheld in Moe.822 Despite the insouciance underlying this conclusion, 
White did not engage in any comparative analysis of the compliance costs. 
Justice White ignored the more onerous burdens that Washington imposed in 
Colville compared with those imposed by Montana in Moe.823 Unlike Mon-
tana in Moe, Washington required the smokeshops to keep detailed records 
of taxable and nontaxable transactions. The number and dollar volume of 
taxable sales to nonmembers had to be recorded. With respect to exempt 
sales, the smokeshops had to record and retain for inspection the names of 
all Indian purchasers, their tribal affiliations, the reservations on which such 
sales occurred, and the dollar amount and dates of sales. Unless the Indian 
purchaser was personally known to the smokeshop, a tribal identification 
card had to be presented.824
The Tribes, however, had not placed any evidence in the record on the com-
pliance burden. The Indians failed to meet their burden of proof of showing 
that the “State’s recordkeeping requirements for exempt sales are not reason-
ably necessary as a means of preventing fraudulent transactions.”825 
Once Justice White upheld the Washington tax, the bar was set very high 
for the Indians to argue successfully that the collection burdens were unrea-
sonable. having gone to the extent he did to uphold the tax, White was not 
about to let allegations of collection difficulties and burdens prevail. Like 
Justice Rehnquist in Moe, White was not going to give the battle to the State 
but have it lose the war. 
820 Colville, 447 U.S. at 158.
821 It would have been a stronger argument on this point had the Court pursued the theme 
that the tax had no independent economic significance. See infra notes 890–96, 1315–17, 
1349–55 and accompanying text.
There is an undeveloped suggestion that if the tribal taxes served nonrevenue goals perhaps 
the result would be different. Colville, 447 U.S. at 158. White also concluded that Congress 
did not intend to authorize the Tribes to preempt otherwise valid state taxes. Id.
822 Id. at 159.
823 See id. at 134.
824 Id. at 159.
825 Id. at 160. Professor Milner Ball feels that the “standard for this proof is virtually impos-
sible to satisfy, for tribes must show that the state’s imposition of the involuntary agency is 
‘not reasonably necessary as a means of preventing fraudulent transactions.’ Apparently a tribe 
would have to demonstrate that the obligation both interferes with its self-government and is 
unnecessary for reasons having nothing to do with the tribe.” Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, 
at 105–06.
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k.  State Taxation of Non-Member Indians 
With respect to the third of the four issues, which should have been the 
heart of the case, the Court upheld Washington’s taxation of nonmember 
Indians in two short paragraphs.826 Taxing nontribal members would not 
“contravene the principle of tribal self-government, for the simple reason that 
nonmembers are not constituents of the governing Tribe. For most practical 
purposes those Indians stand on the same footing as non-Indians resident 
on the reservation.”827 White stated that federal statutes, even read broadly, 
“cannot be said to pre-empt Washington’s power to impose its taxes on Indi-
ans not members of the Tribe.”828 Implicit in this phrasing is the assumption 
that Washington had this power in the first place. Once again, the Court 
assumed away the very issue before it. As Professor Milner Ball puts it, 
“[t]his innovation was not only without precedent but contrary to 
precedent . . . Washington had no such power. No state had such power . . . [S]
tates may not tax Indian commerce with Indians within Indian country.”829
With his typical acumen, Professor Taylor has challenged Colville’s treating 
nonmember Indians the same as non-Indians: 
[A]s often as not the non-member Indians are spouses or relatives of mem-
bers or are frequently employees of the tribe. Under these circumstances, 
the tribe clearly has an interest in promoting the family life of its members 
and in hiring employees to provide needed services. 
826 The Court did not reach this issue in Moe because Montana failed to raise it on appeal, 
Colville, 447 U.S. at 160. Under a Washington regulation, reservation Indians were exempt 
from state cigarette and sales taxation only if the purchase took place on the reservation of the 
tribe to which the Indian belonged. Wash. Admin. Code § 458-20-192 (2010); Appellants’ 
Opening Brief, supra note 744, at 91.
827 Colville, 447 U.S. at 161. The Court noted that there was “no evidence that nonmembers 
have a say in tribal affairs or significantly share in tribal disbursements.” Id.
828 Id. at 160. Only two statutes were cited, the Major Crimes Act and the Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1934. Rather remarkably, Justice White cited these Acts as demonstrat-
ing congressional intent not to exempt non-member Indians from state taxation, notwith-
standing that neither statute addressed state taxation nor dealt with the difference between 
member and non-member Indians. See id. at 160–61.
829 Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 106. Professor Ball’s comments could be equally 
addressed to Moe. 
Washington claimed that the question “is whether the federal government has preempted the 
field with regard to state taxation of Indians who have left their own reservations.” Appellants 
Opening Brief, supra note 744, at 92. “[A]bsent clear statutory guidance courts will not imply 
tax exemption.” Id. at *92–93. This formulation assumes the State has the right to tax in the 
first instance.
The State also argued that taxation of non-members of the tribe “cannot interfere with tribal 
self-government for the simple reason that those Indians are neither constituents nor subject to 
the jurisdiction of the reservation tribe.” Id. at *96. This argument (and language) is mirrored 
in the opinion.
For a sociological attack on White’s drawing a line between member Indian and non-mem-
ber Indians, see Clinton, supra note 807.
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It is also important to note that many tribes have a history of inclusion, 
adoption, consolidation, and amalgamation. Given this history, it is inap-
propriate for the Court to assume that non-member Indians have no role 
to play in the social, cultural, spiritual, economic, and political life that 
constitutes an Indian tribe.830 
More specifically, 
It is very significant that the Colville Reservation itself is an amalgamation 
of more than one tribe brought together by the process of federal dispos-
session of their lands. This intermingling reflects general historical forces 
that caused many members of different tribes to find themselves together 
on a single reservation. The process of sorting out these intermixings is an 
essential attribute of tribal sovereignty.831
830 Taylor, Framework, supra note 23, at 898. Professor Gould is equally critical of the dis-
tinction between members and nonmembers. 
A grave[] consequence was that the Court could use political status distinctions, and 
its concept of the congressional trust responsibility, to trivialize tribal claims for equal 
protection. Still graver was the prospect that the Court would use the concept of 
political status to confine the powers of tribal governments to their membership, 
thereby eliminating their sovereignty over their territory. 
Gould, Tough Love, supra note 11, at 680.
831 Taylor, Onslaught, supra note 534, at 963. The Court cited Colville with approval in Duro 
v. Reina, holding that a tribal court did not have criminal jurisdiction over a non-member who 
was accused of committing a crime on the reservation. 495 U.S. 676, 706–07 (1990). For 
Professor Taylor’s critical analysis of this use of Colville by Duro, see Taylor, Onslaught, supra, 
at 968. Duro was overruled by a federal statute, which was upheld in United States v. Lara, 541 
U.S. 193, 196, 215–16 (2004). 
Professor Clinton views Duro as illustrating the “Court’s concern that nonmembers have no 
political control whatsoever over the scope and nature of tribal law and procedure.” Clinton, 
Dormant, supra note 22, at 1237. But “nonmembers have a political say in the federal govern-
ment which possesses the ultimate power to determine whether the continued exercise of 
tribal authority over nonmembers is fair and equitable in any particular circumstances.” Id. 
at 1238. The more fundamental question is who should legislative inertia favor: the Indians 
or the states? Should the states have no power to tax unless they can lobby Congress to grant 
that power, or should they be viewed as having the power unless the Indians can lobby for an 
exemption?
Professor Taylor identified pre-Colville state income tax cases in Minnesota, Montana, and 
New Mexico that apply McClanahan equally to both tribal and non-tribal members, not treat-
ing the latter as if they were non-Indians, which is what Colville does. Taylor, Onslaught, supra, 
at 959–63. After Colville, New Mexico reversed its position. N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep’t 
v. Greaves, 864 P.2d 324, 325–26 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993). In a post-Colville case, Wisconsin 
upheld the state income taxation of a non-tribal member, a Menomonee Indian, who lived and 
worked on the Oneida reservation, was divorced from a tribal member, and had two children 
who were members of the Oneida tribe. LaRock v. Wis. Dep’t of Revenue, 621 N.W.2d 907 
(Wis. 2001). Professor Taylor criticizes that case in Taylor, Onslaught, supra note 534, at 973. 
Idaho, Oregon, and North Dakota have statutes treating non-tribal members the same as tribal 
members and exempting the former from state income taxes under the same circumstances as 
the latter. Id. at 975.
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l.  Seizure of Cigarettes in Transit 
Finally, the Court upheld the State’s seizure of unstamped cigarettes in transit 
to the Tribes from out-of-state distributors. The Court acknowledged that the 
cigarettes were exempt at the time of their seizure,832 but for Justice White the 
more relevant facts were that the Tribes refused to collect and remit validly 
imposed taxes, and that the seizures took place off-reservation “in locations 
where state power over Indian affairs is considerably more expansive than it is 
within reservation boundaries. [Cf. Mescalero.] By seizing cigarettes en route 
to the reservation, the State polices against wholesale evasion of its own valid 
taxes without unnecessarily intruding on core tribal interests.”833 
The Indian Commerce Clause could have been viewed as preventing this 
burden on commerce with the Tribes, especially because at the time of the 
seizure no tax was yet owed. In addition, the Court did not address whether 
seizing cigarettes before any tax was owed might violate the Due Process 
Clause.834 
832 Colville, 447 U.S. at 161. The Court’s statement seemed to contradict what the State 
alleged. According to the State, “[u]nder Washington law, unstamped cigarettes moving in 
interstate commerce consigned to a person in the state [were] contraband unless the consignee 
[was] an authorized purchaser.” Unstamped cigarettes purchased for sale to non-members of 
the Tribe would constitute contraband. Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 744, at 103.
833 Colville, 447 U.S. at 162. Washington also claimed that it could enter the reservation and 
seize stocks of cigarettes intended for sale to nonmembers. The Court refused to consider this 
argument because it was not properly raised. Id.
In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 
514, the Court acknowledged the sovereign immunity of the tribe and suggested that a state 
might enforce its cigarette tax by: suing individuals acting as agents for the tribe, confiscating 
untaxed cigarettes off-reservation in transit to the reservation, collecting taxes from upstream 
wholesalers off-reservation, negotiating collection agreements with the tribes, or seeking con-
gressional assistance. See Stacy L. Cook, State Collection on Indian Sales to Nontribal Members: 
States Have a Right Without a Remedy, 31 Washburn L. J. 130 (1991); 498 U.S. 505, 514 
(1991); see also Dep’t of Taxation & Fin. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., 512 U.S. 61 (1994) (uphold-
ing a New York regulation that imposed various reporting and collection burdens on wholesal-
ers selling to the tribes, including a regime of quotas for the sale of unstamped cigarettes). Dean 
Getches describes Milhelm Attea as the first case in which the Court “expressly resolved a case 
through interest balancing.” Getches, Conquering, supra note 14, at 1628; see also Potawatomi, 
498 U.S. 505 (1991). For a general discussion of tribal sovereign immunity, see Canby, supra 
note 3, at 101–14. 
834 The Tribe did not make an Indian Commerce Clause argument. Instead, they argued 
that the seizures violated the Due Process Clause. See Brief of Appellee, Yakima Nation at 9, 
Colville, 447 U.S. 134 (1980) (No. 78-630), 1979 WL 200128.
Washington’s brief cited state cases in support of the proposition that states have the “power 
to seize cigarettes as contraband even though in the course of interstate commerce when the 
cigarettes are within the state contrary to state cigarette tax statutes.” Appellants’ Opening 
Brief, supra note 744, at 105. For a thorough analysis of the seizure issue, see Michael Minnis, 
Judicially-Suggested Harassment of Indian Tribes: The Potawatomis Revisit Moe and Colville, 
16 Am. Indian L. Rev. 289, 303–06 (1991). Minnis concludes that the seizure of interstate 
cigarette shipments bound for Indian tribes is a much more difficult issue than the Court has 
recognized. Id. at 303.
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m.  Rehnquist’s Concurrence
i.  The Indian Commerce Clause. Justice Rehnquist wrote a separate 
concurring opinion.835 he rejected the majority’s modest resurrection of the 
Indian Commerce Clause.836 he lost no time in attempting to re-bury it:
Since early in the last century, this Court has been struggling to develop a 
coherent doctrine by which to measure with some predictability the scope 
of Indian immunity from state taxation. In recent years, it appeared such 
a doctrine was well on its way to being established. . . . That doctrine, I 
had thought, was at bottom a pre-emption analysis based on the principle 
that Indian immunities are dependent upon congressional intent [citing 
McClanahan, Mescalero, Moe] at least absent discriminatory state action pro-
hibited by the Indian Commerce Clause. I see no need for this Court to 
balance the state and tribal interests in enacting particular forms of taxation 
in order to determine their validity. Absent discrimination, the question is 
only one of congressional intent. Either Congress intended to pre-empt the 
state taxing authority or it did not. Balancing of interests is not the appro-
priate gauge for determining validity since it is that very balancing which we 
have reserved to Congress.837 I concur in the Court’s conclusion, however, 
that the cigarette tax is valid because Congress has not pre-empted state 
authority to impose the tax.838 
Justice Rehnquist endorsed the majority’s erosion of the Indian Commerce 
Clause, reducing it to protection against discriminatory state actions.839 So 
limited, the Clause would have been irrelevant in any of the cases he cited 
(McClanahan, Mescalero, Moe) because none involved a discriminatory tax. 
McClanahan involved Arizona’s nondiscriminatory personal income tax; 
Mescalero addressed New Mexico’s nondiscriminatory sales tax; and Moe 
835 he dissented with respect to the majority’s treatment of the state excise tax on motor 
vehicles. Colville, 447 U.S. at 190. 
836 Apparently Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence was originally intended to be a dissent to 
Justice Brennan’s majority opinion. When Brennan was unable to garner enough votes for his 
position, he became a dissenter. Getches, Conquering, supra note 14, at 1605.
837 The reference to “we” is ambiguous. Apparently it refers to the Constitution. Professor 
Jensen speculates that with “judicial sympathy for tribal interests on the wane, the result of 
balancing is likely to be that a state may proceed with a tax that falls on nonmembers.” Jensen, 
supra note 9, at 73. Another commentator is also skeptical about the Indians prevailing under 
a balancing test. “Predictably, if any significant state interest is found, states nearly always have 
a larger absolute interest that invariably prevails over the smaller absolute Indian interest, even 
though the Indians’ interest may be geometrically greater in a relative sense.” Minnis, supra 
note 834, at 299. One of the difficulties with a balancing test is the difficulty of comparing 
and evaluating competing interests. While the term “geometrically greater” suggests some kind 
of quantitative test, which some cases may lend themselves to, others may require a qualitative 
test. Like most balancing tests, a court is adrift without a rudder.
838 Colville, 447 U.S. at 176–77 (emphasis added). Justice Rehnquist was generally critical 
of balancing tests. See, e.g., Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 962 (1982); 
Kassel v. Consol. Freightways, 450 U.S. 662, 687–92 (1981); Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 
426 U.S. 833, 876 (1976). 
839 Colville, 447 U.S. at 157.
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concerned Montana’s nondiscriminatory cigarette tax.840 The majority cited 
nothing in support of this formulation of the Indian Commerce Clause, and 
Rehnquist did no more than merely endorse the majority. Discrimination is 
a key factor in interpreting the Interstate Commerce Clause, however,841 and 
the majority’s formulation blurred the distinction between the two.
Justice Rehnquist agreed that McClanahan did not resolve the extent to 
which Indian sovereignty would be recognized in the rare case where no fed-
eral treaties or legislation existed842 (which Rehnquist did not acknowledge 
was the situation, ironically, in Colville).843 In that rare situation, “this ‘resi-
due’ of sovereignty is no greater than the freedom from nondiscriminatory 
taxation held sufficient to protect sovereignty in other areas of constitution-
ally derived immunities.”844 Rehnquist did not mention that McClanahan, 
Moe, and Colville all involved nondiscriminatory taxes, so that his “residue of 
sovereignty” would be worthless.
At the same time, Rehnquist recognized that the tradition of Indian sov-
ereignty could be useful in ascertaining congressional intent. McClanahan 
determined that historically Indians were “exempt from taxes on Indian 
ownership and activity confined to the reservation and not involving non-
Indians.”845 No treaty or statute altered that tradition. Mescalero, by contrast, 
held there was no similar tradition immunizing off-reservation activities, and 
there were no treaties or statutes altering that result.
The “rare” case where no federal treaties or legislation existed is the very 
situation where the Indian Commerce Clause should be in play. The history 
of the Indian Commerce Clause shows that the struggle between the states 
and the federal government over control of the Indians had nothing to do 
with discrimination per se. The emphasis on discrimination would have come 
as a surprise to Chief Justice Marshall, whose seminal cases emphasized the 
sovereignty of the Indians. 
840 See id. at 177. Justice Rehnquist also cited Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976), 
not discussed in this Article, which involved a nondiscriminatory property tax. 
841 See, e.g., Fulton v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325 (1996); New Energy v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 
269 (1988); Bacchus Imports v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. 
Tully, 466 U.S. 388 (1984); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981); Bos. Stock Exch. v. 
State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977). For a thorough treatment of the area, see Philip M. 
Tatarowicz, Federalism, The Commerce Clause and Discriminatory State Tax Incentives: A Defense 
of Unconditional Business Tax Incentives Limited to In-State Activities of the Taxpayer, 60 Tax 
Law. 835 (2007).
842 Colville, 447 U.S. at 177 n.2.
843 In Moe, Justice Rehnquist accepted the lower court’s finding that the Montana treaty and 
statutes were “essentially the same as those involved in McClanahan.” 425 U.S. at 477; 447 
U.S. at 177 n.2. There was no similar finding in Colville.
844 Colville, 447 U.S. at 177 n.2.
845 Id. at 178.
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ii.  Rehnquist’s Distortion of Thomas v. Gay. Justice Rehnquist thought 
Thomas v. Gay846 best illustrated the relevant “backdrop” to interpreting con-
gressional intent.847 his broad reading of that case was unsurprising. 
The . . . Tribes maintain that the tax at issue is impermissible, though per-
missible in Moe, because here the Tribes are raising governmental revenues 
and establishing commercial enterprises. The effect of the state tax then 
would be to reduce the tribe’s governmental revenues and force the tribe to 
choose between losing those revenues by forgoing its tax or subjecting res-
ervation retailers to a competitive disadvantage compared to those retailers 
outside the reservation not subject to the tribal tax. These may be the facts, 
but they are facts which Thomas v. Gay held to be irrelevant to the recogni-
tion of a sovereign tribal immunity.848 . . . It is apparent therefore that the 
backdrop relevant to this action is one of no sovereign immunity.849 
In Thomas, the taxpayers argued that the Oklahoma territorial property 
tax had to be invalidated because the revenues which the Indians received as 
lessor would be directly reduced. Lessees would be unwilling to pay the same 
rent to use Indian grazing lands once their cattle became taxable. The Thomas 
Court rejected this argument essentially because it viewed the tax on the les-
sees’ cattle as too remote and indirect850 to be deemed a tax upon the lands 
or privileges of the Indians.851 Rather astonishingly, Rehnquist described the 
Tribe’s involvement in Thomas as “far more direct”852 than in Colville. his 
support for that description was that in Thomas the lessor was a tribal leasing 
enterprise. Rehnquist did not explain why that was “more direct” than the 
Tribes’ involvement in Colville as both the taxing sovereigns and as wholesal-
ers or retailers.
The Thomas Court emphasized the “remoteness” of the tax.853 But “remote-
ness” is hardly an apt description of the Washington tax in Colville, which in 
combination with the “Tribal tax,”854 the Court assumed would destroy the 
846 169 U.S. 264 (1898), discussed supra notes 354–75 and accompanying text.
847 Colville, 447 U.S. at 182.
848 Id. at 183.
849 Id. at 183–84.
850 By the end of the 19th century, the Court commonly conceptualized state taxation in 
terms of its direct or indirect burdens on interstate commerce. Taxes imposing direct bur-
dens were invalid whereas taxes imposing indirect burdens were upheld. See, e.g., DiSanto v. 
Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34 (1927); S. Ry. Co. v. King, 217 U.S. 524 (1910); Erb. v. Morasch, 
177 U.S. 584 (1900); Adams Express Co. v. Ohio, 165 U.S. 194 (1897); Pullman’s Palace Car 
Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891); Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465 (1888). The test was 
a legal one and not economic in nature. Richard D. Pomp, State and Local Taxation 1-7 to 
1-8 (6th ed. 2009). “This test . . . did little more than place labels on the result rather than ana-
lyze whether the state law should stand.” Stephen M. Feldman, Preemption and the Dormant 
Commerce Clause: Implications for Federal Indian Law, 64 Or. L. Rev. 667, 689 (1986).
851 169 U.S. at 274–75.
852 447 U.S. at 184.
853 The Thomas Court also misdescribed Utah & Northern, see supra notes 359–60 and 
accompanying text.
854 See infra notes 890–94, 1315–17, 1349–54 and accompanying text.
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smokeshops.
Two further differences with Thomas exist. First, the Tribes in Colville docu-
mented that their tobacco revenues financed tribal services; this aspect of 
Thomas was unaddressed because the Indians were not parties to that case. 
Second, in Colville the State tax imposed administrative collection burdens on 
the Tribes; in Thomas the lessee paid the tax with no reporting obligation on 
the Indian lessors. Add to these differences that Thomas was decided in 1898, 
using analytical tools that the Court would subsequently abandon,855 and 
that the Thomas Court rejected the taxpayer’s argument by simply announc-
ing ipse dixit that the territorial was remote and indirect, and Rehnquist’s 
pronouncement that the case “best illustrates the relevant backdrop” requires 
a more generous reading of precedent than is palatable.
iii.  Rehnquist’s Misreading of Silas Mason. The liberties Rehnquist 
took in describing Thomas856 paled in comparison with his blatant misstating 
of the facts in Henneford v. Silas Mason.857 Justice Rehnquist cited Silas Mason 
in support of the heart of his argument:
When two sovereigns have legitimate authority to tax the same transaction, 
exercise of that authority by one sovereign does not oust the jurisdiction 
of the other858 . . . In [Silas Mason] this Court upheld a state tax on one of 
its resident’s use of goods purchased in another State without regard to the 
fact that the other State’s competitive ability to tax the same transaction was 
obviously reduced. The Court observed that such a tax was permissible even 
if no credit for the other state tax were allowed.859
A cursory reading of Silas Mason is enough to see that it contradicts Jus-
tice Rehnquist. That 1937 case involved Washington’s use tax on tangible 
personal property purchased elsewhere and brought into the State. Washing-
ton provided a credit for sales taxes paid to other states on the purchase of 
such property so that, contrary to Justice Rehnquist’s assertion, the issue of 
whether the use tax would be permissible without a credit was not raised.860 
The credit meant that out-of-state purchases (i.e., interstate commerce) were 
not discriminated against. Reflecting the typical judicial reluctance to decide 
issues not before it, the Silas Mason Court stated: 
855 See Richard D. Pomp, State and Local Taxation 1-8 to 1-19 (6th ed. 2009).
856 Dean Getches describes Rehnquist as “press[ing] his point with a vigor that seems inap-
propriate for a concurring opinion until one discovers that it was originally written as a dissent 
from Justice Brennan’s proposed majority opinion.” Getches, Conquering, supra note 14, at 
1606. I do not mind “vigor” as long as it is intellectually honest.
857 300 U.S. 577 (1937).
858 Colville, 447 U.S. at 184 n.9.
859 Id. (emphasis added).
860 See Silas Mason, 300 U.S. at 587. The Court had previously recognized that the effect of 
the credit was to equalize the taxation of purchases whether made in-state of out-of-state. “The 
effect of [Washington’s tax system in Silas Mason] was nondiscriminatory treatment of in-state 
and out-of-state purchases.” Bos. Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318, 331 (1977). 
For a wonderful presentation of the issues, see Tatarowicz, supra note 841.
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We have not meant to imply by anything said in this opinion that allowance 
of a credit for other taxes paid to Washington made it mandatory that there 
should be a like allowance for taxes paid to other states. . . . It will be time 
enough to mark [limits on state taxing powers] when a taxpayer paying in 
the state of origin is compelled to pay again in the state of destination. This 
statute by its framework avoids that possibility. The offsetting allowance has 
been conceded, whether the concession was necessary or not, and thus the 
system has been divested of any semblance of inequality or prejudice.861 
Not even a crabbed reading of this excerpted language can support Rehn-
quist’s description of Silas Mason. Moreover, under contemporary doctrine, 
the question left open in 1937 would appear to be resolved under the so-
called internal consistency doctrine,862 and today nearly all states that levy a 
use tax provide a credit for sales taxes paid to other states.863 
iv.  Rehnquist’s False Parallel with State Taxation of Those Doing Busi-
ness with the Federal Government. Justice Rehnquist also tried to bolster the 
Washington tax by citing a series of Supreme Court cases for the proposition 
that a state tax is constitutional even if its economic incidence falls on the 
federal government. 
Even the sovereign immunity of the Federal Government would not pre-
vent the effects of a tax comparable to those in issue. . . . Thus the State, 
through its exercise of taxing authority, can effectively require the Federal 
Government to forgo revenues which would otherwise be available to it in 
order to remain competitive as an enterprise.864
In all areas of tax immunity, this Court has staunchly refused to con-
sider the permissibility of a tax by reference to the economic burdens 
which it imposes if those burdens are nondiscriminatory and satisfy due  
process. . . . If Indians are to function as quasi co-sovereigns with the States, 
they like the States, must adjust to the economic realities of that status as 
every other sovereign competing for tax revenues, absent express interven-
tion by Congress.865 
861 300 U.S. at 587. 
862 See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 192 n.6 (1995). Jefferson 
Lines also described Silas Mason as upholding a use tax “which provided credit for sales taxes 
paid to any State.” Id.
863 Rehnquist may have been misled by Washington’s Brief in Colville, which stated that 
“[j]ust as two sister states may each impose its own tax upon income earned in one state by the 
resident of another (Maine v. New Hampshire, 426 U.S. 660 (1976)) or upon the same item 
of personal property, if purchased in one state and used in another ([Silas Mason]), so also the 
Tribe and the State each have the power to tax.” Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 744, 
at *29. The Brief failed to note that in the case of an income tax, states grant a credit to their 
residents for income taxes levied by other states on income earned in those states. Similarly, in 
the case of a use tax, states grant a credit for any sales taxes levied on the purchase of the good 
that subsequently becomes subject to a use tax. See Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 192 n.6. 
864 Colville, 447 U.S. at 184 n.9.
865 Id. at 185–86 (citation omitted). Simply put, Rehnquist was saying to the Indians “you 
cannot have your cake and eat it too.”
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Justice Rehnquist correctly summarized the law governing state taxation of 
those doing business with the federal government. But the premise that the 
doctrine upholding state taxes whose impact falls on the Federal Government 
should be applied in pari materia to the Indians is simply wrong. 
Much of the doctrine dealing with state taxation of those doing business 
with the federal government was established during the Great Depression and 
World War II. During that period, the federal government became actively 
involved in the economy, and the states were desperate for tax revenue. The 
cases of that era relaxed prior judicial constraints (often highly formalistic) by 
disregarding whether the burden of a state tax fell on the federal government, 
which was true of cost-plus contracts that were commonplace during the war. 
This paradigmatic shift allowed the states to share in the increased economic 
activity generated by the federal government, especially important for states 
that were home to federal contractors or federal facilities. 
These federal cases reflected the political reality of that era. More funda-
mentally, the cases also reflected a pragmatic legal safeguard unique to the 
Federal Government. Congress can always intervene and prohibit any state 
tax that is unacceptable, although imagining any nondiscriminatory state tax 
posing a serious threat to the federal government is difficult. True, Congress 
can always intervene on behalf of the Indians as well and prohibit oppressive 
state taxes, but as a political matter the government is more likely to act when 
it perceives a threat to its self-interest, including the federal fisc. The interests 
of the Indians are less likely to trigger congressional intervention. As will 
be seen, Justice Rehnquist apparently read the politics differently because he 
viewed Congress as a source of protection for the Indians.
As a practical matter, a nondiscriminatory state tax is not likely to severely 
impact a federal activity the way that Moe and Colville most likely destroyed 
business with the smokeshops (absent some kind of tax-sharing agreement or 
compact).866 Any state tax falling on the federal government would impose a 
trivial burden and be unlikely to have any real impact.867 
The constitutional prohibition against a discriminatory state tax means 
that the federal government rides the coattails of state taxpayers. That is, to 
levy a high rate of tax on the federal government requires that state taxpayers 
accept that same rate applied to themselves. Realistically, therefore, state taxes 
present no serious threat to the federal fisc.868 Moe and Colville, by contrast, 
illustrate how even a nondiscriminatory state tax can wipe out a sector of a 
tribe’s economy.
866 See supra note 814; infra note 901.
867 From a narrower perspective, a federal agency issuing a contract might worry about the 
effect of a state tax on the cost of the contract. An agency has a limited budget, and the more 
that is spent on state taxes the less available for other uses. This type of concern might trigger 
congressional intervention. 
868 Nothing similar to a Williams v. Lee test has ever been applied to state taxes on the Federal 
Government, presumably because realistically no state could ever infringe on the Federal 
Government’s ability to make its own laws and be ruled by them.
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Justice Rehnquist cited two sources of protection for the Indians to show 
that they are not “helpless hostages of the State absent judicial intervention.”869 
First, reiterating a theme he already expounded, Rehnquist underscored that 
the Indians cannot be subject to a discriminatory tax.870 Considering that 
Moe and Colville (as well as the other leading cases discussed above) involved 
nondiscriminatory state taxes, this first protection is of more theoretical than 
practical significance.871
Second, the Indians were protected by Congress, which can always inter-
vene. This view, however, puts the onus on the Indians to overcome legisla-
tive inertia. That is, a state tax would stand unless Congress overcame its 
normal legislative inertia and state opposition, and prohibited the offending 
tax. This approach would replace judicial protection with political protection, 
an approach that has been rejected in other areas of constitutional law. The 
Indians could certainly be excused if they viewed Congress somewhat skepti-
cally, if not cynically, as their protector.
Justice Rehnquist’s views, if extended to interstate commerce, would elimi-
nate the dormant Interstate Commerce Clause. The Court would not evaluate 
whether a state tax imposed undue burdens on interstate commerce because 
Congress would make that evaluation. Only discriminatory taxes would be 
struck down by the courts. This philosophy is consistent with Justice Rehn-
quist’s more general aversion to balancing tests,872 and it mirrors the philoso-
phy of Justices Scalia873 and Thomas,874 who reject the existence of a dormant 
Commerce Clause doctrine.875 
Justice Rehnquist found that under the teaching of Mescalero, Congress’s 
failure to prohibit the nondiscriminatory Washington cigarette tax was dis-
positive.876 The only protection the Tribes had was from nondiscriminatory 
869 Colville, 447 U.S. at 186 n.11.
870 For example, a state could not tax sales on the reservation without taxing off-reservation 
sales. Id. Similarly, a state could not tax sales on a reservation at a higher rate than sales off a 
reservation. 
871 Because a court would ultimately be involved in determining whether illegitimate dis-
crimination exists, Rehnquist’s description that this protection would not involve “judicial 
intervention” is misleading.
872 See supra note 719 and accompanying text; infra note 883 and accompanying text.
873 Justice Scalia’s views are set forth in Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington State 
Department of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 259–65 (1987). Dean Getches notes that “Justice 
Scalia has candidly summarized his view of the Supreme Court’s approach to Indian law as a 
search for ‘what the current state of affairs ought to be.’” Getches, Conquering, supra note 14, 
at 1642 (emphasis in original).
874 Justices Scalia and Thomas reject the Dormant Commerce Clause but draw an exception 
for discriminatory taxes. Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring 
in part; Thomas, J., concurring in judgment); United Haulers Ass’n. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid 
Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in part; Thomas, J., concurring 
in judgment).
875 Moreover, if these two sources of protection (protection from discriminatory taxation 
and protection by Congress) were applied to the intergovernmental immunity cases, the Court 
would have started down a very different path as well. 
876 See Colville, 447 U.S. at 185 (1980).
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taxation held sufficient to protect sovereignty in other areas of constitution-
ally derived immunities.877 The burden was on the Tribes to find an explicit 
expression of immunity, which they could not do.878 That Washington could 
not find an explicit congressional authorization to impose its tax was irrel-
evant. Chief Justice John Marshall would be aghast.
n.  Brennan’s Dissent
i.  The Majority Undermines the Tribes’ Sovereign Authority to Regu-
late and Tax Cigarettes. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented 
because they viewed the Washington tax as undermining the Tribes’ sover-
eign authority to regulate and tax cigarettes on trust lands. In addition, the 
Washington tax conflicted with activities expressly approved by the federal 
government.879 Justice Stewart dissented separately.
Brennan started with a brief doctrinal overview. First, “Indian reserva-
tions do not partake of the full territorial sovereignty of States or foreign 
countries. The result has been to blur the boundary between state and tribal 
authority.”880 Second, unless the Tribes consent, “state law does not reach on-
reservation conduct involving only Indians.”881 Third, “a significant territorial 
component of tribal power” exists so that “state taxes on the off-reservation 
activities of Indians are permissible” and “tribal laws will often govern the on-
877 Id. at 177 n.2.
878 
In the area of state taxes on reservations, Justice Rehnquist has developed a test that 
severely limits tribal immunity from state taxes. The Rehnquist test is simply to ask 
whether Congress has spoken to the particular type of tax the state wishes to impose, 
and whether Congress intended that Indian lands be immune. The intent of Congress 
in each case is ascertained by determining whether there has been a traditional immu-
nity for Indians against imposition of this type of tax. If traditional immunity exists, 
and Congress has spoken on the subject and has not removed the immunity, the 
intent of Congress presumably is to retain the immunity for the Indians. If there is 
no finding of “traditional immunity,” however, Congress’s silence means no tribal 
immunity exists. Congress must specifically preempt state action in the area of the 
tax for the state’s taxing power to be limited. Rehnquist’s test is contrary to the Indian 
law doctrine disfavoring the application of state laws on a reservation where Congress 
has expressed no clear intent.
Ralph W. Johnson & Berrie Martinis, Chief Justice Rehnquist and the Indian Cases, 16 Pub. 
Land L. Rev. 1, 21–22 (1995).
879 Colville, 447 U.S. at 165. They concurred with the majority’s striking down the motor 
vehicle tax. Id. at 164–65.
880 Id. at 165–66. See Atkinson Trading, discussed supra notes 331, 592, 762; infra note 1075, 
which seems to adopt this view in striking down a Navajo hotel occupancy tax imposed on the 
guests of a non-Indian hotel on non-Indian fee land on the reservation.
881 Colville, 447 U.S. at 166. The examples the dissent gave covered the adoption of chil-
dren by on-reservation tribal members, Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976); the 
income derived by reservation Indians from reservation sources, McClanahan v. Ariz. State 
Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); on-reservation sales to reservation Indians, and personal 
property taxes on property owned by such Indians, Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai 
Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976). 
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reservation conduct of non-Indians.”882 Fourth, if a conflict exists “between 
state and tribal authority over on-reservation conduct involving Indians and 
non-Indians, a relatively particularistic look at the interests of the state and 
the tribe and the federal policies that govern relations with Indian tribes is 
appropriate.”883 
[T]he preceding results flow from an intricate web of sources including 
federal treaties and statutes, the broad policies that underlie those federal 
enactments, and a presumption of sovereignty or autonomy that has roots 
deep in aboriginal independence. The prevalent mode of analysis is one of 
pre-emption. It takes as its starting point the exclusive power of the Federal 
Government to regulate Indian tribes and proceeds to bound state power 
where necessary to give vitality to the federal concerns at stake. Only rarely 
does the talismanic invocation of constitutional language or rigid concep-
tions of state and tribal sovereignty shed light on difficult problems.884
This formulation is noteworthy for three reasons. First, the dissent refers to 
a presumption of sovereignty or autonomy and the Government’s exclusive 
power to regulate the tribes, so it is unclear who has the burden to “bind” 
the state. Second, if no federal concerns can be identified, then presumably 
a state statute will be upheld, which seems to undercut the presumption and 
the “exclusive power of the Federal Government.” Brennan was obviously not 
attempting to resurrect Worcester. Third, the dissent omits any explicit refer-
ence to the Indian Commerce Clause. The reference to the “exclusive power 
of the Federal Government” could be read as an oblique reference to that 
Clause. If the caveat that “only rarely does the talismanic invocation of con-
stitutional language” shed light on difficult problems is meant to refer to the 
Indian Commerce Clause, then this was hardly a resounding endorsement of 
that Clause. But it is unclear if that is what the dissent intended, and the rest 
of Brennan’s opinion (not excerpted above) relies not on the Constitution, 
but rather on the federal policy of encouraging tribal self-government and 
stimulating economic and commercial development, described as “of central 
importance in analyzing any conflict of state and tribal law.”885 There was no 
explicit mention of the Indian Commerce Clause anywhere in Brennan’s dis-
sent. (Justice Stewart’s dissent, by contrast, would refer to the Clause.)
ii.  Limiting Moe. Analytically, Brennan had to limit the reach of Moe 
so that it did not control Colville. Brennan distinguished Moe as involving a 
private cigarette business; in Colville, by comparison, the Tribes were acting 
in federally sanctioned ways by raising governmental revenues, establishing 
commercial enterprises, and struggling to escape from a “century of oppres-
882 Colville, 447 U.S. at 166–67 (citing Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 
(1973) and Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959)).
883 Id. at 167. This particularistic examination of the interests suggests the type of balancing 
that is anathema to Rehnquist.
884 Id. at 167–68 (citing Moe and McClanahan) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
885 Id. at 168–69.
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sion and paternalism.”886 Unlike Moe, the Washington tax directly reduced 
tribal revenue. The combination of the Washington and tribal taxes put the 
smokeshops at a disadvantage. And the State tax injected Washington law 
onto a reservation transaction that the Indians had chosen to subject to their 
own laws.887
Brennan viewed the majority as putting the Tribes to an unsatisfactory 
choice between tribal self-government and commercial development. The 
Tribes are
free to tax sales to non-Indians, but doing so will place a burden upon 
such sales which may well make it profitable for non-Indian buyers who 
are located on the reservation to journey to surrounding communities to 
purchase cigarettes.888 Or they can decide to remain competitive by not 
taxing such sales, and in the process forgo revenues urgently needed to fill 
governmental coffers. Commercial growth, in short, can be had only at the 
expense of tax dollars. And having to make that choice seriously intrudes on 
the Indians’ right “to make their own laws and be ruled by them.”889
886 Id. at 169–70 (quoting Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 152).
887 Id. at 170.
888 In an attempt to limit Moe, the dissent stated that this problem was entirely absent in 
that case, which technically was true because there were no tribal taxes and the holding in Moe 
could be viewed as merely establishing that on-reservation and off-reservation purchases by 
non-Indians would be subject to the same state tax. As a practical matter, however, off-reser-
vation non-Indians were hardly going to drive to the reservation to buy cigarettes and pay the 
same tax that applied off-reservation. While on-reservation non-Indians had no reason to buy 
off-reservation after Moe because the state tax would be paid in either event, presumably the 
smokeshops did not exist to service that group. Brennan viewed Moe as maintaining neutrality 
between on- and off-reservation purchases, creating “a situation in which persons were encour-
aged to buy cigarettes on the basis of factors other than tax benefits and avoidance—factors 
like geographical location and convenience.” Id. at 171 n.6. Those factors, of course, did not 
favor the Indians.
889 Colville, 447 U.S. at 171 (citing Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959)). The dissent 
recognized that the choice between taxes and economic development could be viewed as com-
monplace because states have to balance their revenue needs against the economic impact 
of their taxes. The dissent dismissed the relevance of the state analogy on the grounds that 
if a state imposes a high tax and consumers purchase goods elsewhere, they will nonetheless 
be subject to a use tax that out-of-state vendors will have to collect in some circumstances. 
Nonetheless, the Indians cannot require off-reservation vendors to collect tribal use taxes. But 
more to the point, the tribes are the “special beneficiaries of certain federal concerns and poli-
cies. As a result, the tradeoffs and frictions that may be inevitable in the state-state context 
demand special scrutiny in the state-reservation context. Tribes may lack the tools needed to 
protect themselves, and protecting them is an important federal concern.” Id. at 171 n.7.
Dean Getches describes the dissent as wanting to treat the reservation as a tax-free enterprise 
zone. Getches, supra note 14, at 1604. The Court rejected that goal as long ago as 1898 in 
Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898). Tax-free enterprise zones are used by the states to encour-
age development in blighted areas, typically the inner cities. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability 
Office, Empowerment Zone and Enterprise Community Program: Improvements 
Occurred in Programs, But the Effect of the Programs is Unclear (GAO-06-727) 
(2006).
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o.  Do the Tribal “Taxes” Have Independent Economic Significance? 
What is misleading about Colville is the Court’s acceptance that the Tribal 
taxes were “real.” The Tribes were apparently both the retailer and the tax-
ing sovereign.890 If that is true, then the taxes had no independent economic 
significance.
Before the adoption of a Tribal tax, cigarettes had to sell at a price that 
made them competitive with off-reservation vendors. If the Washington tax 
did not apply on the reservation, which is what the Tribes assumed prior to 
Moe, cigarettes on the reservation could be priced the same as cigarettes sell-
ing off-reservation (ex-tax). The inapplicability of the Washington tax would 
give the Tribes a competitive edge.891 That edge would be preserved if the 
Tribe adopted its own sales tax but lowered the base price of the cigarettes 
on the reservation by the amount of the tax. Under that condition, the total 
sales price of cigarettes on the reservation with the Tribal tax (but without the 
Washington tax) would be the same as before the Tribe adopted its tax. 
To illustrate, if cigarettes were selling for $X before the adoption of a $Y 
tribal tax, their base price could be reduced so that after the adoption of a 
Tribal tax they would continue to sell for $X with the tax. Their competitive 
edge would still come from the lack of the Washington tax.892 
Put differently, suppose that without a tribal or Washington tax, the Tribe 
was receiving net revenue from the smokeshops it owned in the amount of 
$100. Assume cigarettes were selling at a price without any taxes for the same 
890 The Court describes the Colville, Lummi, and Makah Tribes as retailers, and that the 
cigarettes remained the property of the Tribes until sold. Colville, 447 U.S. at 144. The Court 
also describes the Tribes as distributing the cigarettes to the tobacco outlets and collecting the 
wholesale distribution price and a tax. Id. That description is more consistent with the Tribes 
being a wholesaler, yet the Court contrasts them with the Yakima, which acts as a wholesaler. 
Id. “While the Colville, Lummi, and Makah Tribes function as retailers, retaining posses-
sion of the cigarettes until their sale to consumers, the Yakima Tribe acts as a wholesaler.” Id. 
The district court opinion adds further confusion. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian 
Reservation v. Washington, 446 F. Supp. 1339, 1347 (E.D. Wash. 1978). The discussion in the 
text proceeds as if the Tribes were both the taxing sovereign and retailer. Whatever the actual 
facts in Colville, the discussion in the text would apply to Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi 
Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005), where the Tribe was clearly wearing both hats: taxing sovereign 
and retailer. It would also apply to Merrion and Cotton where again the tribes were wearing 
both hats.
891 To the extent the reservation smokeshops had costs of doing business that were compa-
rable to off-reservation competitors, the base price of cigarettes on-reservation (ex-tax) would 
approximate the base price of cigarettes sold off-reservation (ex-tax). Without having to charge 
a state tax, cigarettes at the smokeshops could be priced so that the purchaser received the full 
tax savings or the sellers could capitalize some of the benefit and increase the price. See supra 
note 706.
892 Presumably, the Tribes set the base price of their cigarettes to maximize their profits. If 
that price were $X before the Tribal tax were adopted, it would remain at $X after the Tribal 
tax were adopted. If the smokeshops increased their prices above $X to take into account the 
tax, and if that produced even more profits than they were making before the tax, the logical 
question is why weren’t they selling cigarettes at that higher price in the first place? Admittedly, 
this is a rarified discussion.
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amount they were selling for off-reservation (ex-tax). Assume the Tribe now 
adopts a tax and lowers its base price of cigarettes by the amount of the tax so 
that there is no change in the demand for cigarettes. Consumers see the same 
price as before, only now the Tribe will receive its net revenue partially in the 
form of a tax. Instead of receiving $100 of net revenue as before, assume the 
Tribe now receives $80 of net revenue and $20 of tax. There is no economic 
difference between these two situations. The “tax” is a formal distinction.893
Why would the Tribe adopt a “tax” that had no independent economic sig-
nificance? One explanation is that the existence of a “tax” was an attempt to 
enhance its litigating position. Although the Tribes ended up losing Colville 
anyway, the Court accepted that the “tax” was real and had economic sig-
nificance. Also, the tax would have real economic significance if there were 
non-Tribal owned smokeshops (although there does not appear to have been 
any).894 Perhaps there were marketing considerations, in that the Tribes adver-
tised the lower ex-tax price of cigarettes. 
After losing Colville, the Tribe could not offer non-Indians or non-member 
Indians (“taxable purchasers”) the advantage of buying free of the Washing-
ton tax. Unless the smokeshops’ cost of doing business was significantly lower 
than those of its off-reservation competitors so that it could lower the base 
price of cigarettes,895 there was little it could do to attract onto the reservation 
taxable purchasers. But the heart of the issue was not the Tribal tax. With or 
without the Tribal tax, the viability of the smokeshops depended on not hav-
ing to collect the Washington tax. From this perspective, Colville added very 
little to Moe except for allowing the State to tax non-member Indians.
Assuming that the tax-inclusive price of cigarettes on the reservation was 
close to the tax-inclusive price of cigarettes off-reservation, sales might still be 
893 Conceivably, the Tribe could have been viewed as previously imposing a tax equal in 
amount to 100% of its net revenue, and was now reducing that tax. See Richard D. Pomp & 
Stanley S. Surrey, The Tax Structure of the People’s Republic of China, 20 Va. J. Int.’l L. 1, 3 
(1979).
The issue of what constitutes a tax when the taxing sovereign is simultaneously the vendor 
(or owner of a resource) has a parallel in the Internal Revenue Code. Congress grants a credit 
for foreign income taxes. When the foreign sovereign wears both hats, the issue arises of how 
much of a payment by a taxpayer to a foreign country should be viewed as a creditable income 
tax? This issue is especially important for the U.S. multinational oil companies. A foreign 
country that owns the oil may not care if it receives its sought after revenue in the form of a 
royalty or an income tax. The oil companies, however, greatly prefer paying a creditable income 
tax rather than a deductible royalty. For the U.S. rules, see Int. Rev. Code of 1986, Reg. Secs. 
1.901-2, 1.901-2A. See Michael J. McIntyre, International Income Tax Rules of the 
United States 5-17 to 5-21 (2nd ed. 2000); John P. Steines, Jr., International Aspects of 
U.S. Income Taxation 303-08 (2004). For a very good early discussion, see Joseph Isenbergh, 
The Foreign Tax Credit: Royalties, Subsidies, and Creditable Taxes, 39 Tax L. Rev. 227 (1984). 
894 Another possibility is that despite what the Court stated, the Tribes were not acting as 
retailers, see supra note 890.
895 See supra note 891 and accompanying text.
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made to taxable purchasers who lived on the reservation.896 And sales would 
continue to be made to Tribal members who had no incentive to purchase 
off-reservation where they would have paid the Washington tax, which was 
higher than the Tribal tax. But the smokeshops did not exist to sell to these 
groups.
Justice Brennan knew that requiring Washington to grant a credit for the 
Tribal “taxes” would eliminate the marketing of an exemption and would 
ensure that consumers would be neutral about where to purchase ciga-
rettes.897 Without the credit, the Tribes “court economic harms when they 
enact taxes of their own,”898 and this possibility “erodes the Tribe’s sovereign 
authority and stands the special federal solicitude for Indian commerce and 
governmental autonomy on its head.”899 That statement would be correct if 
the Tribes were not both a retailer and taxing sovereign.900 Brennan concluded 
that Washington could “not impose a tax that forces the Tribes to choose 
between federally sanctioned goals and places their goods at an actual com-
petitive disadvantage.”901 
If the Tribes were both a retailer and the taxing sovereign, then a credit 
would only encourage a tribe to adopt a tax equal to the State tax and reduce 
the base price of its cigarettes accordingly. To illustrate, if the Tribe sold $100 
of cigarettes and had no Tribal tax, a credit would be irrelevant. If, however, 
the Tribe were to adopt a tax and reduce its prices accordingly so that it now 
sold $80 of cigarettes and collected a creditable Tribal tax of $20, the State 
would sacrifice $20 of revenue, yet there might be no effect on reservation 
sales because there would be no change in tax-inclusive reservation prices.902 
Where a tribe acts only as a taxing sovereign, and thus has no control over 
the price of the underlying cigarettes, however, the issue of a credit becomes 
896 Before the district court, the State conceded that if both the Washington and tribal taxes 
were imposed, “it is painfully apparent that very few, if any, cartons of cigarettes would have 
been sold.” Appellants’ Opening Brief, Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian 
Reservation, 446 F.Supp. 1339 (E.D. Wash. 1978), 1979 U.S. Briefs LEXIS 1817, at *96. The 
State did not realize that the Tribes could lower the base price of their cigarettes to offset the 
tribal tax. The district court in ruling for the tribes accepted that “with regard to a commodity 
as highly price elastic as cigarettes, the result will be the depletion of an already limited tribal 
tax base, probably destruction of the tribal enterprises and elimination of essential revenues 
needed for tribally sponsored programs.” Id. at *97. 
897 Colville, 447 U.S. at 172.
898 Id.
899 Id.
900 See supra notes 890–93 and accompanying text.
901 Colville. 447 U.S. at 173. The dissent proceeded to chide the majority for deciding the 
collection issue when the district court failed to do so. Id. at 173–74. One commentator 
reported that after losing the case, the Colville Tribe closed all of its smokeshops. Richard J. 
Ansson, Jr., State Taxation of Non-Indians Whom Do Business With Indian Tribes: Why Several 
Recent Ninth Circuit Holdings Reemphasize The Need For Indian Tribes To Enter Into Taxation 
Compacts With Their Respective State, 78 Or. L. Rev. 501, 543–44 (1999) (citing a phone 
interview with a tribal attorney).
902 The status quo ante is assumed to be one where the Tribes had no taxes of their own and 
the State offered no credit.
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relevant.
Of course, all of this is a highly stylized discussion, which has a greater 
import if a tribe is both a sovereign and a vendor.903 But it does underscore 
that the issue under those conditions was more complicated than the Court 
appreciated, and that Moe, rather than Colville, was the key case. Once Moe 
held that a state could tax non-Indians, the sought-after tax advantage was 
lost. 
p.  Stewart’s Willingness to Require a (Meaningless) Credit for the Tribal 
Taxes 
Unlike Justices Brennan and Marshall, Justice Stewart’s dissent explicitly 
referred to the Indian Commerce Clause, although he was unwilling to inter-
pret it as prohibiting the Washington tax. According to Justice Stewart, 
when a State and an Indian tribe tax in a functionally identical manner the 
same on-reservation sales to nontribal members, it is my view that con-
gressional policy conjoined with the Indian Commerce Clause requires the 
State to credit against its own tax the amount of the tribe’s tax. This solution 
fully effectuates the State’s goal of assuring that its citizens who are not tribal 
members do not cash in on the exemption from state taxation that the tribe 
and its members enjoy. On the other hand, it permits the tribe to share with 
the State in the tax revenues from cigarette sales, without at the same time 
placing the tribe’s federally encouraged enterprises at a competitive disad-
vantage compared to similarly situated off-reservation businesses.904 
Like White’s and Rehnquist’s focus on discrimination, Stewart’s emphasis 
on a credit moves the interpretation of the Indian Commerce Clause away 
from its roots and closer to the Interstate Commerce Clause.905 
Justice Stewart’s reasoning would be identical if the issue were whether 
Washington had to provide a credit against its use tax for sales taxes paid to 
State X having a lower sales tax. To paraphrase the reasoning above using the 
more general sales and use tax, a credit fully effectuates [Washington’s] goal 
of assuring that its citizens who are not [residents of X] do not cash in on 
the [lower rate of X’s sales taxes that X residents enjoy]. On the other hand, 
it permits [X] to share with [Washington] in the tax revenues from cigarette 
sales, without at the same time placing [X’s businesses] at a competitive disad-
vantage compared to similarly situated businesses in [Washington]. 
Seen from this perspective, Justice Stewart’s interpretation of the Indian 
Commerce Clause dovetails with the Interstate Commerce Clause and treats 
the Tribes as if they were a state.906 The Founders, however, never intended 
903 See supra note 890; infra notes 909–10 and accompanying text.
904 Colville, 447 U.S. at 175. The Court’s analysis is more relevant when a tribe is acting as 
a taxing sovereign and not as a vendor of the taxed goods. Otherwise, the credit can result in a 
loss in state revenue without any encouragement of reservation sales. See supra note 902.
905 See supra notes 807, 810, 870–71 and accompanying text.
906 Justice Stewart viewed the tribes as enjoying a “power at least equal to that of the State to 
tax the on-reservation sales of cigarettes to nontribal members.” Colville, 447 U.S. at 174–75.
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that the Indian Commerce Clause be viewed in pari materia with the Inter-
state Commerce Clause,907 and Justice Stewart did not view the Indian Com-
merce Clause of its own force as prohibiting the Washington sales tax on 
reservation sales.
The credit operates exactly as Justice Stewart describes, but is not going to 
provide “funds for the maintenance and operation of tribal self-government.”908 
A credit will not give the Indians the tax advantage they were seeking in being 
able to sell to non-Indians and non-member Indians free of a state tax. At 
best, a credit would ensure that the tax rate on cigarettes sold on the reserva-
tion will be equal to the rate on off-reservation sales.909 
A credit would encourage the tribe to adopt a tax (or increase the rate of an 
existing tax) equal to the amount that would creditable. A taxable purchaser 
would not be any worse off, and the effect would be to transfer revenue from 
the state to the tribe. The group whose decision might be affected by the 
credit in a situation where a tribe was not also a vendor would be those living 
on the reservation, whether non-member Indians or non-Indians. This group 
would be subject to the Tribal and State tax and thus benefit from the credit, 
which would remove a tax incentive to purchase off-reservation.910
In other situations, a credit might be extremely valuable at eliminating 
double taxation. For example, a credit would eliminate the double taxation 
that would otherwise result from the simultaneous imposition of a tribal and 
state income tax, or the simultaneous imposition of a tribal and state sever-
ance tax.911 
q.  The Economic Implications of Moe and Colville 
The combination of Moe and Colville imposes a dilemma for tribes in the 
case of cigarettes, liquor, gasoline, and the like.912 Moe and Colville remove 
the advantage of selling goods on the reservation without a state tax. If a 
tribe is both a sovereign and a vendor and imposes its own tax, it can lower 
the base price of the goods it sells to offset its own tax, but it can never offer 
non-Indians and non-member Indians the advantage of buying without a 
state tax. Where a tribe is not a vendor, it can continue levying its own tax, 
907 See supra notes 180, 190, 283 and accompanying text.
908 Colville, 447 U.S. at 175.
909 For a general discussion, see Cowan, Double Taxation, supra note 814.
910 Cotton Petroleum, infra notes 1131–1270 and accompanying text, involved the simulta-
neous assertion of a tribal severance tax and a state severance tax. The Court refused to grant 
any relief from the resulting multiple taxation. 
911 See supra notes 890–93 and accompanying text. Justice Stewart drew a distinction 
between the taxes levied by the Colville, Lummi, and Makah Tribes, which functioned like 
the State’s general sales tax, and the tax levied by the Yakima Tribe, which was imposed on the 
retailer and not required to be added to the ultimate retail sales price. Because of this differ-
ence, Justice Stewart would not have required a credit for the Yakima tax. he did not pursue 
the issue discussed in the text that when a tribe is both the sovereign and the vendor, the exis-
tence of a tribal tax has no independent economic significance.
912 See supra text accompanying note 653.
01-Pomp.indd   1120 12/23/2010   11:03:53 AM
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2443846
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 63, No. 4
 INDIAN COMMERCE CLAUSE AND STATE TAXATION 1121
but the smokeshops are likely to suffer a decline in revenue as non-tribal 
members and non-Indians shop off-reservation. The tribe would be left tax-
ing its captive market, that is, those living and working on the reservation 
that have no easy access to off-reservation stores (assuming no black market 
develops).913 Even without a tribal tax, however, Moe already ensured that 
off-reservation non-Indians had no tax incentive to shop on-reservation (Moe 
had not addressed the issue of non-tribal members). 
After Moe and Colville, on-reservation non-Indians and non-members lost 
the tax incentive to purchase on reservation. But if there were no tribal taxes, 
they also had no tax reason to shop off-reservation. If there were a tribal 
tax, however, they would be discouraged from purchasing on the reservation, 
unless that tax were creditable (or there were other relief arrangements). A 
tribe could adopt other types of taxes on the smokeshops, such as an income 
tax, a property tax, an excise tax on doing business, a business activities tax, 
and the like. Double taxation could still result depending on whether a state 
imposes similar taxes and what relief mechanisms it adopts.914 In the short-
term, these alternatives may not be as attractive as selling cigarettes free of 
state tax. If, however, Moe and Colville encourage tribes to pursue more sub-
stantial forms of economic development, the long-term consequences of these 
cases could be positive.915 
913 The Yakima Tribe had a population that was one-fourth enrolled tribal members and 
three-fourths non-members living on the reservation. Bess Lee Chen, What About Colville, 8 
Am. Indian L. Rev. 161, 167 (1980). If the non-members were a captive market because they 
had no easy transport and rarely left the reservation, they might continue to buy cigarettes 
and pay the double tax. They might also stock up on cigarettes when they happened to be 
off-reservation. If the captive market were large, a black market might be expected to emerge, 
as persons purposely bought cigarettes off-reservation free of the tribal taxes with the intent of 
reselling them on-reservation. Even if the tribes imposed a use tax to deal with this situation, 
they would still need a way of enforcing it. The smokeshops could, of course, cut their prices 
so that even with the tribal and state taxes, cigarettes would still be cheaper on the reservation 
than off, but the reduction in profits might not make this a viable option. See supra note 891.
An intriguing question starkly posing the sovereignty issue would be whether a tribe could 
require an off-reservation vendor to collect a tribal use tax on the sale of goods sent onto the 
reservation. Without any analysis, the dissent in Colville stated that “it is highly unlikely that 
the Tribes . . . could require sellers elsewhere in Washington to collect tribal taxes.” Colville, 
447 U.S. at 171 n.7.
914 For a discussion of the double tax issue, see Cowan, Double Taxation, supra note 814, at 
95–96.
915 Unlike many other tribes, the Yakima did not depend solely on cigarette sales because it 
also sold timber. Chen, supra note 913, at 167–68. One commentator reported that smoke-
shop closings in Washington “have created losses of tribal revenues of $200,000” and that 
some tribes were planning to sell liquor and DMSO, a pain reliever that was not approved by 
the FDA. Id. at 168 n.25.
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E.  The Preemption/Balancing Cases
1.  White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker 
The next reference to the Indian Commerce Clause was in White Mountain 
Apache Tribe v. Bracker.916 The case involved the application of the Arizona 
motor carrier license tax917 and use fuel taxes918 to Pinetop, an enterprise919 
that—pursuant to a contract with a tribal corporation—was logging on the 
reservation.920 The legal incidence of each tax was on the company, but the 
Tribe agreed contractually to reimburse Pinetop and intervened as a plain-
tiff.921 Timber operations provided an overwhelming percentage of the Tribe’s 
profits from all of its enterprises. Timber profits funded governmental, health, 
916 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980). The Court handed down White Mountain and Central 
Machinery, discussed supra notes 469–518 and accompanying text, two weeks after Colville. 
The state taxes were struck down in White Mountain and Central Machinery but upheld in 
Colville. According to Dean Getches:
The different results left lawyers and scholars puzzled as to the applicable rules. Only 
three Justices had voted in the majority in all three cases! The boundaries of tribal tax 
immunity became fuzzy, lying somewhere between Colville and the other two cases. 
Still, it was not unreasonable at the time to see White Mountain-Central Machinery 
as stating the general rule and Colville, which pieced together a majority from four 
opinions based on separate rationales, as an exception.
Getches, Conquering, supra note 14, at 1608. 
917 The license tax was imposed on every common motor carrier of property and every 
contract motor carrier of property. The tax was 2.5% of the carrier’s gross receipts, White 
Mountain, 448 U.S. at 139, to support the “maintenance of Arizona highways from parties 
who enter into business arrangements which look directly to the inordinate use of public high-
ways to realize pecuniary benefits.” Brief for Petitioners, at 23, White Mountain, 448 U.S. 136 
(No. 78-1177), 1979 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1274, at *23 [hereinafter Brief for Petitioners] 
(citing Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40-641 (1979)).
918 The excise or use fuel tax was designed to partially compensate the State for the use of its 
highways. It was imposed at eight cents per gallon of fuel used in the propulsion of a motor 
vehicle on any highway within the State. White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 140. Pinetop conceded 
liability for both taxes for travel on State highways within the reservation. Id. at 140 n.6. The 
Tribe conceded that its roads were “within this State.” Brief for Petitioners, supra note 917, at 
*25.
919 The Court described Pinetop as “an enterprise consisting of two non-Indian corpora-
tions,” and as a joint venture corporation. White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 137–38, 153 (Stevens, 
J., dissenting). The Tribe’s brief describes Pinetop as the “business name of two Oregon corpo-
rations . . . which jointly conduct the logging business . . . .” Brief for Petitioners, supra note 
917, at *8 n.1.
920 A tribal enterprise (FATCO) managed, harvested, processed, and sold timber. FATCO 
contracted “with six logging companies, including Pinetop, which perform certain operations 
that FATCO could not carry out as economically on its own.” White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 
139. 
921 Id. at 140. When Pinetop contracted to undertake the timber operations for FATCO, 
both parties assumed no state taxes would be owed. After Arizona assessed the taxes at issue, 
FATCO agreed to pay them to avoid the loss of Pinetop’s services. Id. at 140 n.7. The Tribe’s 
Brief stated that the economic burden of the taxes fell entirely on it. Brief for Petitioners, supra 
note 917, at *13. This statement is unremarkable given the agreement to reimburse Pinetop 
was made after the fact when there were no opportunities to shift the tax.
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education, welfare, and social programs.922 Timber on the reservation trust 
land was owned by the United States for the benefit of the Tribe and could 
not be harvested for sale without consent of Congress.923 The operations were 
subject to extensive federal control.924 
a.  Justice Marshall and the Indian Commerce Clause 
Justice Marshall, writing again for the majority, started the opinion with a 
reminder that “[l]ong ago the Court departed from Mr. Chief Justice Mar-
shall’s view that ‘the laws of [a State] can have no force’ within reservation 
boundaries,”925 and stressed that tribes retain “attributes of sovereignty over 
both their members and their territory.”926 Consequently, there was “no rigid 
rule by which to resolve the question whether a particular state law may be 
applied to an Indian reservation or to tribal members.”927 
Congress has broad power to regulate tribal affairs under the Indian 
Commerce Clause. [The Indian Commerce Clause] and the “semi-inde-
pendent position” of Indian tribes have given rise to two independent but 
related barriers to the assertion of state regulatory authority over tribal res-
ervations and members. First, the exercise of such authority may be pre-
empted by federal law. See, e.g., [Warren Trading, McClanahan].928 Second, 
it may unlawfully infringe “on the right of reservation Indians to make 
their own laws and be ruled by them.” [Williams v. Lee].929 The two barriers 
922 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 917, at *15. The revenue used to fund the Tribe’s programs 
was derived almost entirely from tribal enterprises and of these, timber operations provided 
over 90% of the Tribe’s annual profits. Id.; see also White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 146–48.
923 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 917, at *16.
924 See White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 138, 146–48.
925 White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 141 (citing Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561 
(1832)).
926 Id. at 142 (citing United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975)).
927 Id.
928 Professor Wilkinson refers to this barrier as subject matter preemption “because it involves 
the analysis of federal statutes dealing with discrete substantive areas of regulation such as com-
merce, criminal jurisdiction, health and education, and resource management.” Wilkinson, 
supra note 7, at 93. See supra notes 436–37.
929 448 U.S. at 142. In Ramah Navajo School Board v. New Mexico, 458 U.S. 832 (1982), infra 
notes 985–1057 and accompanying text, this second barrier was described as “interfer[ing] with 
the tribe’s ability to exercise its sovereign functions.” 458 U.S. at 837. Commentators some-
times refer to the second barrier as an “infringement of tribal sovereignty.” See, e.g., Stephen M. 
Feldman, Preemption and the Dormant Commerce Clause: Implications for Federal Indian Law, 
64 Or. L. Rev. 667, 669 (1986). Feldman argues that the second barrier should be analyzed 
under the Dormant Indian Commerce Clause and balance state interests against federal and 
tribal interests. Id. But the second barrier has its roots in Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), 
supra notes 376–424 and accompanying text, which was not a balancing test.
Professor Wilkinson refers to this second barrier as “geographical preemption,” which is 
“purely territorial because it assesses the extent to which state law is ousted due solely to the 
creation of an Indian reservation by joint federal-tribal action, or unilateral federal action, in a 
treaty or treaty substitute.” Wilkinson, supra note 7, at 93. 
In a non-Indian case, the Court has stated that state law is preempted where either Congress 
has occupied the field with respect to the subject matter the state law seeks to regulate or the 
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are independent because either, standing alone, can be a sufficient basis930  
for . . . [striking down a state statute]. They are related, however, in two 
important ways. The right of tribal self-government is ultimately dependent 
on and subject to the broad power of Congress. Even so, traditional notions 
of Indian self-government are so deeply engrained in our jurisprudence 
that they have provided an important “backdrop,” against which vague or 
ambiguous federal enactments must always be measured.931 
The role Justice Marshall was ascribing to the Indian Commerce Clause 
was unclear. he asserted that the Indian Commerce Clause in combina-
tion with the semi-independent position of the tribes gave rise to barriers 
to state statutes. The first of the two barriers, preemption, however, invokes 
the Supremacy Clause.932 Neither of the cases he cited in support, Warren 
Trading and McClanahan,933 involved the Indian Commerce Clause. Indeed, 
both cases would have been decided identically even if no Indian Commerce 
Clause existed.934 
The second barrier, set forth in Williams v. Lee, mentioned the Indian 
Commerce Clause only by citation in a footnote.935 It is hard to tease a foun-
dational role for the Indian Commerce Clause out of that case. And nothing 
in Williams v. Lee recognizes the possibility that the Indian Commerce Clause 
on its own might prohibit a state statute even if there were no relevant federal 
statute or treaty. his “two barrier” doctrine was hardly a sweeping endorse-
ment of the Court’s right under the Indian Commerce Clause to strike down 
state law conflicts with federal law. See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157–58 
(1978). A conflict exists if the state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execu-
tion of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Id. at 158 (quoting hines v. Davidowitz, 
312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)); see also Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956) (factors include 
whether “[t]he scheme of federal regulation [is] so pervasive to make reasonable the inference 
that Congress left room for the states to supplement it”; whether “the federal statutes ‘touch a 
field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system [must] be assumed to 
preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject’”; whether state enforcement “presents 
a serious danger of conflict with the administration of the federal program.”); supra notes 
436–37, 928.
930 White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 143.
931 Id. (citing McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Commissioner, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973)). 
Dean Getches views Marshall’s opinion as the “Court’s clearest and most forceful articula-
tion of the McClanahan rule.” Getches, Conquering, supra note 14, at 1607. But the Indian 
Commerce Clause did not play a role in McClanahan.
932 Obviously, the federal statutes have to be constitutional, that is, Congress must have had 
the right to enact them in the first instance. The Indian Commerce Clause might well be the 
source of Congress’s power to enact the federal statute that will prohibit or preempt the state 
statute, but that does not seem to be the context in which Justice Marshall is referring to the 
Clause.
933 See Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., 458 U.S. 832, 837 (1982). he also cited Williams v. Lee, but 
presumably that was for the second of the two barriers.
934 Assuming again that the statutes reflected a constitutional exercise of Congress’s power. 
See supra note 932.
935 See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), discussed supra notes 421–22 and accompany-
ing text.
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a state statute in the absence of any applicable federal statute.
In addition, his reference to the Indian Commerce Clause seems unneces-
sary to his two otherwise pedestrian comments. No one would disagree that a 
state law can be preempted by a federal statute. And his citation of Williams 
v. Lee did no more than quote the holding in that case.
b.  Justice Marshall’s Views on Preemption 
More significant was Justice Marshall’s apparent response to Justice Rehn-
quist’s views on preemption. Marshall warned that,
[t]he unique historical origins of tribal sovereignty make it generally unhelp-
ful to apply to federal enactments regulating Indian tribes those standards 
of pre-emption that have emerged in other areas of the law. Tribal reserva-
tions are not States, and the differences in the form and nature of their sov-
ereignty make it treacherous to import to one notions of pre-emption that 
are properly applied to the other.936 The tradition of Indian sovereignty over 
the reservation and tribal members must inform the determination whether 
the exercise of state authority has been pre-empted by operation of federal 
law [Moe] . . . . [T]his tradition is reflected and encouraged [in federal 
statutes] demonstrating a firm federal policy of promoting tribal self-suf-
ficiency and economic development. Ambiguities in federal law have been 
construed generously in order to comport with these traditional notions of 
sovereignty and with the federal policy of encouraging tribal independence 
[McClanahan]. We have thus rejected the proposition that in order to find a 
particular state law to have been pre-empted by operation of federal law, an 
express congressional statement to that effect is required [Warren Trading]. 
At the same time any applicable regulatory interest of the State must be 
given weight [McClanahan] . . . and “automatic exemptions ‘as a matter of 
constitutional law’” are unusual [Moe, n.17].937 
936 For example, in non-Indian areas, courts presume that state law is not preempted. 
Ambiguities are resolved in favor of the state. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 
U.S. 504 (1992). As Warren Trading, supra notes 425–68 and accompanying text, and Central 
Machinery demonstrate, supra notes 469–518 and accompanying text, no similar presumption 
exists in the Indian cases.
Policies of promoting tribal self-government and economic development, unique to Indian 
law, might also inform a preemption analysis. Feldman claims that the “primary difference 
between Indian preemption and preemption in other fields was the influence of the backdrop 
of tribal sovereignty and the canons of construction that favored the tribes.” Feldman, supra 
note 929, at 686. “Contemporary Indian preemption, however, now focuses upon weighing 
federal and tribal interests against state interests. Thus, state interests are given undue promi-
nence. Contemporary Indian preemption therefore appears to be a preemption in name only.” 
Id. at 687.
937 White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143–44 (1980). In an internal 
Supreme Court memorandum, Justice White wrote “[a]t least the clear implication in Moe was 
that automatic exemptions of this type are not recognized at all.” Preso, supra note 41, at 463 
n.124. Marshall responded:
I do not agree that the statement . . . in Moe—referring to automatic exemptions as a 
matter of constitutional law—should be read as broadly as you suggest. Certainly the 
language of the footnote does not extend that far. Moreover, a number of our cases 
01-Pomp.indd   1125 12/23/2010   11:03:54 AM
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2443846
1126 SECTION OF TAXATION
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 63, No. 4
This last reference to Justice Rehnquist’s footnote in Moe, without any criti-
cism, would seem to endorse it, yet the proposition is at odds with Justice 
Marshall’s earlier reference to the Indian Commerce Clause. The Rehnquist 
footnote attempts to undercut the Indian Commerce Clause, but Marshall 
cites the Clause as a foundation for his two barrier doctrine. 
Marshall elaborated on the first of his two barriers, preemption: “[w]hen 
on-reservation conduct involving only Indians is at issue, state law is gener-
ally inapplicable, for the State’s regulatory interest is likely to be minimal and 
the federal interest in encouraging tribal self-government is at its strongest 
[Moe, McClanahan].”938 The language he used, however, seems more akin to 
a balancing test than a preemption analysis. 
On-reservation conduct involving only Indians, like in McClanahan, was 
the easy case. More difficult questions arise when non-Indians are involved.939 
In that situation, Justice Marshall endorsed a “particularized inquiry into the 
nature of the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake, an inquiry designed 
to determine whether, in the specific context, the exercise of state author-
ity would violate federal law.”940 This language was ambiguous enough to be 
confused with a balancing test, which is the way some subsequent cases have 
interpreted it,941 although nowhere does White Mountain use that phrase.942 
In addition, a “particularized inquiry” is inconsistent with the prominent 
role Justice Marshall assigned to the Indian Commerce Clause. The Founders 
intended no “particularized inquiry” into the respective interests of the states, 
recognize the principle that the exercise of state authority over the reservation may 
be impermissible, not because it is “preempted” in the ordinary sense, but because it 
infringes on tribal self-government. . . . This principle, I think, is difficult to reconcile 
with the view that “automatic” or “constitutional” exemptions are not recognized at 
all. 
Id. at 463–64. Marshall misstated the Moe footnote, which referred to “exemptions ‘as a matter 
of constitutional law’ either under the Commerce Clause or the intergovernmental-immunity 
doctrine.” his infringement example was apparently a reference to Williams v. Lee, and not the 
Indian Commerce Clause, unless he viewed that case as being an application of the Clause.
938 White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 144.
939 Moe, of course, involved both Indians and non-Indians. Marshall’s earlier references to 
Moe were presumably to sales to Indians rather than sales to non-Indians.
940 White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 145.
941 See, e.g., Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95, 100 (2003), dis-
cussed infra notes 1290–1358 and accompanying text. A leading casebook also refers to the 
White Mountain balancing test. Anderson, et al., supra note 208, at 432 (emphasis added). 
Commentators agree. See, e.g., Rebecca Tsosie, Separate Sovereigns, Civil Rights, and the Sacred 
Text: The Legacy of Justice Thurgood Marshall’s Indian Law Jurisprudence, 26 Ariz. St. L. J. 495, 
506 (1994).
942 Dean Getches agrees that White Mountain has been misinterpreted. “An oblique refer-
ence to ‘interests’ has been taken as an invitation for courts to balance interests subjectively and 
search for a result that ought to obtain, without guidance from the historical tradition of tribal 
sovereignty.” Getches, Conquering, supra note 14, at 1608. Unlike Getches, I do not find the 
reference to be oblique and Marshall’s description of a “particularized inquiry into the nature 
of the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake” invited a balancing test. Dean Getches is cer-
tainly correct, however, that like any balancing test objectivity will be replaced by subjectivity. 
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the tribes, and Congress when they adopted that Clause. Such an inquiry was 
also inconsistent with Williams v. Lee, which gave no weight to the interest of 
Arizona in that case. To the contrary, it was the interests of the Navajos that 
provided a constraint on the State; the case made no mention of any State 
interest.
Despite this confusion, when Marshall applied his “particularized inquiry” 
test to the facts in White Mountain, it was clear that he meant a preemption 
analysis and not a balancing test.943 he proceeded to hold that the federal gov-
ernment’s regulation of the harvesting of Indian timber is “comprehensive,”944 
controls “the most minute details of timber production,”945 and is 
so pervasive as to preclude the additional burdens sought to be imposed in 
this case. . . . There is no room for these [state] taxes in the comprehensive 
federal regulatory scheme. In a variety of ways, the assessment of state taxes 
would obstruct federal policies. And equally important, [the State has] been 
unable to identify any regulatory function or service performed by the State 
that would justify the assessment of taxes for activities on [Bureau of Indian 
Affairs’ roads] and tribal roads within the reservation.946 
The State taxes would undermine the federal policy “guaranteeing Indians 
that they will ‘receive . . . the benefit of whatever profit [the forest] is capable 
of yielding.’”947 The taxes would “undermine the Secretary’s ability to make 
the wide range of determinations committed to his authority concerning 
the setting of fees and rates with respect to the harvesting and sale of tribal 
timber.”948 These statements suggest that Marshall’s particularized inquiry was 
intended to be a preemption approach rather than a balancing test.949 Mar-
shall characterized Arizona as merely arguing that it could tax non-Indians 
whenever there is no express congressional statement to the contrary.950 “That 
is simply not the law. In a number of cases we have held that state author-
943 The Tribe and Pinetop never suggested a balancing test; they argued the Arizona taxes 
were preempted by federal law, or were an “unlawful infringement on tribal self-government.” 
See White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 138.
Professor Milner Ball describes White Mountain as removing tribal sovereignty and self-
government as “real doctrinal factors,” and preemption becomes the sole meaningful test of 
whether state taxes shall be allowed in Indian country. State taxation will be allowed unless 
federal legislation excludes it. Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 107.
944 See White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 145.
945 Id. at 149.
946 Id. at 148–49.
947 Id. at 149 (citing 25 C.F.R. § 141.3(a)(3) (1979)).
948 Id. at 149. In its Brief, the Tribe made both a preemption argument and a Williams v. Lee 
argument. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 917, at *30–31. 
949 The lower court had concluded that the federal regulatory scheme did not “occupy the 
field.” White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 141.
950 See id. at 150–51.
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ity over non-Indians acting on tribal reservations is preempted even though 
Congress has offered no explicit statement on the subject.”951
c.  The Role of Economic Incidence 
The Court also noted that it was “undisputed that the economic burden of 
the asserted taxes will ultimately fall on the Tribe.”952 Marshall did not explain 
the significance of this comment. Moe and Colville were graphic examples 
of where the economic burden of the state taxes had severely impacted the 
smokeshops, and the Court was indifferent. Warren Trading was also uncon-
cerned about the incidence of the Arizona tax and stated that it “would put 
financial burdens on [the vendor] or the Indians,”953 indicating that whether 
the tax fell on the Indians was irrelevant. In a footnote in White Mountain, 
Marshall explained: 
Of course, the fact that the economic burden of the tax falls on the Tribe 
does not by itself mean that the tax is pre-empted, as [Moe] makes clear.954 
Our decision today is based on the pre-emptive effect of the comprehensive 
federal regulatory scheme, which, like that in [Warren Trading], leaves no 
room for the additional burdens sought to be imposed by state law.955 
One is left wondering why Marshall even noted what turns out to be an irrel-
evant factor: the burden (economic incidence) of the tax.956 Unfortunately, 
951 Id. at 151 (citing Warren Trading Post Co. v. Ariz. Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965); 
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959)). he also emphasized the geographical component 
to tribal sovereignty, “which remains highly relevant to the pre-emption inquiry; though the 
reservation boundary is not absolute, it remains an important factor to weigh in determining 
whether state authority has exceeded the permissible limits.” White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 
151.
952 Id. at 151.
953 Warren Trading Post v. Ariz. Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 685, 691 (1965) (emphasis 
added).
954 Colville would have been an even better illustration than Moe.
955 White Mountain, 448 at 151 n.15. For a discussion of Warren Trading and the preemp-
tion analysis, see supra notes 436–45 and accompanying text. One difference with Warren 
Trading was that in White Mountain the Government had actually controlled a number of 
fees and prices the Indians would pay or receive. The reason why the Indian Trader statutes in 
Warren Trading were not discussed in White Mountain was presumably because Pinetop was 
providing a service and not selling tangible personal property. This was the position taken by 
the Solicitor General. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, 1979 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs 
LEXIS 1279, at *16 n.9. See supra note 516 and accompanying text; infra note 986.
956 Professor Jensen tries to reconcile the sentence to which the footnote is appended with 
the text of the footnote. “[I]t is hard to understand how the textual sentence could have sur-
vived the editing process if it did not mean something, and the footnote says only that eco-
nomic burden is not enough by itself to result in preemption.” Jensen, supra note 9, at 77 
(emphasis in original).
The Government’s amicus brief, however, made the point that 
[n]one of the Court’s previous decisions involves a situation where the economic 
burden of a tax nominally imposed on a non-Indian party will be borne by the Tribe. 
For example, in Thomas v. Gay, the Court found that the burden of a tax on cattle 
owned by a non-Indian lessee of reservation lands was ‘too remote and indirect’ to 
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the footnote will lead to confusion.957
Like Warren Trading, there was no evidence in the White Mountain record 
about the issue of economic incidence. Normally, the issue of economic inci-
dence is a tricky empirical question, and not resolved by who actually remits 
the tax. For example, just because a consumer might pay a sales tax does not 
mean that the incidence of that tax actually falls on the consumer. But White 
Mountain was not a normal situation. At the time the contract was negoti-
ated between Pinetop and FATCO,958 neither party thought state taxes would 
be due. Consequently, state taxes could not have been taken into account in 
setting the contract price. After the taxes were assessed, “FATCO agreed to 
pay them to avoid the loss of Pinetop’s services.”959 Under those unusual cir-
cumstances, the Tribe actually did bear the economic incidence of the taxes 
because of the difficulty of passing them through to Pinetop (or to anyone 
else). 
Nevertheless, whether the tax was borne by the Tribe should have been 
irrelevant, just the way it was in Warren Trading and Colville.960 The statutory 
scheme simply left no room for a state tax, regardless of its economic inci-
dence. Marshall’s footnote—irrelevant as it was—would be used against the 
Indians in subsequent cases.961
Arizona made a feeble attempt at asserting its interests by referring to a 
“general desire to raise revenue,”962 which hardly merited any consideration. 
The roads used by the logging company were “built, maintained, and policed 
exclusively by the Federal Government, the Tribe, and its contractors.”963 
Consequently, Arizona could not claim a quid pro quo to justify its tax. The 
reality was that Arizona had nothing to do with the logging operations, just 
the way it had no responsibility for the reservation in Warren Trading. Left 
unaddressed, however, was whether the State would have had a stronger case 
be regarded as a tax on the Indian lessors. And in Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, the 
Court focused only on the claim that the burden of the state tax fell on the Indian 
cigarette retailers because they were required to collect the taxes at the time they 
made sales.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 12–13, White Mountain v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 
136 (1980), 1979 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1276, at *12–13. Colville, which obviously con-
tradicts the Brief, had not been decided yet. But even in Moe, while the short-term burden fell 
on the retailers, who lost business, in the longer term that loss would have secondary effects 
on the tribe.
957 See Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 854 (1982), infra notes 
985–1057 and accompanying text.
958 See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 956, at *16. The Government’s 
brief describes the contracts as being approved and even to a considerable extent drafted by 
agents of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. See id.
959 White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 140 n.7. 
960 Warren Trading, 380 U.S. at 691; supra notes 446, 769–72 and accompanying text.
961 See, e.g., infra note 977 and accompanying text. 
962 White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 150.
963 Id. The opinion refers to both logging and the use of the roads. The Court did not address 
the fact that the tax was on the use of the roads whereas the regulations concerned logging.
01-Pomp.indd   1129 12/23/2010   11:03:55 AM
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2443846
1130 SECTION OF TAXATION
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 63, No. 4
had it provided more services on the reservation.964
Marshall concluded the opinion by holding that White Mountain was 
indistinguishable from Warren Trading.965 There was no need to analyze the 
second of his two-barrier test, Williams v. Lee.966
d.  Particularized Inquiry and Balancing 
As will be seen, the “particularized inquiry” language will morph into a bal-
ancing test, which will be used against the Indians. White Mountain was a 
straightforward, traditional pre-emption analysis, despite Marshall’s language 
inviting a “particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and 
tribal interests at stake.” As future cases will illustrate, a large analytical price 
was paid for this loose language.
According to one commentator, until White Mountain, 
Indian preemption had paralleled preemption in other fields. Indian pre-
emption cases followed traditional preemption principles, focusing on the 
search for congressional intent. The primary difference between Indian pre-
emption and preemption in other fields was the influence of the backdrop 
of tribal sovereignty and the canons of construction that favored the tribes. 
In other words, the Court was more likely to find congressional intent to 
preempt [a state tax] in Indian cases than in others. . . . Contemporary 
Indian preemption, however, now focuses upon weighing federal and tribal 
interests against state interests.967 
964 
Where, as here, the Federal Government has undertaken comprehensive regulation 
 . . . where a number of the policies . . . are threatened by the [Arizona taxes], and 
where [the taxes cannot be justified] except in terms of a generalized interest in raising 
revenue, we believe that the proposed exercise of state authority is impermissible.
White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 151 (relying on Warren Trading).
965 White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 152–53. Marshall emphasized that the Tribe had been 
largely free to run the reservation and its affairs without state control and that Arizona had 
no duties or responsibilities respecting the Indians. Id. at 152. Justice Black expressed similar 
sentiments in Warren Trading. See supra notes 454–56.
966 As part of its Williams v. Lee argument, the Tribe stated that “application of that doctrine 
may fairly allow inquiry into the substantially [sic] of both the tribe’s and the State’s legitimate 
interests in having a given activity subject to or free from state regulation.” Brief for Petitioners, 
supra note 917, at *31. Because the State’s interests were so insignificant, this formulation was 
useful from a litigating strategy, but nothing in Williams v. Lee suggests an inquiry into a state’s 
interests. The Tribe’s formulation invited a balancing test: “Examination of all the legitimate 
indicia of tribal interests and of all the legitimate indicia of state interests in this case shows 
that the state interests in collecting these taxes fall far short of justifying the palpable intrusion 
they would cause into the internal affairs of the Indians.” Id. at *31–32.
967 Feldman, supra note 929, at 686–87. Feldman claims that “if Congress intended to pre-
empt state law, the Court should not have the flexibility under a balancing test to uphold the 
state laws in violation of congressional intent.” Id. at 694. I doubt that even a generous balanc-
ing test would encourage a court to override a clear finding of congressional intent. Obviously, 
however, there will be disagreements about the degree of clarity regarding intent.
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The “balancing of interests test that the Court uses under the dormant inter-
state commerce clause is remarkably similar to the balancing test that the Court 
uses in contemporary Indian preemption and infringement analyses.”968 
To be sure, inquiring into a state’s interests can be compatible with a pre-
emption analysis. A classical preemption analysis would determine what 
Congress intended when it adopted a statute. Congress might well have taken 
into account a state’s concerns in formulating the statute. Analytically, this 
approach would be less “balancing” per se and more determining what weight 
Congress should be viewed as having given a state’s interest when it enacted a 
federal statute. Warren Trading can be viewed as consistent with this formula-
tion when it emphasized that “since federal legislation has left the State with 
no duties or responsibilities respecting the reservation Indians, we cannot 
believe that Congress intended to leave to the State the privilege of levying 
this tax.”969 
In any event, White Mountain’s preemption analysis has come to over-
shadow the Williams v. Lee infringement test, the second of Marshall’s two 
barriers to “the assertion of state regulatory authority over tribal reservations 
and its members.”970 In addition, preemption has come to encompass a bal-
ancing test, weighing the federal and tribal interests against the state’s inter-
ests, with a backdrop of tribal sovereignty that presumably places a thumb on 
the scales in favor of the Indians. The preemption test appears to take into 
account the same values as the infringement test, leading Professor Jensen 
to conclude that in the tax context “preemption has effectively swallowed 
infringement.”971 Where no federal statute applies, however, so that preemp-
tion would be irrelevant, the infringement test would have independent sig-
nificance, as would (or should) the Indian Commerce Clause.
In terms of the fundamental issue of whether a state can tax without federal 
authorization, Marshall conceded that issue with his “particularized inquiry” 
language, his two-barrier test, and his preemption analysis. These approaches 
evaluate an already existing tax. No federal statute existed in White Moun-
tain authorizing the Arizona tax, but the decision assumes no congressional 
authorization was needed. To be sure, as long as Marshall sat on the Court, 
968 Id. at 691.
969 Warren Trading Post v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 685, 691 (1965) (cited in 
White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 152).
970 White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 142.
971 Jensen, supra note 9, at 62. 
[T]he balancing test mandated in preemption analysis is supposed to take into 
account tribal interests—weighing federal and tribal interests against state interests, 
and doing so with tribal sovereignty as a “backdrop.” A state tax on non-Indians that 
did in fact infringe on tribal self-government would almost certainly be treated as 
being preempted as well.
Id. The Williams v. Lee opinion, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), however, gave no weight to the state 
interests at stake; balancing clearly does. And a pure preemption analysis would not “mandate” 
a balancing test.
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a state would have difficulty satisfying the hurdles he established. Once the 
composition of the Court changed, however, the Indians and those doing 
business with them would be left with less protection.
e.  Stevens’s Dissent 
Justice Stevens972 wrote in dissent for himself and Justices Stewart and Reh-
nquist. According to Stevens, Warren Trading relied on both the threat that 
Arizona’s tax would “disturb and disarrange” a pervasive scheme of federal 
regulation and the lack of any State interest that could justify imposing the 
972 Professor Frickey describes Stevens as “a leading advocate on the Court of overturning 
much of Chief Justice Marshall’s legacy.” Frickey, Marshalling, supra note 199, at 423 n.172. 
Dean Getches describes Stevens as having “no allegiance to the foundation principles drawn 
from two centuries of the Court’s Indian law decisions.” Getches, Conquering, supra note 14, 
at 1635. Stevens exerts 
significant influence on the Court’s current Indian law jurisprudence. Stevens has put 
his own brand on Indian law, arguing continually against the sovereignty and special 
status of tribal governments. In a series of cases, Stevens and Rehnquist took turns 
expressing their minority view that the preemption analysis should not begin with a 
presumption in favor of preempting state law in Indian country.
Id. Stevens is “willing to make policy choices in Indian jurisdiction cases with little more sup-
port than his perception of the ‘balance of interests.’” Id. at 1652.
Justice Stevens was no fan of Indian sovereignty. “At one time [the tribes] exercised virtu-
ally unlimited power over their own members as well as those who are permitted to join their 
communities. Today, however, the power of the Federal Government over the Indian tribes 
is plenary.” National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 851 (1985). 
For a penetrating critique of this statement, see Ball, Constitution, supra note 7, at 20–22, 
34–43. Claiborne describes Stevens as “not hostile to the Indian cause.” Claiborne , supra note 
11, at 587. Professor Goldberg describes Stevens as the “most attentive to tribal sovereignty 
and property claims.” Carole Goldberg, Finding the Way to Indian Country: Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg’s Decisions in Indian Law Cases, 70 Ohio St. L. J. 1003, 1017 (2009). 
Justice Stevens’s retirement this summer allows us a chance to review his legacy in 
relation to federal Indian law and policy. Justice Stevens ascended to the Supreme 
Court as the sole appointee of President Ford in late 1975. he voted in exactly 100 
cases related to Indian law and tribal interests during that period. Loosely speaking, 
Justice Stevens is the sitting Justice most likely to support tribal interests in the last 
decade, but his voting record in the 1980s and 1990s was overwhelmingly opposed 
to tribal interests. his seeming reversal in this context is fairly remarkable. Justice 
Stevens generally speaking favored tribal interests in treaty rights cases and statutory 
interpretation cases (less so), but was a serious opponent in tribal immunity and 
taxation cases.
The Stats: Overall voting record: 31 votes in favor of tribal interests; 63 votes against; 
and 7 votes unclassifiable. Voting from 1976–1983: 14 votes in favor; 20 votes 
against; 1 unclassifiable. Voting from 1985–2000: 9 votes in favor; 41 votes against; 
4 unclassifiable. Voting from 2001–2009: 8 votes in favor; 2 votes against; 1 unclas-
sifiable. 
The Indian Law Legacy of Justice Stevens, Turtle Talk (Apr. 9, 2010), http://turtletalk.word-
press.com/2010/04/09/the-indian-law-legacy-of-justice-stevens/.
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tax.973 The dissent rejected the first ground because the $5,000–$6,000 of 
taxes imposed on Pinetop974 were trivial compared with its profit of over $1.5 
million for “the Indian tribal enterprise.”975 “It is difficult to believe that these 
relatively trivial taxes could impose an economic burden that would threaten 
to ‘obstruct federal policies.’”976
Ignoring the majority’s footnote that disclaimed it was relying on the eco-
nomic incidence of the tax falling on the Tribe,977 the dissent found “the 
Court’s reliance on the indirect financial burden imposed on the Indian Tribe 
by state taxation of its contractors disturbing.”978 According to the dissent, 
Warren Trading found an exception to the general rule979 that a tax is not 
invalid simply because it is passed forward to an exempt person. This excep-
tion was because Congress had chosen to regulate the relationship between 
a tribe and non-Indian trader to such an extent that there was no room for 
the additional burden. In White Mountain, however, the state tax of $5,000-
$6,000 was unlikely to have a serious adverse impact on the tribal business so 
no similar inference about congressional intent should be drawn.980 
The difficulty with the dissent’s reasoning was that Warren Trading never 
expressed the sentiment now being attributed to it. Moreover, there was noth-
ing in the record in Warren Trading about the effects of the two percent Ari-
zona tax. Further, Congress could have intended with its extensive control 
of timbering, which the dissent does not challenge, to preempt any state tax, 
whether trivial or serious, thus obviating any need to determine the impact 
on a case-by-case, year-by-year basis. The dissent would invite endless future 
litigation and line drawing as each taxpayer would argue that in its particular 
973 White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 157. For reasons not discussed in the text, the dissent would 
have vacated the Arizona Court of Appeals’ opinion and remanded the case. See id.
974 The Government’s brief stated that there was “no clear basis in the record for” calculating 
the amount of Arizona taxes paid by Pinetop. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, 
supra note 956, at *29. The Tribe’s Brief claimed that Pinetop paid over $30,000. Brief for 
Petitioners, supra note 917, at *27. The Arizona Court of Appeals suggested the taxes were only 
$9,000 per year. According to the Tribe, this amount “was taken by that court from a specula-
tion in the State’s Brief which was not grounded in the evidence of record.” Id. In its reply brief, 
the Tribe asserted that the “true total effect of these taxes falls between $20,000 and $50,000 
a year. The present discounted value of such exactions ranges from hundreds of thousands of 
dollars to more than a half-million dollars.” Petitioners’ Reply Brief, White Mountain Apache 
Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980) (No. 78-1177), 1980 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1625, 
at *7.
975 White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 158–59. The reference to “Indian tribal enterprise” presum-
ably described Pinetop, but was not technically correct. Pinetop was not a “tribal enterprise” 
but rather a joint venture between two non-Indian corporations. Id. at 137–38. The tribal 
enterprise was FATCO, which managed, harvested, processed, and sold timber. Pinetop was 
under contract with FATCO. Id. at 139. 
976 Id. at 159.
977 Id. at 151 n.15.
978 Id. at 159.
979 The dissent cited United States v. Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958), a case upholding the state 
taxation of those doing business with the Federal Government. 
980 White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 159.
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case the state tax was substantial and imposed “serious adverse impacts.” A 
taxpayer that lost this issue in one year would presumably be free to relitigate 
in some future year as circumstances changed (e.g., an increase in taxes or a 
decline in profits or even a loss).981 
With respect to the lack of any legitimate interest in Arizona’s imposing a 
tax, the dissent suggested that Pinetop might well have a right to be free from 
taxation under the Due Process Clause.982 This argument was reminiscent of 
Justice Black’s comments in Warren Trading,983 although he never cited that 
Clause. The argument could serve as a separate cause of action, independent 
of a preemption analysis. A Due Process argument would be particularly rel-
evant if no federal statutes existed so that no preemption argument would be 
available. On the other hand, the lack of State services might be a factor to 
be taken into account in discerning congressional intent under a preemption 
analysis.984
2.  Ramah Navajo School Board v. New Mexico
Two years after White Mountain, Ramah Navajo School Board v. New Mexico 
raised similar issues.985 The question in Ramah was whether federal law pre-
empted New Mexico’s gross receipts tax (sales tax) imposed on a non-Indian 
construction company that built a school on the Navajo reservation under 
contract with the Navajo School Board (Board). The tax was imposed on the 
payments received under the contract. During the construction, the contrac-
tor986 paid the gross receipts tax and, pursuant to standard industry practice, 
981 The dissent in Commonwealth Edison v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 638–53 (1981), dis-
cussed infra note 1105, would have similarly invited endless litigation.
982 White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 158.
983 See Warren Trading v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965); supra notes 454–63 
and accompanying text.
984 See supra notes 457–58 and accompanying text.
985 458 U.S. 832 (1982).
986 Nothing in the record indicated whether the contractor was “licensed under the Indian 
Trader regulations.” Jurisdictional Statement, Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. New Mexico, 458 U.S. 
832 (1982) (No. 80-2162), 1981 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1303, at *16 n.5 [hereinafter 
Jurisdictional Statement]. If the contractor were viewed as providing services, I have argued 
that the Indian Trader statute would not apply. See supra note 516. The Board, however, antici-
pated and rejected this argument. 
It would be a strained interpretation indeed to read the terms “trader” and “trade” in 
a restrictive way by excluding those business activities by non-Indians on reservations, 
such as large-scale construction projects, that have the most economic impact, espe-
cially since 25 U.S.C. 262, enacted several years after Section 261, is not restricted 
to “goods.” 
Brief of the School Board, Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. New Mexico, 458 U.S. 832 (1982)(No. 
80-2162), 1982 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1164, at *51 [hereinafter Brief of the School Board]. 
As a policy matter, the Board is right, but the statutory language does not allow that reading. 
See supra note 516; see also Brief of the State of New Mexico, Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. New 
Mexico, 458 U.S. 832 (1982) (No. 80-2162), 1982 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1165, at *49 
[hereinafter Brief of the State of New Mexico]. 
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was reimbursed by the Board.987 The construction contract provided that the 
Board would be entitled to any refund of the gross receipts tax if it were 
invalidly paid.988 The New Mexico gross receipts tax was the same one as in 
Mescalero.989
a.  Justice Marshall’s Particularized Inquiry 
Justice Marshall, writing again for the majority, relied on his analysis in White 
Mountain, and reiterated that each case “requires a particularized examina-
Arizona v. Blaze Construction Co., 526 U.S. 32 (1999), upheld the Arizona sales tax on con-
struction services performed on a reservation under contract with the United States. Professor 
Taylor describes the case as “holding that federal Indian trader statute did not preempt” the 
Arizona sales tax. Taylor, Framework, supra note 23, at 844 n.18. The Indian Trader statutes, 
however, were not at issue in that case. See also infra note 1308, 1326 and accompanying text. 
For a discussion of Blaze, see Richard J. Ansson, Jr., Protecting Tribal Sovereignty: Why States 
Should Not Be Able To Tax Contractors Hired By The BIA To Construct Reservation Projects For 
Tribes: Blaze Construction Co. v. New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Department: A Case Study, 
20 Am. Indian L. Rev. 459 (1995-96).
987 The Board’s Brief claimed that the contractor would not have contracted with the Board 
had it not secured a promise of reimbursement for the sales taxes. Brief of the School Board, 
supra note 986, at *13. The Board’s Jurisdictional Statement claimed that the “unavoidable tax 
burden imposed on the Navajo Board has prevented completion of the facilities.” Jurisdictional 
Statement, supra note 986, at *17. New Mexico’s Motion to Dismiss or Affirm stated “[t]here 
was no particular building or facility that could not be built because of the gross receipts tax.” 
Motion to Dismiss or Affirm, Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. New Mexico, 458 U.S. 832 (1982) 
(No. 80-2162), 1981 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs Lexis 1302, at *5 [hereinafter Motion to Dismiss or 
Affirm]. New Mexico also asserted that the Board 
included New Mexico gross receipts tax [and the contractor] included gross receipts 
tax as part of the total construction cost bid. The construction contracts between the 
School Board and [the contractor] providing for the gross receipts tax as a cost of 
construction were approved by the BIA. 
Id. at *4.
The contractor paid the sales tax to the State and passed the “economic burden” of the tax 
to the Board as part of the “periodic construction draw procedure, in accordance with the 
construction contracts providing for the contractor to ‘pay all sales, consumer, use and other 
similar taxes required by law’ and ‘to comply with sales and use taxes laws.’” Id. at *5.
988 Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., 458 U.S. at 835–36. At some point, the executive director of the 
Board questioned whether the contractor was liable for the gross receipts tax, and a clause was 
put into the contract recognizing that the Board could litigate the issue and would be entitled 
to a refund. Brief of the State of New Mexico, supra note 986, at *14.
The Board’s Brief argued that the fact that the legal incidence of the tax was on the con-
tractor should be disregarded. Legal incidence is a fiction if the economic incidence falls on 
the Board, which does not have the ability to pass the tax on to anyone else. “Ramah Navajo 
School Board and its children . . . were forced to absorb this tax by sacrificing school facilities.” 
Brief of the School Board, supra note 986, at *56. The State countered that the Board was able 
to pass the economic burden of the tax to the United States like any merchant or contractor. 
Brief of the State of New Mexico, supra note 986, at *33. In an unrelated case, the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the legal incidence of the New Mexico sales tax was on the 
seller of goods and services. United States v. New Mexico, 581 F.2d 803 (10th Cir. 1978).
989 See supra notes 595–96 and accompanying text. 
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tion of the relevant state, federal, and tribal interests,”990 enshrining that 
methodology as the accepted starting point when non-Indians are involved. 
he issued the now standard caveat that “[t]he question whether federal law, 
which reflects the related federal and tribal interests, pre-empts the State’s 
exercise of its regulatory authority is not controlled by standards of pre-emp-
tion developed in other areas.”991 The traditional notions of tribal sovereignty 
inform the analysis. Ambiguities in federal law are “construed generously” in 
favor of the Indians, and preemption does not require an explicit congres-
sional statement.992 (Unfortunately for the Indians, he does not require an 
explicit congressional statement authorizing a state tax.)
Marshall found that the federal government had a long history of educating 
Indian children,993 and the federal regulatory scheme was so comprehensive 
and pervasive that Ramah was “indistinguishable in all relevant respects from 
White Mountain.”994 “[The New Mexico sales tax], although nominally fall-
ing on the non-Indian contractor, necessarily impedes the clearly expressed 
federal interest in promoting the ‘quality and quantity’ of educational oppor-
tunities for Indians by depleting the funds available for the construction of 
Indian schools.”995 Put simply, the more money that went to pay taxes the less 
available for brick and mortar.
Justice Marshall easily and quickly disposed of the argument that no federal 
statute expressly preempted the New Mexico tax. That argument was “clearly 
foreclosed by [White Mountain, Warren Trading, and Williams v. Lee].”996 
990 Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., 458 U.S. at 838 (citing White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 
448 U.S. 136, 145 (1980)).
991 Id. at 838 (citing White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 143–44).
992 Id. 
993 Id. at 839–40.
994 Id. Because White Mountain was indistinguishable from Warren Trading, White Mountain, 
448 U.S. at 152–53, presumably Ramah was indistinguishable from Warren Trading as well.
995 Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., 458 U.S. at 842.
996 Id. at 843. The Board argued that the tax frustrated a vital Navajo governmental func-
tion—education—and was therefore barred by Williams v. Lee. Brief of the School Board, 
supra note 986, at *15–16. 
[T]he tax constitutes an extra and unauthorized burden on the educational process at 
Ramah. It contributes to overcrowding and similar physical and instructional prob-
lems in this Navajo school on the Navajo Reservation. The tax thus interferes with a 
conceded governmental priority of both the Navajo Tribe and the United States to 
produce educated Navajo citizens, a need which this Court has long recognized as 
essential in a democratic society. 
Reply Brief of School Board, Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue of New Mexico, 1982 
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1164 (No. 80-2162), 1982 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1163, at *11–12 
(citing Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)). True to the Williams v. Lee 
case, the Board was not making a preemption argument; indeed, it cited no federal statute with 
which the New Mexico tax conflicted. 
The State characterized the “infringement on sovereignty” test as “clearly a standard in need 
of revision, for there are no objective criteria in its formulation and its only real content has 
come simply from a case by case inclusion and exclusion of sets of facts.” Brief of the State 
of New Mexico, supra note 986, at *30. It argued that the Board was independent of the 
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Apparently Williams v. Lee had been cut loose from its roots and had now 
been accepted as a preemption case by the Court. (Justice Black, the author 
of Williams v. Lee, was no longer on the Court.)
New Mexico hardly had the high moral road in Ramah. Navajo children 
attended a small public high school near the reservation until the State shut it 
in 1968.997 Because there were no other public high schools reasonably close 
to the reservation, the children were forced to either abandon their schooling, 
or attend a federal Indian boarding school far from the reservation.998 
having declined to take any responsibility for the education of these Indian 
children, the State is precluded from imposing an additional burden on 
the comprehensive federal scheme intended to provide this education—a 
scheme which has “left the State with no duties or responsibilities.” [Warren 
Trading]. Nor has the State asserted any specific, legitimate regulatory inter-
est to justify the imposition of its gross receipts tax.999 
This argument had a due process flavor and might have been an indepen-
dent ground for striking down the New Mexico tax even if no federal statutes 
and regulations existed.1000
b.  Possible Role of State Services 
Justice Marshall, however, gratuitously stated that if New Mexico “were 
actively seeking tax revenues for the purpose of constructing, or assisting in 
the effort to provide, adequate educational facilities for Ramah Navajo chil-
dren,” “[t]his case would be different.”1001 Perhaps this was meant as a carrot 
for the states to take on more of the costs of educating the Indians1002 (or as 
a sarcastic comment on New Mexico’s closing the high school, which led to 
the construction that triggered the tax at issue). If the former, it is unclear 
whether Marshall would require as a precondition to the tax that the State 
Tribe and was not covered by the Williams v. Lee doctrine. Id. at *32. Nor did the economic 
burden of the tax fall on the Board but rather on the United States. Id. at *32–33. The Board 
responded by noting that tribal court systems, the subject of Williams v. Lee, were funded by 
the federal government and that the size of the Navajo Nation requires that it delegate author-
ity to local units of government. Reply Brief of the School Board, supra at *13–14. 
997 A lawsuit to reopen the school was unsuccessful. Brief of the School Board, supra note 
986, at *9.
998 Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., 458 U.S. at 834. Two years after the high school was shut, 
the Tribe established its own school board. The Bureau of Indian Affairs provided funds and 
the Board operated a school in the abandoned high school, creating what is viewed as the 
first independent Indian school in modern times. Id. President Nixon hailed the school as a 
“notable example” of Indian self-determination in his Message to Congress on Indian Affairs, 
July 8, 1970. Brief of the School Board, supra note 986, at *10.
999 Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., 458 U.S. at 843. 
1000 Justice Marshall cited Warren Trading, where the Court made a similar argument. See 
supra notes 425–68 and accompanying text.
1001 Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., 458 U.S. at 844 n.7.
1002 The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act authorizes the Secretary 
of the Interior to enter into contracts with any state to construct educational institutions for 
Indian children. 25 U.S.C. § 458 (2006). 
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earmark the revenues for the education of Navajo children, or whether it 
would be enough that the revenues be available as part of the general budget. 
Whatever Marshall intended, this dictum invites states to defend a tax on 
reservation activities by identifying services they provide to the Indians, an 
invitation that will be accepted in subsequent cases.1003 
c.  New Mexico’s Defense 
Like Arizona in White Mountain, New Mexico had little to rely on in defend-
ing its tax. “The only arguably specific interest advanced by the State is that 
it provides services to [the contractor] for its activities off the reservation.”1004 
Justice Marshall rejected this argument with an assertion more than an expla-
nation: Although the State may have conferred substantial benefits on the 
contractor qua state contractor, these could not “justify a tax on the construc-
tion of a school on tribal lands pursuant to a contract with the Tribe.”1005 Pre-
sumably, the tax on the contractor’s off-reservation activities was an adequate 
quid pro quo for the services provided off-reservation by New Mexico. The 
inference is that the State could tax the contractor’s on-reservation activities if 
it provided services to the Tribe.
d.  Marshall’s Views on Economic Incidence 
Marshall stated that the State’s argument “is not a legitimate justification 
for a tax whose ultimate burden falls on the tribal organization.”1006 Justice 
1003 See, e.g., infra notes 1175–78 and accompanying text.
1004 Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., 458 U.S. at 843–44. New Mexico also argued that the services it 
provided to the Ramah Navajo Indians justified the tax, although these benefits did not relate 
to the construction of the school. Brief of the State of New Mexico, supra note 986, at *45–47. 
In addition, New Mexico argued that the “balancing of interests inquiry mandated by [White 
Mountain] heavily favors” it. Id. at *47. This argument was undercut because it received some 
federal funding to reimburse it for these services. 458 U.S. at 845 n.10. Note, however, that 
New Mexico conveniently misdescribed White Mountain’s preemption analysis as a balancing 
test.
New Mexico’s other argument was that Congress had not specifically and expressly pre-
empted the tax, which Justice Marshall made short shrift of by declaring “this argument is 
clearly foreclosed by our precedents. [White Mountain, Warren Trading, Williams v. Lee].” 
Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., 458 U.S. at 843.
1005 Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., 458 U.S. at 844 (emphasis in original). Central Machinery v. 
Arizona State Tax Commission, 448 U.S. 160 (1980), discussed supra note 440, held that the 
Arizona tax on a reservation sale was preempted by the Indian Trader statutes, notwithstanding 
the substantial services provided off the reservation by the State to the vendor. Ramah Navajo 
Sch. Bd., 458 U.S. at 844 n.9.
1006 Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., 458 U.S. at 844. Marshall also made a formalistic argument 
that the statute imposed the tax on the privilege of engaging in business, but such privilege was 
exclusively bestowed by the federal government. Id. This formalism had been rejected in the 
context of the Interstate Commerce Clause a few years earlier in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. 
Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977) (upholding a Mississippi sales tax on the “the privilege of doing 
business” within the State when applied to an interstate business). had New Mexico lost on 
this issue, the statute could have been redrafted to cure the constitutional defect, which is true 
of many formalistic argument and shows why they should not be given much weight.
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Marshall’s reference to the ultimate burden of the tax falling on the tribe sum-
marizes a more complicated reality, which shows the wisdom of avoiding an 
elusive search into economic incidence. The bids each contractor submitted 
for the project included the New Mexico sales tax, although it was not identi-
fied as such.1007 If Congress appropriated funds for whatever the amount of 
the bid, the government bore the full amount of the tax, although it might 
not have been aware of the New Mexico sales tax. If Congress had only a fixed 
amount to budget, the more that went for taxes the less that was left over for 
brick and mortar. In that event, the Tribe would have borne the tax by “get-
ting less school.”1008 The facts were unclear.
The better point, however, was not on whom the economic incidence of 
the tax fell, a complicated question, but rather that any State tax on reserva-
tion activities could not be justified by services provided by New Mexico off 
the reservation—activities that New Mexico was already taxing under its sales 
1007 Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., 458 U.S. at 835. The bid specifications required prospective 
bidders to include “all taxes required by law.” Id. at 842 n.6. The bidders included the New 
Mexico sales tax, but did not identify it as such as a separate line item. Id. Marshall stated that 
there is “absolutely no indication that Congress was even made aware of the existence of these 
taxes when it appropriated funds for the construction of the Ramah Navajo school.” Id. If 
Congress were aware that it was approving the New Mexico sales tax, Marshall’s preemption 
argument would have been seriously undercut. For a similar issue in Central Machinery, see 
supra notes 498–505 and accompanying text.
The Board’s Jurisdictional Statement described the construction process as follows: 
Congress appropriated funds in a series of enactments from 1972 through 1977 for 
the construction of new school facilities. These appropriations were unusual. They 
were directed specifically to the Board, which has legal title to the new facilities, the 
Interior Department serving primarily as a conduit for the funds. Each appropriation 
contained language providing that the monies were to be used ‘for the construction 
of school facilities’ by the [Board]. . . The federal construction monies were dis-
bursed through contracts between the Board and the Interior Department’s Bureau 
of Indian Affairs obligating the Board to construct the facilities. . . . When succeed-
ing phases of construction were funded by Congress, the Board issued successive  
subcontracts. . . . Each contract . . . contained a provision under which the Board 
was required to reimburse [the contractor] for all taxes in the nature of sales taxes for 
which [the contractor] might be assessed on account of its work on this project. [The 
contractor] had insisted on such a provision in [its bid]. 
Jurisdictional Statement, supra note 986, at *15–16. While this statement might have estab-
lished the Board’s right to a refund of the tax, it did not establish that Congress might have 
been aware of the New Mexico sales tax.
1008 One scenario is that Congress put the construction project out to bid, awarded it to the 
low bidder, and then appropriated the necessary funds. Alternatively, Congress might have first 
appropriated a fixed sum of money for the project. The New Mexico sales tax might then be 
viewed as being borne by the Indians in the sense that less funds were available for the actual 
construction because of the tax. Although this latter scenario seems contrary to the facts, the 
Court may be assuming it: “This [New Mexico sales tax] burden, although nominally fall-
ing on the non-Indian contractor, necessarily impedes the clearly expressed federal interest in 
promoting the ‘quality and quantity’ of educational opportunities for Indians by depleting the 
funds available for the construction of Indian schools.” Ramah, 458 U.S. at 842.
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tax.1009 The off-reservation activities could not justify a tax on the contractor’s 
on-reservation activities when the State provided no benefits on the reserva-
tion. The implicit premise of this argument is that the reservation is separate 
and distinct from New Mexico. If the reservation is viewed as merely a part 
of the State, like a municipality or a county, no reason would exist why New 
Mexico could not tax a business on its activities in that sub-jurisdiction as a 
quid pro quo for services it provided elsewhere in the State.1010
e.  The Solicitor General and the Indian Commerce Clause 
In the context of this Article, one notable feature of Ramah was that the 
Solicitor General filed two amicus briefs supporting the Board. In the first, 
the Government suggested a “modest general rule.”1011 On-reservation activi-
ties involving a tribe should be presumptively beyond the reach of State law, 
unless the State could demonstrate that its intrusion into reservation affairs 
was either condoned by Congress or justified by a compelling need to protect 
legitimate State interests.1012
1009 Justice Marshall comes close to endorsing this argument in a footnote. “Presumably, the 
state tax revenues derived from [the contractor’s] off-reservation business activities are adequate 
to reimburse the State for the services it provides . . .” Id. at 844 n.9. The dissent overreacted 
to the use of “presumably.” 
The Court’s “presumptions,” however, are no substitute for the considered judgment 
of the state taxing authority. Indeed, in assessing the validity of a state tax, the Court 
has previously recognized that the State’s interests are strongest when the taxpayer is 
the recipient of state services. [Colville]. To the extent presumptions are relevant, the 
Court has inverted the one that ought to apply. 
Id. at 852 n.3 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Colville, however, was a tax avoidance case, which 
dealt with consumers who drove to the reservation to purchase cigarettes free of the Washington 
tax. If the Indians did not collect the tax, the sale would effectively be tax-free. In Ramah, by 
contrast, New Mexico was taxing the contractor’s gross receipts on its off-reservation transac-
tions. Tax avoidance was not an issue.
1010 This perspective would be a response to the argument that if a state provided no services 
on a reservation, it had no right to tax activities on that reservation. For the clearest statement 
of that argument, see Warren Trading, discussed supra notes 454–63 and accompanying text.
1011 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Urging Reversal, Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. 
v. Bureau of Revenue of New Mexico, 458 U.S. 832 (1982) (No. 80-2162), 1982 U.S. S. Ct. 
Briefs LEXIS 1169, at *28 [hereinafter Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Urging 
Reversal]. 
1012 Id. This rule would not apply if: the tribe was not implicated, such as white-on-white 
crime, see, e.g., United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1882); property taxes were assessed 
against non-Indian property, see, e.g., Utah & Northern Ry., 116 U.S. 28 (1885), discussed 
supra note 321; the reservation situs is a pretext for avoiding state jurisdiction, see, e.g., Colville, 
discussed supra note 707; or non-Indian activities on the reservation do not involve a tribe or 
significantly impinges on tribal interests, see, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 
557–67 (1981). The rule would apply regardless of the legal incidence of a state tax. Brief for 
the United States as Amicus Curiae Urging Reversal, supra note 1011, at *29, *36.
01-Pomp.indd   1140 12/23/2010   11:03:56 AM
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2443846
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 63, No. 4
 INDIAN COMMERCE CLAUSE AND STATE TAXATION 1141
The Solicitor General argued that relying on this principle of tribal sov-
ereignty alone “provides a clearer guide for decision of cases like the present 
one.”1013 One benefit of this approach was that: 
[A] relatively uniform set of rules can be developed. Since the residual sov-
ereignty of every Indian tribe is presumptively alike, and does not derive 
from federal delegation, it should no longer be necessary to eke out pre-
emptive meaning in the particular provisions of disparate treaties, enabling 
acts, other federal statutes, or implementing regulations.1014 
One advantage, according to the Solicitor General, of stressing tribal sover-
eignty rather than preemption was avoiding the “tension created by the focus 
on the pervasiveness of federal regulations . . . in a day when the Political 
Branches are committed to encouraging tribal self-government, in part by 
loosening federal control of reservation affairs.”1015 Put differently, the fewer 
the number of federal statutes, the less likely a preemption argument would 
be available.1016
The Solicitor General had no trouble identifying the source of tribal sov-
ereignty: “it is the residuum of the aboriginal independence of the tribes, 
limited by their assuming a dependent status vis-à-vis the United States and 
reduced in particular matters by subsequent Congressional action.”1017 But 
was there a constitutional source for the protection of tribal sovereignty? After 
all, a “State’s assertions of jurisdiction, normally complete over its territory 
and its citizens, [are] subject only to the barriers imposed by the [F]ederal 
Constitution or federal law.”1018 “[T]he most important constitutional text 
is the Indian Commerce Clause, which, as its history reveals, is both the 
primary source of Congressional power over white-Indian relations and an 
important restraint on State jurisdiction over that intercourse.”1019 After a 
brief historical review, the Solicitor General concluded that “the Indian Com-
merce Clause effectively ‘nationalizes’ our relations with the Indian tribes. 
Not only is plenary power over the intercourse given to Congress; the States 
surrendered what prerogatives they previously claimed in this area, subject, of 
course, to any re-delegation of authority.”1020 
The Solicitor General’s first exception to his proposed approach was for 
1013 Id. at *30.
1014 Id. It is unclear why the Solicitor General had to rely on notions of residual sovereignty 
for this point. If the Court wanted to develop a uniform set of rules, it could do so with a 
uniform interpretation of the Indian Commerce Clause. In the end, neither the language of 
the Clause nor concepts of residual sovereignty on their own point in any uniform direction; 
it is up to the Court to impose that uniformity with its interpretations.
1015 Id. at *30–31.
1016 Justice Marshall thought the opposite, see supra notes 574–78 and accompanying text, 
which perhaps explains his resistance to this proposal.
1017 Id. at *31.
1018 Id. at *31–32.
1019 Id. at *32–33.
1020 Id. at *34.
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state action that Congress condoned. This exception was unremarkable and 
dictated by the Supremacy Clause. But the exception for state action justified 
by a “compelling need to protect legitimate State interests” appears to be the 
Solicitor General’s own gloss,1021 and was perhaps an attempt to incorporate 
the Moe and Colville tax avoidance situations, or meant to be a “police pow-
ers” exception. Perhaps building in an “escape clause” was an attempt to make 
the argument more attractive than a more absolutist approach. In any event, 
the connection between this exception and the Indian Commerce Clause was 
not obvious and was not developed in the Government’s brief.
Whatever its rationale, an exception for a “compelling state need” would 
inevitably invite litigation. The Government was unhappy with the existing 
doctrine because “it is apparent that State courts and lower federal courts 
are not always able to discern the teaching of this Court’s precedents when 
they turn on a ‘particularized inquiry,’ with few general guidelines.”1022 True 
enough—but it is hard to see how replacing a “particularized inquiry” with 
evaluating “compelling needs” would improve the quality and predictability 
of the decisions.
The Solicitor General was willing to concede that the Indian Commerce 
Clause of its own force did not “automatically” bar all “state taxation of matters 
significantly touching the political and economic interests of the Tribes.”1023 
In short, the government’s brief avoided proposing a more sweeping, more 
absolutist interpretation that would return the Indian Commerce Clause to 
its roots. The latter would occur a few months later when the Government 
filed its second brief.
The Solicitor General’s first brief was dated January 25, 1982. Perhaps 
appreciating some of the conceptual weaknesses in its position, less than three 
months later the Government filed a supplemental brief.1024 The Solicitor 
General apparently had a conversion since the January brief.1025 After argu-
ing that Thomas v. Gay should not be extended1026 and that Colville should 
1021 Id. at *28. A Lexis search did not turn up any use of that term by the Supreme Court.
1022 Id. at *27.
1023 Id. at *35 (citing Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 
U.S. 134, 157 (1980), which referred to Rehnquist’s footnote in Moe, discussed supra notes 
689–95 and accompanying text.
1024 Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. 
Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832 (1982) (No. 80-2162), 1982 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1162. 
The Solicitor General’s justification for the supplemental brief was that the other major amicus 
brief for the State joined issue with the United States, and the Court “ought to have the benefit 
of the views of the United States articulated in less abbreviated form than in the brief now on 
file.” Id. at *2. In reality, the second brief articulated a new position.
1025 For example, the first brief claimed that “[w]ithout attempting to revive” Worcester, it 
may be possible to “articulate a more modest general rule for determining when State regula-
tion or taxation of activities or transactions within an Indian reservation are permissible.” 
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Urging Reversal, supra note 1011, at *27–28. 
By contrast, the second brief attempts to revive Worcester and proposes a rule that is hardly 
“modest.” 
1026 Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 1024, at *7.
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be limited to anti-tax avoidance situations,1027 the Government turned to the 
heart of this second brief: the Indian Commerce Clause.
[W]e once again raise the banner of the Indian Commerce Clause, embold-
ened by the Court’s most recent opinion [Merrion]1028 in which the Clause 
is given honorable mention and [Worcester] is apparently restored to full 
standing as a seminal precedent. . . . We read the Indian Commerce Clause 
as deciding no more than that all intercourse between tribal Indians within 
their reservations and outsiders is, presumptively, an exclusive federal con-
cern, in which the States are off limits, until and unless Congress determines 
otherwise . . . all we say is that the Constitution requires congressional 
leave before the States intervene in Indian affairs1029 . . . . In the face of an 
unchanged constitutional text, it seems a little late in the day to weigh in 
against such an established consensus and ask the Court to repudiate the 
constitutional settlement reached two centuries ago.1030 
Despite the Solicitor General’s powerful defense of the Indian Commerce 
Clause, the reality was the opposite of what the government suggested. It was 
“a little late in the day” to expect the Court to endorse this “constitutional 
settlement.”
f.  Marshall’s Rejection of the Solicitor General 
Justice Marshall rejected the Solicitor General’s proposal.1031 Marshall’s expla-
nation suggests he was responding to the government’s first brief and not the 
second. 
1027 Id. at *7–8.
1028 See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982), discussed infra notes 
1058–30. Merrion was handed down on January 25, 1982, the same day that the Solicitor 
General’s first brief was filed. It is possible, as the quotation in the text suggests, that the second 
brief was inspired by the Merrion decision.
1029 Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 1024, at *9–10. 
The Brief reviewed the history of the Indian Commerce Clause and declared: 
Few things are clearer in our early history than the long and hard, but ultimately 
successful, effort to nationalize Indian affairs—as a matter of constitutional law . . . .  
[T]here was fundamental agreement that Indian affairs was one area that belonged 
to the central government. . . . From the start, the objective was not merely to con-
fer power on the national government to manage Indian affairs, but to disable the 
colonies or States from doing so. If, as we submit, the architects of the Constitution 
eventually succeeded, that achievement ought not lightly be cast aside. 
Id. at *13–14.
1030 Id. at *19–20.
1031 Putting the best spin on Marshall’s reaction to the Solicitor General’s proposal, Feldman 
says that the “Court, however, did not reject the test; it merely did ‘not believe it necessary 
to adopt’ the test at that time.” Feldman, supra note 436, at 694. Cases decided after Ramah 
suggest that the Court will be even less willing to adopt the test today. Those who believe that 
the Indian Commerce Clause should be resurrected will no doubt view Marshall as rejecting 
the opportunity presented by the Solicitor General, but he may not have had the votes to have 
done otherwise.
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The Solicitor General [suggests we] hold that on-reservation activities 
involving a resident tribe are presumptively beyond the reach of state law 
even in the absence of comprehensive federal regulation, thus placing the 
burden on the State to demonstrate that its intrusion is either condoned by 
Congress or justified by a compelling need to protect legitimate, specified state 
interests other than the generalized desire to collect revenue.1032 
We do not believe it necessary to adopt this new approach—the existing 
pre-emption analysis governing these cases is sufficiently sensitive to many 
of the concerns expressed by the Solicitor General. Although clearer rules 
and presumptions promote the interest in simplifying litigation, our prec-
edents announcing the scope of pre-emption analysis in this area provide 
sufficient guidance to state courts and also allow for more flexible consid-
eration of the federal, state, and tribal interests at issue.1033 We have con-
sistently admonished that federal statutes and regulations relating to tribes 
and tribal activities must be “construed generously in order to comport  
with . . . traditional notions of [Indian] sovereignty and with the federal 
policy of encouraging tribal independence.”1034 This guiding principle helps 
relieve the tension between emphasizing the pervasiveness of federal regula-
tion and the federal policy of encouraging Indian self-determination.1035 
Remarkably, Marshall made no mention that the Government’s second 
brief had taken a more absolutist approach. Indeed, the opinion never even 
mentioned that the Government filed a second brief.
Certainly in Justice Marshall’s hands, the existing doctrine was adequate 
to protect the interests of the Indians, who had won full or partial victories 
in Williams v. Lee, Warren Trading, McClanahan, Mescalero, Central Machin-
ery, White Mountain, Ramah, and Merrion, although some of these came 
with high analytical costs that would haunt the Indians going forward. But 
the Indians had not lost a case that Justice Marshall authored. Perhaps the 
“[d]evil you know is better than the one you don’t” explains his rejection of 
the Government’s first brief with its “compelling state need language,” but 
that exculpatory provision had been dropped from the second brief. Even if 
Justice Marshall sensed that the tide might be turning, as earlier unanimous 
decisions1036 were now giving way to splintered opinions, he might not have 
had the votes to adopt the Government’s more sweeping approach in the 
1032 Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 845 (1982) (emphasis 
added). The italicized language is a paraphrasing of the Solicitor General’s argument in the 
first brief, but not the second.
1033 This flexibility is more characteristic of a traditional balancing test under the dormant 
Interstate Commerce Clause rather than a traditional preemption analysis. Accord, Feldman, 
supra note 436, at 694.
1034 Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., 458 U.S. at 846 (citing White Mountain Apache Tribe v. 
Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 144 (1980); McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 
174–75 (1973); Warren Trading Post v. Ariz. Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 685, 690–91 (1965)).
1035 Id.
1036 See, e.g., McClanahan, 411 U.S. 164 (1973), supra notes 519–91 and accompanying 
text; Warren Trading, 380 U.S. 685 (1965), supra notes 425–68 and accompanying text.
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second brief.1037
One situation where the Solicitor General’s proposed test (in either brief ) 
would make a difference would be if no federal statute (or treaty) existed. 
With no preemption argument available, the Indian Commerce Clause 
could, on its own force, prohibit a state statute. In earlier cases, however, Jus-
tice Marshall indicated that he thought this situation was highly unlikely.1038 
Given that assumption, Marshall had no incentive to embrace the govern-
ment’s proposal and embark in a new and unknown direction.
g.  Rehnquist’s Dissent 
Justice Rehnquist,1039 writing in dissent and joined by Justices White and 
Stevens, rejected the majority’s reliance on White Mountain, viewed the res-
ervation activity as free of federal regulation, and again accused the Court of 
according the Tribes greater immunity than that of the United States.1040
“[T]he scope of reservation immunity from nondiscriminatory state taxa-
tion [is] a question of pre-emption, ultimately dependent on congressional 
intent . . . the tradition of Indian sovereignty stands as an independent barrier 
to discriminatory taxes, and otherwise serves only as a guide to the ascertain-
ment of the congressional will.”1041 The burden of proof seems to be placed on 
the Indians to show why a state should not be allowed to tax.
Most of the dissent was spent arguing that the regulations were neither 
1037 “Although the Court does not adopt [the Solicitor General’s] suggestion it appears to 
suggest that on another occasion it might be prepared to reconsider the Solicitor General’s 
position, a position which moves a step closer to that of John Marshall in Worcester.” Walters, 
supra note 11, at 144 n.68. I do not find any language in the opinion that would justify 
Walters’s optimism and subsequent cases belie it.
1038 McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 172 n.8. 
1039 “Rehnquist tends to deny federal preemption of state laws on Indian reservations when 
preemption would be beneficial to Indians.” Johnson & Martinis, supra note 194, at 20.
1040 Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue of N.M., 458 U.S. 832, 847 (1982)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see supra notes 864–68 and accompanying text. Justice Rehnquist 
began his dissent by characterizing the majority as “reprov[ing] the New Mexico Court of 
Appeals for failing to heed our precedents, much as a disappointed parent would rebuke a 
wayward child.” Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., 458 U.S. at 847 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Professor 
Laurence describes the dissent as demonstrating a “testiness largely missing from previous 
Marshall-Rehnquist Indian law exchanges.” Robert Laurence, Thurgood Marshall’s Indian Law 
Opinions, 27 howard L. J. 3, 70 (1984).
1041 Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., 458 U.S. at 848 (emphasis added). One commentator summa-
rized the White Mountain and Ramah preemption cases as follows: 
Preemption is more likely to be found where there is a history of federal involvement 
both by Congress and by the executive branch; where the extent of authorized execu-
tive involvement is broad; and where executive agencies have exercised their authority 
extensively. Competing state interests may also be included in the analysis. Where 
the regulated activity has weak off-reservation effects, state interests will not weigh 
heavily against competing interests of the federal and tribal governments. Specific 
statutory language is likely to be a component of the analysis. 
Tabor, supra note 771, at 392. This excerpt starts by describing a preemption test, but ends 
with comments more typical of a balancing test.
01-Pomp.indd   1145 12/23/2010   11:03:57 AM
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2443846
1146 SECTION OF TAXATION
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 63, No. 4
comprehensive nor pervasive and thus rejected the reliance on White Moun-
tain. But it also accused the majority of “bestow[ing] its favors on a new 
analytical framework in which the extent of economic burden on the tribe, 
and not the pre-emptive effect of federal regulations, appears to be the para-
mount consideration.”1042 “A careful reading of the Court’s opinion demon-
strates that the single, determinative factor in its judgment is the fact that the 
challenged state taxes have increased the financial burden of constructing a 
tribal school . . . by depleting the funds available for the construction of Indian 
schools.”1043 The dissent reduced the majority’s preemption argument to the 
simple proposition that the tax was prohibited because its burden fell on the 
Tribe.1044
Although that characterization was too glib, Marshall did help muddy the 
waters. In White Mountain, he was careful to note that “the fact that the eco-
nomic burden of the tax falls on the Tribe does not by itself mean that the 
tax is preempted, as [Moe] makes clear.”1045 In Ramah, however, he described 
White Mountain as a case where “we found it significant that the economic 
burden of the asserted taxes would ultimately fall on the Tribe.”1046 The dis-
sent cited Colville, Moe, and Mescalero as firmly establishing the proposition 
that the impact of a tax on a tribe is not determinative.1047
i.  The Indians Have Greater Immunity than the Federal Government. 
Characterizing the majority’s opinion as relying on the burden of the tax 
allowed Rehnquist to again argue that the Indians had greater immunity from 
state taxes than the United States.1048 A long line of Supremacy Clause cases 
have immunized the United States from state taxes whose legal incidence fell 
on the government (or its instrumentalities).1049 “[I]mmunity may not be 
conferred simply because the tax has an effect on the United States, or even 
because the Federal Government shoulders the entire economic burden of 
the levy.”1050 
As discussed above,1051 this statement accurately captures the law about 
state taxation of the federal government, but Justice Rehnquist’s premise that 
the tribes should be taxable whenever the federal government would be tax-
1042 Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd, 458 U.S. at 848 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
1043 Id. (emphasis in original).
1044 Id.
1045 White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 151 n.15. Colville would have been a better citation because 
the burden of the tax directly fell on the tribes rather than indirectly as in Moe. See supra notes 
741–42, 763–67 and accompanying text.
1046 Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., 458 U.S. at 844 n.8. 
1047 Id. at 854 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Mescalero seems inapposite because it involved 
off-reservation activities.
1048 Id. at 854 n.4 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see supra notes 864–68 and accompanying 
text.
1049 See, e.g., United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720 (1982); United States v. Cnty. of 
Fresno, 429 U.S. 452 (1977).
1050 U.S. v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. at 734.
1051 See supra notes 864–68 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 1157–61 and accom-
panying text. 
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able was wrong.1052
Not only is there no reason why tribal immunity from state taxation should 
be coterminous with federal immunity, or lack thereof, but also since McCla-
nahan in 1973, Indian employees resident and working on a reservation have 
a greater state income tax immunity than federal employees resident and 
working on a reservation. That is, a state can impose its income tax on the 
salary of the federal employee1053 but not, as McClanahan holds, on the salary 
of the Indian employee.
ii.  Relationship Between the Subject Matter of a Tax and the Object 
of a Regulation. While many of the dissent’s arguments addressed the nature 
of the federal regulations and were limited to the facts of Ramah, one mer-
its comment because of its more general applicability. The dissent argued 
that the regulations dealt with education and did not regulate school con-
struction, which was the taxed activity,1054 essentially drawing a distinction 
between Congress’s goal of educating Indians and the means of implementing 
that goal. “[T]he regulations on which the Court relies [for its preemption 
holding] do not regulate school construction, which is the activity taxed. 
They merely detail procedures by which tribes may apply for federal funds in 
order to carry out school construction. . . . The BIA simply does not regulate 
the construction activity which the State seeks to tax.”1055 Marshall did not 
dispute Rehnquist but suggested the same argument could have been made 
in White Mountain,1056 which merely raised the obvious question of whether 
Marshall correctly decided that case as well.1057 
Logically, no reason exists why the statute or regulations that are being 
challenged have to deal precisely with the same transaction on which the tax 
is imposed. The issue is whether they “leave no room for the state tax.” True, 
the more closely aligned the subject matter of the tax and the object of the 
regulations, the stronger the argument for preemption. But a tax can interfere 
with, or thwart, the goal of a statutory scheme without the tax being imposed 
on the activities that are the subject of the regulation. Conversely, notwith-
standing that a tax might be imposed on the same transactions covered by the 
1052 Rehnquist viewed the preemption doctrine and the federal government’s immunity as 
having their roots in the Supremacy Clause. That does not mean, however, they should be 
interpreted identically for the reasons suggested in the text. Nonetheless, Justice Rehnquist 
argued that because “both immunities derive from precisely the same source—the supremacy 
of federal law—I find the Court’s decision today inexplicable.” Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., 458 
U.S. at 857 n.6.
1053 Graves v. New York, 306 U.S. 466 (1939).
1054 Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd, 458 U.S. at 851. This theme was advanced by New Mexico. See 
Motion to Dismiss or Affirm, supra note 987, at *7–8.
1055 Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., 458 U.S. at 851–52.
1056 Id. at 841 n.5.
1057 Professor Jensen is skeptical about whether Ramah would be decided the same way today. 
“One cannot be sure, of course, but Ramah was decided at a time when the Indian canons, and 
judicial sympathies for American Indian tribes more generally, were in full force. State taxes 
with potentially unhappy consequences for tribes or tribal members were disfavored. That 
seems no longer to be the case.” Jensen, supra note 9, at 72.
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regulations, the latter may still not be pervasive or comprehensive enough to 
justify preempting the tax. 
In a sense, Justice Rehnquist was raising a classical slippery slope argument. 
Could the New Mexico income tax paid by the construction workers be pre-
empted on the theory that their wages were higher because of that tax, which, 
in turn, increased the cost of the construction? In the end, the more closely 
aligned the subject matter of the federal regulations with the base of the state 
tax, the less steep the slope.
F.  The Natural Resource Cases
1.  Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe1058 upheld the Tribe’s power to adopt a sever-
ance tax on the production of oil and gas1059 by non-Indian lessees of wells 
on the reservation after the leases had been entered into. Once again, Justice 
Marshall wrote the majority opinion; Justice Stevens dissented,1060 joined by 
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist. 
a.  Origin of a Tribe’s Right of Taxation 
At the core of the case was the origin and basis of a tribe’s power of taxation. 
At the time they were entered into, the leases did not mention any Tribal 
severance tax, which had not yet been adopted.1061 The issue was whether 
1058 455 U.S. 130 (1982). There were two consolidated cases involving 21 lessees. Id. at 133. 
The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico enjoined the tax, ruling that 
the Tribe had no authority to impose it, and that the tax violated the Commerce Clause. The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the power of taxa-
tion was an inherent attribute of tribal sovereignty that was not divested by Congress or by 
treaty. The court also found no violation of the Interstate Commerce Clause. Id. at 136. 
1059 The severance tax applied to “any oil and natural gas severed, saved and removed from 
Tribal lands.” Id. at 133. For a discussion of the procedural aspects of challenging tribal tax 
provisions, see Anna-Marie Tabor, Sovereignty in the Balance: Taxation by Tribal Governments, 
15 U. Fla. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 349, 364–65 (2004).
1060 Stevens circulated a draft that was initially intended to be the majority opinion, but 
subsequently became the dissent. Justice Marshall circulated a dissent that became the majority 
opinion. Getches, Conquering, supra note 14, at 1619 n.201. 
1061 The Tribe was organized under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. Its original con-
stitution, approved by the Secretary of the Interior in 1937, declared that the Tribe’s powers 
included all those powers possessed in the past, in addition to those specifically conferred by 
Section 16 of the Indian Reorganization Act. Subsequent revisions to the Tribe’s Constitution 
in 1960 and 1968 elaborated on these powers. Brief for the Secretary of the Interior, Merrion 
v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982) (Nos. 80-11 and 80-15), 1981 WL 389704, at 
*2 [hereinafter Brief for the Secretary of the Interior]. Immediately after passage of the Act, 
the Solicitor of Interior interpreted this language to include the power to tax. Powers of Indian 
Tribes, 55 Interior Dec. 14, 18 (1934). In 1969, the constitution was revised to give the tribal 
council, with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, the power to impose taxes and fees 
on non-members of the Tribe doing business on the reservation. Brief for the Secretary of the 
Interior, supra, at *2.
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the Tribe could impose such a tax after the leases had been executed.1062 The 
taxpayer argued that it had not consented to a severance tax so that the Tribe 
had no power to levy one after the fact. The Tribe argued that the power to tax 
was inherent in its being a sovereign, independent of whether Merrion had 
consented. Accordingly, it was also irrelevant that the Tribe did not condition 
Merrion’s lease or its entry onto the reservation on its consent to be taxed. 
Merrion’s consent was simply unnecessary.
Justice Marshall started off directly and unambiguously, citing Colville for 
the proposition that the “power to tax transactions occurring on trust lands 
and significantly involving a tribe or its members is a fundamental attribute 
of sovereignty which the tribes retain unless divested of it by federal law or 
necessary implication of their dependent status.”1063 
The power to tax is an essential attribute of Indian sovereignty because it is 
a necessary instrument of self-government and territorial management. This 
power enables a tribal government to raise revenues for essential services. 
The power does not derive solely from the Indian tribe’s power to exclude non-
Indians from tribal lands. Instead, it derives from the tribe’s general author-
ity, as sovereign, to control economic activity within its jurisdiction, and to 
defray the cost of providing governmental services by requiring contribu-
tions from persons or enterprises engaged in economic activities within that 
jurisdiction.1064 
Unlike in McClanahan, tribal sovereignty was not a platonic notion rel-
egated to a back drop.1065 The Court identified the ways in which the taxpay-
ers benefited from the Tribe. The taxpayers availed themselves of the privilege 
of carrying on business on the reservation, and benefited from tribal services 
and “advantages of a civilized society” assured by tribal government.1066 Mar-
1062 Effective 1977, the Tribe levied a severance tax on “any oil and natural gas severed, saved 
and removed from Tribal lands.” Brief for the Secretary of the Interior, supra note 1061, at 
*2.
1063 Merrion, 455 U.S. at 137 (citing Colville, 447 U.S. at 152).
1064 Id. (emphasis added). This statement is consistent with Marshall’s opinion in Iowa 
Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987) (“Tribal authority over the activities 
of non-Indians on reservation lands is an important part of tribal sovereignty.”). “This recogni-
tion of the responsibilities of tribes today—their duty to act as municipalities and to provide 
the amenities commonly expected from governments—is central to a definition of legitimate 
tribal interests.” Wilkinson, supra note 7, at 108. As long ago as 1879, the Senate stated that 
the tribes “undoubtedly possess the inherent right to resort to taxation to raise the necessary 
revenue for the accomplishment of these vitally important object—a right not in any sense 
derived from the Government of the United States.” S. Rep. No. 698, 45th Cong., 3d. Sess., 
at 1–2 (1879).
1065 See supra note 558 and accompanying text.
1066 Merrion, 455 U.S. at 137–38 (quoting Exxon Corp. v. Dep’t. of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 
228 (1980) (quoting Japan Line v. Los Angeles, 441 U.S. at 445 (1979))). Marshall apparently 
based this part of the opinion on the government’s brief, which argued that unlike the non-
Indians attracted onto a reservation in Colville, the taxpayers here availed themselves of the 
substantial privilege of carrying on business on the reservation, and benefited substantially in 
their occupation of reservation lands from the provision of police and fire protection and other 
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shall compared the Tribe to numerous other governmental entities that levy 
a similar tax when they provide comparable services.1067 There was nothing 
exceptionable in requiring a business to contribute taxes to the general cost 
of tribal government.1068 
Unfortunately from the perspective of the Indians, Justice Marshall went 
on to condition this power of taxation by endorsing Colville’s statement that a 
tribe’s interest in levying taxes on nonmembers to raise “revenues for essential 
government programs . . . is strongest when the revenues are derived from 
value generated on the reservation by activities involving the Tribes and when 
the taxpayer is the recipient of tribal services,”1069 and concluded that this 
“surely is the case here.”1070 
This citation to Colville is unfortunate in two respects. First, if the Indians 
truly have the sovereign power of taxation, it should not be divested under 
the Colville approach. Second, Colville dealt with a tax avoidance situation, 
which need not have been generalized and gratuitously elevated to a more 
general principle.
The majority distinguished three old decisions cited by the dissent1071 and 
rejected the proposition that the power of taxation derived solely from the 
Tribe’s power to exclude non-Indians from tribal land.1072 Limiting the power 
in the manner the dissent suggested would contradict “the conception that 
Indian tribes are domestic, dependent nations, as well as the common under-
standing that the sovereign taxing power is a tool for raising revenue necessary 
governmental services, as well as the advantages of a civilized society. Brief for the Secretary of 
the Interior, Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982) (Nos. 80-11 and 80-15), 
1981 WL 389704, at *14. The Government cited, inter alia, Exxon and Japan Line, discussed 
supra notes 180, 192, 463.
1067 Merrion, 455 U.S. at 138.
1068 Id. at 137–38. 
1069 Id. at 138 (citing Colville, 447 U.S. at 156–57).
1070 Id. at 138; see also Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 195, 201 
(stating that a tribe’s power to tax is a fundamental attribute of sovereignty, and prior approval 
by the Secretary of the Interior is not necessary in the absence of a specific statutory require-
ment). 
1071 See Merrion, 455 U.S. at 141–44 (discussing Morris v. hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384 (1904); 
Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905), appeal dismissed, 203 U.S. 599 (1906); Maxey 
v. Wright, 3 Ind. T. 243, 54 S.W. 807 (Ct. App. Ind. T. 1900), aff’d, 105 F. 1003 (8th Cir. 
1900)).
1072 Merrion, 455 U.S. at 141. The Court appeared to reject the implicit divestiture doctrine. 
“We have considered [Indian tribes] as invested with the right of self-government and jurisdic-
tion over the persons and property within the limits of the territory they occupy, except so far 
as that jurisdiction has been restrained and abridged by treaty or act of Congress.” Id. at 140. 
“Only the Federal Government may limit a tribe’s exercise of its sovereign authority.” Id. at 
147 (citing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978)). “Because the Tribe retains 
all inherent attributes of sovereignty that have not been divested by the Federal Government, 
the proper inference from silence . . . is that the sovereign power . . . remains intact.” Id. at 
148 n.14.
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to cover the costs of government.”1073 Marshall also rejected the argument 
that various federal statutes preempted the severance tax or divested the Indi-
ans of their power of taxation.1074
Responding to the dissent’s position that the power to tax derived from the 
power to exclude, Marshall offered a classical “the whole includes the lesser” 
type of argument. 
Nonmembers who lawfully enter tribal lands remain subject to the tribe’s 
power to exclude them. This power necessarily includes the lesser power 
to place conditions on entry, on continued presence, or on reservation 
conduct, such as a tax on business activities conducted on the reservation. 
When a tribe grants a non-Indian the right to be on Indian land, the tribe 
agrees not to exercise its ultimate power to oust the non-Indian as long as 
the non-Indian complies with the initial conditions of entry. however, it 
does not follow that the lawful property right to be on Indian land also 
immunizes the non-Indian from the tribe’s exercise of its lesser-included 
power to tax or to place other conditions on the non-Indian’s conduct or 
continued presence on the reservation.1075
1073 Id. at 141. The reference to “domestic dependent nation” is from Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831), and was Chief Justice Marshall’s oxymoronic description of 
the status of an Indian tribe. See supra notes 220–28 and accompanying text; supra note 224. 
Cherokee Nation was decided by the Court in 1831; since that time the expression has been 
used by the Supreme Court in only eight cases, including Merrion.
1074 Merrion, 455 U.S. at 150–52.
1075 Id. at 144–45 (emphasis in original). had Merrion owned the land on which it was pro-
ducing oil, the Tribe might not have been able to levy a severance tax under Atkinson Trading 
Co. Inc. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001). Atkinson prevented the Navajo Nation from imposing 
its hotel occupancy tax on patrons of a hotel located on land owned by non-Indians within the 
reservation, despite the Navajo’s provision of various services to the hotel and its guests. 
The Merrion Court proclaimed that neither 
the United States, nor a state, nor any other sovereignty loses the power to govern 
the people within its borders by the existence of towns and cities therein endowed 
with the usual powers of municipalities, nor by the ownership nor occupancy of the land 
within its territorial jurisdiction by citizens or foreigners.
455 U.S. at 143 (citing Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947, 952 (8th Cir. 1905) (emphasis in Buster)). 
Atkinson, however, claims that the Court never endorsed Buster’s statement that an Indian 
tribe’s jurisdiction to govern the inhabitants of a country is not conditioned or limited by the 
title to the land which they occupy in it. To the contrary, “only full territorial sovereigns enjoy 
the ‘power to enforce laws against all who come within [their] territory,’ and Indian tribes ‘can 
no longer be described as sovereigns in this sense.’” Atkinson, 532 U.S. at 653 n.5 (quoting 
Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 685 (1990)). For a discussion of Duro, see supra notes 336, 831. 
Atkinson raises questions about the viability of tribal property taxes on non-Indian fee lands 
and tribal sales taxes on sales made by non-Indians on non-Indian fee land. In commenting 
on Atkinson, Professor Fletcher notes that “Federal Indian policy supported the exercise of the 
tribal tax in Atkinson; indeed, it actively supported it,” citing the Tribal Tax Status Act and the 
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. Fletcher, Supreme Court, supra note 14, at 177. (“In the Tribal 
Tax Status Act, Congress stated that its intent was to ‘create the development environment 
necessary for true economic and social self-sufficiency.’”) Id. (The Indian Tribal Government 
Tax Status Act of 1982 granted the tribes many of the federal tax advantages of a state. See Int. 
Rev. Code of 1986, sec. 7871.)
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The majority correctly characterized the dissent’s argument as confusing 
the two hats the Tribe wore: commercial partner and taxing sovereign.1076 
Atkinson applied Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981), which denied a tribe 
the right to regulate fishing and hunting by non-members on land not owned by the tribe. The 
Montana Court stressed that because fishing was not a significant part of the tribe’s activities, 
id. at 566, the tribe had an insufficient interest in regulating it—hardly true of Merrion. The 
Court applied a presumption that “exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect 
tribal self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status 
of the tribes, and so cannot survive without express congressional delegation.” Id. at 564. The 
Court acknowledged two exceptions: “A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or 
other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe 
or its members, through commercial dealings, contracts, leases, or other arrangements,” and 
a tribe retains “inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on 
fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the 
political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.” Id. at 565–66. 
Atkinson described Montana as showing that “Indian tribe power over nonmembers on non-
Indian fee land is sharply circumscribed,” Atkinson, 532 U.S. at 650, and that an “Indian tribe’s 
sovereign power to tax—whatever its derivation—reaches no further than tribal land.” Id. at 
650, 653. 
Professor William Rice is reported to have described Montana as holding that “Brown 
people don’t regulate white people.” N. Bruce Duthu and Dean B. Suagee, Supreme Court 
Strikes Two More Blows Against Tribal Self-Determination, 16 Nat. Resources & Env’t. 118, 
121 (2001). For a discussion of Atkinson, see Leonika Charging, Atkinson Trading Company 
v. Shirley: A Taxing Decision on Tribal Sovereign Power, 47 S.D. L. Rev. 134 (2002); Gould, 
Tough Love, supra note 11; Tabor, supra note 771, at 369–72. 
“The highly contextual determinations that have followed the Montana approach offer law-
yers no promise of clarity and tribes no hope for an end to the Court’s bit-by-colonial-bit 
diminishment of their sovereignty.” Ball, John Marshall, supra note 193, at 1191. Montana was 
applied in Brendale v. Confederate Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989), 
upholding a tribe’s zoning powers over non-Indian fee land located in an area of the reserva-
tion that was not open to the public. The non-Indian owners wanted to develop the land in a 
manner that would threaten the “political integrity, economic security, or the health or welfare 
of the tribe.” Id. at 431. “In Brendale, three tangled opinions, none with majority support, 
offered very different assessments of Montana’s meaning and produced a tangle of new limits 
on tribal regulation of reservation land use.” Ball, John Marshall, supra note 193, at 1191; see 
also Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997) (tribe had no adjudicatory power over a 
personal injury arising from an accident on a state highway running through the reservation); 
South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993) (denying a tribe the right to regulate hunting 
and fishing in a reservation area Congress opened to the public after the tribe gave it up for a 
reservoir).
One of the common criticisms of Montana is that it relied on the discredited decision in 
Oliphant and its “implicit divestiture” theory. See, e.g., Duthu & Suagee supra note 331, at 119; 
N. Bruce Duthu, Implicit Divestiture of Tribal Powers: Locating Legitimate Sources of Authority 
in Indian Country, 19 Am. Indian L. Rev. 353 (1994). For an insightful critique of Montana, 
see Alex Tallchief Skibine, The Court’s Use of the Implicit Divestiture Doctrine to Implement Its 
Imperfect Notion of Federalism in Indian Country, 36 Tulsa L. J. 267, 269 (2000). 
1076 The failure to recognize that a tribe can wear both hats simultaneously has kept the 
Court from appreciating that from an economic perspective, a “tax” may be just a formal label. 
That is, if a tribe were to otherwise keep all the revenue from an activity that it conducted, it 
may make no economic difference if it subsequently adopts a tax and now receives part of that 
revenue from the tax. See supra notes 890–93, 909–10 and accompanying text; infra notes 
1315–17, 1349–55 and accompanying text.
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Wearing its first hat, the Tribe, like any landowner, entered into a lease calling 
for a royalty. Wearing its second hat, the Tribe, like any sovereign, imposed a 
tax.1077 Although a landowner could not unilaterally renegotiate a previously 
executed lease, a sovereign can impose a tax any time it wants. 1078
b.  The Interstate Commerce Clause 
The majority also upheld the tax against an Interstate Commerce Clause chal-
lenge. Unlike Merrion’s first argument that the Tribe did not have the power 
to levy a tax, an attack under the Interstate Commerce Clause assumes the 
right to levy a tax. 
The Court acknowledged that reviewing the tax under the Interstate Com-
merce Clause had “conceptual difficulties,”1079 but proceeded to do so any-
way. At least two “conceptual difficulties” can be identified. First, Congress 
implicitly authorized the severance tax.1080 The tax was adopted pursuant to 
a series of federal checkpoints that had to be cleared before a tribal tax could 
take effect,1081 and was thus authorized by Congress. It was irrelevant that 
1077 “It is an article of faith among American Indian tribes, and most scholars who write 
about them, that tribes possess the powers of inherent sovereigns. . . . What many tribes and 
scholars are only now discovering is that the Supreme Court all but ended this territorial 
conception of tribal power more than twenty years ago [in Montana v. United States].” Gould, 
Tough Love, supra note 11, at 669
“Montana has replaced Worcester as the paradigm of tribal sovereignty. . . . Sovereignty 
over territory is now supplanted by sovereignty based upon consent.” Id. at 692. Writing long 
before Atkinson, Professor Williams sounded a similar warning. “The tribe’s majority status 
[in Merrion], an important legitimating factor in the exercise of political power in United 
States legal and political theory, thus distinguishes Merrion from Oliphant, [see supra notes 336, 
1075; infra note 1114,] where non-Indians constituted an unrepresented racial and landhold-
ing majority.” Williams, Algebra, supra note 216, at 276.
1078 See, e.g., Veix v. Sixth Ward Building & Loan Association of Newark, 310 U.S. 32 (1940); 
home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). One limited exception is when 
a statute is narrowly directed at a particular subset of persons under circumstances in which a 
contractual right is created. If a person accepts the invitation of the statute to engage in certain 
behavior, the government might be liable by changing the statute. See, e.g., Centex v. United 
States, 395 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2005); First Nationwide Bank v. United States, 431 F.3d 1342 
(Fed. Cir. 2005). Nothing even approaching this situation would involve a sovereign’s decision 
to impose a tax. It also seems clear that the sovereign could impose a tax on events taking place 
earlier in the taxable year. Due Process considerations, however, might limit how far back in 
time a state can go when it adopts a new tax. See United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26 (1994). 
This issue was not present in Merrion.
1079 Merrion, 455 U.S. at 153.
1080 This is one of the two difficulties referred to by Marshall. See id. at 155 n.21. Another 
difficulty was that the taxpayers’ discrimination argument, not discussed in the text, assumed 
that the transportation of minerals across the boundary of the reservation constituted interstate 
commerce. Id. at 158 n.24. If the reservation is considered to be part of New Mexico, where 
the severance took place, there would be no interstate commerce—just minerals moving from 
one part of New Mexico to another.
1081 Id. at 155. Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 195 (1985), rejects 
reading Merrion as holding that such “federal checkpoints” are a precondition for a tax to be 
constitutional. In Kerr-McGee, the Court upheld a Navajo tax where there were no “federal 
checkpoints” because, unlike in Merrion, the Tribe was not subject to the Indian Reorganization 
01-Pomp.indd   1153 12/23/2010   11:03:58 AM
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2443846
1154 SECTION OF TAXATION
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 63, No. 4
Congress had the power to require that approval under the Indian Com-
merce Clause, or “by virtue of its superior position over the tribes,”1082 rather 
than under the Interstate Commerce Clause.1083 Either source of the power 
would suffice to uphold the tax from attack under the Interstate Commerce 
Clause.1084
The second conceptual difficulty is that the tribes are not “states.” Any anal-
ysis of the tax should proceed under the Indian Commerce Clause, not the 
Interstate Commerce Clause.1085 Because Congress had explicitly approved 
the severance tax, any attack under the Indian Commerce Clause should be 
easily repelled.
The Solicitor General, on behalf of the Secretary of the Interior, correctly 
argued that the language, structure, and purpose of the Interstate Com-
merce Clause did not, of its own force, limit the tribes in their dealings 
with non-Indians.1086 The government accurately observed that the “Fram-
ers contemplated that the remedies [for inimical tribal legislation] would 
be the negotiation or renegotiation of treaties, the enactment of legislation 
governing trade and other relations, or the exertion of superior force by the 
United States Government.”1087 The Solicitor General, however, then mis-
stated the Framers’ intent by claiming that “if the Commerce Clause does 
impose restrictions on tribal activity, those restrictions must arise from the 
Indian Commerce Clause, and not its interstate counterpart.”1088
Act (IRA). Id. at 198. Congress is free to impose such “checkpoints” (again illustrating the ten-
sion between the Indians being “sovereigns” and Congress having plenary power over them), 
but if Congress has not done so, the tribes are free to impose their own taxes. In Kerr-McGee, 
the Court determined that Congress had not enacted legislation requiring Secretarial approval 
of Navajo tax laws. Id. Kerr-McGee recognized that under the IRA, a tribe must obtain approval 
from the Secretary of the Interior before adopting or revising its constitution to announce its 
intention to tax nonmembers. Further, the Secretary had to approve any severance tax that was 
actually enacted. The IRA, however, does not apply to all tribes. If, as Merrion holds, taxation is 
an inherent attribute of sovereignty, a tribe not subject to the Indian Reorganization Act could 
nonetheless enact a severance tax. 
1082 Merrion, 455 U.S. at 155 n.21. Professor Milner Ball describes Congress’s acting pur-
suant to its superior position as acting on the “basis of might, not constitutional law.” Ball, 
Constitution, supra note 7, at 1, 99. “Superior position, in the form of a proposition with 
judicial backing, may be traced to United States v. Kagama.” Id. at 50. Although Marshall in 
Merrion did not cite Kagama and Lone Wolf, “those cases and their reasoning are the source of 
the idea.” Id. at 54.
1083 Merrion, 455 U.S. at 155 n.21.
1084 That the Tribe has the inherent power of taxation would not automatically satisfy the 
Interstate Commerce Clause. For example, the states have the inherent power of taxation, yet 
their taxes must satisfy the Complete Auto tests, described infra note 1095 and accompanying 
text. If Congress were to authorize a state to adopt a particular tax, however, like a severance 
tax, presumably that would immunize it from a Commerce Clause challenge.
1085 “As separate sovereigns pre-existing the Constitution, [Indian] tribes have historically 
been regarded as unconstrained by those constitutional provisions framed specifically as limita-
tions on federal or state authority.” Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978).
1086 Merrion, 455 U.S. at 153.
1087 Id.
1088 Id. (emphasis added). 
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Justice Marshall corrected this misstatement: “To date, however, this Court 
has relied on the Indian Commerce Clause as a shield to protect Indian tribes 
from state and local interference . . . .”1089 This statement, while historically 
accurate,1090 was particularly incongruous coming from Justice Marshall—
who never applied the Indian Commerce Clause in this manner1091 and who 
rejected attempts by the Solicitor General in Central Machinery and Ramah to 
breathe some life into the Clause.1092
Despite the inapplicability of the Interstate Commerce Clause, Mar-
shall inexplicably proceeded to analyze the severance tax under that Clause. 
“The tax challenged here would survive judicial scrutiny under the Inter-
state Commerce Clause, even if such scrutiny were necessary.”1093 Marshall 
started his Interstate Commerce Clause analysis with Complete Auto Transit, 
Inc. v. Brady,1094 which has come to be interpreted as sustaining a tax “if it is 
applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly 
apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly 
related to the services provided by the State.”1095
The taxpayers focused their attack primarily on the nondiscrimination 
requirement. That attack turned on a technical interpretation of the tax-
ing statute, which the Court rejected.1096 The taxpayers also contended that 
because New Mexico could tax the same mining activity at full value, the 
Tribal tax imposed a multiple tax burden on interstate commerce, violating 
1089 Id. at 153–54. “The use of the Indian commerce clause as a shield to protect Indian 
tribes from state and local interference is a capsule summary of the constitutional dimension 
of Worcester v. Georgia. It is a far cry from preemption based on the supremacy clause alone 
and from the contention that any other constitutionally based claim is frivolous.” Robert S. 
Pelcyger, Justices and Indians: Back to Basics, 62 Or. L. Rev. 29, 40-41. (1983).
Justice Marshall also stated that the Court has not relied on the Indian Commerce Clause 
to authorize tribal regulation of commerce without any constitutional constraints. 455 U.S., 
at 154. This issue had not been presented in any earlier case and Marshall cited nothing in 
support of his statement.
1090 “[T]he Indian Commerce Clause originally was not conceived as a federal power to 
regulate Indians, but, rather, as a federal power to regulate non-Indians who dealt with Indians 
in Indian country.” Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1218–19.
1091 In the opinion below, the Tenth Circuit stated:
[N]o court has analyzed how the tribes are limited in their taxing power by the 
Indian Commerce Clause. We hold the standard to be used in applying that clause 
is whether a tribe’s tax legislation infringes upon the national interest in maintaining 
the free flow of interstate trade. Our view is that the national interest is measured by 
traditional analyses. 
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537, 545 (10th Cir. 1980). The court held the 
severance tax did not violate the Indian Commerce Clause. Id. at 547. The question is why a 
court is in a better position than Congress to determine when a tribal tax might “infringe upon 
the national interest in maintaining the free flow of interstate trade.” Id.
1092 See supra notes 517–18, 1011–35 and accompanying text.
1093 Merrion, 455 U.S. at 156.
1094 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
1095 Merrion, 455 U.S. at 156 (citing Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279).
1096 Id. at 157–58. See supra note 1080.
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the Commerce Clause. The Court described the multiple taxation issue as 
arising where two or more taxing jurisdictions 
point to some contact with an enterprise to support a tax on the entire 
value of its multistate activities, which is more than the contact would jus-
tify. This Court has required an apportionment of the tax based on the 
portion of the activity properly viewed as occurring within each relevant  
State. . . . This rule has no bearing here, however, for there can be no claim 
that the Tribe seeks to tax any more of [Taxpayers’] mining activity than the 
portion occurring within tribal jurisdiction.1097 Indeed, [Taxpayers] do not 
even argue that the Tribe is seeking to seize more tax revenues than would be 
fairly related to the services provided by the Tribe1098 . . . . In the absence of 
such an assertion, and when the activity taxed by the Tribe occurs entirely on 
tribal lands, the multiple taxation issue would arise only if a State attempted 
to levy a tax on the same activity, which is more than the State’s contact with 
the activity would justify. In such a circumstance, any challenge asserting 
that tribal and state taxes create a multiple burden on interstate commerce 
should be directed at the state tax, which, in the absence of congressional 
ratification, might be invalidated under the Commerce Clause.1099 
The Court made it clear that because Merrion was not challenging the State 
tax, it was not expressing any opinion on that issue.1100
Justice Marshall’s dicta merit several comments. First, Marshall seemed to 
be adopting language of the fourth prong of Complete Auto (although he did 
not cite the case in this part of the analysis) when he noted that the taxpayers 
1097 Id. at 158 n.26. This part of the Court’s statement conforms to the due process nexus 
standards of the 14th Amendment that apply when a state exercises its powers of taxation. The 
Due Process Clause requires “a ‘minimal connection’ between the interstate activities and the 
taxing State, and a rational relationship between the income attributed to the State and the 
intrastate values of the enterprise.” Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 
436–37 (1980). The Bill of Rights and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
do not apply to the tribes. The Indian Civil Rights Act incorporates a stripped down version of 
the Bill of Rights that imposes certain conditions on the actions of the tribes. One condition 
is that a tribe cannot take “private property for a public use without just compensation,” 25 
U.S.C. § 1302 (2006), which could be interpreted as encompassing under a different rubric 
the 14th Amendment due process constraints that apply to the states. The Act also prohibits 
tribes from denying to “any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws.” Id. 
The Court has held that the Act does not create a private cause of action that could be pursued 
in the federal courts; instead, any actions must be pursued in tribal courts. Santa Clara Pueblo 
v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 69–72 (1978).
Apparently, Congress’s predominant concern in passing the Act was to provide procedural 
rights in criminal trials. Note, The Indian Bill of Rights and the Constitutional Status of Tribal 
Governments, 82 harv. L. Rev. 1343, 1359 (1969). For a general discussion of the Indian Civil 
Rights Act of 1968, see Canby, supra note 3, at 394–405; Stephen L. Pevar, The Rights of 
Indians and Tribes 278–91 (3rd ed. 2002).
1098 When the Tribe tried to introduce at trial evidence of the services it provided, the tax-
payers successfully argued that such evidence was irrelevant to their case. Merrion, 455 U.S. 
at 157 n.23.
1099 Id. at 158–59 n.26 (emphasis in original).
1100 Id. 
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“do not even argue that the Tribe is seeking more tax revenues than would be 
fairly related to the services provided by the Tribe.”1101 The fourth prong of 
Complete Auto was essentially eliminated in Commonwealth Edison,1102 how-
ever, and the Court’s dicta inviting that the issue be revisited would prove to 
be ill founded just seven years later in Cotton Petroleum. 
Second, the activity of “severance” occurred simultaneously within the 
reservation and within New Mexico. Both could be viewed as having equal 
claims to tax the severance. Like the Tribe, the State must also show that its tax 
was not “more than the State’s contact with the activity would justify.”1103 Part 
of those contacts would presumably be the services the State provided. The 
Court indicated that both the Tribe and the State must justify their respec-
tive taxes in terms of services provided (assuming the reference to “contacts” 
includes “services”). Presumably, the Tribe and the State must satisfy the same 
standard. 
If the Tribal tax was commensurate with services provided, and the State 
taxes were not, then the State tax might be viewed as creating a multiple 
tax burden. But the opposite is equally true. If the Tribal tax were not com-
mensurate with services it provided, but the State tax was, then the Tribal tax 
should be viewed as creating multiple taxation. 
Third, any attempt to compare taxes with services is almost guaranteed to 
be meaningless. Language like “fairly related to the services provided,” sug-
gests some kind of qualitative or quantitative evaluation. Justice Marshall, 
however, had properly rejected that type of evaluation just one year earlier 
in a case that also involved a severance tax (albeit not one imposed by the 
Indians). In Commonwealth Edison, the taxpayers, utility companies, unsuc-
cessfully argued that the Montana severance tax had to relate to the value of 
services provided by the State.1104 
Justice Marshall’s majority opinion in Commonwealth Edison is worth quot-
ing at length, not only because it sheds light on how to interpret his comments 
in Merrion, but also because of the insight it offers into the more general (and 
misguided) theme that has played a prominent role in some of the Indian tax 
cases—the extent to which taxes have to be related to services.
[Taxpayers] only complaint is that the amount the State receives in taxes far 
exceeds the value of the services provided to the coal mining industry. In 
objecting to the tax on this ground, [Taxpayers] may be assuming that the 
Montana tax is, in fact, intended to reimburse the State for the cost of spe-
1101 Id. at 158.
1102 Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981), upheld the constitutional-
ity of Montana’s severance tax under the Interstate Commerce Clause. “[A] severance tax is 
like a real property tax, which has never been doubted as a legitimate means of raising revenue 
by the situs state.” Id. at 624. But see Am. River Transp. Co. v. Bower, 813 N.E.2d 1090 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2004); Sylvia Dennen, The Fourth Prong: The Court’s Neglected Stepchild?, 33 State 
Tax Notes 743 (2004).
1103 Merrion, 455 U.S. at 158.
1104 453 U.S. at 609–11.
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cific services furnished to the coal mining industry. Alternatively, [Taxpayers] 
could be arguing that a State’s power to tax an activity connected to inter-
state commerce cannot exceed the value of the services specifically provided 
to the activity. Either way, the premise of [Taxpayers’] argument is invalid. 
Furthermore, [Taxpayers] have completely misunderstood the nature of the 
inquiry under the fourth prong of the Complete Auto Transit test.
The Montana Supreme Court held that the coal severance tax is “imposed 
for the general support of the government,” and we have no reason to ques-
tion this characterization of the Montana tax as a general revenue tax . . . . 
This Court has indicated that States have considerable latitude in impos-
ing general revenue taxes. The Court has, for example, consistently rejected 
claims that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment stands 
as a barrier against taxes that are “unreasonable” or “unduly burdensome.” 
Moreover, there is no requirement under the Due Process Clause that the 
amount of general revenue taxes collected from a particular activity must 
be reasonably related to the value of the services provided to the activity. 
Instead, our consistent rule has been: 
Nothing is more familiar in taxation than the imposition of a tax upon a 
class or upon individuals who enjoy no direct benefit from its expenditure, 
and who are not responsible for the condition to be remedied.
A tax is not an assessment of benefits. It is, as we have said, a means of dis-
tributing the burden of the cost of government. The only benefit to which 
the taxpayer is constitutionally entitled is that derived from his enjoyment of 
the privileges of living in an organized society, established and safeguarded 
by the devotion of taxes to public purposes. Any other view would preclude 
the levying of taxes except as they are used to compensate for the burden on 
those who pay them, and would involve abandonment of the most funda-
mental principle of government–that it exists primarily to provide for the 
common good. 
There is no reason to suppose that this latitude afforded the States under the 
Due Process Clause is somehow divested by the Commerce Clause merely 
because the taxed activity has some connection to interstate commerce; 
particularly when the tax is levied on an activity conducted within the  
State. . . . To accept [Taxpayers’] apparent suggestion that the Commerce 
Clause prohibits the States from requiring an activity connected to inter-
state commerce to contribute to the general cost of providing governmental 
services, as distinct from those costs attributable to the taxed activity, would 
place such commerce in a privileged position. . . . When, as here, a general 
revenue tax does not discriminate against interstate commerce and is appor-
tioned to activities occurring within the State, the State “is free to pursue its 
own fiscal policies, unembarrassed by the Constitution, if by the practical 
operation of a tax the state has exerted its power in relation to opportunities 
which it has given, to protection which it has afforded, to benefits which it 
has conferred by the fact of being an orderly, civilized society.1105
1105 Id. at 621–25 (emphasis in original). The dissent in Commonwealth Edison would have 
entertained a trial on the issue of whether the Montana severance tax was fairly related to the 
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In light of these comments, only the most sanguine of taxpayers would 
assume they could prevail in arguing that a tax should be struck down because 
of a comparison between what is paid and the services received. The one 
exception is a situation that Warren Trading presented, in which the State had 
no responsibilities for the reservation and provided no services whatsoever.1106 
In that case, the state simply provided no benefits, opportunities, or protec-
tions that could justify a quid pro quo. But as discussed above,1107 even that 
statement is less categorical than first appears, depending on how broadly the 
notion of benefits, opportunities, or protections is defined.
c.  The Majority Refuses to Save Merrion from Not Anticipating a Tribal Tax 
In a sense, the Court refused to rescue Merrion from its lack of foresight in 
drafting its lease agreement.1108 Merrion could have drafted a clause prevent-
ing the Tribe from imposing any taxes in the future on its activities on the 
reservation.1109 Because it failed to do so, Merrion could no more complain 
about the enactment of a new tribal tax than could someone who went into 
business before a state adopted a personal income tax or a sales tax. Unless 
there are extenuating circumstances,1110 no one has the right to freeze the tax 
law as it existed in the year in which he or she made a business or investment 
decision, and that general proposition was implicitly extended to those doing 
business with the Tribe. 
True, Merrion might not have ever anticipated that the Tribe would have 
enacted a tax on its activities; the leases were entered into in 1953 at a time 
when the extant Tribal constitution did not provide for taxing powers.1111 
services provided by the State, a fruitless undertaking. One can imagine economists in tow on 
both sides—with the de rigueur computer printouts—engaged in cerebral discussions about 
the aesthetic damage of strip mining, the nature and value of State services, including that of 
providing an organized society. Moreover, this could be a recurring event if the State were to 
periodically adjust its rates, change its mix of taxes, alter the type and amount of services it 
provided, or if the taxpayer changed the nature of its activities.
1106 See supra notes 454–63 and accompanying text. 
1107 See supra notes 454–63, 964, 1003–10 and accompanying text; infra notes 1179–82, 
1256, and accompanying text. 
1108 Apparently, some Navajo leases prohibit the tribe from taxing leaseholds granted to non-
members. Fulwood, Of Tribes and Taxes: Limits on Indian Tribal Power to Tax Nonmembers, 
1986 Utah L. Rev. 729, 749 (1986). In general, investors are free to strike whatever tax deal 
they can with the Indians. One strategy might be for the tribes to adopt taxes so that they can 
be given away as a bargaining chip with investors. For a discussion of how investors use the 
Indians as a tax shelter, see Mark J. Cowan, Leaving Money on the Table(s): An Examination of 
Federal Income Tax Policy Towards Indian Tribes, 6 Fla. Tax Rev. 345, 367–68 (2004).
1109 Indeed, those structuring transactions with the Indians on the reservation should attempt 
to negotiate a no-tax clause or at least negotiate an agreement about how the transaction will 
be taxed.
1110 See supra note 1078.
1111 Merrion, 455 U.S. at 134–35. In commenting on an earlier draft of this article, Professor 
Fletcher notes that in 1953 Congress was actively engaged in the termination period and the 
tribes were viewed by the mining companies and by the Department of the Interior as “exploit-
able.”
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Nonetheless, Merrion could have, but did not, contract against that possibil-
ity and had to live with the consequences. “[S]overeign power, even when 
unexercised, is an enduring presence that governs all contracts subject to the 
sovereign’s jurisdiction, and will remain intact unless surrendered in unmis-
takable terms.”1112 Moreover, Merrion had benefited through the years from 
police protection and other services so that it did not have a strong equitable 
position.1113 By not contracting for a “no-tax” clause, Merrion was assumed to 
have taken the risk that the Tribe would exercise its sovereign powers some-
time in the future.1114
d.  Stevens’s Dissent 
Justice Stevens wrote for the dissent, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Jus-
tice Rehnquist. Justice Stevens struck the theme that while the tribes have 
broad powers over their own members, their powers over nonmembers are 
narrowly confined.1115 The dissent read Maxey v. Wright, Morris v. Hitchcock, 
and Buster v. Wright1116 for the proposition that the “power of an Indian tribe 
to impose a tax solely on nonmembers doing business on the reservation 
derives from the tribe’s power to exclude those persons entirely from tribal 
lands or, in the alternative, to impose lesser restrictions and conditions on 
a right of entry granted to conduct business on the reservation.”1117 “Tribal 
1112 Id. at 148. “[T]here is no ‘use it or lose’ rule that applies to taxing power.” Jensen, supra 
note 9, at 23. 
1113 Merrion, 455 U.S. at 137–38. 
1114 Apparently, New Mexico increased its severance tax some time after Merrion had entered 
into its leases with the Tribe and no argument was made that the State’s action was illegal. Brief 
for the Secretary of the Interior, supra note 1066, at *18.
Under Merrion, a tribe can tax a nonmember company with presumably significant 
“justifiable expectations” to the contrary in a circumstance where the tribe has agreed 
to allow the company on the reservation. Yet, absent congressional authorization or 
clear nonmember consent, a tribe cannot criminally sanction nonmember residents 
of the reservation [Oliphant, Duro], cannot regulate nonmembers who hunt or fish on 
nonmember fee lands unless their conduct threatens a core tribal interest [Montana], 
might be able to zone some nonmember lands on the reservation [Brendale], and yet 
cannot even regulate the hunting or fishing of transient nonmembers who come to a 
federal recreational area within the reservation [Bourland]. 
Frickey, Common Law, supra note 15, at 50. Without attempting to analyze all of the cases 
Frickey cites, I would disagree with any characterization that Merrion had “justifiable expecta-
tions” of not being taxed when it failed to negotiate a no-tax clause with the Tribe. Also, what 
is “justifiable” is a function of what the law is, so there is a circularity in determining what is 
“justifiable” to determine what the law is.
1115 Merrion, 455 U.S. at 170–71 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens thought that the “tribes’ 
sovereignty over their own members is significantly greater than the States’ power over their 
own citizens. Tribes may enforce discriminatory rules that would be intolerable in a non-
Indian community.” Id. at 170.
1116 See supra note 1071 and accompanying text. 
1117 Merrion, 455 U.S. at 181–83 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Professor Laurence describes the 
dissent’s analysis as having “a technical precision . . . but the reading depends on a narrow, 
indeed grudging acceptance of tribal sovereignty . . . .” Laurence, Thurgood Marshall, supra note 
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powers over nonresidents are appropriately limited because nonmembers are 
foreclosed from participation in tribal government.”1118 “In this Nation each 
sovereign governs only with the consent of the governed.”1119 
The dissent feared that 
an Indian tribe may with equal legitimacy contract with outsiders . . .  
and . . . after the contract is partially performed—change the terms of the 
bargain by imposing a gross receipts tax on the outsider. If the Court is will-
ing to ignore the risk of such unfair treatment . . . because the Secretary of 
the Interior has the power to veto a tribal tax, it must equate the unbridled 
discretion of a political appointee with the protection afforded by rules of 
law.1120 
e.  Policy Considerations Regarding the Taxation of Nonresidents 
The dissent could have bolstered these comments by comparing the equiva-
lent situation of an outsider contracting with a state. A state can enter into 
a contract with a nonresident and then adopt a new tax that reduces the 
profit the outsider was expecting.1121 One political safeguard that outsiders 
have, however, is that because a state cannot discriminate against them under 
the Interstate Commerce Clause (or, in the case of an individual, also the 
470, at 67. Professor Laurence claims that Stevens “sees the power to exclude as one granted by 
the Europeans and the United States Constitution to the tribes; to Justice Marshall, the power 
to exclude is one retained from original sovereignty.” Id. at 66.
Claiborne, writes that: 
Indian Tribes are, of course, “domestic” sovereignties. In this respect, they are deemed 
to have surrendered (willingly or not) to the United States much the same pow-
ers the States surrendered by forming the “more perfect Union.” But there are, of 
course, important differences. Tribes, unlike States, are not directly constrained by 
the Bill of Rights or the Reconstruction Amendments. On the other hand, they are 
not protected by the Tenth Amendment and congressional power over them is almost 
unlimited. What is more, even without legislation, Tribes, because of their ‘depen-
dent status’ vis-à-vis the United States, are deemed to have relinquished the right to 
alienate their land except to the United States or with its approval, and also the right 
to punish non-members. In sum, tribal sovereignty is a precarious thing subject to 
diminution, even perhaps destruction, at the will of Congress.
Claiborne, supra note 11, at 595–96. The constitutional right to travel, see, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 
526 U.S. 489 (1999), does not limit the Indians right to exclude nonmembers from a reserva-
tion.
1118 Merrion, 455 U.S. at 183. In addition, Stevens argued that in “becoming part of the 
United States,” the tribes had “yielded their status as independent nations” and had no power 
over non-Indians. Id. at 160.
1119 Id. at 173 (quoting Nevada v. hall, 440 U.S. at 426 (1979)). See generally Richard B. 
Collins, Indian Consent to American Government, 31 Ariz. L. Rev. 365 (1988). 
1120 Merrion, 455 U.S. at 190.
1121 Exactly that situation occurred in 1991 when Connecticut adopted a personal income 
tax, which applied to existing contracts the State had with nonresidents. To take an easy 
example, nonresident employees of the State became subject to the tax even if they sincerely 
believed, and relied upon, all of the anti-income tax rhetoric that had marked earlier discus-
sions over fiscal reform, suggesting that a personal income tax would never be enacted.
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Privileges and Immunities Clause),1122 any new tax has to apply equally to 
residents, i.e., voters. In a sense, while nonresidents do not vote, their inter-
ests are protected by residents who do.1123 The outsiders ride the coattails of 
the insiders, which presumably is why a tax on nonresidents is not normally 
viewed as violating the slogan, “no taxation without representation.”
One significant difference exists with many tribes, however. If there are 
few local economic actors—which may be why a tribe is turning to outsid-
ers in the first place—the normal political protection for nonresidents may 
not exist. In other words, a new tax may be nondiscriminatory on its face,1124 
but as a practical matter, may apply only to nonresidents, who are the only 
significant economic players. 
Commonwealth Edison1125 (authored by Justice Marshall) presented this 
very situation. The Montana severance tax in that case was nondiscriminatory 
on its face, that is, it applied uniformly to the severance of coal whether used 
within the State or outside the State. As a practical matter, however, nearly all 
(90%) of the Montana coal was destined for outsiders and the Court assumed 
the tax was passed forward to nonresidents. The tax could be described as 
discriminatory in fact. But because the tax was facially nondiscriminatory, 
the Court held it did not discriminate against interstate commerce. Presum-
ably, nonresidents did not have the political protection of riding the coattails 
of Montana voters, who did not bear the burden of the tax. Quite possibly, 
Montana voters would have endorsed “sticking it to outsiders.”
More generally, states often impose facially neutral taxes that are politically 
attractive to voters because of the disproportionate impact on nonresidents 
who do not vote. Special excise taxes on rental cars and hotels, Delaware’s fees 
on incorporation, Alaska’s overwhelming reliance on the taxation of oil and 
gas, and Nevada’s taxes on gambling, for example, are attractive to residents 
of those states because they are presumably paid predominately by nonresi-
dents.1126 A tribal severance tax is consistent with this philosophy. Drawing 
1122 U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; see Richard D. Pomp, State and Local Taxation, Ch. 
4 (6th ed. 2009).
1123 Residents under contract with Connecticut, for example, also became subject to that 
State’s personal income tax in 1991, see supra note 1121. The adoption of Connecticut’s per-
sonal income tax was especially contentious and nonresidents had the assurance that they were 
riding the coattails of residents pursuing their own self-interests. 
1124 Under the Interstate Commerce Clause, a facially discriminatory tax is “virtually per se 
invalid.” Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328 (2008) (citing Oregon Waste, Inc. v. Dep’t. 
of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1979)).
1125 Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 624 (1981).
1126 Even “tourist taxes,” however, will be paid by some residents. For example, some upstate 
New York residents come to New York City for recreation, stay in hotels, and pay the excise 
taxes on hotel rooms. Similarly, New York residents who do not own cars (common in New 
York City) will rent cars and pay the excise taxes on rental cars. But these are the exceptions 
and not the rule.
The political goal of these tourist taxes is to have them paid by nonresidents (i.e., nonvoters) 
but determining their economic incidence can be a difficult empirical question. For example, 
hotel room rates may be lower because of the excise tax than they would be if there were no 
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any kind of justiciable line between acceptable and non-acceptable Indian 
taxes having a disproportionate impact on nonresidents would be impossible, 
and unnecessary for at least four reasons. 
First, some tribes have few activities they can tax. A tribe has no interest in 
taxing an activity at such a high level that it drives away business. Certainly 
states are timid about flexing their tax muscles for fear of hurting economic 
development and tribes can hardly be expected to be voracious and rapacious 
revenuers to the point of destroying what little economic activity they might 
be able to attract. 
Second, while corporations do not vote, their employees do. These employ-
ees also have no interest in seeing a tribe (or a state) adopt a philosophy of 
“taxing what the traffic will bear,” for fear of losing their jobs or discouraging 
business from creating jobs. And while corporations might not vote, they do 
lobby and have more access to the power structure than do nearly all voters.
Third, in the case of certain tribes and states, the nonresident investor might 
have some leverage. The fact that there may not be any residents serving as a 
proxy for their interests is, ironically, the very situation in which the outsider 
may have enough leverage to protect itself through its negotiations with a 
tribe. The outsider might well have enough clout to negotiate, if not a no-tax 
clause, or a tax holiday, then at least favorable treatment. Merrion did not 
do this, although one suspects that in 1953 when the leases were executed, it 
could have easily negotiated a “no tax” clause. 
Fourth, Congress is always the final arbiter of situations where the local 
political process might break down and offer inadequate protections for non-
voters. That Congress has infrequently intervened in issues of state taxation 
illustrates that concerns for economic development can be expected to act as 
a brake on tendencies to overtax nonvoters. But Congress can be expected 
to intervene if a tribe purposely uses its taxing powers, for example, to force 
lessees to abandon their leases so they can be taken over or given to others.1127 
Justice Marshall recognized this safety valve by noting,
[T]he Tribe’s authority to tax nonmembers is subject to constraints not 
imposed on other governmental entities: the Federal Government can take 
away this power, and the Tribe must obtain the approval of the Secretary 
such taxes. That observation would be only the starting point in trying to trace through the 
effects of that lowered price.
In Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, see supra note 186 and the citations therein, Justice 
Blackmun suggested that taxes “tailored” to single out interstate businesses should receive extra 
scrutiny, 430 U.S. at 288 n.15, but his advice has gone unheeded.
1127 The trial court made a finding of fact that the producers would be able to pass the major-
ity of the tax on to their customers, but if they had to absorb the tax, 
the ability of some of the lessees to operate profitably some of the existing oil wells 
on the reservation would be substantially limited; those lessees not able to profitably 
operate wells ‘would be required to shut down such wells resulting in a loss of natural 
resources and an unjust return of the wells to the Jicarilla Apache Tribe’ . . . .
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537, 540 (10th Cir. 1980).
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before any tax on nonmembers can take effect.1128 These additional con-
straints minimize potential concern that Indian tribes will exercise the power 
to tax in an unfair or unprincipled manner, and ensure that any exercise of 
the tribal power to tax will be consistent with national policies.1129 
With the exception of the reference to the Secretary, the same statement 
could be made of Congress’s ability to prohibit under the Interstate Com-
merce Clause an offending state statute. 
Many commentators view Merrion as a great victory for the Indians;1130 
1128 That requirement was true in Merrion because the Tribe was subject to the IRA. As Kerr-
McGee makes clear, 471 U.S. 195 (1985), supra note 1081, that requirement is not necessary.
After Merrion, the Secretary of the Interior approved guidelines “to assist Indian tribes in 
the exercise of their inherent authority to tax mineral activities within their jurisdiction,” and 
to “consider interests of other persons affected by their taxing ordinances.” Williams, Algebra, 
supra note 216, at 279 n.231. According to the American Indian Law Newsletter, the 
patent effect of the . . . regulations is to make it enormously more difficult for tribes 
to enact severance taxes . . . and make it vastly easier for the Secretary to disapprove 
such ordinances on the simple ground that they fail to meet any one of a number of 
complicated, costly and time-consuming requirements; and to make any ordinance 
which is approved much more vulnerable to legal challenges from the resource com-
panies which would pay a tribal severance tax.
Id.
1129 Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 141 (1982). Professor Williams has crit-
icized Merrion as drawing “upon European-derived legal discourse on Indian rights to delimit 
tribal taxing authority over non-Indians.” Williams, Algebra, supra note 216, at 274. Professor 
Williams argues more generally that 
American Indian Nations have been judged and their legal rights and status deter-
mined in European legal thought and discourse by alien and alienating norms 
derived from the European’s experience of the world. The central texts of contem-
porary Federal Indian law, beginning with its grounding legal text, the Doctrine of 
Discovery, deny respect to American tribal peoples’ fundamental human rights of 
autonomy and self-determination.
Robert A Williams, Jr., Learning Not to Live With Eurocentric Myopia: A Reply to Professor 
Laurence’s Learning to Live With the Plenary Power of Congress Over the Indian Nations, 30 Ariz. 
L. Rev. 439, 439 (1988). 
[M]odern Federal Indian law, as well as those lawyers who write and practice in the 
field, ought to be liberated from a genocidal, imperialist past and adopt a perspective 
of tolerance and respect for the fundamental human right of American Indian people 
to self-determination which can only be achieved through decolonization. 
Id. at 440. William’s article, like so much of his writing, raises issues that many persons would 
just as soon ignore. It makes a paper on Indian taxation appear downright quotidian.
1130 But see Williams, Algebra, supra note 216, at 275 (“Merrion can be interpreted as a 
victory for Indian tribes only from a thoroughly myopic, un-Americanized perspective. The 
Court balanced the concern that tribes might act in an ‘unfair or unprincipled manner’ with 
the comforting fact that secretarial approval ensures ‘that any exercise of the tribal power to tax 
will be consistent with national policies.’” (quoting Merrion, 455 U.S. at 141)).
[T]his “victory” for tribes is clearly contained by the Court’s structural subordination 
of tribal self-governing powers within the hierarchical matrices of the United States 
political and legal theory . . . . Merrion should be read as but a part of the long litany 
01-Pomp.indd   1164 12/23/2010   11:04:00 AM
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2443846
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 63, No. 4
 INDIAN COMMERCE CLAUSE AND STATE TAXATION 1165
true enough, but a victory that would soon be blunted by Cotton Petroleum, 
which upheld the simultaneous imposition of a state severance tax without 
any relief for the resulting multiple taxation. The combination of Merrion and 
Cotton meant that resource-endowed tribes would have to share that tax base 
with the states.
2.  Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico
Seven years after Merrion, Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico1131 upheld the 
simultaneous imposition of severance taxes by a state and a tribe without 
apportionment or relief for the resulting double taxation. The taxpayer was 
related to the entity that challenged the Tribal taxes in Merrion. After losing 
that case, Cotton now attacked the New Mexico oil and gas taxes. Signifi-
cantly, the Tribe was not a party to the case.1132
Cotton, a non-Indian corporation, extracted and marketed oil and gas on 
trust land owned by the United States for the benefit of the Jicarilla Tribe.1133 
The Tribe, pursuant to the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 (hereinafter 
1938 Act), entered into the leases.1134 Mineral leases constituted the primary 
source of the Tribe’s general operating revenue.1135
Cotton paid royalties and production taxes to the Tribe,1136 and also paid 
five oil and gas severance taxes to New Mexico. Because these taxes over-
lapped, Cotton’s total oil and gas severance tax burdens were approximately 
14% of the value of production, whereas off-reservation producers paid only 
8% of value.1137 
of European derived legal texts which seek to hierarchically subordinate the Indian’s 
self-defining vision within the universalized structures of the white man’s legal and 
political worldview. The implication that the tribe would be prohibited from exer-
cising its taxing authority should tribal mineral development policies conflict with 
the United States’ sovereign interests undermines the Court’s upholding of “Indian 
sovereignty.” 
Id. at 278–79.
1131 Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989).
1132 “For 50 years following Rickert [in 1903] nearly all reservation tax cases involved non-
Indian lessees; in none was an Indian or Indian tribe directly represented.” Barsh, Reservation 
Wealth, supra note 5, at 561 n.116.
“Just as Indian land was the object of white settlers in the nineteenth century, so Indian 
minerals are the object of white-dominated urban centers hungry for additional sources of 
energy in the twentieth century.” Carole E. Goldberg, A Dynamic View of Tribal Jurisdiction to 
Tax Non-Indians, 40 Law and Contemp. Probs. 166, 166 (1976).
1133 Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 168.
1134 Id.
1135 Id. at 167.
1136 The Tribe’s taxes were upheld in Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
1137 Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 168–69. The State claimed that the economic burden 
of its taxes was not passed onto the Tribe. Brief of Appellees State of New Mexico, Cotton 
Petroleum, 490 U.S. 163 (No. 87-1327),1987 U.S. Briefs 1327, at *7 [hereinafter Brief of 
Appellees State of New Mexico].
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a.  The Merrion Footnote
The issue was whether New Mexico could tax the on-reservation production 
of oil and gas by a non-Indian company. Cotton’s primary argument was 
based on dictum in a footnote in Merrion.1138 That footnote explained that 
one of the reasons the Court rejected Merrion’s Interstate Commerce argu-
ment was that it made no attempt to show that the Jicarilla Apaches were 
seeking to tax more than what was fairly related to services provided by the 
Tribe.1139 The footnote also suggested that the New Mexico tax in Merrion 
“might be invalid under the Commerce Clause if in excess of what ‘the State’s 
contact with the activity would justify.’”1140 Because Commonwealth Edison 
1138 Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 169 (citing Merrion, 455 U.S. at 158–59 n.26). Cotton 
could not challenge the validity of the Tribe’s severance tax because that argument was rejected 
by Merrion. The argument that the Tribal tax preempted the State tax was rejected by Colville. 
There was a lack of evidence that the multiple taxation negatively impacted the Tribe, and 
Cotton apparently vacillated on a preemption argument. See infra note 1140. Cotton was 
boxed into a fairly weak litigating posture.
1139 Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 169. As discussed above, under the best of circumstances 
this is a fairly weak argument. See supra notes 1094–1107 and accompanying text.
1140 Id. (quoting Merrion, 455 U.S. at 158–59 n.26 (emphasis in Merrion)). According to 
the Tribe’s amicus brief, Cotton disclaimed a preemption argument and discussed it only as a 
backdrop for its Commerce Clause argument. Brief of Jicarilla Apache Tribe as Amicus Curiae 
in Support of the Appellants, Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. 163 (No. 87-1327), 1987 U.S. S. 
Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1327, at *7–8 [hereinafter Brief of Jicarilla Apache Tribe as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of the Appellants]. The New Mexico Court of Appeals summarized Cotton’s litigation 
theory as “contend[ing] that this case is not a preemption case because the economic impact on 
the Tribe is minimal and is not a primary consideration. . . . It asks us to adopt a new analysis 
to apply to non-Indian producers who enter into lease agreements with tribes for on-the-res-
ervation operations.” Cotton Petroleum v. State, 745 P.2d 1170, 1172 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987). 
In keeping with its litigation strategy, apparently Cotton made no effort to analyze the impact 
of the State taxes on the Tribe and did not seriously challenge on appeal the trial court’s find-
ings of fact that there was no such impact. Id. at 1174. In its amicus brief, the Tribe described 
Cotton as not developing the factual record needed to evaluate a preemption claim and argued 
that it should not be allowed to assert that theory. Brief of Jicarilla Apache Tribe as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of the Appellants, supra, at *6. An amicus brief filed by the Crow Tribe et al. 
argued that there was no final judgment on the preemption issue by the highest court in New 
Mexico so that the U.S. Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to consider this argument. Brief 
Amici Curiae of the Crow Tribe et al., Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. 163 (No. 87-1327), 1987 
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1327, at *11. 
At oral argument, Cotton suggested the New Mexico Court of Appeals was wrong in con-
cluding that it had disclaimed a preemption argument.
QUESTION: But if you said in the New Mexico Court of Appeals that it is not a 
preemption case 
COTTON: I didn’t say that, Mr. Chief Justice.
QUESTION: Well, but I—let me read again what the New Mexico Court of Appeals 
said you said, and I asked you whether that was a correct statement. “Cotton, on the 
other hand, contends this is not, a preemption case because the economic impact on 
the tribe is minimal and is not a primary consideration.” Now, is that a correct state-
ment of the position you took in the New Mexico Court of Appeals?
COTTON: No, it is not, Mr. Chief Justice.
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authored by Justice Marshall had effectively rejected a similar argument, Cot-
ton Petroleum had a steep obstacle to overcome. But even if Commonwealth 
Edison had not existed, Cotton still would have had a tough burden to bear.
Relying on that footnote, Cotton argued that the New Mexico taxes 
imposed on reservation activity are valid only if related to actual expenditures 
by the State in relation to the activity being taxed. Cotton presented evidence 
at trial tending to prove that the New Mexico taxes far exceeded the value of 
services it received.1141 Cotton did not attempt to prove that the State taxes 
imposed any burden on the Tribe.1142 Cotton also argued that the New Mex-
ico taxes were preempted by the 1938 Act.1143 Finally, it argued that weighing 
the respective state, federal, and tribal interests, the New Mexico taxes inter-
fered with the federal interest in promoting tribal economic self-sufficiency 
and were not justified by an adequate state interest.1144
b.  The Tribe’s Amicus Briefs 
After the trial below, the Tribe filed an amicus brief arguing that the New 
Mexico taxes substantially interfered with its ability to raise its own tax rates 
and would diminish the desirability of on-reservation leases.1145 The Tribe also 
expressed a “particular concern” about the failure of New Mexico to provide 
QUESTION: The court was wrong then in saying it.
COTTON: Yes.
We said--and the next sentence makes it clearer. We said that when you have a 
Commerce Clause inquiry, you look at the controlling acts of Congress, Congress 
to see if there are any—if you see—to see if there are any, and then you look to the 
Commerce Clause. We said the preemption concept was a background here. So, we 
didn’t—we didn’t say it wasn’t a preemption case. We said the preemption issues were 
a part and parcel of the Commerce Clause issues.
Transcript of Oral Argument, Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. 163 (No. 87-1327), 1988 U.S. 
Trans. LEXIS 114, at *41–42 [hereinafter Transcript of Oral Argument]. See also infra note 
1199.
1141 Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 170. Cotton also argued that the taxes paid by all non-
member producers far exceeded the value of services that the State provided to the reservation 
as a whole. Id. Cotton Petroleum’s Reply Brief cited the record below for the proposition that 
the Jicarilla Tribe and the United States provide 90% of the governmental services on the res-
ervation. Reply Brief of Appellants Cotton Petroleum Corp., supra note 1141, at *3–4 [Reply 
Brief of Appellants Cotton Petroleum Corp.]. The brief claimed that the New Mexico oil and 
gas taxes from reservation producers, including Cotton, equaled 400% of the estimated State 
services provided to the reservation. Id. at *4.
1142 Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 170. Because there was no evidence of serious economic 
impact on the Tribe, Cotton thought its best argument was under the Interstate Commerce 
Clause rather than arguing preemption. Cotton Petroleum, 745 P.2d at 1172; see also supra note 
1140. Many tribes, however, believe the double taxation discourages businesses from operating 
on a reservation. Cowan, Double Taxation, supra note 814, at 95–96.
1143 Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 177. The Court rejected this argument. Id. at 177–83. 
1144 Id. at 177.
1145 Id. at 170. This latter argument is reminiscent of Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898), 
discussed supra notes 354–75 and accompanying text.
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services commensurate with the taxes collected.1146 After the Tribe filed its 
brief, the New Mexico District Court upheld the New Mexico taxes, reject-
ing Cotton’s theory of the case and concluding that the taxes had no adverse 
impact on tribal interests and were not pre-empted by federal law. The court 
also held that the taxes were consistent with the Due Process Clause and the 
Commerce Clause.1147
The Tribe then filed an amicus brief before the New Mexico Court of 
Appeals. Unlike Cotton, the Tribe argued that the New Mexico taxes could 
not withstand a traditional preemption analysis. The Tribe conceded that 
“state laws, to the extent they do not interfere with tribal self-government, 
may control the conduct of non-Indians on the reservation.”1148 The Tribe 
maintained, however, that the taxes interfered with its ability to raise taxes 
and thus with its right to self-government.1149 The appellate court rejected this 
argument because the record contained no evidence of any adverse impact on 
the Tribe;1150 to the contrary, there was evidence that the Tribe could have 
imposed even higher taxes without any adverse effect.1151
1146 Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 170. 
1147 Id. at 171–72.
1148 Id. at 172.
1149 Id. In its amicus brief before the U.S. Supreme Court, the Tribe argued that it was irrel-
evant that the New Mexico Court of Appeals found that Cotton had proven no actual interfer-
ence with the Tribe’s economic development or sovereignty. Brief of Jicarilla Apache Tribe as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of the Appellants, supra note 1140, at *26–27. It was irrelevant that 
Cotton paid the taxes and not the Tribe; to make anything turn on that fact would resurrect the 
incidence test rejected in Ramah Navajo School Board, Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832 
(1982). Brief of Jicarilla Apache Tribe as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Appellants, supra 
note 1140, at *27. The Tribe also argued that it was irrelevant that Cotton continued to drill on 
the reservation or that the Tribe could have imposed higher taxes. Id. at *27–28. It is not a pre-
requisite to preemption that the state taxes actually disrupt reservation activity. Id. The Tribe 
cited White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980), for the proposition that 
an actual burden need not be shown. Brief of Jicarilla Apache Tribe as Amicus Curie in Support 
of the Appellants, supra note 1140, at *28. “The proper question under this Court’s decisions 
is whether requiring Pinetop [in White Mountain] or Cotton to pay state taxes is compatible 
with the federal and tribal interests in the activity.” Id. at *28 n.12 (emphasis in original). “If 
the market would bear a 14% tax burden, then the tribe is entitled to that full amount, not 
whatever fraction remains after the state takes as much as it wishes.” Id. at *28 n.11. “Under 
the analysis applied by the court of appeals, preemption depends on the vagaries of supply and 
demand: the state is free to tax the on-reservation production of the tribe’s minerals up to the 
point at which the tax forces price increases high enough to reduce demand for the minerals 
produced, or possibly until the producer’s return on investment is reduced to the point it 
invests elsewhere . . . . This entire approach to preemption is misguided. The particularized 
inquiry mandated by White Mountain is not an inquiry into transitory market conditions.” Id. 
at *30–31. See also supra note 1140 and infra note 1199.
1150 Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 172–73. Professor Clinton, however, claims that the record 
“demonstrated that multiple state and tribal taxation discriminated against Indian oil and gas 
development in preference to reserves located outside of Indian lands.” Clinton, Dormant, 
supra note 22, at 1244.
1151 Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 172–73. The New Mexico Supreme Court refused to hear 
the case. Cotton Petroleum v. State, 745 P.2d 1159 (N.M. 1987). 
The Appellate Court noted that Cotton and not the Tribe paid the taxes, that the record 
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contained no evidence of an impact on tribal sovereignty, and that Cotton drilled 12 new wells 
while subject to both the State and Tribal taxes. Cotton Petroleum v. State, 745 P.2d 1170, 
1175 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987). The Appellate Court also rejected Cotton’s argument that was 
based on the Merrion footnote. Id. at 1173–74. 
The Tribe opposed certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. Brief of Jicarilla Apache 
Tribe as Amicus Curiae in Opposition to the Appellants at 2–3, Cotton Petroleum, 745 P.2d 
1170 (No. 9268). The Tribe was not a party to the proceedings in the New Mexico courts and 
had no chance to shape the record. “Cotton made no effort at trial to prove the impact its state 
tax burden had on the Tribe. Cotton did not seriously challenge the trial court’s findings of fact 
that there was no such impact.” Id. Cotton relied heavily on an Interstate Commerce Clause 
argument rather than a preemption argument. 
New Mexico opposed the filing of the Tribe’s amicus brief before the Supreme Court. 
The [Tribe’s] accusation . . . that New Mexico discriminates against the tribe in 
the distribution of state education funds is incorrect and appears to be an effort to 
inflame the Court. It was the fear of this type of misrepresentation of fact—not tested 
by cross-examination and not a part of the record in this case because the tribe chose 
not to be a party—that motivated New Mexico not to consent to the tribe’s filing 
[an amicus brief ].
Brief of Appellee State of New Mexico at 31 n.37, Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. 163 (No. 
87-1327), 1988 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 160, at *56 n.37 [hereinafter Brief of Appellee State 
of New Mexico]. The State argued that the taxes imposed no burden. Id. at *7. 
At trial, Cotton called the President of the Tribe as a witness, who testified that he did not 
object to the State’s taxation of Cotton and did not suggest that the New Mexico tax hindered 
economic development or the Tribe’s ability to raise taxes. Id. at *9–10. his only concern was 
that the State was not providing enough expenditures on the reservation. Id. Why Cotton 
wanted that testimony is unclear and proved detrimental to its case. Presumably, the Tribe 
hoped that New Mexico would have to increase the level of its services on the reservation if it 
won the case. New Mexico used the testimony of the Tribal President to cast dispersions on 
why the Tribe did not seek to intervene in the case. Id. 
The testimony by the President of the Tribe was not only unhelpful to Cotton but also 
troubled the Supreme Court. At oral argument, the following exchange took place: 
Cotton: Yes. The tribal chairman testified in the trial. he focused on—that the imbal-
ance between the substantial taxes imposed by New Mexico and the lack of services. 
And he said if you’re going to tax at this level, let’s have some significantly greater 
services. . . .
QUESTION: Yes, but it doesn’t—it didn’t—it didn’t—the tribe doesn’t claim that 
their self-government or their economy is being hurt by New Mexico’s tax.
Cotton: Well, the amicus brief of the tribe says it has a chilling effect. It said that 
because of these overlapping taxes—this is page 1 and page 2 of the amicus brief. It 
said we are having . . . it’s complicating and making more difficult new—new oil and 
gas deals. It also says on page 2 that it’s . . . it’s taking away from the attractiveness of 
oil and gas deals on the reservation, and it’s increasing the expenses of doing business 
for—not only for present operators of the tribe, but future operators.
QUESTION: Do I understand correctly that from now on—I mean, after this thing 
arose—the tribe took the position that it would be a partner in any oil and gas deals 
and thereby preclude the state from having any taxes on it? Is that right? Is that what’s 
happening now?
Cotton: No. And there’s a suggestion by the New Mexico brief. It is simply incorrect. 
And I think your question, Justice O’Connor, is very relevant.
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c.  State Taxes are Presumptively Valid 
Justice Stevens, writing for a six-person majority, set forth the analytical 
framework as follows:
This Court’s approach to the question whether a State may tax on-reser-
vation oil production by non-Indian lessees has varied over the course of 
the past century. At one time, such a tax was held invalid unless expressly 
authorized by Congress; more recently, such taxes have been upheld unless 
expressly or impliedly prohibited by Congress.1152 
Justice Stevens cited no Indian tax cases in support of this position. 
Instead of citing any Indian tax cases, Stevens relied on the intergovern-
mental tax immunity doctrine for support.1153 During the early part of the 
20th century this doctrine prohibited state taxes that imposed direct or indi-
rect economic burdens on the federal government or its instrumentalities.1154 
At one time, the Indians fell within this doctrine, being viewed as “wards” 
of the federal government. For example, in 1922, Gillespie v. Oklahoma1155 
applied the doctrine to strike down a state tax on income derived by a non-
Indian lessee from the sale of his interest in oil produced on Indian land. “[A] 
tax upon such profits is a direct hamper upon the effort of the United States 
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1140, at *4–5, Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. 163 (No. 
87-1327).
1152 Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 173.
1153 Id. at 173–76. That doctrine did not figure prominently in the briefs of Cotton or New 
Mexico. Brief of Appellants Cotton Petroleum Corp., Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. 163 (No. 
87-1327), 1988 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 159; Brief of Appellees State of New Mexico, supra 
note 1137.
1154 Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 174–75. The doctrine still prohibits a state tax directly 
imposed on the federal government or on an Indian tribe. For example, a sales tax imposed 
directly on the federal government would be unconstitutional, notwithstanding that a sales tax 
imposed on the vendor would be constitutional even if the economic incidence of the tax fell 
on the government. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4. Wheat.) 316 (1819); South Carolina 
v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 523 (1988). The same analysis would result if a tribe were substituted 
for the federal government. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 768 (1985). See supra 
note 357. Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995), discussed 
infra notes 1272–89 and accompanying text, and Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 
546 U.S. 95 (2003), discussed infra notes 1290–1358 and accompanying text, are consistent 
with this approach.
1155 257 U.S. 501, 506 (1922) (cited by Justice Stevens in Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 
174); see also United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432 (1903) (applying federal instrumentality 
doctrine to strike down state taxes on land held in trust by the United States for Indians, and 
improvements on such land, and state taxes on personal property bought with government 
money for the use and benefit of the Indians). 
To tax [allotted] lands is to tax an instrumentality employed by the United States 
for the benefit and control of this dependent race, and to accomplish beneficent  
objects . . . . [I]f they may be taxed, then the obligations which the government has 
assumed in reference to these Indians may be entirely defeated.
Rickert, 188 U.S. at 437–38.
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to make the best terms that it can for its wards.”1156 
During the Great Depression, however, the Court started relaxing this 
doctrine so that the states had greater flexibility to tax the increased involve-
ment of the federal government in the economy.1157 In 1938, Gillespie was 
squarely overruled by Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp.1158 By World 
War II, when the states were taxing private-sector contractors working for the 
federal government, sometimes under cost-plus contracts, the doctrine was 
“thoroughly repudiated.”1159 
Thus, after Mountain Producers was decided, oil and gas lessees operating 
on Indian reservations were subject to nondiscriminatory state taxation as 
long as Congress did not act affirmatively to pre-empt the state taxes . . . . 
[A] state can impose a nondiscriminatory tax on private parties with  
whom . . . an Indian tribe does business, even though the financial burden 
of the tax may fall on the . . . tribe. . . .1160 
The question for us to decide is whether Congress has acted to grant the 
Tribe such immunity, either expressly or by plain implication.1161
d.  Misuse of the Intergovernmental Doctrine 
There is a gaping non sequitur in Justice Stevens’s use of the intergovernmen-
tal immunity doctrine. That doctrine (and its repudiation) has nothing to do 
with whether a state has the right to levy a tax in the first instance. In other 
words, the intergovernmental doctrine was applied defensively to exempt 
Indians (or federal instrumentalities) from an otherwise legitimate state tax. 
Its repudiation simply meant no exemption existed under that doctrine. A tax 
that is otherwise permissible will not run afoul of the now defunct intergov-
ernmental doctrine, but that tax must still be permissible in the first instance. 
Nonetheless, Stevens proceeded as if the New Mexico taxes were valid unless 
preempted.
e.  No Federal Preemption 
Justice Stevens described the inquiry into whether any federal legislation had 
preempted the New Mexico tax as primarily an exercise in examining Con-
gressional intent, with the history of tribal sovereignty serving as the necessary 
1156 Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 174 (citing Weston v. Charleston, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 449, 
468 (1829)). In Choctaw, Oklahoma & Gulf Railroad Co. v. Harrison, 235 U.S. 292, 298 
(1914), the Court characterized a non-Indian mineral lessee as a federal instrumentality free of 
state tax. But see Thomas v. Gay, supra notes 354–75 and accompanying text.
1157 See supra notes 865–68 and accompanying text. 
1158 303 U.S. 376, 386–87 (1938). See Barsh, Reservation Wealth, supra note 5, at 562.
1159 Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 174 (quoting South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. at 520). 
1160 Id. at 175. In its reply brief, Cotton agreed that the federal government immunity argu-
ment “does not carry the day.” Reply Brief of Appellants Cotton Petroleum Corp., supra note 
1141, at *14.
1161 Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 175–76.
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backdrop.1162 he paid homage to White Mountain (preemption is not con-
trolled by mechanical or absolute conceptions of state or tribal sovereignty)1163 
and Ramah (each case requires a particularized examination of the relevant 
state, federal, and tribal interests), and acknowledged that although congres-
sional silence no longer entails an immunity from taxation for private par-
ties doing business with the tribes, preemption is not limited to cases where 
Congress expressly, rather than impliedly, preempts the state tax.1164 Finally, 
he repeated the maxim that ambiguities in federal law are generally resolved 
in favor of tribal independence.1165 Any hope that the New Mexico tax would 
be preempted by the application of these doctrines would soon be dashed.
Justice Stevens’s assertion that non-Indians were subject to nondiscrimina-
tory state taxation—provided Congress did not act affirmatively to preempt the 
tax—assumes that a state has, in the first instance, the power to levy a tax. 
Justice Stevens does not explain the source of that power. In that sense, the 
opinion is consistent with Moe and Colville, which also assumed, without 
discussion, that the states had the power to tax cigarette sales to non-members 
and non-Indians on the reservation. Those cases could be read narrowly to 
apply only to tax avoidance situations, the “marketing of an exemption.” But 
Stevens had no desire to limit Colville.
The Court assumed that New Mexico had the power to tax and then placed 
the burden on Cotton to show whether Congress had exempted the Tribe, 
“either expressly or by plain implication.”1166 Justice Stevens made it clear 
that the Court would no longer require an explicit federal authorization of 
1162 Id. at 176. Cotton’s Reply Brief argued that the “field of Indian affairs is one of a very 
limited number of subject areas where the ‘federal interest is so dominant’ that congressio-
nal intent to preempt the field can be assumed.” Reply Brief of Appellants Cotton Petroleum 
Corp., supra note 1141, at *20. The Tribe’s amicus brief argued that 
Congress has attempted to strengthen and promote the ability of tribes to manage 
their territory and natural resources and to undertake economic activity within their 
reservations that will permit them to function as viable governments. In light of these 
overriding federal goals . . . an assertion of State authority must be viewed against any 
interference with the successful accomplishment of the federal purpose.
Brief of Jicarilla Apache Tribe as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Appellants, supra note 1140, 
at *9. The Tribe characterized the New Mexico Court of Appeals decision as requiring that the 
State taxes actually reduce Tribal revenue as a precondition to a preemption argument. “This 
Court has never incorporated this mechanical condition into the preemption analysis.” Id., at 
*14.
1163 Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 176.
1164 Id. at 176–77.
1165 Stevens “talked the talk” although he would not “walk the walk.” 
1166 Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 175–76.
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a state tax.1167 he ignored the Indian Commerce Clause and the Williams v. 
Lee doctrine.
Much of the opinion then focused on Cotton’s argument that the New 
Mexico taxes were preempted1168 by federal laws and policies which protect 
tribal self-government and strengthen impoverished reservations. Cotton 
relied heavily on the 1938 Act, describing it as “exhibit[ing] a strong federal 
interest in guaranteeing Indian tribes the maximum return on their oil and 
gas leases,”1169 and that the federal and tribal governments “exercise compre-
hensive regulatory control over the reservation.”1170 “[W]eighing the respec-
tive state, federal, and tribal interests, Cotton concludes that the New Mexico 
taxes unduly interfere with the federal interest in promoting tribal economic 
self-sufficiency and are not justified by an adequate state interest.”1171
Justice Stevens rejected these arguments. he concluded the 1938 Act 
“neither expressly permit[ted] state taxation nor expressly preclud[ed] it”1172 
but was consistent with “an intent to permit state taxation of nonmember 
lessees.”1173 The Court also held that the Indian Reorganization Act, the 
Indian Financing Act, and the Indian Self-Determination and Education 
Assistance Act of 1975 did not preempt the New Mexico tax.1174
f.  Rejection of White Mountain and Ramah 
In response to Cotton’s argument that White Mountain and Ramah preempted 
the New Mexico taxes, the Court first noted that both cases emphasized that 
1167 
[T]hese assumptions turn the original understanding of the Indian Commerce Clause 
on its head and takes federal Indian law back to the confederation period when states 
continued to assert claims of inherent sovereignty in Indian country to detriment of 
both the exercise of federal Indian affairs powers and the tribes.
Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1218.
1168 Cotton had not pressed the preemption argument as an independent claim before the 
New Mexico Court of Appeals, but the Supreme Court nonetheless treated the issue as prop-
erly before it. The issue was addressed by the Tribe’s amicus brief at the Court of Appeals. 
Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 176 n.11. See supra notes 1146–48 and accompanying text.




1173 Id. at 183. Justice Stevens’s interpretation is well criticized in Taylor, Framework, supra 
note 23, at 871–72. Taken out of context, the statement in the text could be read to mean that 
state permission to tax was required, but Stevens assumed that New Mexico had that right and 
the only issue was whether Congress had preempted the state taxes.
1174 Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 183 n.14. Professor Jensen describes Cotton as “[p]erhaps 
the most important modern preemption case,” and “sometimes characterized as the death 
of preemption.” Jensen, supra note 9, at 74. “At a minimum, Cotton reflected a Court much 
less supportive of tribal interests than had been true only seven or eight years earlier.” Id. 
he concludes that after Cotton, “statutes that support the idea of tribal self-determination in 
general—the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, for example—are apparently irrelevant in 
the ‘particularized’ analysis. They are ignored in balancing.” Id. at 75. I think the die had been 
cast before Cotton.
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the test is a flexible one, sensitive to the state, federal, and tribal interests, 
and then relied on the findings of the New Mexico District Court to distin-
guish those cases. That court found that the State provided services to both 
the Tribe and Cotton costing approximately $3 million per year.1175 Cotton 
conceded that over a four-year period, New Mexico provided it with services 
costing nearly $90,000 but then compared this with the more than $2.2 mil-
lion in paid taxes.1176 Justice Stevens correctly rejected Cotton’s “proportional-
ity” standard, which was not endorsed by either White Mountain or Ramah 
(or any non-Indian case),1177 describing both cases as involving “complete 
abdication or noninvolvement of the State in the on-reservation activity.”1178 
Stevens did not opine on what minimum amount of State services would 
be necessary before a taxpayer’s proportionate argument would be rejected. 
That is, if a state provided no services, a taxpayer can argue that it should 
not be required to pay a tax. That position goes back to Warren Trading1179 
1175 Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 185. The Court did not identify the nature of those ser-
vices. Pirtle, Morisset, Schlosser and Ayer emphasize that there was no indication that these 
benefits were related to the on-reservation activity New Mexico sought to tax. Pirtle, et al., 
supra note 19. Their comments ignore the $90,000 in services that Cotton admitted were 
provided to it. See infra note 1176 and accompanying text. 
1176 Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 170 n.6, 185. In its brief, the State argued that 
New Mexico provides substantial services to both the Jicarilla Tribe and Cotton. 
The amount of direct state expenditures on the reservation is approximately $3 mil-
lion per year. The state also provides the benefits of living in an organized society to 
Cotton and the tribe. The state per capita spending per Jicarilla member is equal to or 
greater than the per capita spending on non-Indian citizens. The state’s expenditures 
do not discriminate against the Jicarilla Reservation or its members. The state, the 
tribe and the federal government all provide services on the Jicarilla Reservation. The 
state provides services on the reservation that substantially benefit the reservation. 
Jicarilla Apaches use many services provided by the state off the reservation.
Brief of Appellees State of New Mexico, supra note 1137, at *7–8, 
1177 In Ramah, the Court dismissed the State’s argument “that the significant services it pro-
vides to the Ramah Navajo Indians justify the imposition of [its] tax” on the grounds that the 
benefits were unrelated “to the construction of schools on Indian land.” Ramah Navajo Sch. 
Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 845 n.10 (1982).
1178 Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 185. In Ute Mountain Tribe v. Homans, No. 07-CV-00772 
(D. N.M. 2009), the court struck down New Mexico’s taxes on oil and gas extraction. 
This case falls much closer to Bracker and Ramah than to Cotton Petroleum. First, 
there is a significant backdrop of tribal sovereignty. Second, although the State of 
New Mexico is not absolutely uninvolved in oil and gas operations on the New 
Mexico lands, its involvement is minimal. Third, the economic burden falls heavily 
on the Tribe. Fourth, to the extent that State of New Mexico regulations are adopted 
by the [Bureau of Land Management, it] does so far its own purposes; it cannot be 
said that the State of New Mexico in fact regulates oil and gas operations on the New 
Mexico lands.
Id.
1179 Warren Trading Post v. Arizona, 380 U.S. 685, 691. One of the earliest versions of this 
argument can be found in Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898), discussed supra notes 373–74 
and accompanying text.
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and is what Stevens referred to as a “complete abdication or noninvolvement 
of the State in the on-reservation activity.”1180 But what if a state provided 
more than a de minimis amount of services but nonetheless relatively insig-
nificant? Presumably the taxpayer’s argument would still be rejected to avoid 
entertaining “nightmarish administrative burdens.”1181 Moreover, Justice Ste-
vens properly understood that a proportionality argument was “antithetical 
to the traditional notion that taxation is not premised on a strict quid pro 
quo relationship between the taxpayer and the tax collector.”1182 Nonetheless, 
the conundrum is that in the kind of preemption and balancing approaches 
the Court has developed, comparing the amount of taxes with the amount of 
services could be relevant.
Justice Stevens also distinguished White Mountain and Ramah by citing the 
District Court’s finding that unlike in those cases, here the economic burden 
of the State tax did not fall on the Tribe.1183 Marshall had muddied this issue 
previously.1184 But economic incidence is such a tricky empirical question, 
and one that can change over time, even for the same taxpayer, that it is a 
meaningless issue to drive the analysis in most cases.
Nevertheless, one can appreciate Stevens’s reaction that if the New Mex-
ico taxes have no economic impact on the Tribe, why should they be struck 
down? Stevens presumably was encouraged in this view by the finding of the 
District Court that the Tribe could have increased its taxes without adversely 
affecting on-reservation production.1185 
1180 Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 185.
1181 Id. at 185 n.15. 
1182 Id. 
The only benefit to which the taxpayer is constitutionally entitled is that derived 
from his enjoyment of the privileges of living in an organized society, established 
and safeguarded by devotion of taxes to public purposes . . . . Any other view would 
preclude the levying of taxes except as they are used to compensate for the burdens on 
those who pay them, and would involve the abandonment of the most fundamental 
principle of government—that it exists primarily to provide for the common good. 
Carmichael v. S. Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 522–23 (1937). Determining the value and 
benefits of roads, police, fire, a legal infrastructure, and so forth illustrates the wisdom of the 
Court’s approach. See also Commonwealth Edison v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981); supra 
notes 462–63, 804–05 and accompanying text.
1183 The New Mexico Court of Appeals used the fact that the Tribe participated in the litiga-
tion, not as a party, but as an amicus, as evidence that the State taxes did not directly interfere 
with the Tribe. Cotton Petroleum, 745 P.2d at 1171. The Supreme Court cited the large number 
of amicus briefs filed by oil and gas companies (e.g., Texaco, Chevron, Union Oil, Phillips 
Petroleum, Exxon, and Mobil) as evidence that “the primary burden of the state taxation falls 
on the non-Indian taxpayers,” Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 187 n.18. This “evidence” is 
rather silly; whatever the economic incidence of the multiple taxes in Cotton, the oil industry 
certainly wanted to avoid similar situations in other states.
1184 See supra notes 952–57 and accompanying text. 
1185 Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 185. The New Mexico Court of Appeals concluded that 
Cotton “failed to show that the [State taxes] significantly interfered with the Tribe’s economic 
development or sovereignty.” Brief for Appellants Cotton Petroleum Corp., supra note 1153, 
at *19–20. 
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Finally, he noted that New Mexico regulated the spacing and mechani-
cal integrity of reservation wells,1186 and that the State regulations had to be 
approved by the Bureau of Land Management. Additional federal spacing 
requirements applied to Indian lands.1187 The record was thin on what New 
Mexico actually did but the Court did not set the bar very high and con-
cluded that “the federal and tribal regulations [although] extensive . . . are 
not exclusive.”1188 
New Mexico also argued that there was no agreement in this case, as there was in White 
Mountain, Central Machinery, and Ramah, to refund this tax to the tribe. “This tax refund 
would go right back to the oil company and any future savings, if the Court struck the tax 
down, would go to the oil company.” Transcript of Oral Argument, Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. 
163 (No. 87-1327), 1988 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 114, at *22. 
Professor Taylor states that 
[b]y allowing New Mexico to impose its severance tax on top of the tribal severance 
tax, oil and gas produced on the Jicarilla Apache reservation were among the most 
heavily taxed products. This, of course, reduced future drilling and encouraged drill-
ing on lands just outside the reservation where production was less heavily taxed. As 
a result, much of the natural resources underneath tribal lands were taken away from 
the Tribe. This in turn reduced royalty and tax revenue. These economic effects have 
taken their toll on the Jicarilla Apache Tribe. 
Taylor, Framework, supra note 23, at 890. his support for this empirical conclusion was a 
general citation to Mark J. Cowan, Double Taxation in Indian Country: Unpacking the Problem 
and Analyzing the Role of the Federal Government in Protecting Tribal Governmental Revenues, 2 
Pitt. Tax Rev. 93 (2005), with no specific page reference.
1186 Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 186. Cotton’s reply brief described the United States, 
the Tribe, and New Mexico as coordinating well spacing on a volunteer basis. Reply Brief for 
Appellants Cotton Petroleum Corp., Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. 163 (No. 87-1327), 1988 
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 163, at *13 n.12. The Tribe’s amicus brief pointed out that New 
Mexico’s role in regulating well spacing is governed by a federal requirement that state well 
spacing programs may be applied to Indian lands only with the approval of the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs. Brief of Jicarilla Apache Tribe as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Appellants, 
Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. 163 (No. 87-1327), 1988 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs Lexis 158, at *19 
n.18. The Court of Appeals did not determine the cost to the State of providing that service. 
Id. at *36. 
1187 Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 206 n.9.
1188 Id. at 186. Cotton’s brief claimed that “that during the past ten years not one of the 
Cotton employees has ever seen a New Mexico oil and gas supervisor or policy enforcement 
officer on the Reservation to supervise drilling or to review oil and gas drilling operations.” 
Brief of Appellants Cotton Petroleum Corp., Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. 163 (No. 87-1327), 
1988 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 159, at *21. Professor Jensen speculates that the “purported 
state interest seemed to have been an afterthought, made up for purposes of litigation.” Jensen, 
supra note 9, at 76. “In form the Court engaged in balancing, but the state interest given con-
trolling weight seemed absurdly trivial. If pretending to regulate well spacing and the mechani-
cal integrity of wells is enough to prevent preemption, a state is almost always going to prevail, 
a marked change from prior practice.” Id. at 80. Professor Jensen, of course, captures the sub-
jectiveness of a balancing test, which is one of the reasons Justice Rehnquist is so opposed to 
that analysis. See Jensen, supra note 9; supra notes 719, 872, 883 and accompanying text.
Another commentator concluded that the New Mexico taxes should have been preempted. 
Oil and gas development on the reservation was regulated by a comprehensive and 
pervasive federal scheme that established important federal and tribal interests. Even 
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g.  Possible Role of Economic Incidence 
Seemingly uncomfortable by the District Court’s somewhat counterintuitive 
economic findings in a case in which the Tribe was not a party, Justice Stevens 
issued a caveat. This was not “a case in which an unusually large state tax has 
imposed a substantial burden on the Tribe.1189 It is, of course, reasonable to 
infer that the New Mexico taxes have at least a marginal effect on the demand 
for on-reservation leases, the value to the Tribe of those leases, and the abil-
ity of the Tribe to increase its tax rate. Any impairment to the federal policy 
favoring the exploitation of on-reservation oil and gas resources by Indian 
tribes that might be caused by these effects, however, is simply too indirect 
and too insubstantial to support Cotton’s claim of preemption.1190 To find 
pre-emption of state taxation in such indirect burdens on this broad con-
gressional purpose, absent some special factor such as those present in White 
Mountain and Ramah, would be to return to the pre-1937 doctrine of inter-
governmental tax immunity.1191 he did not identify what those special factors 
were, but earlier he had cited the District Court’s findings that the economic 
incidence of the taxes in those cases fell on the tribes. Stevens conceded that 
any “adverse effect on the Tribe’s finances caused by the taxation of a private 
in the absence of evidence of a direct economic impact on the Tribe, the state sever-
ance taxes interfered with federal policy and tribal sovereignty. Because the burden 
of the state taxes was not justified both by a sufficient state interest in the limited oil 
and gas related services that New Mexico provided to Cotton and by minimal state 
regulation of reservation oil and gas activities, the Court should have held that the 
state taxes were preempted by federal law. 
Katherine B. Crawford, State Authority to Tax Non-Indian Oil and Gas Production on Reservations: 
Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 495, 515.
1189 Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 186. This caveat allowed the Court to avoid reexamining 
Montana v. Crow Tribe, 484 U.S. 997 (1988), summarily aff’g 819 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1987). 
That case held that Montana’s severance and gross proceeds taxes could not be imposed on coal 
mined on Crow tribal property; state taxes had a negative effect on the marketability of coal 
produced in Montana, and the combined effective rate of taxes was more than twice that of 
any other state’s coal taxes. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 187 n.17; see also hoopa Valley Tribe 
v. Nevins, 881 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1989) (federal law preempted state tax on timber because 
the timber tax did not fund services that directly related to the harvesting of tribal timber); 
Marty Indian Sch. Bd., Inc. v. South Dakota, 824 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1987) (state motor fuels 
tax could not be applied to fuel purchased by on-reservation boarding school; in light of the 
strong federal policy of promoting Indian self-determination and education and the pervasive 
involvement of the federal government in the operation of appellants’ school, there was no 
room for the additional burden of the state’s tax).
1190 Surprisingly, Stevens did not cite Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898), where a similar 
argument was made in 1898 in upholding a property tax levied by the Territory of Oklahoma 
on cattle owned by non-Indians grazing on reservation land under leases with the Indians. See 
supra notes 354–75 and accompanying text.
1191 Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 186–87. The Court did not discuss the impact of its find-
ing in Blackfeet that one of the purposes of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 was to provide the 
Indians with the maximum amount of revenue from their property. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe 
of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 767 n.5 (1985).
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party contracting with the Tribe would be ground to strike the state tax.”1192 
This last statement, a bone thrown to the Indians, is contradicted by the 
Court’s opinion in Moe and Colville, where the Tribes’ retail sector (Moe) and 
its tax revenue and profits (Colville) were severely impacted by the “taxation 
of a private party” purchasing cigarettes on the reservation. Nonetheless, Ste-
vens’s “bone” allows future litigants to describe Cotton as a failure of proof 
case.
The reference to the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine, which did 
not figure prominently in the briefs of either Cotton or New Mexico, is curi-
ous as well. A decision for Cotton would not be turning the clock back to that 
doctrine but rather endorsing Worcester and the Indian Commerce Clause.1193 
Neither the majority nor the dissent even bothered to mention Worcester, nor 
did Cotton’s briefs. As further evidence of the desuetude of the Indian Com-
merce Clause, Cotton made the Interstate Commerce Clause the centerpiece 
of its position.1194
Apparently Stevens did not want to federalize every situation in which a 
state tax is levied on a non-Indian just because it may be passed forward 
to a tribe.1195 hopefully in the future, the Court will not sit idly by and 
allow a state to destroy a tribe’s major—perhaps exclusive—source of revenue 
through the imposition of a tax on a non-Indian. At some point, a substantial 
enough—albeit indirect—tax will have sufficient negative spillover effects on 
a tribe’s economic development to invalidate it. It is one thing for the state 
1192 Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 187.
1193 “Turning Chief Justice Marshall’s clear-statement approach almost completely on its 
head, the Court in Cotton Petroleum . . . concluded that the state could tax because Congress 
had failed to prohibit it from exercising that power.” Frickey, Marshalling, supra note 199, at 
422.
1194 Cotton did not argue that the Indian Commerce Clause excluded the New Mexico taxes. 
“An unresolved question surrounding the preemption of state taxes need not be examined in 
this appeal, namely whether in the absence of express congressional enactment, the Indian 
Commerce Clause of its own weight protects the tribes from intrusive state regulation.” Brief 
of Appellants Cotton Petroleum Corp., Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. 163 (No. 87-1327), 1988 
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 159, at *47 n.19. The Court as recently as Ramah Navajo School 
Board, Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. at 845–46, has declined to adopt a constitutional 
doctrine that on-reservation activities are presumptively beyond the reach of state law even 
in the absence of comprehensive federal regulation. Id. While not eliminating this approach, 
the Court indicated its continuing satisfaction with relying on the presence of federal statu-
tory and regulatory pronouncements, although it acknowledged that they are to be construed 
“generously” in order to comport with traditional notions of Indian sovereignty and with 
the federal policy of encouraging tribal independence. Id. at 846 (quoting White Mountain 
Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 144 (1980)). Brief of Cotton Petroleum, Corp., supra, 
at *47 n.19.
The Tribe’s amicus brief argued that the Indian Commerce Clause prohibited undue bur-
dens on Indian commerce, and required that New Mexico grant a credit against its taxes for 
any functionally equivalent tribal taxes. Brief of Jicarilla Apache Tribe as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of the Appellants, Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. 163 (No. 87-1327), 1988 U.S. S. Ct. 
Briefs Lexis 158, at *48.
1195 See Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005).
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taxes in Moe and Colville to have virtually destroyed the on-reservation ciga-
rette business, which the Court viewed as illegitimate.1196 It is quite another 
thing for a tax to dry up a legitimate on-reservation business. Cotton can be 
viewed as an idiosyncratic situation where the tribe was not a party to the 
litigation at the trial level and thus could not shape the record.1197 Cotton 
shaped the record consistent with its litigating posture. The Tribe was forced 
to make its case through its amicus briefs and not through expert witnesses1198 
1196 In its brief, Cotton Petroleum tried to distinguish Moe as “having no real reservation 
connection and hence not truly a part of protected Indian commerce.” Brief of Appellants 
Cotton Petroleum Corp., Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. 163 (No. 87-1327), 1988 U.S. S. Ct. 
Briefs LEXIS 159, at *30.
Colville acknowledged that both tribal and state taxes may be imposed on Reservation 
cigarette sales, the case is of no help to New Mexico, because in Colville, the Court 
found no federally protected Indian commerce subject to multiple taxation. To the 
contrary, Colville involved an attempt to obtain a competitive advantage on the 
Reservation through the marketing of an alleged Reservation exemption from state 
taxes imposed on the sale of cigarettes. Similarly while Merrion upheld tribal taxa-
tion and acknowledged overlapping state taxation, it is the very case where the Court 
suggested that Cotton and other Jicarilla lessees may indeed not have to pay an ever 
increasing penalty for electing to do business on the Reservation, and that a claim 
of impermissible multiple taxation might be asserted against New Mexico, if New 
Mexico’s responsibilities for Reservation mineral development were out of proportion 
to its unabated imposition of five general statewide oil and gas taxes.
Id. at *22 n.21.
1197 The Tribe may have made a litigating decision not to intervene because it did not 
have the best of evidence about the impact of the State taxes. As reported in the State’s Brief, 
“[t]he fortuitous timing of the tribe’s own actions proved conclusively that the combined state 
and federal tax load did not affect the tribe’s ability to raise the level of tax revenue it desired.” 
Brief for Appellees State of New Mexico, Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. 163 (No. 87-1327), 1988 
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 160, at *27–29. In 1984, 
the Tribe commissioned a study from Professor Alfred Parker, Chairman of the 
Economic Department of the University of New Mexico, to determine its taxing 
options. Dr. Parker’s study of revenue projections revealed that a tribal tax of either 
three percent or six percent would have no appreciable impact on the mineral les-
sees and would not slow development or production. . . . The tribe knew from Dr. 
Parker’s study that it could impose a tax of at least six percent, and perhaps consider-
ably higher . . . . In the face of these facts, Cotton was unable to offer even a shred of 
evidence that New Mexico’s taxes impeded collection of Jicarilla taxes or any other 
aspect of tribal sovereignty.
Id. New Mexico accused the Tribe of purposely choosing not to be a party to the litigation but 
instead participating as an amicus. Id. at *29 n.14.
1198 New Mexico had an expert witness who testified that “the substantial profits resulting 
from oil extraction rendered taxes an insignificant factor in production decisions for oil com-
panies.” Id. at *25. 
The significant factors, he testified, were geology, access to markets, costs of drilling 
and pumping, and government regulation. Pressed under cross-examination to agree 
that state taxes are a factor, [the expert] was presented an unrealistic hypothetical 
situation in which a producer has the opportunity to drill two equally lucrative wells, 
one on the Jicarilla Reservation and one off, but only enough money to drill one well. 
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or other trial testimony, and so could not rebut directly the District Court’s 
findings.1199 
Asked which well would be drilled [the expert] testified: My best judgment is that he 
is going to drill both wells . . . . I think he will go to a banker and get enough money 
to drill a second well too . . . . If the one well looks attractive and the other one is 
going to be associated with a tax of five to six percent more, it is going to be more 
attractive too; you can take that prospect to any banker and he will finance you. . . . 
Cotton’s actual behavior confirmed this expert’s conclusion. The combined burdens 
of federal, state and tribal taxes did not lessen Cotton’s interest in further developing 
its reservation oil leases. [The production manager for Cotton] testified that Cotton 
planned to drill 12 new wells in that year (1986)—the third highest annual increase 
during its ten years on the reservation . . . . As a factual matter, no impact on tribal 
economic development was shown.
Id. at *25–27.
1199 The New Mexico Court of Appeals understood that “[t]his appeal is unique in that the 
primary parties differ sharply as to the proper legal approach to apply.” Cotton Petroleum 
v. New Mexico, 745 P.2d 1170, 1172 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987). Cotton made a rather weak 
Interstate Commerce Clause argument, inconsistent with Commonwealth Edison. It never 
pushed the preemption argument. The Tribe asked the Supreme Court to dismiss Cotton’s 
appeal for this reason:
Given this decision not to pursue a separate preemption claim, Cotton did not make 
the effort at trial to prove any impact its state tax burden had on the Jicarilla Apache 
Tribe. Neither did Cotton seriously challenge on appeal the trial court’s findings of 
fact that there was no such impact. Id. at 1174; Jurisdictional Statement at App. 10 to 
App. 11. Certainly, Cotton made no effort to analyze the impact on the Tribe caused 
by state taxes on other producers on the reservation. The Tribe was not a party to this 
litigation, and had no opportunity to establish the factual record that Cotton chose 
not to develop on this critical point.
As long as Cotton relied on the preemption theory only as a “backdrop” to its 
Commerce Clause argument and did not assert preemption as an independent basis 
for its claim, the Tribe perceived no serious danger in Cotton’s limited trial record. 
Now, however, Cotton has attempted to assert the preemption theory as an inde-
pendent basis for its appeal to this Court. The Tribe therefore must oppose Cotton’s 
appeal.
The New Mexico Court of Appeals took Cotton at its word and treated the 
Commerce Clause theory as the real basis for the refund claim. The court there-
fore devoted most of its opinion to the consideration of Cotton’s argument that the 
Commerce Clause requires a dollar for dollar equivalence between state taxes and 
state expenditures on the reservation. The court briefly discussed the preemption 
doctrine only because it felt “constrained” to do so in light of this Court’s criticism of 
the New Mexico court in Ramah Navajo School Board v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 
832, 846 (1982). While necessarily quite brief given Cotton’s litigation strategy, the 
court of appeals’ discussion of preemption neither misstated the law nor misapplied it 
to the facts in the appellate record. . . . The court of appeals concluded that the factual 
record before it did not show any interference with the relevant federal policies. This 
Tribe as amicus had urged the court to reach a contrary conclusion.
Nonetheless, the New Mexico Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for deciding 
this case on the appellate record before it. Even though the Tribe vigorously rejects 
the proposition that New Mexico’s taxes on oil and gas production reservation-wide 
have no negative impact on the Tribe, in this litigation Cotton did not attempt to 
prove the nature or full extent of those impacts. Instead, Cotton focused on its own 
production and its own Commerce Clause theory, rather than federal preemption. 
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h.  Apportionment Not Required 
Cotton argued that the Interstate Commerce Clause required that the New 
Mexico severance taxes had to be apportioned.1200 Cotton relied on three 
Cotton chose not to develop fully the factual record necessary to evaluate a preemp-
tion claim, and chose not to make the legal arguments in the state courts to sup-
port an independent claim based on federal preemption. having made these strategic 
choices below, Cotton should not be permitted to assert the preemption theory now. 
On the record of this case, there is no substantial federal question concerning the 
special preemption doctrine applicable in Indian reservation matters. The trial court’s 
findings of fact support the conclusion stated by the New Mexico Court of Appeals 
in its brief discussion of the preemption doctrine. 
The Tribe agrees with Cotton Petroleum that the question whether states may tax 
mineral production on Indian reservations is a very substantial and important issue 
for the Indian tribes, the states and the mineral producers, especially in the West. 
Precisely because it is such an important issue, this Court should not attempt to 
address it on the inadequate and limited factual record presented by Cotton Petroleum 
concerning its own economic situation. This is particularly true because Cotton did 
not pursue the preemption theory below as an independent basis for its refund claim. 
A case such as Cotton’s, which used the preemption doctrine only as a “backdrop” to 
a very different legal theory under the Commerce Clause, is not the proper vehicle 
for deciding the significant issues raised by application of the federal preemption 
doctrine to state taxation of mineral production throughout the reservation.
Brief of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe as Amicus Curiae in Opposition to the Appellants, Cotton 
Petroleum, 490 U.S. 163 (87-1327), 1988 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 146, at *3–7. See also supra 
notes 1140, 1199. Because of the peculiar procedural posture of the case, Cotton Petroleum 
may not have strong precedential value.
One commentator asserts without citation that because of the dual state and tribal taxation, 
“[m]ost tribes have experienced a definite and substantial impact, both in terms of continuing 
production form marginal wells and in attracting new production.” Jeanne S. Whiteing, Tribal 
and State Taxation of Natural Resources on Indian Reservations, 7 Nat. Resources & Env’t L. 
Rev. 17, 59 (1993). The multiple taxation of activities on a reservation with no relief granted 
by a state (or federal government) is part of what is called the “Indian differential,” which 
includes the lack of an infrastructure. Michael J. Kurman, Indian Investment and Employment 
Tax Incentives: Building a New Highway to Indian Country for Private Sector Businesses and Jobs, 
41 Fed. B. News & J. 578, 583 (1994).
Another commentator also asserts without citation that “[m]ineral developers, for example, 
could afford to pay either a tribal or a state severance tax, but they would not develop Indian 
land if forced to pay both.” Robert S. Pelcyger, Justices and Indians: Back to Basics, 62 Or. L. 
Rev. 29, 33 (1983).
Professor Frickey considered Cotton to be the “Rehnquist Court’s prime offender of the 
Marshall legacy. [T]his case expressed the general proposition, completely contrary to Worcester, 
that an Indian reservation is within the territorial jurisdiction of three sovereigns: the state, the 
tribe, and the federal government.” Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, 
Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 harv. L. Rev. 381, 433-34 
(1993).
1200 Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 187–88. When the Court initially granted review, it 
requested the parties to address the question whether “the Tribe should be treated as a State 
[under the Commerce Clause] for the purpose of determining whether New Mexico’s taxes 
must be apportioned.” Id. at 191. Professor Clinton thinks the Court was almost unaware of 
the existence of the Indian Commerce Clause. “Given the post-McClanahan efforts of certain 
members of the Court to limit or take the dormant Indian Commerce Clause completely out 
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facts: (1) the State and the Tribe taxed the same activity; (2) the total tax 
burden on Cotton was higher than on its off-reservation competitors; and 
(3) the New Mexico tax far exceeded the value of services it provided on the 
reservation.1201 
This was less of an argument and more of a description. The first point 
was obviously just a description of the facts, and the second point is the con-
sequence of having two severance taxes apply on the reservation rather than 
only one severance tax applying off-reservation. The third point, in essence, 
was a repackaging of Cotton’s rejected “proportionality” argument. In short, 
Cotton gave the Court little to work with, and Stevens was not about to take 
up the taxpayer’s cause on his own.
Cotton’s apportionment argument under the Interstate Commerce 
Clause1202 faced a severe, and determinative obstacle. Severance taxes are not 
normally apportioned.1203 Unlike a corporate income tax, which uses appor-
tionment rules to mediate conflicting claims by states to taxing the same 
transaction,1204 the simultaneous imposition of two state severance taxes does 
not arise in a multistate context. The act of bringing oil or gas to the surface 
is a unique event that can occur only within one state; the same oil or gas 
cannot be severed simultaneously in two states. In Cotton, the severance took 
place entirely on the reservation and entirely within New Mexico. The case 
involved overlapping jurisdictions, not adjacent ones.
Consequently, Cotton had no relevant precedent to rely on. Because the 
severance occurred solely in New Mexico, no other state would have a cred-
of play in the analysis of state power in Indian affairs, such apparent ignorance of the dormant 
Indian Commerce Clause perhaps is not surprising.” Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 
1219. The Court, however, distinguished the Indian Commerce Clause from the Interstate 
Commerce Clause, which belies Professor Clinton’s suggestion. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. 
at 192.
Professor Clinton views Cotton Petroleum as overturning “two centuries of prior law by 
authoritatively rejecting any claim that the dormant Indian Commerce Clause doctrine limited 
state governmental action in Indian country.” Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1057–58. 
Professor Clinton, however, classifies cases as involving the Indian Commerce Clause even if 
they do not mention that provision, provided their results are consistent with that Clause. he 
believes that in many cases, like Williams v. Lee, “the Court often relied on analyses that clearly 
resonated in the Indian Commerce Clause, albeit without attribution.” Id. at 1186. The prob-
lem with this generous classification is that any case in which a state tax is struck down can be 
characterized as consistent with the Indian Commerce Clause.
1201 Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 188. Cotton argued that one reason New Mexico’s level 
of services was so low was that the State constitution “prohibits state aid to any community 
like a federal Indian reservation which is ‘not under the absolute control of the state.’” Brief 
of Appellants Cotton Petroleum Corp., Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. 163 (No. 87-1327), 1988 
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 159, at *31 n.6. The relevance of this observation is unclear.
1202 According to the State’s Brief, Cotton and several of its amici intermixed references to 
the Interstate Commerce Clause, the Indian Commerce Clause, and the Foreign Commerce 
Clause. Brief of Appellees State of New Mexico, Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. 163 (No. 87-1327), 
1988 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 160, at *60.
1203 Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 617 (1981).
1204 See Richard D. Pomp, State and Local Taxation, ch. 10 (6th ed. 2009).
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ible claim that the same severance took place within their borders. Unlike 
a corporate income tax, which commonly apportions the income of a mul-
tijurisdictional taxpayer to the states in which the activities generating the 
income take place,1205 severance taxes are not apportioned because there are 
no competing states asserting tax jurisdiction on the same activity. The rel-
evant analogy in Cotton would be if a city or county also had a severance tax 
in addition to a state tax, but that intrastate situation would not implicate the 
Interstate Commerce Clause. 
Moreover, the apportionment issue had already been resolved in Common-
wealth Edison just eight years earlier and was cited by the State in its brief.1206 
In Edison, the Court held that there was no question about apportionment 
or potential multiple taxation because the severance could occur in only one 
state.1207 Cotton was in the awkward posture of making an Interstate Com-
merce Clause apportionment argument that had been recently rejected in a 
case authored by Justice Marshall, who was still on the Court.1208
Justice Stevens noted that because the federal government had not pro-
hibited either the Tribal or the New Mexico severance tax, each jurisdiction 
had the right to tax.1209 Although Stevens made this statement in the context 
of Cotton’s Interstate Commerce Clause argument, it is consistent with the 
framework he set forth at the beginning of the opinion when he asserted that 
New Mexico could levy a nondiscriminatory tax on activities on the reserva-
tion provided Congress did not act affirmatively to preempt the tax.1210 
The Court acknowledged (as it had to) that on-reservation activities bore 
a higher tax than off-reservation activities, but that result was acceptable 
because neither jurisdiction was imposing a discriminatory tax.1211 Cotton 
was simply conducting activities that simultaneously fell within two jurisdic-
tions, which triggered two taxes. Neither jurisdiction could be blamed for the 
higher tax.1212 The higher burden was merely the adventitious consequence of 
the Tribe and New Mexico sharing jurisdiction. And because of the unique 
nature of severance taxes, there was no interstate precedent mandating a dif-
ferent analysis.1213
1205 Id.
1206 Brief of Appellees State of New Mexico, Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. 163 (No. 87-1327), 
1988 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 159, at *61 n.39.
1207 Commonwealth Edison, 453 U.S. at 617.
1208 Justice Marshall dissented in Cotton but not on the apportionment issue.
1209 Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 189.
1210 Id. at 175.
1211 Id. at 189.
1212 Using more modern concepts, each severance tax would be described as internally and 
externally consistent. See, e.g., Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 
169–70 (1983). 
1213 A leading treatise suggests that if the Tribe was analogized to a foreign country, the Court 
might have invalidated the state taxes under Japan Line, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 
(1979). Japan Line added two additional tests to Complete Auto’s four tests if foreign commerce 
were involved. One test would strike down a tax if it created a substantial risk of multiple taxa-
tion. Cohen’s handbook, supra note 7, at 274. There are three problems with this suggestion. 
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i.  Relationship of Taxation and Services 
The Court described Cotton’s “most persuasive” argument to be based on 
evidence that tax payments by reservation lessees far exceeded the value of 
services provided by the State to the lessees, or more generally, to the reserva-
tion as a whole.1214 This argument, presumably based on the fourth prong 
of Complete Auto, was nothing more than the same argument based on the 
Merrion footnote that was already rejected by the Court1215 and also rejected 
in Commonwealth Edison.1216 Instead of relying on these grounds, however, 
Justice Stevens provided two new ones. 
First, “the relevant services provided by the State include those that are 
available to the lessees and the members of the Tribe off the reservation as 
well as on it. The intangible value of citizenship in an organized society is not 
easily measured in dollars and cents . . . .”1217 
This response should have been the end of this type of argument. But he 
quickly added that “the District Court found that the actual per capita state 
expenditures for Jicarilla members are equal to or greater than the per cap-
ita expenditures for non-Indian citizens.”1218 No information was provided 
on how this calculation was performed.1219 Nor was its significance appar-
First, Japan Line seems to have been greatly narrowed by the Court, albeit in income tax cases. 
See, e.g., Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994); Wardair Canada Inc., v. 
Fla. Dept. of Rev., 477 U.S. 1 (1986); Container Corp., 463 U.S. 159 (1983); Mobil Oil Corp. 
v. Vermont, 445 U.S. 425 (1980). Second, it seems too late in the day to treat the tribes as 
foreign nations, and none of the reasons given in Japan Line for the increased vigilance of a 
state tax on foreign taxpayers would apply to the tribes. Third, a severance tax defies traditional 
notions of multiple taxation. For a more sympathetic treatment of the relevance of Japan Line, 
however, see Lester J. Marston & David A. Fink, The Indian Commerce Clause: The Reports of Its 
Death Have Been Greatly Exaggerated, 16 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 205, 236–42 (1986).
1214 Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 189.
1215 Id. at 169–170; see supra notes 1175–82 and accompanying text.
1216 Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 645, 646 n.10 (1981), discussed 
supra notes 1102–07 and accompanying text. 
1217 Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 189.
1218 Id. at 189–90. Cotton’s Reply Brief accused New Mexico of misleading the Court when 
it suggested that the state public school contributions were greater on the reservation than off 
the reservation. “The record shows, to the contrary, that New Mexico’s general fund contribu-
tion to the Jicarilla Reservation public schools equals less than one half of its statewide level of 
support for public schools.” Reply Brief of Appellants Cotton Petroleum, supra note 1141, at 
*5. Cotton described the State as providing no courts, parks, recreation facilities, water, sew-
age, fire, public health facilities or university facilities on the reservation. Id. at *6–7.
1219 Cotton’s Reply Brief claimed that New Mexico’s own expert agreed that the assertion 
that State spending on a per capita tribal member basis was equal to its per capita spending for 
non-Indians off the reservation was based on the erroneous assumption that services benefited 
only the 1700 reservation Indians. In fact, the State services also benefited the off-reservation 
residents passing through the reservation as well as a significant number of on-reservation resi-
dents who were not members of the Tribe. Cotton also accused the State of rewriting the record 
when it claimed that the evidence showed that it spends approximately $3 million annually 
in reservation services. In fact, the State’s expert agreed with Cotton that expenditures were 
only $2 million. Id. at *5 n.3. If anything, this kind of back and forth quantitative bickering 
indicates the wisdom of the courts not entertaining this type of analysis.
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ent. Why was a comparison of Jicarillas to non-Indians relevant? Finally, the 
Court had opined in Ramah that off-reservation services provided to a con-
tractor are “not a legitimate justification” for taxing on-reservation activity 
because “[p]resumably, the state tax revenues derived from [the contractor’s] 
off-reservation business activities are adequate to reimburse the State for the 
services it provides,”1220 which was equally true in Cotton. 
The Court may have felt uneasy about examining on-reservation expendi-
tures because it acknowledged what should have been the starting point in 
its analysis: “there is no constitutional requirement that the benefits received 
from a taxing authority by an ordinary commercial taxpayer—or by those liv-
ing in the community where the taxpayer is located—must equal the amount 
of its tax obligations”1221 and proceeded to quote Commonwealth Edison dis-
cussed above, that “there is no requirement under the Due Process Clause 
that the amount of general revenue taxes collected from a particular activ-
ity must be reasonably related to the value of the services provided to the 
activity.”1222 Consequently, the reference to the per capita State expenditures 
or the $90,000 services provided by New Mexico to Cotton turned out to be 
irrelevant—as indeed it should have been. Given that Commonwealth Edison, 
rejected Cotton’s arguments just eight years earlier, Stevens’s characterization 
of the taxpayer’s position as its “most persuasive argument” seems to be a 
polite, if not charitable, overstatement. And it is puzzling why Stevens even 
addressed the argument under the Interstate Commerce Clause when he pre-
viously rejected Cotton’s invocation of the Merrion footnote where essentially 
this same argument was raised.
Justice Stevens paraphrased Cotton’s argument as asking the Court to 
“divest New Mexico of its normal latitude because its taxes have ‘some con-
nection’ to commerce with the Tribe.”1223 In rejecting this argument, Stevens 
once again noted that no evidence existed in the record showing that the tax 
had an adverse effect on the Tribe’s ability to attract oil and gas lessees.1224 he 
realized that it was reasonable to infer that the tax limited the profitability of 
1220 Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 844 n.9 (1982) (cited 
by the dissent at Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 208 n.10 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
1221 Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 190.
1222 Id. (citing Carmichael v. S. Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 521–23 (1937)).
1223 Id. at 191. See the language in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 623 
(1981), upon which this is based.
1224 Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 191. Because the Tribe was not a party to the case, it 
did not have the opportunity to offer such evidence. See supra note 1199. Professor Clinton 
criticizes Stevens for never citing or overruling “that portion of Colville that indicated such 
discriminations against Indian commerce if demonstrated to be detrimental to Indian com-
mercial development would be struck down on dormant Indian Commerce Clause grounds.” 
Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1223. This criticism seems unfair because of the dearth of 
evidence in the record on this point.
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Indian leases, but this sort of indirect burden had been rejected as a basis for 
striking down a state tax in other cases, including Moe and Colville.1225 
j.  Why an Interstate Commerce Clause Analysis at All? 
One mystery is why Justice Stevens engaged in an Interstate Commerce 
Clause analysis at all.1226 The Court invited the parties to address the question 
of whether the Tribe should be treated as a state for the purpose of determin-
ing whether New Mexico’s taxes must be apportioned.1227 All of the tribes that 
filed amicus briefs, including the Jicarilla, uniformly answered with a resound-
ing “no.” The Court seemed to agree, noting the language of “the Commerce 
Clause draws a clear distinction between ‘States’ and ‘Indian Tribes.’”1228 The 
“language of the Clause no more admits of treating Indian tribes as States 
than of treating foreign nations as States,”1229 which makes one wonder why 
the Court raised the issue in the first place. Stevens seems to ignore that the 
question asked was whether “the Tribe should be treated as a State for the 
purpose of determining whether New Mexico’s taxes must be apportioned,”1230 not 
whether a tribe should be viewed as a state for all purposes. 
Stevens also noted that the Interstate Commerce Clause is concerned with 
maintaining free trade among the States even in the absence of federal legisla-
tion, whereas the 
1225 The origin of the “indirect burden” argument in the Indian context is Thomas v. Gay, 169 
U.S. 264, 273 (1898). See supra note 363 and accompanying text.
1226 Professor Clinton argues that Stevens “analyzed the Indian Commerce Clause, rather 
than the Interstate Commerce Clause, as the potential source of any requirement that states 
apportion taxes assessed on Indian commerce which also is subject to tribal taxation,” Clinton, 
Dormant, supra note 22, at 1220, but that seems to be sheer conjecture.
1227 Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 191. The actual question put to the parties was whether 
the “Commerce Clause requires that an Indian Tribe be treated as a State for purpose of deter-
mining whether a state tax on nontribal activities conducted on an Indian Reservation must be 
apportioned to account for taxes imposed on those same activities by the Indian Tribe.” Cotton 
Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 485 U.S. 1005 (1988).
Professor Clinton feels that because of this question, “the initial grant of review there-
fore proceeded almost as if the Court was completely unaware of the existence of the Indian 
Commerce Clause.” Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1219. “[T]he question posed by the 
Court seemed ludicrous in light of the language of the Commerce Clause which separately 
mentioned commerce among the several states and ‘commerce . . . with the Indian tribes.’” 
Id. The question was not ludicrous, however. The Court was not asking if a tribe should be 
treated as a state, but rather whether the apportionment rules that had been developed under 
the Interstate Commerce Clause should be applied to Indian commerce. For example, should 
a credit be provided against the New Mexico severance taxes for the Tribal taxes?
The tribal amici briefs unanimously answered the question in the negative, presumably 
because they did not want to concede in any way that their status was more similar to a state 
than to a country or a nation. For the reasons suggested in the text, a severance tax was not an 
appealing context in which to argue the apportionment issue.
The Internal Revenue Code treats a tribe as a state for some purposes. I.R.C. § 787 
(2010).
1228 Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 191–92.
1229 Id. at 192.
1230 Id. at 191 (emphasis added).
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central function of the Indian Commerce Clause is to provide Congress with 
plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian affairs.1231 . . . The exten-
sive case law that has developed under the Interstate Commerce Clause, 
moreover, is premised on a structural understanding of the unique role of 
the States in our constitutional system that is not readily imported to cases 
involving the Indian Commerce Clause.1232 Most notably, as our discussion 
of Cotton’s ‘multiple taxation’ argument demonstrates, the fact that States 
and tribes have concurrent jurisdiction over the same territory1233 makes it 
inappropriate to apply Commerce Clause doctrine developed in the context 
of commerce ‘among’ States with mutually exclusive territorial jurisdiction 
to trade ‘with’ Indian tribes. . . .”1234 
In light of these comments, that the Court dealt with Cotton’s Interstate 
Commerce arguments in the first place is indeed curious1235—unless Stevens 
was looking to close down this avenue of attack in future cases. Presumably, 
taxpayers will not receive a sympathetic ear to their arguments that double 
taxation that would violate the Interstate Commerce Clause should be held 
to violate the Indian Commerce Clause. 
k.  Rejecting the Indian Commerce Clause 
he also shut down any argument that the Indian Commerce Clause pre-
empted the New Mexico tax. It is unclear what sense of “plenary” the Court 
was using1236 when it stated that the central function of the Indian Commerce 
1231 Professor Prakash wonders how the Clause “might ever grant plenary authority over all 
Indian tribes.” Prakash, Against, supra note 180, at 1079. “[T]he power to regulate commerce 
with the Indian tribes hardly seems like a power to regulate the Indian tribes themselves. 
Likewise, the authority to make treaties with Indian nations scarcely seems to grant federal 
power to unilaterally legislate upon Indian nations.” Id. 
1232 The Tribe’s amicus brief argued that if federal law does not preempt state taxation of 
Cotton, then the New Mexico taxes must be evaluated under the dormant Indian Commerce 
Clause. Brief of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Appellants, 
Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. 163 (No. 27-1327), 1988 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 158, at *7.
1233 “Even the platonic notion of backdrop had disappeared . . . .” Ball, John Marshall, supra 
note 193, at 1187. Stevens did not discuss New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 
324 (1983), where the Court struck down the application of New Mexico’s fish and game 
laws to non-Indians on the reservation. “The exercise of concurrent [regulatory] jurisdiction 
by the State would effectively nullify the Tribe’s unquestioned authority to regulate the use of 
its resources by members and nonmembers, interfere with the comprehensive tribal regula-
tory scheme, and threaten Congress’s firm commitment to the encouragement of tribal self-
sufficiency and economic development.” Id. at 343–44. One difference with Cotton was that 
the Mescalero Court found that New Mexico could not show any services it provided with the 
activity it sought to regulate.
1234 Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 192.
1235 The dissent saw “no purpose in the majority’s detailed application of Interstate Commerce 
Clause analysis in [its opinion].” Id. at 193 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Professor Clinton 
claims that Justice Stevens analyzed the Indian Commerce Clause and not the Interstate 
Commerce Clause “as the potential source of any requirement that states apportion taxes 
assessed on Indian commerce,” Clinton, Dormant, supra note 22, at 1219–20, but I find no 
support for that reading. 
1236 See supra notes 167, 181, and accompanying text.
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Clause is to provide Congress with “plenary” power to legislate in the field of 
Indian affairs. Presumably, Justice Stevens did not mean Congress had abso-
lute, sole, and exclusive power; otherwise, he would have analyzed whether 
New Mexico’s assertion of taxing jurisdiction violated the Indian Commerce 
Clause instead of assuming the State had such power. Apparently, Stevens 
used “plenary” in the more limited sense of “unlimited” rather than exclusive, 
at odds with at least one plausible reading of the intent of the Founders and 
with other statements by the Court.1237 
Justice Stevens abruptly ended his opinion by agreeing with a comment in 
White Mountain. “Tribal reservations are not States, and the difference in the 
form and nature of their sovereignty make it treacherous to import to one 
notions of pre-emption that are properly applied to the other.”1238 That state-
ment in White Mountain was meant to be favorable to the Indians, and Ste-
vens’s reference to it—coming after a truncated view of the Indian Commerce 
Clause and an opinion that held against Cotton (and indirectly against the 
Indians)—created a tension that made for an odd conclusion to his analysis. 
As Professor Frickey recognized, Chief Justice John Marshall would not 
have recognized the analysis in Cotton. 
It should not matter that a non-Indian company [Cotton] was involved 
 . . . . for some of the practical effects of the tax fell upon the tribe, and in 
any event a non-Indian—Worcester himself—was the subject of the asserted 
state regulation in [the Georgia case], as well. Nor should it matter that the 
case involved a conflict between the regulatory jurisdiction of a state and a 
tribe; that is, of course, precisely the setting in Worcester. . . . [T]he quasi-
constitutional, structural nature of Chief Justice Marshall’s approach is lost 
on the current Court.1239 
Similar sentiments could be expressed about the Court’s other tax cases.
l.  Blackmun’s Dissent 
Justice Blackmun wrote the dissent on behalf of Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall.1240 The dissent described the majority as “faithfully reciting” the prin-
ciples that define the “boundaries between state regulatory authority and [the 
1237 See supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
1238 Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 192–93 (quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe v. 
Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980)). An amicus brief of the Southern Ute Indian Tribe asked 
the Court to adopt the preemption test suggested by the Solicitor General in Ramah. Brief of 
Southern Ute Indian Tribe in Support of the Appellants, Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. 163 (No. 
87-1327), 1988 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 149, at *12–13.
1239 Frickey, Marshalling, supra note 199, at 423–24. Professor Clinton describes the Cotton 
Court as “affirmatively misstat[ing] history, asserting, without any citation of historical sources, 
that the original purposes of the Indian Commerce Clause only involved the grant of congres-
sional power, without any limitations on state authority in Indian country.” Clinton, Dormant, 
supra note 22, at 1245.
1240 These three were in the majority in Ramah, along with Burger and Powell, who were not 
on the Court at the time of Cotton. As stated in the Introduction to this Article, cases involv-
ing the Indians can easily turn on the sympathies of particular justices. See supra note 14 and 
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Tribe’s] self-government”1241—a remarkably generous description, especially 
coming from Justice Marshall who authored some of the key opinions the 
Court was dismantling. Taken literally, the dissent was agreeing with Justice 
Stevens’s statement that “[a]t one time, [a state tax on non-Indians on the 
reservation] was held invalid unless expressly authorized by Congress; more 
recently, such taxes have been upheld unless expressly or impliedly prohib-
ited by Congress.” The dissent took issue with the way the majority applied 
the principles. The majority “talked the talk” but did not “walk the walk.” 
The dissent would have held that the 1938 Act preempted the New Mexico 
tax.1242 In addition, federal and tribal interests would preempt the state tax.
The dissent accused the Court of “distort[ing] the legal standard it pur-
ports to apply.”1243 The majority failed to engage in a careful examination 
of state, tribal, and federal interests because of the distorted view that there 
is no preemption unless the states are “entirely excluded from a sphere of 
activity and provide no services to the Indians or to the lessees they seek to 
tax.”1244 Because the majority found no “direct evidence of Congress’s intent 
to preclude state taxation of non-Indian oil production on Indian lands,”1245 
the Court “[must engage] in a careful examination of state, tribal, and federal 
interests.”1246 The majority was wrong to assume that no preemption exists 
unless the “States are entirely excluded from a sphere of activity and provide 
no services to the Indians or to the lessees they seek to tax,”1247 an unfair accu-
sation by the dissent that ignored the three grounds on which the majority 
distinguished Ramah and White Mountain.1248 
i.  The New Mexico Tax Should Have Been Preempted. For Justice 
Blackmun, a traditional preemption analysis would have prohibited the New 
Mexico tax. Blackmun viewed the federal regulation of leasing Indian oil 
as both comprehensive and pervasive.1249 In addition, the Jicarilla Apache 
enacted their own regulations and created a Tribal Oil and Gas administra-
tion.1250 The dissent criticized the majority for accepting that there was suffi-
cient state activity to support the New Mexico tax.1251 The majority’s reliance 
on the proposition that “[t]his is not a case in which the State has had noth-
accompanying text. Many commentators would not limit this statement to only Indian law 
cases.
1241 Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 193 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing White Mountain, 
448 U.S. at 141).
1242 Id. at 193–203.
1243 Id. at 204.
1244 Id.
1245 Id. at 203.
1246 Id. at 204.
1247 Id. (emphasis in original).
1248 See id. at 176–87.
1249 Id. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. Bureau of 
Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 839 (1982)).
1250 Id.
1251 Id. at 206.
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ing to do with the on-reservation activity, save tax it,”1252 was criticized as 
“mechanical and absolutist.”1253 Complete abdication or noninvolvement has 
never been the applicable standard.1254 
ii.  The Majority Placed Undue Significance on State Expenditures. The 
dissent also denounced the majority for placing undue significance on the 
State having made some expenditures that benefited Cotton’s on-reservation 
activities. The reality was that the federal and Tribal governments provided 
almost the entire infrastructure supporting the production of oil and gas.1255 
According to the dissent, the majority was also confused about the rel-
evance of the disparity between the $89,384 in State services and the $2.293 
million in taxes paid by Cotton. The majority characterized this disparity as 
legally irrelevant in order to avoid imposing a “proportionality” requirement. 
The concept that a tax is not a quid pro quo has no role to play in a preemp-
tion analysis.1256 
Preemption analysis calls for a close consideration of conflicting interests 
and of their potential impact on one another. Under the majority’s analy-
sis, insignificant state expenditures, reflecting minimal state interests, are 
sufficient to support state interference with significant federal and tribal 
interests. The exclusion of all sense of proportion has led to a result that is 
antithetical to the concerns that animate our Indian pre-emption jurispru-
dence.1257
iii.  The Economic Impact of the State Tax Adversely Affected the Tribe. 
Finally, the dissent chastised the majority for “sorely underestimat[ing] the 
degree to which state taxation of oil and gas production adversely affects the 
interests of the Jicarilla Apache.”1258 Taxes were 75% higher on the reserva-
tion. The trial court did not appreciate the negative effects of this differ-
ential because it misunderstood why new wells were being drilled on the 
reservation.1259 In addition, “[i]n weighing the effect of state taxation on tribal 
1252 Id. (citing id. at 186).
1253 Id.
1254 Id.
1255 Id. at 207.
1256 Id. at 208.
1257 Id. One commentator described the dissent as applying a “modernized” preemption 
analysis. Under this standard, a state may tax Indian reservation land and activities unless 
federal law or federal policies preempt the tax. The latter requires consideration of state, tribal, 
and federal interests. Keith E. Whitson, State Jurisdiction to Tax Indian Reservation Land and 
Activities, 44 Wash. U. J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 99, 132–33 (1993), see also Rice v. Rehner, 463 
U.S. 713, 735–44 (1983).
1258 Id. at 208.
1259 Id. New Mexico argued that Cotton substantially expanded its reservation oil and gas 
production even after an increase in tribal taxes. Brief of Appellees State of New Mexico, 
Cotton Petroleum Corp v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989) (No. 87-1327), 1988 U.S. S. 
Ct. Briefs LEXIS 160, at *6. But the new wells could not be taken as a sign that the 75% rate 
differential had no effect because they were “infill” wells. These are drilled between existing 
producing wells to increase the efficiency of drainage on already leased lands. An infill well is 
a no-risk proposition because oil has already been found. The willingness to drill infill wells 
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interests, logic dictates that it is necessary to consider not only the size of the 
tax, but also the importance of the taxed activity to the tribal economy.”1260 
“[O]il and gas production is the Jicarilla Apache economy. . . .”1261 The use 
of the term “weighing” makes clear what the dissent’s earlier comments also 
suggested: the approach is one of balancing rather than of preemption.
The majority was also attacked for disregarding the long-term impact of 
New Mexico taxation on the Tribe. “The market can bear only so much taxa-
tion, and it is inevitable that a point will be reached at which the State’s taxes 
will impose a ceiling on tribal tax revenues.”1262 
Finally, the dissent emphasized the inconsistency between Warren Trading, 
White Mountain, and the majority’s opinion. In Warren Trading, the Court 
struck down a 2% Arizona sales tax; in White Mountain, the dissent charac-
terized the less than 1% tax as “relatively trivial” and “unlikely to have a seri-
ous adverse impact on tribal business.”1263 These cases were inconsistent with 
the majority’s observation that Cotton is not “a case in which an unusually 
large state tax has imposed a substantial burden on the Tribe.”1264 The dissent 
concluded that “New Mexico asserts little more than a desire to increase its 
general revenues at the expense of tribal economic development.”1265
Justice Blackmun thought that under established principles the New Mex-
ico tax was preempted. The governing federal statute contained no express 
authorization of state taxation. The statute was enacted in a period in which 
tribal sovereignty and tribal self-sufficiency were at the core of federal Indian 
policy. The federal government regulated every aspect of the producers’ activ-
ities. The statute encouraged tribes to assert their own sovereignty, which 
the Tribe did through regulations and taxation. New Mexico’s interest, by 
cannot be viewed as a sign that producers are willing to drill new wells. Cotton Petroleum, 490 
U.S. at 208–09 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
1260 Id. at 209.
1261 Id. (emphasis in original) “[T]he oil and gas taxes, the rents, and the royalties pro-
vided the Tribe with 90% of its revenue.” Brief of Appellants Cotton Petroleum Corp., Cotton 
Petroleum, 490 U.S. 163 (No. 87-1327), 1988 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 159, at *8. New 
Mexico’s Brief emphasized that the Tribe imposed no taxes on its members, and distributed 
over $9 million annually as a cash distribution to its members. In addition, the Tribe ran a bud-
getary surplus. A substantial portion of the Tribe’s taxes went into a permanent fund that con-
tained approximately $50 million. Brief of Appellee State of New Mexico, Cotton Petroleum, 
490 U.S. 163 (No. 87-1327), 1988 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 160, at *9.
1262 Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 210 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The State’s brief had 
emphasized the lower court’s findings that the Tribe’s economic consultant reported that “a tax 
rate even higher than that ultimately selected by the tribe would not adversely affect oil and gas 
development on the reservation.” Brief of Appellees, State of New Mexico, Cotton Petroleum, 
490 U.S. 163 (No. 87-1327), 1988 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 160, at *8.
1263 Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 210–11 (citing White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 
448 U.S. 136, 159 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
1264 Id. at 210 (citing id. at 186). 
1265 Id. at 211. For a discussion of the options that exist for economic development of the res-
ervations after Cotton Petroleum, see Susan M. Williams, State Taxation on Indian Reservations: 
The Impact of Cotton Petroleum Corporation v. New Mexico, 36 Fed. Bar News & J. 431 
(1989).
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comparison, consisted of little more than raising revenue at the expense of 
tribal development.1266 As Ramah held, “[t]hat purpose ‘is insufficient to jus-
tify the additional burdens imposed by the tax on the comprehensive federal 
scheme . . . and on the express federal policy of encouraging Indian self-
sufficiency in [this] area.’”1267
According to Professor Krakoff, “[l]ower court cases applying Cotton con-
tinue to follow the ‘flexible preemption analysis’ but the trend is increasingly 
to marginalize White Mountain, Central Machinery, and Ramah as anoma-
lies and to allow state taxation of non-Indians in Indian country [with some 
exceptions].”1268 “After Cotton Petroleum, courts generally upheld state taxa-
tion of non-Indian businesses within Indian country.”1269 The Navajo Nation, 
however, has been able to alleviate the concurrent taxation authorized by Cot-
ton through intergovernmental agreements and state legislation.1270 There is 
an incentive to cooperate because it is in neither a state’s nor a tribe’s interest 
if multiple tax burdens constrain activity on the reservation and reduce tax 
revenues for both parties. 
G.  The Gasoline Cases
1.  Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw Nation
Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw Nation1271 concerned two indepen-
dent issues: the Oklahoma motor fuels excise tax and the Oklahoma income 
tax, discussed infra.
The first issue involved the imposition of the Oklahoma motor fuels excise 
tax on gasoline sold by the Chickasaw Nation at two convenience stores on 
1266 Cotton’s Reply Brief cited “the testimony of the Bureau of Indian Affairs officer in charge 
of oil and gas matters who stated that in his fourteen years on the Reservation he had never 
seen New Mexico directly involved in any oil and gas monitoring or supervision.” Reply Brief 
of Appellants Cotton Petroleum Corp. supra note 1141, at *5 n.3.
1267 Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 211 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Ramah Navajo Sch. 
Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 845 (1982)).
1268 Krakoff, supra note 12, at 1171.
1269 Anderson, Berger, Frickey & Krakoff, supra note 208, at 467 (citing Gila River 
Indian Cmty. v. Waddell, 91 F.3d 1232 (9th Cir. 1996)).
1270 The New Mexico Legislature, for example, was more impressed with the unfairness of the 
resulting multiple taxation from the Tribal and State taxes than was the Court. The Legislature 
adopted a credit to mitigate the double taxation. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 7-29C-1 (1978); see 
also Krakoff, supra note 12, at 1172.
Cotton had argued that a credit for the tribal taxes would cure the alleged constitutional 
defect. Brief of Appellants Cotton Petroleum Corp., Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. 163 (No. 
87-1327), 1988 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 159, at *64–65. In order to distinguish Colville, 
which rejected the use of a credit, Cotton described that case as not involving a “comprehen-
sive federal scheme promoting the sale of cigarettes as Indian Commerce and no indication 
that that the cigarettes reflected value generated by the reservation. . . .” Id. at *65.
1271 515 U.S. 450 (1995).
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tribal trust land. Justice Ginsburg,1272 writing for a unanimous Court on this 
issue, struck the tax because its legal incidence fell on the Tribe on sales made 
within Indian country.1273 had the legal incidence not fallen on the Tribe but 
rather on the non-Indian purchaser, presumably a balancing test would have 
been triggered.1274
a.  Legal Incidence is Determinative 
Because no federal legislation existed,1275 the case could have been seen as 
presenting a pure Indian Commerce Clause issue. The Court, however, had 
a more direct (and easier) way of disposing of the tax. Rejecting a balancing 
1272 For a general discussion of Justice Ginsburg’s Indian law opinions, see Carole Goldberg, 
Finding the Way to Indian Country: Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Decisions in Indian Law Cases, 
70 Ohio St. L. J. 1003 (2009).
1273 The Court stated that “when Congress does not instruct otherwise, a State’s excise tax is 
unenforceable if its legal incidence falls on a Tribe or its members for sales made within Indian 
country.” Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at 453 (emphasis added). The reference to the Tribe’s 
members was dictum because the excise tax was imposed on the tribal retailer. Nonetheless, it 
seems consistent with McClanahan, which the Court did not cite in support of its statement. 
McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
The Tribe argued that “[t]he Constitution vests the Federal Government with exclusive 
authority over relations with Indian tribes . . . and in recognition of the sovereignty retained by 
Indian tribes even after formation of the United States, Indian tribes and individuals generally 
are exempt from state taxation within their own territory,” Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at 455 
(quoting Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 764 (1968)).
Oklahoma countered by arguing that, even if the legal incidence of the fuels tax falls on the 
Tribe as retailer, “tax immunity should be disallowed here because ‘the state interest supporting 
the levy is compelling, . . . the tribal interest is insubstantial, and . . . the state tax would have 
no effect on tribal governance and self-determination.’” Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at 456 
(quoting Brief of Petitioner, Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (No. 94-771), 1995 U.S. S. Ct. 
Briefs LEXIS 85, at *39). 
1274 After the decision below, the Tribe imposed its own tax on gasoline and diesel fuel that 
was roughly equivalent to that imposed by the State. Presumably, this was to rebut any sugges-
tion that the Tribe would be marketing a tax exemption if the Oklahoma tax were struck down. 
This fact would distinguish the case from Colville and reduce that case’s relevance. Of course, 
tribal rates can always later change or the tax can be eliminated. If the tax were eliminated, for 
example, the case would then be similar to Colville.
As discussed elsewhere, see supra notes 890–93, 909–10 and accompanying text, and infra 
notes 1315–17, 1349–55 and accompanying text, when a tribe is both the taxing sovereign 
and the vendor, the adoption of a tax on the sale is a formality, having no independent eco-
nomic significance.
Oklahoma’s brief argued that “the economic burden of the tax plainly falls upon the ulti-
mate consumer of fuel, as the court of appeals itself understood.” Brief of Petitioner, Chickasaw 
Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (No. 94-771), 1995 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs 85, at *23.
1275 Oklahoma belatedly raised the argument that the hayden-Cartwright Act, 4 U.S.C. 
§ 104 (2009), authorized the tax. That Act authorizes the states to tax motor fuel sales on 
“United States military or other reservations.” Id. § 140(a). The question is whether the Act’s 
reference to “reservation” meant Indian reservations. The Court declined to address this argu-
ment. In White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, the Court also refused to consider this 
argument. 448 U.S. 136, 151 n.16 (1980); see supra notes 916–84 and accompanying text. 
Cf. supra note 542.
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test advocated by Oklahoma,1276 Justice Ginsburg held that “when a State 
attempts to levy a tax directly on an Indian tribe or its members inside Indian 
country, rather than on non-Indians, we have employed instead of a balanc-
ing inquiry, ‘a more categorical approach: “absent cession of jurisdiction or 
other federal statutes permitting it,” we have held, a State is without power to 
tax reservation lands and reservation Indians.’”1277 
The Constitution vests the Federal Government with exclusive authority 
over relations with Indian tribes . . . and in recognition of the sovereignty 
retained by Indian tribes even after formation of the United States, Indian 
tribes and individuals generally are exempt from state taxation within their 
own territory.1278
The initial and frequently dispositive question in Indian tax cases . . . . is who 
bears the legal incidence of a tax.1279 If the legal incidence of an excise tax 
rests on a tribe or on tribal members for sales made inside Indian country, 
the tax cannot be enforced absent clear congressional authorization [Moe]. 
But if the legal incidence of the tax rests on non-Indians, no categorical bar 
prevents enforcement of the tax; if the balance of federal, state, and tribal 
interests favors the State, and federal law is not to the contrary, the State 
1276 The taxed fuel was used almost exclusively outside of Indian country on state roads; the 
fuel was brought into Indian country for resale; and the purchasers were for the most part 
non-Indians. The Tribe did not construct or maintain roads for the use by the general public. 
Oklahoma’s Brief argued that it was
the existence of state-funded public highways that makes possible the Tribe’s sale of 
fuel, while the use of that fuel requires considerable expenditures for the maintenance 
and construction of state roads. This particular ‘spillover’ effect is qualitatively differ-
ent from any ‘spillover’ effects of income taxes or taxes on cigarettes. ‘A State’s regula-
tory interest will be particularly substantial if the State can point to off-reservation 
effects that necessitate state intervention.’ And here—in contrast to other cases in 
which state taxes have been invalidated the Tribe does not construct or maintain 
highways for the use of the general public; that burden falls entirely on the State. 
Brief of Petitioner, Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (No. 94-771), 1995 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs 
LEXIS 85, at *49–50.
1277 Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at 458 (quoting County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes 
and Bands of Yakima Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 258 (1992)). In County of Yakima, the Court 
allowed the county to impose a property tax on fee-patented lands owned by Indians and 
permitted the State to foreclose on such land. The Court concluded that express authority for 
taxation of fee-patented land was found in Section 6 of the Indian General Allotment Act of 
1887. For an analysis of that case, see Christopher A. Karns, County of Yakima v. Confederated 
Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation: State Taxation as a Means of Diminishing the 
Tribal Land Base, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 1213 (1993).
1278 Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at 455 (quoting Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 
U.S. 759, 764 (1968).
1279 Justice Ginsburg claimed that this “[j]udicial focus on legal incidence in lieu of a more 
venturesome approach accords due deference to the lead role of Congress in evaluating state 
taxation as it bears on Indian tribes and tribal members. Id., 502 U.S. at 267.” Chickasaw 
Nation, 515 U.S. at 459. Professor Goldberg correctly asks “why this is so?” Carole Goldberg, 
Finding the Way to Indian Country: Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Decisions in Indian Law Cases, 
70 Ohio St. L. J. 1003, 1020 (2009).
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may impose its levy [Colville] and may place on a tribe or tribal members 
“minimal burdens” in collecting the toll.1280
Balancing has now clearly replaced “preemption” as the methodology for 
evaluating taxes on non-Indians.
b.  Formalism and Legal Incidence 
The emphasis on legal incidence is a familiar one to state tax lawyers. Complete 
Auto rejected that formalism in the context of interstate commerce, where 
it was described as having “no relationship to economic realities. Rather it 
stands only as a trap for the unwary draftsman.”1281 Oklahoma relied heavily 
on Complete Auto, making a similar argument about economic realities.1282 
The Court, however, endorsed formalism.
1280 Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at 458–59 (emphasis added). Justice Ginsburg described 
Moe as an attempt “to compel Indians to collect and remit taxes actually imposed on non-
Indians.” Id. at 458.
1281 Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). “There is no economic 
consequence that follows necessarily from the use of . . . particular words . . . and a focus on 
that formalism merely obscures the question whether the tax produces a forbidden effect.” Id. 
at 288.
1282 Oklahoma’s Brief asserted that 
there is no denying that the court of appeals’ invalidation of the fuel tax rested on 
a formalism. The court properly did not suggest that the tax was preempted by the 
terms of any treaty; instead, it found that the legal incidence of the tax falls upon the 
retailer (and therefore, in this case, upon the Tribe), and proceeded to apply a conclu-
sive presumption against the validity of such a tax. We explain below that the court’s 
placement of the levy’s legal incidence was wrong. But even granting for the moment 
that the legal incidence of the tax does fall upon the Tribe, it is beyond dispute that, at 
least so far as sales to non-members of the Tribe are concerned, Oklahoma could per-
missibly impose a tax that is, in all essential respects, identical to the one invalidated 
by the court of appeals. It has long been settled, and the Tribe does not dispute, that 
a State may require an Indian tribe to collect a tax on on-reservation sales to non-
members where the legal incidence of the levy falls on the purchaser. This means, as 
the Tribe itself acknowledged in its brief in opposition to the petition for certiorari 
that Oklahoma could cure the asserted defect in the tax with a ‘stroke of the pen’ 
simply by declaring the levy’s legal incidence to fall on the ultimate consumer rather 
than the retailer.
Against this background, the question in this case is whether the formalism of 
“legal incidence” precludes imposition of a state tax on tribal transactions that impose 
enormous burdens on the State and no burdens at all on the Tribe, and that in large 
part are concluded with non-members. In answering that question, the court below 
expressly disregarded economic realities, declaring the competing state and tribal 
interests “not relevant.” In our view, however, the court of appeals’ answer plainly 
departed from this Court’s precedents: it elevated form over substance, ignored the 
substantial extra-reservation consequences of the taxed activities, and imposed a dra-
matic restriction on state taxing authority. 
Brief of Petitioner, Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (No. 94-771), 1995 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs 
LEXIS 85, *24–26. Before Complete Auto made them irrelevant, these arguments were com-
monplace under the Interstate Commerce Clause. Oklahoma’s Brief also emphasized that 
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[A] tax’s legal incidence accommodates the reality that tax administration 
requires predictability. . . . If we were to make ‘economic reality’ our guide, 
we might be obliged to consider . . . how completely retailers can pass along 
tax increases without sacrificing sales volume—a complicated matter depen-
dent on the characteristics of the market for the relevant product.1283
Presumably, exactly that type of inquiry would be required if the legal inci-
dence fell on the purchaser. Given the splintered opinions in Ramah and 
White Mountain, Justice Ginsburg’s willingness to avoid another contentious 
decision is understandable when a seductively easy legal incidence argument 
was available. But the contrary lesson that had been learned from the now-
discarded pre-Complete Auto cases was how easily a state could manipulate 
legal incidence, and the premium formalism placed on draftsmanship.1284 
Those cases demonstrated how easily a statute that improperly imposed the 
legal incidence of a tax on the privilege of conducting an interstate business 
could be redrafted and upheld without any change in the amount of tax that 
would be owed.1285 Those cases made a mockery of formalism.
[t]he motor fuel subject to tax is used almost exclusively outside of Indian country on 
state jurisdiction roads. And the tax revenues are used to defray the costs (of road con-
struction and maintenance) imposed upon the State—and only upon the State—by 
the use of that fuel; the Tribe does not construct, police, or maintain significant road 
mileage. 
Id. at 24–26. See also supra note 1276.
1283 Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at 459–60.
1284 Oklahoma did not concede that the legal incidence of the tax fell on the Tribe. See Brief 
of Petitioner, Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (No. 94-771), 1995 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 
85, at *58–68.
1285 See, e.g., Ry. Express Agency v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 434 (1959) (described in Complete 
Auto, 430 U.S. at 284–85); Ry. Express Agency v. Virginia, 347 U.S. 359 (1954). Much of 
Oklahoma’s brief implicitly recognized the ease with which a statute could be redrafted. 
Aside from its naked interest in raising revenue, the Tribe has no significant stake 
here. After all, requiring a tribe to remit a tax on sales to non-members—a tax that 
will be used to meet costs imposed on the State by use of the goods sold—in no sense 
imposes a “burden which frustrates tribal self-government.” [Moe]. To the contrary, 
it is difficult to see how such a tax has any bearing whatsoever on the tribes’ ability 
“to control their own internal relations, and to preserve their own unique customs 
and social order.” Indeed, any argument that immunity from the levy “is necessary  
to . . . tribal government is refuted” by the fact that the State historically assessed 
the tax and the Tribe until very recently paid it, so “that the parties to this case had 
accommodated themselves to the state regulation.”
Moreover, the tax at issue here does not fall upon any value generated by Indians 
on Indian land. Instead, this is the paradigm of a case in which the Court has indi-
cated that there is no tribal interest supporting immunity from state law: the tax falls 
on “on-reservation sales outlets which market to non-members goods not manufac-
tured by the tribe or its members, in which the tribal contribution to [the] enterprise 
is de minimis.”
As the Court has explained in very similar circumstances: “It is painfully appar-
ent that the value marketed by the [retailers] to persons coming from outside is not 
generated on the reservations by activities in which the Tribes have a significant  
interest. . . . What the [retailers] offer these customers, and what is not available 
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Indeed, Justice Ginsburg was well aware that a state could draft around the 
legal incidence test, so that any “predictability” could be short-lived. 
[I]f a State is unable to enforce a tax because the legal incidence of the 
impost is on Indians or Indian tribes, the State generally is free to amend 
its law to shift the tax’s legal incidence. So, in this case, the State recognizes 
and the Tribe agrees that Oklahoma could accomplish what it here seeks ‘by 
declaring the tax to fall on the consumer and directing the Tribe to collect 
and remit the levy.’1286 
The Court supported its emphasis on legal incidence by citing precedent 
holding that the states are prohibited from levying a tax directly on the federal 
government.1287 What the Court did not cite, however, were its own cases 
allowing the states to draft around this doctrine, reducing the prohibition to 
a mere formalism.1288
elsewhere, is solely an exemption from state taxation” . . . [T]he Court has repeatedly 
‘rejected the proposition that principles of federal Indian law, whether stated in terms 
of preemption, tribal self-government, or otherwise, authorize Indian tribes thus to 
market an exemption from state taxation to persons who would normally do their 
business elsewhere.’
Brief of Petitioner, Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (No. 94-771), 1995 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs 
LEXIS 85, at *46–48.
1286 Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at 460; see infra note 1302. 
1287 Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at 460 n.9. The Court cited United States v. County of 
Fresno, 429 U.S. 452, 459 (1977) (“States may not . . . impose taxes the legal incidence of 
which falls on the Federal Government.”). If the legal incidence of a state tax is not on the 
federal government it will be upheld notwithstanding that the economic incidence falls on the 
government.See supra note 357. County of Fresno actually demonstrated how a state could draft 
around the legal incidence roadblock by upholding California’s tax on a possessory interest 
held by an individual in government owned property. A tax on the property itself would have 
been unconstitutional. See also City of Detroit v. Murray Corp., 355 U.S. 489 (1958); United 
States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958). Unlike the cases involving the federal govern-
ment, whether the economic incidence of a state tax falls on a tribe may influence the Court to 
strike it down. See, e.g., Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 855–57 
(1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (complaining that the majority’s striking down the New 
Mexico gross receipts tax gave the Tribe more protection than the federal government would 
have in that case). The federal government, of course, can easily protect itself by prohibiting the 
state tax at issue. The Indians have no similar power to act on their own.
1288 See, e.g., United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720 (1982). Indeed, Oklahoma did 
exactly that after the Court’s opinion. The amended statute reads as follows: 
A: It is the intent of the Legislature that the taxes imposed on motor fuel have always 
been and continue to be declared and conclusively presumed to be a direct tax on 
the ultimate or retail consumer. When the taxes are paid by any person other than 
the ultimate or retail consumer, the payment shall be considered as precollected and 
as an advance payment for the purpose of convenience and facility to the consumer 
and shall thereafter be added to the price of the motor fuel and recovered from the 
ultimate or retail consumer, regardless of where or how the taxable fuel is ultimately 
consumed. 
[. . .]
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The Court should have been skeptical about the formalistic legal incidence 
doctrine promoting predictability,1289 considering that the statute did not 
expressly specify upon whom the legal incidence was placed and that the issue 
was sharply contested below. Legal incidence would also prove to be elusive 
in Prairie Band Potawatomi, where the Court disagreed on how to interpret 
the statute. 
2.  Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation
a.  Ambiguity of Legal Incidence 
The failure of the legal incidence doctrine to promote predictability was under-
scored by the need for a detailed statutory analysis of that issue in Wagnon 
v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, and the resulting disagreement between 
the majority and dissent.1290 Justice Thomas was joined by Chief Justice Rob-
erts and Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Scalia, Souter, and Breyer in uphold-
ing a Kansas tax on the motor fuel received by non-Indian fuel distributors 
off-reservation.1291 The fuel was subsequently delivered to an on-reservation, 
tribally owned gas station. The Court assumed that the distributors passed 
C: It is also the intent of the Legislature that the recodification of the tax levied by 
this act shall not be considered and construed to be a new tax or change in the motor 
fuel tax, but a clarification of the motor fuel tax as it existed prior to the effective 
date of this act. The purpose of this recodification is a result of the interpretation of 
the motor fuel tax code of this state by the federal courts, specifically the decision by 
the Supreme Court of the United States in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw 
Nation.
Okla. Stat. tit. 68, § 500.2 (2009).
In retrospect, was it was a good use of everyone’s time and money for the Court to issue an 
opinion that could be de facto overturned with one stroke of the legislative pen? One virtue of 
Complete Auto was that it made it unnecessary for legislatures to rewrite existing laws.
1289 The Court was probably reassured by an amicus brief it cited from eleven States with 
large Indian populations arguing that legal incidence “provide[s] a reasonably bright-line stan-
dard which, from a tax administration perspective, responds to the need for substantial cer-
tainty as to the permissible scope of state taxation authority.” Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at 
460 (quoting Brief for South Dakota et al. as Amici Curiae at 2, Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 
450 (No. 94-771)). Given the ease with which a state can redraft an offending statute, the 
position in the brief is understandable.
1290 546 U.S. 95 (2005).
1291 The tax was imposed on the receipt of motor fuel in Kansas by fuel distributors. Id. at 
99. The Court rejected the Tribe’s interpretation of the statute as imposing the tax on the sale 
taking place on the reservation. Id. at 103–06. One monograph reports that with “growing 
frequency, states are turning to pre-collection of taxes at the wholesale level, before the product 
ever reaches retailers. In the case of motor fuels, for example, a majority of state have shifted 
to taxing at the ‘terminal rack’—the point where barges and shiploads of motor fuels are trans-
ferred into truck-size tankers. About 1,300 such terminal racks exist in the United States. Of 
the 33 states that have federally recognized tribes, at least 27 states have enacted terminal rack 
or first sale from distributor collection laws.” National Conference on State Legislatures and 
National Congress of American Indians, Government to Government: Models of Cooperation 
Between States and Tribes 74 (2002)
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along the cost of the State’s fuel tax to the Tribe.1292 The Tribe also imposed 
its own, earmarked tax on the station’s fuel sales,1293 generating approximately 
$300,000 annually for transportation infrastructure.1294 
The Tribe owned and operated a casino, and apparently to accommodate 
visitors it built its gas station nearby. The price of gas at the Tribal station fell 
within two cents per gallon of the off-reservation prices,1295 and the over-
whelming majority of the sales were made to casino patrons or those working 
or living on the reservation.1296 Because the casino was built in a “remote 
area,”1297 the Tribe could not be viewed as “marketing an exemption,” unlike 
the tribes in Moe and Colville.1298 
1292 The record in the case did not clearly establish whether the distributor passed along the 
cost of the tax to the Tribe. At oral argument, however, the State made this representation. Id. 
at 100 n.2. Presumably, this representation meant that the distributor raised its prices by the 
amount of the tax, not that the actual economic incidence of the tax fell on the Tribe, which 
is a much more difficult analysis. If, for example, the demand curve for gasoline at the Tribe’s 
station were inelastic, an increase in price by the amount of the tax would not have affected 
the retailer’s revenue and the economic incidence of the tax would have fallen on consumers. If 
demand were inelastic, however, the logical question is why the Tribe had not already increased 
its price to that level.
1293 Id. at 100.
1294 Id.
1295 Id. The Court does not state whether the reservation gas was sold above or below the 
prevailing off-reservation market price. The Tenth Circuit opinion, however, suggests that the 
Tribe did not sell gasoline below the prevailing prices: “[The State] does not argue that the 
[Tribe] sells fuel below market prices.” Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation v. Richards, 379 F.3d 
979, 982 (10th Cir. 2004). This concession undercut any argument that the Tribe was mar-
keting an exemption, like in Moe or Colville. But see infra notes 1349–54 and accompanying 
text.
1296 Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 99. The opinions below provide a useful glimpse into the back-
ground of the case. The Tribe owned and operated a $35 million casino. Prairie Band, 379 
F.3d at 981. Nation Station, a convenience store and gas station, was owned and operated by 
the Tribe near the casino. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation v. Richards, 241 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 
1297 (D. Kan. 2003). Eleven of the store’s 15 employees were Indians and seven of these were 
members of the Tribe. Prairie Band, 379 F.3d at 981. Seventy-one percent of the store’s revenue 
was generated by the fuel sales. Prairie Band, 241 F. Supp. 2d at 1298. Revenue from the Tribe’s 
fuel tax financed the maintenance of the roads and bridges that provided access to the casino 
and for which the Tribe received no money from the State. Prairie Band, 379 F.3d at 982. The 
Tribe’s expert at trial testified that “but for the casino, there would not be enough traffic to 
support [the station].” Id. The latter testimony was part of the Tribe’s efforts at proving it was 
not marketing an exemption. See infra note 1298 and accompanying text.
1297 Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 127 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
1298 The Tribe had never advertised an exemption from the state fuel tax, Prairie Band, 379 
F.3d at 982, unlike in Moe and Colville, where cigarettes were being marketed free of a state tax, 
presumably to off-reservation persons who came onto the reservation specifically to purchase 
them. In Wagnon, the Tribe apparently had a fairly captive market in casino customers, who 
would have been on the reservation anyway, and there was no need to charge less than the off-
reservation price for gasoline. Seventy-three percent of sales were made to casino patrons and 
11% were made to persons who lived or worked on the reservation. Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 99.
One commentator claimed that “[t]he fact that the tribal fuel tax and the state fuel tax are 
mutually exclusive, i.e., only one can be collected without rendering the Nation Station’s fuel 
prices uncompetitive, should have signaled to the Court the need for interest-balancing in 
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The Tribe argued that the legal incidence of the state tax was imposed on 
its on-reservation purchase and receipt of the gas,1299 and therefore the tax was 
unconstitutional under Chickasaw Nation.1300 Alternatively, even if the inci-
dence of the tax was on the distributor, the Tribe argued it was nonetheless 
preempted under White Mountain.1301 To make this alternative argument, the 
Tribe had to bring the taxable transaction onto the reservation.
b.  White Mountain Balancing 
After a lengthy statutory analysis, Justice Thomas concluded the legal inci-
dence of the tax was imposed on the non-Indian distributor on its off-reserva-
tion receipt of motor fuel.1302 Justice Thomas then clarified White Mountain’s 
this case.” Jesse K. Martin, Kansas v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation: Undermining Indian 
Sovereignty Through State Taxation, 6 U. Md. L. J. Race, Religion, Gender & Class 251, 270 
(2006). The fact that the Tribe was selling gas at competitive prices belies this assertion. The 
comment misunderstands that the Tribe was wearing two hats: it was both the retailer and the 
taxing sovereign. In other words, the Tribe was imposing the tax as well as keeping the profit 
on the sale of the gas. Consequently, the line was blurred between what part of the station’s net 
revenue from the sale of gas should be viewed as a profit and what should be viewed as a tax. 
The concept of multiple taxation is meaningless if the Tribe wears both hats because whether 
the Tribe imposes a tax or not, it will nonetheless receive the same net revenue. See infra notes 
1345–54 and accompanying text.
1299 See Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 102. The statute provided that the incidence of the tax was 
“imposed on the distributor of the first receipt of the motor fuel.” Id. Presumably, the statute 
meant “imposed on the distributor on the first receipt of the motor fuel.” This reading is 
consistent with section 79-3410(a) of the Kansas Statutes Annotated, which provides that 
“[e]very distributor . . . shall compute and shall pay . . . the amount of taxes due to the state 
on all motor-vehicle fuels or special fuels received or imported by such distributor.” Kan. Stat. 
ann. § 79-3410(a) (West 2010) (emphasis added).
1300 Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995). See supra notes 1271–89 
and accompanying text.
1301 Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 102.
1302 Id. at 103, 110. The lower courts had reached the same conclusion. Prairie Band, 379 
F.3d at 982; Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation v. Richards, 241 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1311 (D. 
Kan. 2003). Apparently in 2003 the Kansas Legislature accepted the Court’s invitation in 
Chickasaw Nation to “amend its law to shift the tax’s legal incidence.” Chickasaw Nation, 515 
U.S. at 460; see supra notes 1272–89. 
Taking note of the United States Supreme Court’s equivocal language in Chickasaw 
Nation, the Kansas legislature quickly acted to amend the Kansas fuel tax  
statutes . . . [to place] the legal incidence of the fuel tax on the “distributor of the first 
receipt.” This provision, as suggested by . . . Chickasaw . . . makes issues of preemp-
tion and Indian sovereignty inapplicable to the Kansas fuel tax. 
Luke R. Spellmeier, A Winning Hand or Time to Fold? State Taxation of Fuel Sales on Kansas 
Indian Reservations, 43 Washburn L. J. 141, 144–45 (2003). If the Tribe were to become a 
distributor, instead of purchasing from a distributor, the legal incidence would then fall on the 
Tribe on its receipt on the reservation of the gasoline. Under those circumstances, the holding 
in Chickasaw would control, nullifying the tax.
Professor Jensen argues that the issue of legal incidence was murky, and should have trig-
gered the Indian canons of construction. Jensen, supra note 9, at 40. If the canons have their 
roots in the trust relationship between the federal government and the Indians, a question can 
be raised about their application to interpreting state law. But neither the majority nor the dis-
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balancing test:1303 “[White Mountain] has never been applied where, as here, 
the State asserts its taxing authority over non-Indians off the reservation.”1304 
White Mountain was limited to situations when a “State asserts authority over 
the conduct of non-Indians engaging in activity on the reservation.”1305 Under 
the majority’s interpretation of the taxing statute, Kansas was taxing an off-
reservation activity, the receipt of motor fuel,1306 so that White Mountain had 
sent mentioned the canons, a failure that presumably reflected the fact that neither the State 
nor the Tribe raised this issue.
1303 Professor Jensen describes Wagnon as the “most explicit downgrading of balancing,” 
Jensen, supra note 9, at 81, but like Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898), it illustrates a neces-
sary line drawing. Wagnon was an easier case than Thomas because the tax was imposed on an 
off-reservation activity, and it is difficult imagining that the Court would strike down a state 
tax imposed off-reservation merely because it impacted on-reservation activities.
The district court applied the balancing test in favor of Kansas. Prairie Band, 241 F. Supp. 
at 1309–11. The Tenth Circuit reversed. Prairie Band, 379 F.3d at 987. Before the Supreme 
Court, Kansas pointed out the flaw of balancing: “The court of appeals found that [the Tribe’s] 
fuel price is within two cents of market. But what if it was four cents, six cents, eight cents, 
a dime below market? . . . Where and when does the balance tip?” Reply Brief for Petitioner, 
Wagnon, 546 U.S. 95 (No. 04-631), 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 547, at *19 n.3. 
1304 Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 110. One commentator claims Ramah contradicts this statement. 
Martin, supra note 1298, at 269–70. But in Ramah, New Mexico was taxing construction ser-
vices that took place on the reservation, which would seem to contradict Martin’s statement. 
1305 Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 110 (emphasis added) (citing White Mountain Apache Tribe v. 
Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 144–45 (1980)). Justice Thomas described Warren Trading, Thomas v. 
Gay, and Williams v. Lee as cases identified in White Mountain that were supportive of balanc-
ing. Id. at 111. But Warren Trading came to be described by the Court as a preemption case. 
See supra note 436. Neither Williams v. Lee nor Thomas v. Gay engaged in a balancing test. 
See supra notes 354–424 and accompanying text. White Mountain was also inconsistent with 
Thomas’s description of it. White Mountain stated that “[o]ur decision today is based on the 
pre-emptive effect of the comprehensive federal regulatory scheme, which, like that in [Warren 
Trading], leaves no room for the additional burdens sought to be imposed by state law,” 448 
U.S. at 151 n.15 (emphasis added), which would seem to be inconsistent with a balancing test. 
White Mountain cited both Warren Trading and Williams v. Lee in support of the statement that 
“[i]n a number of cases we have held that state authority over non-Indians acting on tribal res-
ervations is pre-empted even though Congress has offered no explicit statement on the subject.” 
Id. at 151 (emphasis added). Thomas v. Gay was cited once by White Mountain in support of 
a “particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake, an 
inquiry designed to determine whether, in the specific context, the exercise of state authority 
would violate federal law. Compare [Warren Trading] and Williams v. Lee . . . with [Moe] and 
Thomas v. Gay.” Id. at 145. Apparently the White Mountain Court was not viewing Thomas v. 
Gay as in the same camp as Warren Trading and Williams v. Lee, so that Justice Thomas’s state-
ment in Wagnon is more puzzling and shows the blurring between a preemption analysis and 
a balancing test. 
1306 Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 106. The Tribe argued that what was taxed was the distributor’s use, 
sale, or delivery of the fuel on the reservation. Id. at 107.
The Government as amicus curiae for the Tribe argued that the Indian Trader statutes and 
Central Machinery should apply. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondent, Wagnon, 546 U.S. 95 (No. 04-631), 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 440, at 
*19–21. The Government argued that under the Kansas Uniform Commercial Code a sale 
occurred on the reservation. Id. at *21 n.9. Although the distributor did not have a license 
to trade with the Indians, Central Machinery held that fact to be irrelevant under the Indian 
Trader statutes. Id. at *21. Neither the majority nor the dissent addressed this argument. 
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no application. 
The Court defended White Mountain’s application to only on-reservation 
activities as reflecting the significant geographical component of Indian sover-
eignty.1307 Applying the balancing test to taxes imposed off-reservation would 
not only be “inconsistent with the special geographic sovereignty concerns 
that gave rise to that test, but also with our efforts to establish ‘bright-line 
standard[s]’ in the context of tax administration.”1308
The Court in Mescalero1309 had upheld the taxation of the gross receipts of 
an off-reservation, tribally owned ski resort, without any kind of a balancing 
test. If a state could tax the off-reservation activities of a tribally owned busi-
ness, then a fortiori it could tax the off-reservation activities of a non-Indian 
business. There was one difference, however. The burden of the New Mexico 
tax in Mescalero fell on an off-reservation activity, and in Wagnon the tax 
arguably fell on a reservation activity:1310 the purchase of fuel. Under that 
distinction, however, “any off-reservation tax imposed on the manufacture 
or sale of any good imported by the [Tribe] or one of its members would be 
subject to interest balancing.”1311 For example, a sales tax, an income tax, or a 
property tax on a retailer’s off-reservation activities would trigger balancing if 
the retailer sold a good to a tribe or an Indian for use in Indian country (and 
there was evidence that the tax increased the price of the good). The chaos 
that would result illustrates the wisdom of the majority rejecting a balancing 
test under the facts of Wagnon.
The majority also dismissed the argument that balancing was appropriate 
because of the Tribal tax. In essence, this argument was just another way of 
complaining about the downstream consequences of a Kansas tax imposed 
off-reservation.1312 The Tribe’s complaint was that the Kansas tax depressed 
1307 Id. at 112.
1308 Id. at 113 (quoting Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue v. Blaze Constr. Co., 526 U.S. 32, 37 
(1999)).
1309 See supra notes 592–652 and accompanying text.
1310 The dissent used this distinction to reject Mescalero as precedent. Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 
123 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
1311 Id. at 114. The motor fuels tax exempted fuel sold or delivered to other sovereigns. The 
Court rejected the Tribe’s argument that there was no exemption for fuel delivered to its sta-
tions so that the statute was discriminatory. If the motor fuels tax, however, is viewed as either 
a consumption tax or a crude user charge for using Kansas roads, an exemption for exports to 
other sovereigns (presumably other states or foreign countries) would be justified because it is 
unlikely the fuel will subsequently be used on Kansas roads. By contrast, most of the purchas-
ers of fuel on-reservation presumably used the fuel off-reservation and in Kansas. Even if the 
fuel were used on-reservation, arguably no exemption would be appropriate to the extent that 
Kansas used the tax revenue to maintain the roads and bridges on the reservation. (The Court 
stated that Kansas used the proceeds from its fuel tax to pay for a significant portion of the 
costs of maintaining the roads and bridges on the reservation, including the main highway 
used by the casino patrons. 546 U.S. at 115.) Many states exempt shipments made in inter-
state commerce from their general sales tax, hellerstein, McIntyre & Pomp, supra note 426, 
at 79, which mirrors the exemption in the Kansas motor fuels tax. The Court had no trouble 
concluding that the tax was not impermissibly discriminatory. 
1312 Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 114.
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the revenues from the gas station, but Moe and Colville had already rejected 
that type of argument, unless those cases were to be limited to tax abuse situ-
ations involving the marketing of an exemption.1313 
Moreover, because the Tribe was selling gas at prices very close to those 
prevailing off-reservation,1314 this was not a situation like Colville, where a 
business was essentially being shut down by a state tax. As long as prices were 
similar on- and off-reservation, patrons and employees of the casino who 
constituted the likely market had no reason to bypass the station. In Colville, 
the smokeshops were servicing off-reservation consumers who were purposely 
shopping on the reservation to buy tax-free cigarettes. If the price of cigarettes 
on-reservation were the same as off-reservation, the smokeshops would lose 
their market.
More subtly, whether the Tribe imposed its own tax or not was irrelevant. 
When a tribe owns an enterprise like a gas station, it has a claim on all of the 
revenue. It is economically irrelevant whether the tribe imposes a tax and pays 
itself some of that revenue through the tax.1315 had the tribe not imposed 
its own tax, it could have sold the gasoline at the same price, and netted the 
same amount of revenue.1316 Analytically, the case did not involve an issue of 
multiple taxation but simply whether an off-reservation tax should be struck 
down because it affected prices on the reservation. Put in those terms, the 
answer was an easy “no.”1317
1313 If the Tribe were to eliminate its own “taxes,” see infra, the Court might then view it as 
seeking to market a tax exemption. But the facts in Wagnon indicated that the gas station had 
a fairly captive market so that the Tribe had no reason to try to exploit any tax differential 
between on- and off-reservation sales. Nonetheless, at the margin, a substantial differential in 
price could encourage some patrons of the casino to fuel up on the reservation rather than off-
reservation; persons working or living on the reservation, might be similarly encouraged. 
Part of the difficulty in accepting the existing level of tribal taxes in determining whether 
a tribe is marketing an exemption is that after a case is handed down in favor of a tribe based 
on the existence of tribal taxes, the tribe might then eliminate the taxes. Justice Ginsburg 
conceded that if the Tribe were to do this, the balancing test would likely come out in favor of 
the State. Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 130 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). A more fundamental argument 
is that the Tribe’s “tax” had no economic significance. See supra notes 890–96, 909–10, and 
accompanying text; infra notes 1315–17, 1349–55, and accompanying text. 
The government as amicus curiae on behalf of the Tribe argued that the Indians were not 
marketing an exemption in part because the “fuel is sold at fair market price, [and] the rate 
of the Tribe’s tax is roughly comparable to the tax imposed by the State.” Brief for the United 
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 1306, at *25.
1314 See supra note 1295.
1315 See supra notes 890–96, 909–10, 1316–17, and accompanying text; infra notes 1349–55 
and accompanying text.
1316 See infra notes 1349–51 and accompanying text.
1317 In a footnote, Justice Thomas perfunctorily dismissed the Tribe’s Williams v. Lee argu-
ment. Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 115 n.6.
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c.  Ginsburg’s Dissent
i.  White Mountain Applies. Justice Ginsburg dissented, writing for 
herself and Justice Kennedy.1318 Justice Ginsburg relied on White Mountain, 
which she read as a balancing test. In her discussion of White Mountain, 
she did not distinguish between a balancing test and a preemption analysis. 
She described Kansas’s position as rejecting White Mountain because the legal 
incidence of the fuels tax fell on the distributor and the tax was triggered by 
the receipt of fuel off-reservation.1319
She attempted to dismantle both legs of the State’s position. In exquisite 
irony for a Justice who just a few years earlier in Chickasaw justified the for-
malism of the legal incidence test on the grounds of “predictability,”1320 she 
went to great lengths to challenge the majority’s statutory analysis, which 
accepted the State’s view. To her, the legal incidence was unclear, although her 
reasoning was murky. 
ii.  Legal Incidence is Unclear. She started her opinion by declaring 
that the “Kansas fuel tax at issue is imposed on distributors, passed on to 
retailers, and ultimately paid by gas station customers.”1321 This statement 
would suggest the legal incidence was on the distributor, unless the “pass-
ing on” of the tax to retailers was meant to suggest it was on the Tribe. But 
whether the tax was passed forward was less clear than she suggested. The 
“Kansas Legislature anticipated that distributors would shift the tax burden 
further downstream.”1322 This may have been the expectation, but accord-
ing to the majority, the statute stated only that distributors are “‘entitled’ to 
pass along the cost of the tax to downstream purchasers,” not that they are 
required to do so.1323 At oral argument, Kansas acknowledged that the record 
on whether the cost was passed on was unclear, but represented that the dis-
tributor did in fact do so.1324 
But even Justice Ginsburg seemed unconvinced by her own argument that 
the legal incidence was on the Tribe. She recounted that Chickasaw Nation 
allows a state to amend its law to shift a tax’s legal incidence and “Kansas took 
the cue,” amending its fuel tax statute to provide that “‘the incidence of this 
1318 Even if the dissent had prevailed, the Tribe might not have paid a lower price to a 
distributor for its purchases. If there were no tax on the sale, a distributor might increase its 
wholesale price to capitalize some or all of the lack of a tax. See supra note 706.
1319 Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 118–19 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
1320 See supra note 1283 and accompanying text. 
1321 Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 116 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
1322 Id. at 119 (emphasis added). She bolstered this argument by analyzing a panoply of 
statutory exemptions. Id.
1323 Id. at 103 (emphasis added). Exactly what the statute was meant to accomplish with this 
provision is unclear. In the absence of price controls, any taxpayer is free to pass along any taxes 
to its customers, just the way other costs are passed along. Competitive constraints, of course, 
affect the degree to which a taxpayer can pass forward its costs by raising its prices. The Kansas 
tax was paid by the distributor and increased the cost of its inventory. That cost would have to 
be recovered in order to stay in business.
1324 Id. at 100 n.2.
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tax is imposed on the distributor.’”1325 
Ultimately, she abandoned any attempt to place the legal incidence on the 
Tribe, and was content with arguing, contrary to the majority, that the tax 
was triggered by a sale and delivery to the Tribe’s gas station. That was enough 
to implicate an on-reservation activity,1326 which triggered a balancing test 
under White Mountain. had she believed that the legal incidence was on the 
Tribe, balancing would have been irrelevant because the tax would have been 
unconstitutional under Chickasaw Nation as she acknowledged.1327 Despite 
her doubts about the majority’s conclusion that the legal incidence fell on the 
distributor, she never based her opinion on a contrary interpretation and as 
her statement above suggests, she apparently agreed with Justice Thomas. 
her grumblings about legal incidence aside,1328 she described the case as 
involving taxes that are “formally imposed on nonmembers [but] nonethe-
1325 Id. at 121 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Kan. Stat. Ann. § 79-3408(c) (2003 
Cumm. Supp.)). In 1992, Kansas had entered into a five-year agreement with the Tribe, pro-
viding an exemption from the state excise tax on the condition that the Tribal tax was not less 
than 60% of the state sales tax. In 1995, Kansas amended its statute to remove the exemption, 
and in 1997 refused to renew the agreement. Brief for Respondent, supra note 1306, at *7–8.
1326 “With respect to sales and deliveries to the [Tribe’s gas station], however, the nontribal 
entity can indeed be described as ‘engaged in [an on-reservation] transaction with [a tribe].’” 
Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 123 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue v. Blaze 
Constr. Co., 526 U.S. 32, 37 (1999)). Blaze, which rejected a balancing test, was an odd 
case to cite in support of such a pedestrian statement that the distributor could be viewed as 
engaged in on-reservation activities. Blaze involved a corporation formed in Montana under 
Blackfeet tribal law and owned by a tribal member, which received gross proceeds from con-
structing roads on several Indian reservations in Arizona under a contract with the BIA. The 
Supreme Court upheld the Arizona sales tax on the proceeds Blaze received for its construction 
services. In rejecting Blaze’s argument that a balancing test should be applied, the Court said 
that it has 
never employed this balancing test in a case such as this one where a State seeks 
to tax a transaction between the Federal Government and its non-Indian private 
contractor. We decline to do so now. . . . The need to avoid litigation and to ensure 
efficient tax administration counsels in favor of a bright-line standard for taxation 
of federal contracts, regardless of whether the contracted-for-activity takes place on 
Indian reservations. Moreover, as we recognized in New Mexico, the “political process 
is ‘uniquely adapted to accommodating’” the interests implicated by state taxation of 
federal contractors.
Blaze, 526 U.S. at 37–38. The Blaze Court saw the case as being controlled by United States v. 
New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720 (1982); see supra notes 657, 1049, 1288 and accompanying text. 
Perhaps the reason Blaze was cited was that Justice Thomas wrote that opinion.
1327 Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 120–21 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). For a perceptive discussion of 
Blaze, see Sarah Krakoff, Undoing Indian Law One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism and 
Tribal Sovereignty, 50 Am. U. L. Rev. 1177, 1238–39 (2001); Richard J. Ansson, Jr., Protecting 
Tribal Sovereignty: Why States Should Not Be Able To Tax Contractors Hired By The BIA To 
Construct Reservation Projects For Tribes: Blaze Construction Co. v. New Mexico Taxation and 
Revenue Department: A Case Study, 20 Am. Indian L. Rev. 459 (1995-96).
1328 “[O]ne can demur to the assertion that the legal incidence of the tax falls on the distribu-
tor, a nontribal entity.” Wagnon. 546 U.S. at 123 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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less burden on-reservation tribal activity.”1329 Although “burden” can be read 
to mean the economic consequences on the Tribe of the off-reservation tax, 
Justice Ginsburg’s view of the statute was that the tax was triggered by on-
reservation activity. Indeed, she quoted favorably from the Tribe’s brief in the 
appellate court that it was not contending “that a non-discriminatory, off-
reservation state tax of general applicability may be precluded simply because 
the tax has an adverse economic impact on a Tribe or its members.”1330 
From that point on, the case became an application of the balancing test 
under White Mountain, and Colville would seem to be a relevant precedent. 
Colville upheld the Washington tax on non-members and non-Indians, 
although no one would accuse the Court of having undertaken a serious bal-
ancing inquiry because it viewed the case as involving tax avoidance. The 
dissent recognized that balancing had been criticized as rudderless,1331 but 
reluctantly saw no alternative to “seek[ing] an accommodation between the 
interests of the Tribes and the Federal Government, on the one hand, and 
those of the State, on the other.”1332 
iii.  Colville Is Limited to Tax Avoidance Situations. In applying that 
balancing test, she had to dispose of Colville. She did this by distinguishing 
Colville as involving the marketing of an exemption. here, by contrast, the 
Tribal station “operates almost exclusively as an amenity for people driving to 
and from the casino.”1333 
1329 Id. (first emphasis added). Because 73% of the gas was sold to non-Indian patrons of 
the Tribal casino, Professor Jensen argues Wagnon was a stronger case for preemption than 
Colville. 
In Colville, the Court had determined, with some reason that the tribe was seeking to 
market only its tax exemption. In contrast, the gas station in Wagnon was largely an 
amenity for the tribal casino’s customers, not a discount station marketing itself to the 
world. One might have characterized fuel sales as part of the gaming enterprise—an 
enterprise in which there was a decidedly strong federal and tribal interest.
Jensen, supra note 9, at 82. 
1330 Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 124 n.9 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Professor Fletcher speculates 
that the 
Court [might have been] worried that the states and the federal government might 
adapt the Nation’s theory for their own purposes . . . Perhaps the Court was worried 
that states would demand a refund for money they paid in accordance with govern-
ment contracts to construction contractors based out of state where that money could 
be traced to another state’s taxation (a circumstance that occurs with regularity in 
tribal construction projects).
Fletcher, Indian Problem, supra note 11, at 629 (footnotes omitted).
1331 Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 124 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Washington v. Confederated 
Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 176 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in 
part, concurring in result in part and dissenting in part)).
1332 Id. (quoting Colville, 447 U.S. at 156).
1333 Id. at 126. 
In Colville, it was “painfully apparent” that outsiders had no reason to travel to Indian 
reservations to buy cigarettes other than the bargain prices tribal smokeshops charged 
by virtue of their claimed exemption from state taxation. . . . “[I]n stark contrast 
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having neutralized Colville, the dissent then relied on the uncontroverted 
testimony of the Tribe’s expert witness at trial, that “the Tribal and State taxes 
are mutually exclusive and only one can be collected without reducing the 
[station’s] fuel business to virtually zero.”1334 The answer to the obvious ques-
tion of why the station was able to sell gas within two cents of the prevailing 
market price despite the application of both Tribal and Kansas taxes was a 
statement made at oral argument that the Tribe was subsidizing the sales.1335 
According to Ginsburg, the Tribe proved what the Colville Tribe could not,1336 
although an assertion at oral argument is hardly rigorous empirical evidence.
The dissent quoted with approval the lower court’s finding that fuel sales 
were “an integral and essential part of the [Tribe’s] on-reservation gaming 
enterprise.”1337 “The [Tribe] built the [station] as a convenience for its casino 
patrons and, but for the casino, there would be no market for fuel in this 
otherwise remote area.”1338 In addition, the Tribal tax was earmarked for 
“constructing and maintaining roads, bridges and rights-of-way located on 
or near the reservation.”1339 Moreover, the “[Tribe’s] interests coincide with 
‘strong federal interests in promoting tribal economic development, tribal 
self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments.’”1340
iv.  Kansas Has No Strong Interest in Taxation. “Against these strong 
tribal and federal interests, Kansas asserts only its ‘general interest in raising 
revenues.’”1341 “By effectively taxing the [station], Kansas would be deriving 
to the smokeshops in Colville,” the [Tribe] here is not using its asserted exemption 
from state taxation to lure non-Indians onto its reservation. The [station] is not vis-
ible from the state highway, and it advertises no exemption from the State’s fuel tax. 
Including the [tribal tax, the gas station] sells fuel ‘‘within 2 [cents] per gallon of the 
price prevailing in the local market.’’ The [station’s] draw, therefore, is neither price 
nor proximity to the highway; rather, the [station] operates almost exclusively as an 
amenity for people driving to and from the casino. 
Id. at 125–26.
1334 Id. at 126 (citing Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation v. Richards, 379 F.3d 979, 986 (10th 
Cir. 2004)). It is unclear whether an injunction against the collection of the tax on sales made 
on the reservation had been issued. But even if it had been, there was a period of time when 
both the state tax and the Tribal tax simultaneously applied and the Tribe was selling gasoline 
at a price competitive with off-reservation stations.
1335 See id. at 127 n.11.
1336
In this respect, the case is indeed novel. It is the first case in which a Tribe demon-
strated below that the imposition of a state tax would prevent the Tribe from impos-
ing its own tax. Cf. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 185, (state and tribal taxes were 
not mutually exclusive because “the Tribe could, in fact, increase its taxes without 
adversely affecting on-reservation oil and gas development”). 
Id. at 126–27. What is also novel is that the Tribe should be allowed to present this fact at oral 
argument without briefing it or arguing it below.
1337 Id. at 127 (quoting Prairie Band, 379 F.3d at 984).
1338 Id. Professor Jensen is sympathetic to this argument. See supra note 1329.
1339 Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 128 (quoting Prairie Band, 379 F.3d at 985–86).
1340 Id. (quoting Prairie Band, 379 F.3d at 986).
1341 Id. (quoting Prairie Band, 379 F.3d at 986).
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revenue ‘primarily from value generated on the reservation’ by the [Tribe’s] 
casino.”1342 Furthermore, the Kansas tax at stake was “less than one-tenth 
of one percent of the total state fuel tax revenues.”1343 And none of the rev-
enues from the Kansas tax was used for the upkeep or improvement of Tribal 
roads.1344
The heart of the disagreement between the majority and the dissent 
involved how to interpret the State’s fuel tax statute. For the majority, the tax 
was imposed on the distributor on the receipt of fuel off-reservation and no 
balancing was required. For the dissent, the tax was imposed on a reservation 
activity, which triggered balancing. Colville was not controlling precedent 
because that was a tax avoidance case and nothing similar could be argued 
here. 
d.  Should the Tribe’s Tax be Viewed as Having Independent Economic 
Significance? 
Resolving this narrow statutory issue of legal incidence that divided the Court, 
unique to the old Kansas statute, would take me far afield (even by the loose 
standards of relevancy exercised throughout this Article), with little redeem-
ing value. however, one point in the dissent’s analysis merits exploration, and 
that is the uncritical acceptance that the Tribe was levying a “tax:” 
Both the [Tribe] and the State have authority to tax fuel sales . . . . As a prac-
tical matter, however, the two tolls cannot coexist. If the [Tribe] imposes its 
tax on top of Kansas’ tax, then unless the [Tribe] operates the [gas station] 
at a substantial loss, scarcely anyone will fill up at its pumps. Effectively 
double-taxed, the [gas station] must operate as an unprofitable venture, or 
not at all. In these circumstances, which tax is paramount?1345 
“As the [Tribe] points out and the Court of Appeals comprehended, ‘the 
actual issue presented here [is] the permissibility of a state tax that effectively 
nullifies a Tribe’s power to impose a comparable tax on fuel sold at market 
price by a tribally owned, on-reservation gas station.’”1346 “[This] is the first 
case in which a Tribe demonstrated below1347 that the imposition of a state tax 
1342 Id. at 128–29 (quoting Prairie Band, 379 F.3d at 986).
1343 Id. at 129. In most imaginable circumstances, a state tax is going to raise an insignificant 
amount of revenue from activities on the reservation compared to the total revenues raised by 
the tax statewide. Such a comparison would seem to skew the balancing test in favor of the 
Indians.
1344 Id. Professor Goldberg describes Justice Ginsburg’s dissent as displaying “real apprecia-
tion for the value of tribal sovereignty and the realities of tribal governments and economies.” 
Carole Goldberg, Finding the Way to Indian Country: Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Decisions in 
Indian Law Cases, 70 Ohio St. L. J. 1003, 1032 (2009). 
1345 Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 116–17 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
1346 Id. at 124 n.9.
1347 At trial, the Tribe had an expert testify that “the Tribal and State taxes [were] mutually 
exclusive and only one [could] be collected without reducing the [station’s] fuel business to 
virtually zero.” Prairie Band, 379 F.3d at 986. 
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would prevent the Tribe from imposing its own tax.”1348
The difficulty with this reasoning is that the Tribe owned the gas station. 
In that case, as the majority understood,1349 the Tribe will keep all revenue 
above its out of-pocket operating costs. For example, suppose no Tribal tax 
were imposed and that revenue above the station’s operating costs (including 
the Kansas tax) were $100. Now suppose that the Tribe imposes a fuel tax, 
which consists of $20. Economically, it makes no difference whether the Tribe 
receives $20 in tax and $80 in profits or (with no tax) $100 in profits.1350
A similar analysis would apply even if the station operated at a loss, as was 
asserted by the Tribe during oral argument.1351 Suppose without a Tribal tax, 
the station had costs (including the Kansas tax) that were $60 more than its 
revenues, so that it operated at a loss. Now suppose that a Tribal fuel tax were 
imposed that resulted in additional costs of $20, increasing the loss to $80. 
The tax revenue of $20, however, would be available to subsidize the loss, so 
that the net loss would be $60, the same as before the tax were imposed. 
The obvious question, then, is why did the Tribe bother to impose a fuels 
1348 Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 127 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
1349 See id. at 114.
1350 Using the figures in the text, if the station were clearing $100 before the tax and $120 
after the tax because of an inelastic demand curve, then the tax could be eliminated and the 
price increased by the amount of the tax so that the same $120 was generated. Apparently, 
the price of gasoline on-reservation was set to match prices off-reservation. The Tribe had no 
incentive to undercut off-reservation prices and was unwilling to test the market by exceeding 
off-reservation prices. If off-reservation prices were $X per gallon, the Tribe would set its tax-
inclusive price at that point. It would make no difference if it had a tax or not—gas would sell 
at that price and the Tribe would net all the revenues above its costs.
If the Tribe would have been better off at a higher price that $X, it should have been selling 
gas at that prices whether it had a tax or not.
A possible wrinkle in this analysis is that the Tribal fuel tax was earmarked for “‘construct-
ing and maintaining roads, bridges and rights-of-way located on or near the reservation.’” Id. 
at 128 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Politically, the Tribe might not have been able to make these 
expenditures without a dedicated tax, or to have been able to enact a tax without earmarking. 
Nonetheless, earmarking could have been achieved without a fuel tax by the Tribe simply 
providing that 16 cents per gallon of gasoline sold at the station (the rate of the tax prior to 
January 2003) would be dedicated for maintaining the roads, etc. To be sure, earmarking a 
fuels tax is an accepted technique used throughout the country, which might have made it 
more politically attractive than this alternative.
1351 Id. at 127 n.11. It seems likely that the station was indeed operated as a “convenience” 
to casino patrons and workers, the same way free drinks and food are provided to high-rollers 
as a “convenience.” The reality, of course, is that the station, just like the free food and drinks, 
is a convenience to, and benefits, both parties: the casino and its patrons. 
State corporate income taxes recognize the illusionary nature of viewing synergistic activi-
ties in isolation from each other and apply the concept of a “unitary business.” The Tribe was 
not subject to the Kansas state corporate income tax so that this issue was moot. however, if 
a remotely located, privately-owned business also operated a gas station because it increased 
sales at the business, the notion that the station operated at a “loss” would be rejected and the 
operations of the station would be combined with the operations of the business for income 
tax purposes. For a general discussion, of this combined reporting or unitary business issue, see 
Richard D. Pomp, State and Local Taxation, ch. 10 (6th ed. 2009).
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tax in the first place? Nothing in the record addressed this question, but one 
possibility is illustrated by the dissent’s (mis)analysis. Anticipating litiga-
tion, the Tribe might have hoped that a fuels tax would enable it to make 
a multiple taxation argument, instead of being in the more pedestrian and 
unsympathetic posture of arguing that the Kansas tax impacted its revenues. 
Alternatively, the answer might lie in Tribal politics,1352 marketing,1353 or more 
simply, that the issue was never considered as the Tribe simply mimicked the 
Kansas tax.1354
The Tribe’s double tax argument was similar to the argument the Court 
had previously rejected in Colville.1355 Kansas argued that if the Tribe were 
to prevail, and the state tax were prohibited, “nothing would stop [it] from 
reducing its tax in order to sell gas below the market price,”1356 a fear similarly 
raised in Colville. The dissent, by contrast, felt confident that “[w]ere the 
[Tribe] to pursue such a course, it would be marketing an exemption, much 
as the smokeshops did in Colville, and hence, interest balancing would likely 
yield a judgment for the State.”1357 The Tribe suggested that Kansas could 
guard against this risk by providing a credit for the Tribal tax.1358
1352 Taxes like the fuels tax are sometimes earmarked in order to increase their political attrac-
tiveness. Although earmarking could have been accomplished in other ways, see supra note 
1350, the tendency of a tribe is to wrap itself in the mantle of taxes that are already accepted, 
such as the state excise tax on gasoline, which is often earmarked for transportation infrastruc-
ture. 
1353 Perhaps the Tribe was able to advertise the price of gasoline without including its tax; 
if there were no tax but a higher price, some potential customers might be discouraged. All 
smoke and mirrors to be sure, but that is typical of much of marketing and advertising.
1354 If there were other non-Indian owned gas stations on the reservation, the tax would 
have a very real economic impact by raising revenue from those sales. There was nothing in the 
proceedings suggesting there were non-Indian owned stations. 
Indian-run casinos and similar venues may be a mixture of privately-owned and tribally-
owned restaurants, hotels, theaters, and the like, so that a tribal tax may have a real economic 
consequence under that situation.
There may be other, more subtle consequences that turn on the existence of a tax, but they 
are unlikely to undercut the point made in the text.
1355 Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
The cigarette taxes in Colville, see supra notes 740–915 and accompanying text, can be analo-
gized to the Tribe’s gasoline tax in Wagnon. In both cases it was irrelevant whether the Tribe 
received $100 in profits with no tax, or $80 in profits and $20 in tax. The double tax argument 
had no role to play in the Court’s analysis in Colville so this point remained undeveloped in 
that case.
1356 Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 130 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
1357 Id.
1358 The Indian Commerce Clause did not figure prominently in the Tribe’s brief. An amicus 
brief supporting the Tribe, however, argued that the Indian Commerce Clause 
completely excluded state regulatory authority without assessment of countervailing 
state interests only where tribes were involved in or directly and concretely affected 
by the transactions that the state sought to regulate. . . . States were empowered to 
exercise general regulatory authority, including taxing authority, over transactions not 
involving, or only remotely affecting, tribes, even if those transactions took place in, 
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h.  The Income Tax
1.  Chickasaw Redux
a.  McClanahan Does not Apply to Indians Working on, but Living off, the 
Reservation 
The second issue in the Chickasaw case supra, involved whether Oklahoma 
could tax the wages of members of the Chickasaw Nation who worked for the 
Tribe on tribal lands, but resided outside Indian country.1359 The Court analo-
gized the situation to the widely accepted principle in interstate and interna-
tional taxation that allows a jurisdiction to tax residents on their worldwide 
income. The Indians were being taxed not because they were Indians, not 
because they were working for a tribe, and not because they had earned their 
income on a reservation, but only because they were residents of Oklahoma. 
Justice Ginsburg never explained why this was a relevant analogy. Further, 
without any substantive discussion, Ginsburg asserted that the McClanahan 
“principle does not operate outside Indian country”1360 ignoring the fact that 
the income was earned on the reservation.
Considering that the other issue in Chickasaw, the gasoline tax, was con-
trolled by the legal incidence of the tax falling on the Tribe, it is odd that 
Ginsburg does not apply, or at least address the applicability of that test, to 
an income tax. The legal incidence of the income tax was on the individual 
Indians. The taxable activity took place on the reservation. Yet Ginsburg does 
not try to justify the difference in result between the gasoline tax and the 
income tax.
2.  Rationale for the Holding
Presumably, the reason why the international rule has such currency is because 
residents benefit from state provided services, protections, opportunities, and 
or had some connection with, Indian country. But, federal authority was exclusive 
with respect to transactions directly or concretely affecting tribes in Indian country.
Brief of Amici Curiae NCAI et al., Wagnon, 546 U.S. 95 (No. 04-631), 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs 
LEXIS 450, at *9. The brief described Worcester as relying in part on the Indian Commerce 
Clause. Id. at *8. The brief also described Williams v. Lee as relying on Worcester, and thus on 
the Indian Commerce Clause. Id. at *9. In response to this brief, Kansas offered a minimalist 
view of the Indian Commerce Clause. The Clause “offers nothing other than justification for 
federal legislation affecting Indians. [Cotton Petroleum]. Further, the Indian Commerce Clause 
possesses no dormant component.” Reply Brief for Petitioner, Wagnon, 546 U.S. 95 (No. 
04-631), 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 547, at *18–19. 
1359 Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 464 (1995). Professor Goldberg 
notes that this fact pattern was “common on small reservations, where there is simply not 
enough land to house all the tribal members who wish to live and work there. It is also com-
mon in Oklahoma, where a federal policy known as allotment broke up large reservations and 
left tribes with small amounts of checkerboarded Indian country.” Carole Goldberg, Finding 
the Way to Indian Country: Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Decisions in Indian Law Cases, 70 
Ohio St. L.J. 1003, 1020 (2009).
1360 Chickasaw, 515 U.S. at 464.
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benefits. In return, they can be taxed on their worldwide income, with a 
credit usually granted for income taxes paid to other states. At its core, the 
principle is based on due process considerations. McClanahan was limited to 
an Indian living and working on a reservation, who was not the beneficiary 
of state-provided goods and services. Apparently, these differences trump the 
legal incidence of the tax.
The Tribe relied heavily on the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek. Specifi-
cally, the Oklahoma income tax was said to violate the provision that 
[t]he Government and people of the United States are hereby obliged to 
secure to the said [Chickasaw] Nation . . . the jurisdiction and government 
of all the persons and property that may be within their limits west, so that 
no . . . State shall ever have a right to pass laws for the [Chickasaws] and 
their descendants . . . but the U[nited] S[tates] shall forever secure said 
[Chickasaws] from . . . all [such] laws.1361 
According to the Tribe, the Oklahoma income tax was a law “for the gov-
ernment of the [Chickasaws] and their descendants.”1362 The Tribe apparently 
hoped for a generous application of the Indian canons of construction in 
interpreting the treaty.
But Justice Ginsburg was not Thurgood Marshall.1363 She quickly dis-
posed of this argument. After the de rigueur reminder that treaties should 
be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, the Court emphasized that the 
Treaty applied only to persons and property within Indian country.1364 “We do 
not read the Treaty as conferring super-sovereign authority to interfere with 
another jurisdiction’s sovereign right to tax income, from all sources, of those 
who choose to live within that jurisdiction’s limits.”1365 Because the Tribe did 
not levy its own income tax, there was no argument that the State tax should 
be preempted or that Oklahoma should provide a credit against its income 
tax for a Tribal tax. To the majority, the Tribe’s claim was “narrow,”1366 and fell 
outside the language of the Treaty.
1361 Id. at 465 (emphasis added).
1362 Id. 
1363 For example, see Marshall’s charitable reading of the relevant treaty and enabling act in 
McClanahan, see supra notes 529–43 and accompanying text.
1364 Chickasaw, 515 U.S. at 466. The Court easily rejected the argument that the income tax 
on a tribal employee should be treated as an unconstitutional tax on the tribal employer, a doc-
trine long discredited in the federal and state contexts. Id. at 466. “We doubt the signatories 
meant to incorporate this now-defunct view into the Treaty.” Id. The dissent took issue with 
this perspective. See id. at 469–70 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
1365 Id. at 466; see also George v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 548 N.Y.S.2d 66 (1989).
1366 Chickasaw, 515 U.S. at 464 n.13.
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3.  Breyer’s Interpretation of the Treaty in Dissent
The dissent had less trouble applying the Treaty. Justice Breyer, joined by Jus-
tices Stevens, O’Connor,1367 and Souter, downplayed the geographical limits 
of the Treaty. Justice Breyer read the historical setting of the Treaty as sug-
gesting the signatories “intended the language to provide a broad guarantee 
that state law would not apply to the Chickasaws if they moved west of the 
Mississippi . . . .”1368 Justice Breyer asserted, without any empirical support, 
that the Oklahoma income would likely increase wages the Tribe would have 
to pay, which would reduce the funds available for other expenditures. “The 
impact of the tax upon tribal wages, tribal members, and tribal land makes it 
possible, indeed reasonable, to consider Oklahoma’s tax (insofar as it applies 
to these tribal wages) as amounting to a law ‘for the government of ’ the 
Tribe.”1369 
Breyer emphasized that the tax “(1) has a strong connection to tribal gov-
ernment . . . (2) does not regulate conduct outside Indian country, and (3) 
does not . . . represent an effort to recover a proportionate share of . . . the cost 
of providing state services to residents,”1370 and would leave for another day 
whether the Treaty would cover a law with a weaker link to tribal government 
or a stronger impact outside Indian country.1371
1367 Dean Getches describes Justice O’Connor as remaining “somewhat independent on 
Indian issues, as is true of her position in other fields.” Getches, Conquering, supra note 14, 
at 1639.
1368 Chickasaw, 515 U.S. at 469 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
1369 Id. Under this view, the tax might be struck down as violating the Williams v. Lee 
infringement test. The Court declined to answer this question in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. 
Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 126 (1993).
Justice Breyer tried to bolster his reasoning by arguing that in “1837, when the United 
States made its promise to the Chickasaws, the law considered a tax like the present one to 
be a tax on its source—i.e., the Tribe itself.” Chickasaw, 515 U.S. at 469. Two problems exist, 
however, which undercut his argument. First, the case he cites, Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie 
County, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 435 (1842), which held that a federal employee’s salary was exempt 
from a state tax, was decided in 1842, after the Treaty was signed. Second, Breyer seems to 
misstate the date the Treaty was signed, 1837 rather than 1830, which makes the Treaty seem 
closer in time to Dobbins than it actually was. (The 1830 Treaty was between the United States 
and the Choctaws; the 1837 Treaty was between the Choctaws and the Chickasaws, Treaty of 
Jan. 17, 1837, 11 Stat. 573, art. I, under terms that were established in the 1830 Treaty.)
The court of appeals had a more straightforward argument. “All that matters is whether the 
law—although facially neutral as between Indians and non-Indians—is being applied to mem-
bers of the Tribe. If so, in the court of appeals’ view, the law is one ‘for the government of the 
Chickasaw Nation’ and is invalid.” Brief of Petitioner, Chickasaw, 515 U.S. 450 (No. 94-771), 
1995 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 85, at *73.
1370 Chickasaw, 515 U.S. at 470. 
1371 Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, involved the State’s attempt to impose its personal 
income tax on the income of Tribal members living within the boundaries of a reservation that 
had been ceded to the federal government in exchange for an allotment within the ceded res-
ervation. The income was earned on Indian trust land. Justice O’Connor rejected Oklahoma’s 
argument that McClanahan should be limited to income earned on a reservation by a tribal 
member living there. Id. at 123. The government as amicus curiae argued that McClanahan 
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Breyer’s first point is debatable. he asserted there was a connection because 
of the impact of the tax on the level of wages. The level of wages on the reser-
vation reflects numerous factors, including the extent to which non-Indians, 
subject to the Oklahoma income tax, work for the Tribe. There was simply 
no evidence that the Oklahoma income tax on Indians living off-reservation 
affected the level of wages paid on the reservation.
his second point is correct but irrelevant—an income tax is generally not 
adopted to regulate conduct. This second point also begs the question of why 
a non-discriminatory income tax cannot be applied. Justice Breyer did not 
explore the rationale of McClanahan and whether it might apply to exempt 
the employees. 
his third point would overrule much of the case law that previously reject-
ed—and rightfully so—the proportionality argument.1372 Income taxes do 
not have to be proportionate to the cost of providing services. Moreover, 
residents are presumed to benefit from state services even if they work outside 
the state. Put differently, if the Indians commuted to Texas rather than to 
the reservation, they would be precluded from arguing that their Oklahoma 
income taxes should be reduced because they received less State services. The 
same argument should be rejected just because they commuted to a reserva-
tion. Justice Breyer’s charitable and generous reading of the Treaty suggests he 
is the heir apparent to Thurgood Marshall.
Neither the Tribe nor its amici argued that the Indian Commerce Clause 
would prevent the Oklahoma income tax. Presumably, the parties thought it 
was too late in the day to raise this argument.
VI.  Conclusion
Those who have slogged their way through this Article deserve a satisfying (if 
not definitive) answer to why the promise of the Indian Commerce Clause 
has remained unfulfilled. I am afraid there will be no drum roll, just conjec-
ture. 
The Court has not relied on the Indian Commerce Clause in striking down 
any state tax. Chief Justice John Marshall, one of the ratifiers of the Consti-
tution from Virginia, had the opportunity in 1832 in Worcester v. Georgia to 
shape the Clause into a powerful doctrine. As a ratifier, he was privy to the 
debates over the Clause and the arguments and facts laid out in Sections II 
and III of this Article. Instead of making the Indian Commerce Clause the 
centerpiece of his opinion, however, he used the case as a platform for an elo-
quent and courageous defense of Indian sovereignty—a thumb in President 
Jackson’s eye.1373 
Despite the long discussion in Worcester describing and defending the pre- 
and extra-constitutional sovereignty doctrine—immunizing the Cherokees 
required the presence of a formal reservation or a reservation community. Brief for the United 
States as Amicus Curiae at 16–20, Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114 (No. 92-259).
1372 See supra notes 1177, 1182, 1202, 1256, and accompanying text.
1373 See supra notes 229–77 and accompanying text.
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from Georgia’s laws—he was apparently worried about resting the opinion 
on that ground. The jurisdictional constraints on the Court imposed by the 
Judiciary Act of 1789 required that the case be grounded in the Constitution 
itself. he needed narrower grounds than the grandiose and sweeping pre- and 
extra-constitutional concept of Indian sovereignty, especially in a case involv-
ing penal laws. It wasn’t enough that the laws of Georgia violated the sover-
eignty of the Cherokees—which they did—he had to show that they were 
repugnant to the “constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States.”1374 
With an economy of language (and lack of verve) totally inconsistent with 
the fervor and passion of his earlier discussion of sovereignty, Marshall satis-
fied the Judiciary Act’s requirement with a compact and conclusory reference 
to Georgia’s laws being repugnant to the “constitution, laws, and treaties of 
the United States.” Although he did not fully unbundle this reference, the 
“constitution” encompassed the Indian Commerce Clause.1375 This lack of a 
resounding endorsement of the Clause, however, led to its being overshad-
owed by Marshall’s championing Indian sovereignty, arguably dicta. Ironi-
cally, that part of the opinion which Marshall apparently feared would not 
satisfy the Judiciary Act came to characterize Worcester and initially took cen-
ter stage, while the Indian Commerce Clause receded into the wings.
Worcester set in motion the course of subsequent litigation. Tribes under-
standably feel passionately and deeply about their sovereignty. The briefs 
involved in the tax cases discussed in this Article show that arguments based 
on sovereignty, at least early on, figured more prominently than those based 
on the Indian Commerce Clause. This was similarly true of arguments based 
on treaties, federal statutes, and state enabling acts. In some cases, this order-
ing of arguments might have reflected concerns about whether sufficient 
“commerce” existed to trigger the invocation of the Clause, but more gener-
ally it seemed to reflect the Clause’s lack of prominence in Worcester. 
The Court’s early opinions ignored the Clause. For example, the 1867 
cases, The Kansas Indians, and The New York Indians, emphasized the sover-
eignty of the tribes and the existence of a treaty.1376 The Indian Commerce 
Clause was not cited (perhaps because of concerns that “commerce” might 
not have existed). The 1885 case of Utah & Northern Railway1377 also ignored 
the Clause (even though commerce was clearly implicated). In 1886, the 
Kagama Court rejected the Clause as the source of Congress’s right to enact 
the Major Crimes Act, although the rationale in that case was the lack of 
“commerce.”1378 
In the 1898 case of Thomas v. Gay,1379 there were no federal statutes, trea-
ties, state enabling acts or the like to serve as a shield against state taxation. 
1374 See supra notes 267–77 and accompanying text.
1375 See supra notes 278–96 and accompanying text.
1376 See supra notes 307–22 and accompanying text.
1377 See supra notes 323–32 and accompanying text.
1378 See supra notes 333–53 and accompanying text.
1379 See supra notes 354–75 and accompanying text.
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“Commerce” clearly existed. The case was thus perfect for an Indian Com-
merce Clause argument. But instead of breathing life into the Clause, the 
Court disposed of the case with ipse dixit reasoning and a retreat into formal-
ism. The Court also erroneously claimed that the Clause had been rejected 
earlier in Utah & Northern Railway.1380 By the end of the 19th century, the 
message to litigants was clear.
There were no major state tax cases implicating the Clause in the early 
part of the 20th century. By the middle of that century, the Solicitor Gen-
eral took up the cause, attempting to rehabilitate and resurrect the Clause. 
Starting with Warren Trading, and continuing with Moe,1381 Central Machin-
ery, Colville,1382 and reaching its zenith in Ramah,1383 the government was an 
aggressive advocate for using the Clause to create a tax-free zone on a reserva-
tion, exactly what Thomas v. Gay refused to do. 
Inexplicably, Justice Thurgood Marshall, one of the Indians strongest allies, 
did not even acknowledge the Solicitor General’s brief in Central Machinery. 
Less surprising was that Justice Rehnquist also failed to mention the govern-
ment’s brief in Moe (in a unanimous opinion in which Marshall joined). In 
Ramah, the Solicitor General filed two briefs—the second of which was a 
resounding and sweeping endorsement of the Clause. Justice Marshall rejected 
the government’s efforts, arguing that current law apart from the Indian Com-
merce Clause was adequate to protect the Indians’ interests.1384 If an ally of 
the Indians felt this way, it is not surprising that in the hands of more hostile 
justices, such as Rehnquist and White, the Clause would be treated as merely 
protecting Indians from discriminatory state taxes.1385 Because none of the 
state tax cases before the Court involved a discriminatory tax, this revisionist 
view of the Clause has more theoretical than practical significance. Moreover, 
of all the Justices, only Stewart has been willing to interpret the Clause as 
requiring a state credit for a tribal tax, and that position was expressed in 
Colville, where the credit would have been meaningless.1386 A more robust 
and invigorated Indian Commerce Clause would have reversed the results 
in many of the cases discussed above. The states would have been the clear 
losers. But Congress would have been expected to have intervened in some 
manner to establish a new order—saying anything more than that would be 
sheer conjecture. For the same reason, I will leave it to others to speculate on 
whether the new composition of the Court provides a fresh opportunity to 
raise the Indian Commerce Clause going forward.
1380 See supra note 366 and accompanying text.
1381 See supra notes 696–97 and accompanying text.
1382 See supra notes 447, 517–18, and accompanying text. 
1383 See supra notes 1011–30 and accompanying text.
1384 See supra notes 1031–37 and accompanying text.
1385 See supra notes 807–13, 1041, and accompanying text.
1386 See supra notes 904–08 and accompanying text. In Cotton, Justice Stevens described the 
central function of the Indian Commerce Clause as providing Congress with plenary power to 
legislate in the field of Indian affairs. See supra note 1231 and accompanying text.
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If the Indian Commerce Clause has not fulfilled its promise, at least I can 
try to fulfill my promise in the Introduction to help negotiate the “laby-
rinth of unpredictability,”1387 which characterizes state-Indian taxation. The 
transactions discussed in this Article can be arrayed along a continuum. At 
one end of the continuum are those transactions taking place on a reserva-
tion without any direct connection to off-reservation activities, the subject of 
McClanahan. 
McClanahan1388 immunized from state income taxation an Indian who 
worked and lived on a reservation, having no direct off-reservation activities. 
Chickasaw teaches that a state cannot impose a tax whose legal incidence falls 
on a tribe (or an Indian) if the taxed activity takes place on a reservation.1389 
McClanahan would seem to be an application of Chickasaw (which had not 
yet been decided, although the cases upon which it relied had been). But 
Chickasaw went on to draw a line between Indians who work and live on 
a reservation and those who work on a reservation but live off-reservation, 
and holds that a state can impose its income tax on the latter.1390 The Court 
justified this distinction by relying on international custom and practice. 
Although the Court did not elaborate, presumably the Indians living off-
reservation benefited from state-provided goods and services in a way that 
on-reservation Indians did not, and that difference was enough to distinguish 
McClanahan.
In the case of cigarette excise taxes, however, the Court has ignored the 
Chickasaw line between residents and non-residents. From a policy perspec-
tive, ignoring that line is proper because cigarette excise taxes are consump-
tion taxes, which do not incorporate a concept of residency—and there is no 
custom or practice suggesting otherwise. The line the Court drew in Colville, 
however, was whether an Indian was a member of the tribe or not, which 
was unprincipled and unsupported by statute, precedent, or policy consider-
ations, and contradicted by the Indian Trader statutes. 
Moreover, in Moe1391 and Colville,1392 where the Court prohibited a state 
from levying its cigarette taxes on member-Indians but not on non-members, 
the legal incidence fell on the purchaser.1393 So much for legal incidence.
As state tax lawyers fully appreciate, legal incidence is a formal concept, 
divorced of economic significance,1394 which is why Complete Auto rejected 
it. The charm of a legal incidence test, according to Chickasaw, is predictabil-
ity and certainty.1395 But Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation demonstrates that 
1387 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
1388 See supra notes 1273–80 and accompanying text.
1389 See supra notes 519–91 and accompanying text.
1390 See supra notes 1359–60 and accompanying text. 
1391 See supra notes 653–739 and accompanying text.
1392 See supra notes 740–915 and accompanying text.
1393 See supra notes 657 (Moe) and 744 (Colville) and accompanying text.
1394 See supra notes 1281–83 and accompanying text.
1395 See supra note 1283 and accompanying text. 
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legal incidence is not always easily determinable, which undercuts its extolled 
benefits.1396 Moreover, like most formalisms, a state can usually re-draft a 
statute to shift the legal incidence from a tribe or an Indian to non-Indians. 
Oklahoma did exactly that after losing Chickasaw,1397 and Kansas did the 
same thing with respect to the tax at issue in Prairie Band.1398 So much for 
formalism.
In the case of a state sales tax on reservation purchases, the Indian Trader 
statutes would likely immunize the Indian consumer, notwithstanding that 
the legal incidence is imposed on a non-Indian vendor. This is the lesson 
of Warren Trading1399 and Central Machinery,1400 where the tax was imposed 
on the vendor but nonetheless struck down under the Indian Trader stat-
utes. Furthermore, unlike the unprincipled distinction drawn in Colville, the 
Indian Trader statutes do not distinguish between member and non-member 
Indians, only between Indians and non-Indians.1401 The Indian Trader stat-
utes should have protected the non-member Indians in Colville. 
The protection extended by the Indian Trader statutes is limited. Reflect-
ing the era in which they were drafted, such statutes are limited to the sale of 
property and do not cover services.1402 
At the other end of the continuum is Mescalero,1403 which dealt with purely 
off-reservation activities.1404 Indians or tribes conducting an off-reservation 
transaction seem to receive no special protection from state taxation (unless 
a statute provides otherwise). An Indian who buys and consumes a good 
off-reservation is subject to a state sales tax like anyone else. Indeed, the sales 
tax applies even if the Indian brings the good onto the reservation or has it 
shipped. And as Chickasaw indicates, an Indian living off-reservation is sub-
ject to a state income tax under the same rules that apply to non-Indians, even 
if the income is earned on a reservation. Finally, Prairie Band Potawatomi 
illustrates that a tax on the off-reservation activities of non-Indians receives 
no special consideration even if the economic incidence of that tax falls on 
reservation activities.1405 
As we move away from either of the polar points on the continuum, 
things get murkier, especially when a transaction occurs on a reservation and 
involves a non-Indian. A treaty, federal statute, or state enabling act can pre-
empt a state tax under these circumstances.1406 In a preemption analysis, the 
1396 See supra notes 1290–1358 and accompanying text.
1397 See supra note 1288.
1398 See supra note 1325 and accompanying text.
1399 See supra notes 425–68 and accompanying text.
1400 See supra notes 469–518 and accompanying text.
1401 See supra notes 725–31, 781–87, and accompanying text.
1402 See supra note 516 and accompanying text.
1403 See supra notes 592–652 and accompanying text.
1404 The case involved a ski resort on land adjacent to the reservation. Mescalero Apache 
Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 146 (1973).
1405 See supra notes 1290–1358.
1406 See, e.g., supra notes 916–1057 and accompanying text.
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Court’s mission should be to determine the scope of federal law by discerning 
the intent of Congress. The Court can take into account a state’s interests in 
inferring Congressional intent. Compelling state interests might be strong 
evidence that Congress did not intend to immunize a transaction from state 
taxation; an insignificant state interest might lead to an opposite conclusion. 
From the perspective of the Indians, a preemption analysis contains an 
undesirable tradeoff. The more Congress relaxes its control over the Indians 
to encourage their self-government and economic development, the less likely 
there will be a federal statute that can be used to preempt a state tax.
The Court has also applied a flexible preemption approach,1407 tantamount 
to a balancing test, to determine when a state tax is valid. In a balancing test, 
the Court is not trying to identify Congressional intent but instead is sub-
stituting its own evaluation of how the competing interests—a state on one 
side, and the federal government and the Indians on the other—should be 
accommodated. A preemption test is grounded on the Supremacy Clause; the 
Constitutional roots of a balancing test are less easily identified. 
One of the critical questions in a balancing test is the weight that should 
be placed on the economic effects of a state tax on the Indians. In Moe and 
Colville, the Court was willing to accept the near destruction of a tribe’s retail 
cigarette sector, apparently because the Indians were characterized as “mar-
keting an exemption.”1408 From the perspective of the Indians, however, they 
were simply engaged in using a tax incentive the way other jurisdictions rou-
tinely do. 
Colville created the concept of “value generated” to help draw a line between 
legitimate and illegitimate transactions.1409 The latter will obviously be given 
no weight in a balancing calculus. The “value generated” litmus test has gone 
undeveloped in the tax cases, however, and probably cannot bear the weight 
it is being asked to carry. 
Moe, Colville, and Cotton indicate the Court has a high tolerance for state 
taxes that severely impact activities on a reservation. If these cases can be 
gently shunted aside, perhaps by limiting Moe and Colville to tax avoidance 
situations, as well as failure of proof cases (which could also describe Cotton), 
the tribes would have much more latitude to argue about the economic con-
sequences of a state tax.
As part of its balancing inquiry, the Court will also take into account the 
nature and extent of the services provided by a state on the reservation. Because 
services come in so many sizes and shapes, and can benefit a reservation even 
if provided off-reservation, conceptually this inquiry is bankrupt.1410 None-
theless, it seems to have a certain emotional appeal for the Court. 
1407 Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 176 (1989).
1408 See supra notes 792–97, 811, 818–21, 1295–98, and accompanying text.
1409 See supra notes 789–802 and accompanying text.
1410 See, e.g., supra notes 462–63 and accompanying text. As just one example, what if a 
state spends money on its off-reservation schools teaching a special program on tolerance? Or 
a special program emphasizing the sovereignty, culture, and history of the Indians? Certainly 
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What should also carry no weight in a balancing inquiry is a state’s inter-
est in raising revenue. Almost every tax is intended to raise revenue. Placing 
too much emphasis on the state’s revenue interests will skew the balancing in 
every case. Moreover, the amount of tax at stake will typically be a de minimis 
percentage of the state’s budget. But for the Indians, the consequences of a 
state tax could be significant.
As part of the arguments about the economic effect of state taxes, litigants 
sometimes request that the Court grant relief for double taxation, that is, relief 
from the simultaneous imposition of a tribal and state tax on the same trans-
action. The Court has been relatively indifferent to issues of double taxation. 
In Colville, the Court accepted the imposition of tribal and state cigarette 
taxes without any kind of relief. Cotton accepted the same double taxation 
involving tribal and state severance taxes. The Tribe, however, was not a party 
in Cotton and was forced to make its case through amicus briefs. Cotton can 
thus be viewed as a failure of proof case. With better facts about the harmful 
effects of double taxation, the Court might be amenable to granting relief.
Only Justice Stewart in Colville seemed willing to relieve double taxa-
tion through a credit for a tribal tax.1411 Ironically, a credit under the facts of 
Colville would have accomplished little because the Indians would still not 
have had the advantage of selling cigarettes free of the Washington tax.1412 In 
Cotton, where a credit for the tribal severance tax would have been significant, 
Stewart was silent. (A credit would also be valuable in the context of sales 
taxes, property taxes, and income taxes.)
More fundamental is the question of whether double taxation should be 
viewed as even existing when a tribe is simultaneously the taxing sovereign 
and the vendor of the taxed good. In that situation, the label “tax” seems a 
formality, having no independent economic significance when applied to the 
goods the tribe sells. The double taxation is chimerical and reduces to a com-
plaint about the negative effects of the state tax.1413
* * * * *
Case-by-case adjudication by a court is a notoriously difficult way of 
imposing order and coherence on a body of doctrine. A court can only decide 
the cases before it, not a very useful way of dealing comprehensively with a 
field of law. That commonplace complaint is even more justified for the cases 
discussed in this Article. The Supreme Court has not distinguished itself, 
mischaracterizing the tax before it,1414 abusing precedent,1415 lapsing into ipse 
the benefits of those programs would inure to the Indians on a reservation, notwithstanding 
the services were provided at off-reservation schools.
1411 See supra notes 904–11 and accompanying text.
1412 See supra notes 814–19 accompanying text.
1413 See supra notes 890–903, 909–10, 1315–17, 1349–58 and accompanying text.
1414 See e.g., supra notes 544–47, 626 and accompanying text.
1415 See e.g., supra notes 366–67, 857–63 and accompanying text.
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dixit reasoning,1416 misreading or ignoring history,1417 and retreating into for-
malism.1418 
With a stroke of the pen, Congress could intervene and change the rules of 
the game, but has shown little inclination in doing so. Congress could formu-
late a tax code for state-Indian activities, but might not have the trust of the 
tribes, which would be a precondition. A group of academics, practitioners, 
states, tribes and those doing business with them, having both Indian law and 
state tax expertise, and having the trust of the stakeholders, might be capable 
of drafting a model code of taxation.1419 No groundswell for such a proposal 
exists today, but the undertaking itself might create that support.
1416 See e.g., supra notes 362–63, 369 and accompanying text.
1417 See supra notes 216, 223, 336; see also Joseph William Singer, Nine-Tenths of the Law: 
Title, Possession & Sacred Obligations, 38 Conn. L. Rev. 605 (2006).
1418 See supra notes 367, 893, 1281–89, 1329 and accompanying text.
1419 Precedent outside the Indian tax area exists demonstrating both the strengths and weak-
nesses of this approach. See, e.g., the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act, and 
the Streamlined Sales Tax Project. For a discussion, see Richard D. Pomp, State and Local 
Taxation, ch. 6, 9 (6th ed. 2009). See also Jeanne S. Whiteing, Tribal and State Taxation of 
Natural Resources on Indian Reservations, 7 Nat. Resources & Env’t L. Rev. 17, 59 (1993) ; 
http://www.ncai.org/Taxation.31.0.html.
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